经济学人 (The Economist)

这周世界 (The world this week)

政治 (Politics)

玩火自焚 (Dicing with danger)

日本首相岸田文雄访问华盛顿，与乔·拜登进行会谈并在国会演讲。美国和日本正在加强他们的军事联盟，包括更紧密的指挥结构合作。日本还将加入美国的登月任务，意味着一名日本宇航员将成为第一位在月球表面行走的非美国人。接着，美国、日本和菲律宾准备举行他们的首次三边首脑会议。菲律宾海岸警卫队最近在南中国海与中国船只发生冲突。

Japan’s prime minister, Kishida Fumio, visited Washington for talks with Joe Biden and to address Congress. America and Japan are strengthening their military alliance, which includes closer co-operation between their command structures. Japan is also to join an American mission to the Moon, meaning a Japanese astronaut will be the first non-American to walk on the lunar surface. America, Japan and the Philippines then prepared for their first trilateral summit. The Philippines’ coastguard has recently clashed with Chinese vessels in the South China Sea.

中国领导人习近平在北京会见了马英九。马英九曾担任台湾总统，从2008年到2016年期间，与中国建立了友好关系。他离任后，两岸关系变得日益紧张。中国正试图争取友好的台湾政治家，同时排斥独立主张的官员，如即将上任的总统赖清德。

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, met Ma Ying-jeou in Beijing. Mr Ma served as president of Taiwan from 2008 to 2016, establishing friendlier ties with China. The relationship grew colder after he left office. China is trying to court friendly Taiwanese politicians, while freezing out independence-minded officials, such as the incoming president, Lai Ching-te.

韩国自由派反对党在议会选举中赢得最多席位，击败了保守党总统尹锡悦。然而自由派未能获得超过半数的席位。

South Korea’s liberal opposition parties won the most seats in parliamentary elections, trouncing the conservative party of President Yoon Suk-yeol. The liberals fell short of a super-majority, however.

在乔·拜登与本雅明·内塔尼亚胡之间紧张的电话中，美国总统警告以色列总理必须做更多来保护平民并与哈马斯谈判停火。拜登表示，美国的政策将取决于以色列的“即时行动”。以色列表示将开放埃雷兹过境口，并允许来自以色列阿什杜德港的直接运输，为援助进入加沙开辟了重要新通道。随后几天，进入加沙携带人道主义援助的卡车数量大幅增加。拜登后来表示，如果伊朗袭击以色列，他将提供“钢铁般的”支持。

In a tense phone call between Joe Biden and Binyamin Netanyahu the American president warned the Israeli prime minister that Israel must do more to protect civilians and negotiate a ceasefire with Hamas. America’s policy, Mr Biden said, would be determined by Israel’s “immediate action”. Israel said it would open the Erez crossing and allow in direct shipments from Ashdod, an Israeli port, opening major new conduits for aid into Gaza. The following days saw a big increase in the number of trucks entering Gaza with humanitarian aid. Mr Biden later offered “ironclad” support to Israel if Iran attacks it.

以色列从汉尤尼斯撤出地面部队，只留下一个旅驻扎在加沙。剩余的部队将试图阻止巴勒斯坦人离开现在几乎有加沙2.2百万人口90%的南部，赶回北部。

Israel withdrew its ground troops from Khan Younis, leaving just one brigade deployed in Gaza. The remaining troops will try to prevent Palestinians from leaving the south, now home to almost 90% of Gaza’s 2.2m people, and returning to the north.

哈马斯领袖，驻卡塔尔的哈马斯领导人伊斯梅尔·哈尼亚表示，他的三个儿子在以色列的袭击中丧生。以色列表示这三名男子是哈马斯军事翼的成员。

Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, who is based in Qatar, said three of his sons were killed in Israeli strikes. Israel said that the three men were members of Hamas’s military wing.

南非前总统雅各布·祖马赢得了一场法庭诉讼，允许他在5月29日的大选中竞选。祖马因藐视法庭罪被禁止参选，并处以15个月监禁。他的新政党，以其首字母简称MK，目前在全国投票中获得了超过10%的支持率。

Jacob Zuma, a disgraced former president of South Africa, won a court case allowing him to run for office in a general election on May 29th. Mr Zuma had been barred by electoral officials because of a conviction for contempt of court and prison sentence of 15 months. His new party, known by its initials, MK, is polling above 10% of the national vote.

在莫桑比克外一艘超载的渡轮翻沉，造成至少96人死亡，这些人当时正试图逃离霍乱疫情。另外，在吉布提海域外，至少38名移民（包括儿童）在一次海难中丧生。

An overcrowded ferry capsized off Mozambique, killing at least 96 people who had been trying to flee an outbreak of cholera. Separately, at least 38 migrants, including children, died in a shipwreck off the coast of Djibouti.

津巴布韦引入了一种以黄金支持的新货币，以遏制通胀，此举是在津巴布韦元价值暴跌后推出的。津巴布韦元在2019年重新推出，此前曾在一次通货膨胀危机中被废除。津巴布韦表示，新货币将以黄金和贵金属储备作为支撑。

Zimbabwe introduced a new gold-backed currency in a bid to contain inflation after a collapse in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar, which was only reintroduced in 2019 after being scrapped during an earlier bout of hyperinflation. It said the new currency would be backed by reserves of gold and precious metals.

气候变化活动家在欧洲人权法院赢得了他们有史以来的第一宗案件。法院裁定瑞士未能保护其公民权利，在一起由一群70多岁妇女提起的案件中，她们认为老年人特别容易受到日益加剧的热浪影响。法官确立了一项由国家保护公民免受气候变化对生活、健康、幸福和生活质量的严重不利影响的权利。欧洲人权法院的管辖范围涵盖46个国家。

Climate-change activists won their first-ever case in the European Court of Human Rights. The court ruled that Switzerland had failed to protect its citizens’ rights in a case brought by a group of women in their 70s, who argued that old people were particularly vulnerable to intensifying heatwaves. The judges established a right to protection by the state “from the serious adverse effects of climate change on lives, health, well-being and quality of life”. Forty-six countries are covered by the ECHR’s jurisdiction.

俄罗斯和乌克兰互相指责在扎波利日核电站发生无人机袭击，该核电站位于乌克兰但由俄罗斯部队控制。这是自2022年11月以来该设施首次受到直接袭击。国际原子能机构表示，这类袭击增加了核事故的风险，并召开了紧急会议。

Russia and Ukraine blamed each other for drone strikes on the Zaporizhia nuclear plant, which is in Ukraine but controlled by Russian forces. It was the first time the facility had been attacked directly since November 2022. The International Atomic Energy Agency said such attacks increased the risk of a nuclear accident and called an emergency meeting.

俄罗斯无人机对乌克兰第二大城市哈尔科夫发动袭击，造成七人死亡。俄罗斯最近几个月加大了对该城市的攻击力度，乌克兰官员认为这可能是对新一轮俄罗斯入侵的前兆。哈尔科夫距离俄罗斯仅30公里（19英里）。

Seven people were killed in a Russian drone strike on Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-most-populous city. Russia has stepped up its attacks on the city in recent months, which Ukrainian officials think may be a prelude to a new Russian incursion. Kharkiv lies just 30km (19 miles) from Russia.

欧盟首席外交官何塞普·博雷尔警告称，俄罗斯的野心扩展至乌克兰之外，意味着“在欧洲发生高强度、常规战争不再是幻想”。他形容局势为“生死攸关”，并表示欧洲可能发现无法像自冷战以来那样依靠美国来保卫自己。

The European Union’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, warned that Russia’s ambitions to expand its reach outside Ukraine meant that “a high-intensity, conventional war in Europe is no longer fantasy”. He described the situation as “existential”, and said Europe may find it cannot count on America to defend it for the first time since the cold war.

俄罗斯法院加重了对亚历克谢·纳瓦尔尼前助手的监禁判决，这位在二月份去世于北极惩教殖民地的反对派领袖。Liliya Chanysheva曾在巴什科尔托斯坦地区负责纳瓦尼先生的办公室，并在其组织被取缔后被判入狱七年半。在一个国家检察官要求加重判决之后，她的刑期现已延长至九年半。

A court in Russia increased the prison sentence handed down to a former aide to Alexei Navalny, the opposition leader who died in an Arctic penal colony in February. Liliya Chanysheva ran Mr Navalny’s office in the Bashkortostan region and had been imprisoned for seven and a half years when his organisation was outlawed. Her sentence has now been increased to nine and a half years after a state prosecutor asked for it to be raised.

英国、比利时、丹麦、德国、荷兰和挪威签署了一项协定，合作保护北海的水下管道及其他基础设施。2022年对北溪管道的破坏以及2023年波罗的海某管道的损坏仍未得到解释。一些人怀疑涉事方是俄罗斯；而另一些人则指向乌克兰特工。

Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway signed a pact to co-operate on protecting underwater pipelines and other infrastructure in the North Sea. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 and damage to a pipeline in the Baltic Sea in 2023 are still unexplained. Some suspect Russian involvement; others have fingered Ukrainian agents.

冰岛将迎来新的总理。保守独立党领导人Bjarni Benediktsson被执政联盟选为政府领导人，取代了左翼绿党领袖Katrin Jakobsdottir，后者辞职竞选基本上是象征性职位的总统。

Iceland is to have a new prime minister. Bjarni Benediktsson, who leads the conservative Independence Party, was chosen by the ruling coalition to lead the government after Katrin Jakobsdottir, of the Left-Green Movement, resigned to run for the mostly ceremonial post of president.

英国发布了一份关于儿童跨性别健康护理的尖锐报告。卡斯审查建议从为转变身份的儿童提供医疗干预模式转变为基于治疗的模式。它还批评了有毒的性别辩论对于阻碍公开讨论的影响。

A scathing report into transgender health care for children was published in Britain. The Cass Review recommended moving away from a model of medical intervention for trans-identifying children to one based on therapy. It also criticised the “toxicity” of the debate on gender for inhibiting open discussion.

墨西哥暂停了与厄瓜多尔的外交关系，原因是厄瓜多尔警方强行进入基多的墨西哥大使馆逮捕了一名前厄瓜多尔副总统。Jorge Glas去年十二月面临腐败指控而在大使馆寻求庇护（他已经因类似指控而入狱）。他声称自己是清白的。墨西哥表示已向他提供庇护。

Mexico suspended diplomatic relations with Ecuador, after Ecuadorean police stormed the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest a former Ecuadorean vice-president. Jorge Glas took refuge in the embassy last December after he faced an arrest warrant for corruption (he has already served prison time on similar charges). He says he’s innocent. Mexico said it had granted him asylum.

美国首对因子女实施的一起大规模枪击事件而被判刑的父母被判处十到十五年监禁。他们的15岁男孩在2021年在底特律郊区的学校枪杀了四名同学。今年早些时候，这对父母在各自的审判中被裁定无意杀人罪成立。而他们的儿子则被判终身监禁。

The first parents in America to be held criminally responsible for a mass shooting carried out by their child were sentenced to between ten and 15 years in prison. Their 15-year-old boy shot dead four fellow pupils at his school in suburban Detroit in 2021. The parents were found guilty in separate trials earlier this year of involuntary manslaughter. Their son was sentenced to life in prison.

亚利桑那州最高法院禁止该州进行堕胎，并恢复了1864年的一项法律来为其裁决辩护。这一命令被暂缓执行两周，但这一决定已经引起了政治上的连锁反应。亚利桑那州是今年十一月总统选举的关键摇摆州之一。

Arizona’s Supreme Court banned abortion in the state, reviving a law from 1864 to justify its ruling. The order was put on hold for two weeks, but the decision has already had political reverberations. Arizona is one of the swing states on which the presidential election in November hinges.

一个男子通过专用眼镜观看克利夫兰，俄亥俄州的日全食

数千万加拿大、美国和墨西哥的人们参与观看了一次日食。一些地区可看到完全日食的包括安大略省和魁北克省南部、纽约州北部、印第安纳州、得克萨斯州以及锡那罗亚州和杜兰戈州。这一事件吸引了大批观日食游客，他们预订了在完全日食区内92%的Airbnb房源。

Tens of millions of people in Canada, the United States and Mexico turned out to watch a solar eclipse. Some of the regions where a total eclipse was viewable included parts of southern Ontario and Quebec, upstate New York, Indiana and Texas and Sinaloa and Durango. The event drew hordes of eclipse-tourists, who booked 92% of Airbnb listings within the zone of totality.

回到目录

本周世界 (The world this week)

商业 (Business)

某种程度上的胜利 (A victory, of sorts)

拜登政府表示将向台积电提供66亿美元的直接资金，以支持其在亚利桑那州设施制造全球最先进的半导体。总部位于台湾的台积电是全球最大的代工芯片制造商，在完成亚利桑那州的新工厂后，将在凤凰城拥有三个工厂。该公司将其投资额增加到650亿美元，创下在美国进行“绿地”项目即从零开始建设的最大外国直接投资记录。台积电为苹果和英伟达提供芯片，用于智能手机和人工智能的应用。

英特尔推出了用于人工智能的“高迪3”芯片，声称比英伟达的H100速度更快、能效更高。它在两个开源大型语言模型Llama上进行了测试，这个模型由Meta公司管理，以及Falcon，这是一个由阿布扎比支持的项目。英特尔还宣布了一个计划，与其他科技公司共同创建一个企业人工智能的开放平台，将“加速部署”安全生成式人工智能系统。

The Biden administration said it would provide $6.6bn in direct funding to TSMC to support its facilities in Arizona for manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductors. TSMC, based in Taiwan and the world’s largest contract chipmaker, will have three sites in Phoenix when it completes a new factory there. It is increasing its investment to $65bn, the largest-ever foreign direct investment in a “greenfield” project, meaning built from scratch, in America. TSMC supplies chips to Apple and Nvidia for use in smartphones and artificial intelligence.

迪士尼将打击共享其流媒体服务密码的用户。迪士尼首席执行官鲍勃·艾格表示，这一打击将从6月开始逐步在不同国家推出。 Netflix去年实施了类似政策，此后报告称其订户数量激增。

Intel unveiled its Gaudi 3 chip for AI, which it claims is faster and more power-efficient than Nvidia’s H100. It tested the chip on two open-source large language models: Llama, which is run by Meta, and Falcon, a project backed by Abu Dhabi. Intel also announced a plan to create, with other tech companies, an open platform for enterprise AI that will “accelerate deployment” of secure generative AI systems.

波音的安全记录再次引起关注。波音公司的一名工程师声称，在制造787和777型飞机时存在质量和安全方面的投机行为，导致潜在结构缺陷。波音将这些指称描述为“不准确”。美国联邦航空管理局调查了又一起涉及波音飞机的事件，这次是一架737-800在丹佛起飞时发生引擎罩脱落。与此同时，阿拉斯加航空公司因为一架飞机的引擎罩在一月脱落留下一个巨大缺口，收到了波音提供的1.6亿美元赔偿金。该航空公司表示预计还将有进一步赔付。

Disney is to crack down on users who share passwords to its streaming services. Bob Iger, Disney’s chief executive, said the crackdown would be gradually rolled out to different countries starting in June. Netflix implemented a similar policy last year, and it has since reported a surge in subscribers.

Tesco，英国最大的超市连锁店，报告称截至2月24日的12个月税前利润大幅增长至23亿英镑（29亿美元）。它预计今年的利润将更高，因为通货膨胀压力“明显减轻”。与此同时，备受困扰的百货商店和超市连锁店约翰·刘易斯任命了之前在Tesco担任高级执行官的杰森·塔里为新主席。原主席达姆·沙朗·怀特担任该职务五年，是历史上任期最短的。

Boeing’s safety record was in the spotlight again. An engineer at Boeing alleged that the company took shortcuts on quality and safety when it manufactured 787 and 777 jets, leaving them with potential structural flaws. Boeing described the claims as “inaccurate”. And the Federal Aviation Administration investigated yet another incident involving a Boeing plane, this time an engine panel that fell off a 737-800 during take-off from Denver. Meanwhile, Alaska Air received $160m in compensation from Boeing for the panel that fell off one of its aircraft in January, leaving a gaping hole in the plane. The airline said it expects further payments.

欧盟一般法院裁定，对俄罗斯投资者米哈伊尔·弗里德曼和他的商业伙伴彼得·阿文于2022年2月至2023年3月实施的制裁必须被撤销。法院发现，欧盟未能足够详细地证实弗里德曼和阿文与弗拉基米尔·普京政权有关的理由，因为俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。弗里德曼是俄罗斯最杰出的商人之一。但这两位仍然受到判决未涵盖的制裁影响。

Tesco, Britain’s biggest supermarket chain, reported a big rise in pre-tax profit to £2.3bn ($2.9bn) for the 12 months ending February 24th. It expects higher profits this year, as inflationary pressures have “lessened substantially”. Meanwhile, John Lewis, a troubled department-store and supermarket chain, appointed Jason Tarry, a former senior executive at Tesco, as its new chair. Dame Sharon White held the position for five years, the shortest-ever tenure in the job.

通货膨胀率再次上升，从2月的3.2%上升到3月的3.5%，美国雇主在3月创造了30.3万个就业岗位，是去年5月以来的最高数字，表明经济依然炙手可热。股市下跌，政府债券收益率上升，以应对这两组数据。投资者已经缩小了对美联储今年会如何以及何时降息的赌注，尽管其中一些赌注，多达七次降息，是极其乐观的。

The EU’s General Court ruled that sanctions imposed on Mikhail Fridman, a Russian investor, and Petr Aven, his business partner, between February 2022 and March 2023 must be annulled. The court found that the EU had not “sufficiently substantiated” its reasons for linking Messrs Fridman and Aven to Vladimir Putin’s regime after Russia invaded Ukraine. Mr Fridman is one of Russia’s most prominent businessmen. Both men are still subject to sanctions not covered by the judgment.

欧洲央行维持利率不变，将存款利率保持在4%，但暗示将在6月的下次会议上提高利率。许多投资者现在认为欧洲央行在美联储之前可能会降息。

Two bits of economic data changed market calculations about the Federal Reserve’s path towards interest-rate cuts. America’s annual inflation rate rose again, to 3.5% in March from 3.2% in February. And American employers created 303,000 jobs in March, the highest number since last May, suggesting that the economy remains red-hot. Stockmarkets sagged and the yield on government bonds jumped in response to both sets of data. Investors have narrowed their bets on when and how the Fed will cut this year, though some of those bets, of up to seven cuts, were wildly optimistic.

惠誉将中国主权信用评级展望从稳定降为负面，但保留了该国的A+评级（穆迪在去年12月采取了类似行动）。惠誉预测，中国中央和地方政府债务今年将占GDP的61.3%。2019年，这一比例为GDP的38.5%。

The European Central Bank left interest rates on hold, keeping the deposit facility at 4%, but indicated that it would raise rates at its next meeting in June. Many investors now think the ECB could cut rates before the Fed does.

汇丰银行决定出售其在阿根廷的业务，并将在第一季度业绩中有约10亿美元的税前费用与此交易相关。该银行表示，在交易完成时还需要承认与比索贬值有关的49亿美元减值损失，尽管这不会影响其财务实力或有形净资产值。为了将焦点集中在亚洲，汇丰银行一直在逐步撤出亚洲以外的市场。

Fitch reduced its outlook for China’s sovereign credit-rating from stable to negative, but retained the country’s A+ rating (Moody’s took similar action in December). Fitch forecasts that China’s central- and local-government debt will rise to 61.3% of GDP this year. In 2019 it was 38.5% of GDP.

“埃隆·马斯克在一次采访中预测，到明年年底，我们将会拥有比任何一个人类更聪明的人工智能。”马斯克先生的预言前提是芯片和电力的持续供应。同时，当他呼吁一名最高法院法官辞职，他在巴西引发了一场政治风波，因为他怀疑这名法官下令封锁他的即时通讯服务X上的某些右翼账户时，马斯克还有更多尘世事务需要考虑。

HSBC decided to sell its business in Argentina, and will book a $1bn pre-tax charge in its first-quarter earnings related to the sale. The bank said it would also have to acknowledge $4.9bn in losses on its books linked to the falling value of the peso when the deal closes, though this would neither affect its financial strength nor its tangible net asset value. HSBC has been gradually pulling back from markets outside Asia in order to focus on its business there.

“We’ll have AI that is smarter than any one human probably around the end of next year,” predicted Elon Musk in an interview. Mr Musk’s prophesy is conditioned on the continuing supply of chips and electricity. Meanwhile, Mr Musk had more earthly matters to consider when he caused a huge political row in Brazil by calling for the resignation of a Supreme Court judge whom he suspects of ordering a block on certain right-wing accounts on his messaging service, X.

回到目录

本周世界 (The world this week)

KAL的漫画 (KAL’s cartoon)

2024年4月13日本周世界 (The world this week April 13th 2024)

深入探讨本周漫画的主题:

Dig deeper into the subject of this week’s cartoon:

克里姆林宫希望让乌克兰的第二大城市无法居住

The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unliveable Charlemagne: If Ukraine loses Mike Johnson may have to choose between Ukraine aid and his job

查理曼：如果乌克兰失败

迈克·约翰逊可能不得不在乌克兰援助和他的工作之间做选择

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本周世界 | 经济学人 (The world this week | The Economist)

本周封面 (This week’s covers)

我们的视角 (How we saw the world)

这周我们在大部分地区考虑了全球变暖对房屋这一全球最大的资产类别的影响。全球价值约十分之一的住宅物业处于威胁之下。房主们面临着25万亿美元的清算。谁最终会为此买单？

In most of the world this week we consider the effects of global warming on housing, the world’s biggest asset class. About one-tenth of the world’s residential property by value is under threat. Homeowners face a $25trn reckoning. Who will end up footing the bill?

Leading：下一个住房灾难简报：房主面临25万亿美元的气候变化账单

Leader: The next housing disasterBriefing: Homeowners face a $25trn bill from climate change

在英国，我们审视了辅助死亡。尽管仍颇具争议，但已不再是边缘问题。公众已经支持，而政客们正在迎头赶上。英国可能正处于其下一个重大社会改革的边缘。

In Britain, we look at assisted dying. Though still controversial, it is no longer a fringe issue. The public is already supportive and politicians are catching up. Britain may be on the verge of its next big social reform.

Leading：辅助死亡的是非曲直更多阅读：英国正朝着辅助死亡迈进

Leader: The rights and wrongs of assisted dyingFurther reading: Britain is moving towards assisted dying

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领导者 | 结束的感觉 (Leaders | The sense of an ending)

安乐死的是非曲直 (The rights and wrongs of assisted dying)

在过去几十年里，英国已经成为了一个更加自由的国家。根据世界价值观调查，在1981年，只有12%的英国人认为同性恋是可以被接受的；而到了2022年，这个数字已经上升到了66%。与此同时，支持离婚的人口比例也从18%上升到了64%。公众引领，政治人士紧随其后：同性婚姻在2013年合法化；无过错离婚在2022年成为了可能。这种模式很可能会在协助死亡方面再次重演。

Britain has become a much more liberal country in recent decades. In 1981 only 12% of Britons thought that homosexuality was justifiable, according to the World Values Survey; in 2022 the figure was 66%. Over the same period the proportion of people who were accepting of divorce rose from 18% to 64%. Where the public has led, politicians have followed: same-sex marriages were legalised in 2013; no-fault divorces became possible in 2022. That pattern may well be about to repeat itself with assisted dying.

超过三分之二的英国人支持修改法律，以允许某人协助终末疾病患者自杀。协助死亡在不久的将来很有可能会通过立法。曼岛、泽西岛以及苏格兰已经有相关法案在进行中。工党领袖基尔·斯塔默爵士表示同情，并承诺在下次大选中（如果他的党派胜出）对议员进行自由表决。

Over two-thirds of Britons support changing the law to let someone help in the suicide of a person with a terminal illness. Assisted dying has a good chance of getting on the statute book in the near future. Bills are already in progress on the Isle of Man, in Jersey and in Scotland. Sir Keir Starmer, the Labour leader, is sympathetic and has promised a free vote among MPs if his party wins the next general election.

如果《经济学人》杂志有投票权，那肯定会毫不含糊地赞成。协助死亡的理由，本质上来说是关乎个人自由的。英国人有权嫁给自己想要的人。他们有权自由漫步。甚至还有些人依据古老的法律，拥有在伦敦桥上赶羊的权利。他们应该有权选择自己死亡的方式和时间。更复杂的问题是，协助死亡制度应该以何种形式出现。这不仅是为了确保防止滥用，尽管它必须做到这一点。也是为了确保法律不过于严格。

If The Economist had a vote, it would be unequivocally in favour. The case for assisted dying is, at its core, one of individual freedom. Britons have the right to marry whom they want. They have the right to roam. Through an obscure medieval law, some even have the right to drive sheep across London Bridge. They should have the right to choose the manner and timing of their death. The more complex question is what form an assisted-dying regime should take. That is not just to ensure safeguards against abuses, though it must undoubtedly do that. It is also to make sure that the law is not drawn too tightly.

英国在很多方面对这个问题反应较迟（像爱尔兰和法国一样也是如此；一个法案上周已提交给了法国内阁）。比利时、荷兰、俄勒冈和瑞士几十年前就有了协助死亡的法律。自2015年我们支持合法化以来，已经有17个司法管辖区通过了法律。尽管反对协助死亡的人持有坚定的信念，并提出合理的担忧，但这些许多司法管辖区的实际经验加强了支持协助死亡的论点。

Britain is in many ways late to the issue (as are countries like Ireland and France; a bill was presented to the French cabinet this week). Belgium, the Netherlands, Oregon and Switzerland have had assisted-dying laws for decades. Seventeen jurisdictions have passed laws since we argued in favour of legalisation in 2015. Although opponents of assisted dying have deeply held beliefs, and raise legitimate concerns, the actual experience of these many jurisdictions strengthens the arguments in its favour.

担心被迫的问题。批评者认为，任何制度都无法完全保护易受攻击的人免受亲属谋财害命，或者国家试图削减医疗成本。然而证据表明，被迫的案例极其罕见。国家应尽最大努力帮助人们过上好生活，无论是通过社会支持还是姑息治疗，但如果做不到，那些真正希望离开的人就不应该被迫忍受。在协助死亡仍然非法的地方，只有有钱人才有权利自行其是──平均每周有一名英国人前往瑞士结束自己的生命。假设易受攻击患者的权利正在凌驾于那些真正处于痛苦中的人的权利之上。

Take concerns about coercion. Critics argue that no regime could ever fully protect the vulnerable from relatives looking to claim an inheritance, or indeed from a state seeking to cut health-care costs. Yet the evidence suggests that cases of coercion are extremely rare. The state should do its best to help people live well, whether through social support or palliative care, but if it cannot, those who truly wish to die should not be obliged to suffer. In places where an assisted death remains illegal, only those with money have the option to take matters into their own hands—on average one Briton a week travels to Switzerland to end their life there. The rights of hypothetically vulnerable patients are taking precedence over the rights of those who are actually in anguish.

一些批评者说协助死亡是一个“滑坡”。如果这是你反对的根本原因，那你基本上是在承认确实存在某些情况下帮助某人去世是正确的──问题在于范围。无论如何，经验表明并不存在这样的滑坡。尽管比利时和荷兰的协助死亡资格标准已经扩大，但在最初法律局限于晚期成年人的司法管辖区中并未这样做。加拿大延迟将协助死亡法律扩展到精神病患者的决定表明“暂停”是有可能的。的确，寻求协助死亡的人数正在增加：他们现在在加拿大占所有死亡人数的4%，在荷兰占5%。然而，如果这些更高的数字是人们想要利用新自由的表达，这是非常有可能的，这是通过立法，而不是阻止它们的原因。

Some critics say that assisted dying is a “slippery slope”. If this is the fundamental reason for your opposition, you are pretty much conceding the principle that there are indeed instances when it would be right to help someone die—it’s the scope that is the problem. In any case experience suggests that no such slope exists. Although eligibility criteria for an assisted death have expanded in Belgium and the Netherlands, they have never done so in jurisdictions whose initial laws were restricted to terminally ill adults. Canada’s decision to postpone the extension of assisted-dying laws to the mentally ill until 2027 shows that it is possible to press “pause”. True, the numbers of people seeking assisted deaths is increasing: they now make up 4% of all deaths in Canada and 5% in the Netherlands. Yet if those higher figures are an expression of people’s desire to make use of a new freedom, as is overwhelmingly likely, they are a reason to pass laws, not to block them.

无论出于信念还是谨慎，政治家往往会根据俄勒冈的模式制定法律，该模式要求一个人必须患有不到六个月寿命的绝症才有资格接受协助死亡。这正是爱尔兰所采取的方式。法国的协助死亡法案也仅限于绝症患者，尽管由法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙举行的公民议会支持了承受不可忍受的疾病的患者扩大法律的立场。如果以往的法案是一个参考，那么议员们最终将最可能辩论的是俄勒冈的模板。这太过严格。

Whether out of conviction or caution, politicians tend to respond to such concerns by writing laws that are based on Oregon’s model, which requires a person to be terminally ill with less than six months to live to be eligible for an assisted death. This is the approach being followed in Ireland. France’s assisted-dying bill is also limited to the terminally ill, even though a citizens’ assembly convened by President Emmanuel Macron supported a broader law for those suffering unbearably from an incurable illness. The Oregon template is also likely to be the one MPs in Westminster will eventually end up debating, if previous bills are a guide. It is too restrictive.

严格的时间限制意味着人们在接受致命药物之前经常会死去。许多人受尽折磨，患的疾病并非绝症。加拿大的模式允许个人自行判断他们的痛苦是否难以忍受，这更加公平。在那里，一个人必须患有严重且不可治愈的疾病，并且必须等待90天来反思他们的决定。认为这种更广泛的范围贬低了残疾人生命的论点是善意的，但有些师长的。四分之三的加拿大残疾人支持现行法律。

Strict time constraints mean that people often die before they can receive the lethal medication. And many people suffer terribly with a disease that is not terminal. Canada’s model, which allows someone to determine for themselves whether their suffering is unbearable, is fairer. A person there must be suffering from a serious and incurable medical condition and must wait 90 days to reflect on their decision. Arguments that this broader scope devalues disabled lives are well-meaning but paternalistic. Three-quarters of Canadians with disabilities support the existing law.

最棘手的问题出现在很难确定人们是否头脑清醒时。出于这个原因，加拿大决定推迟将辅助死亡法律延伸到患有精神健康障碍的人是明智的。精神痛苦与身体痛苦一样真实，然而社会对其理解仍然不足。医生必须能够区分深思熟虑、理性的死亡意愿与自杀冲动，这是许多临床医生感到无法做出的区别。

The thorniest issues arise when it is hard to determine whether people are of sound mind. Canada’s decision to postpone the extension of assisted-dying laws to people with mental-health disorders is sensible for this reason. Mental suffering is as real as physical suffering, yet society’s understanding of it is still inadequate. Doctors must be able to tell between a considered, rational wish to die and a suicidal impulse, a distinction many clinicians feel unable to make.

认知障碍，已经影响到65岁以上英国人中的十一分之一，也是一个困难的领域。对于早期患有痴呆症的人来说，他们可以提前要求辅助死亡，但当时机到来时，他们的意愿应该优先考虑。当存在疑虑时，最好的经验法则是不要继续进行。

Dementia, which already afflicts one in 11 Britons over 65, is also a difficult area. It is possible for someone in the early stages of dementia to make a request in advance for an assisted death, but their wishes when the time comes should prevail.When in doubt, the best rule of thumb is not to proceed.

没有保证英国政治家们会支持辅助死亡。但当他们辩论这个问题时，他们不应默认将其定义为基本人权的最狭隘范畴。所有头脑清醒、正忍受难以忍受的痛苦且没有康复的人都应该能够选择他们死亡的方式。 ■

There is no guarantee that politicians in Britain will vote in favour of assisted dying. But when they do debate the issue, they should not default to the narrowest definition of what is a basic human right. All adults of sound mind who are enduring unbearable suffering with no prospect of recovery should be able to choose the way they die. ■

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领导者 | 一场25万亿美元的打击 (Leaders | A $25trn hit)

全球变暖正在接近您的家园 (Global warming is coming for your home)

谁将为损失买单？ (Who will pay for the damage?)

当想到气候变化容易受到威胁的地方时，你可能会想到孟加拉国的稻田或太平洋的低洼岛屿。但另一个更令人惊讶的答案应该是你自己的房子。世界上大约十分之一的住宅资产受到全球变暖的威胁—包括许多远离海岸**的房屋。从龙卷风袭击美国中西部郊区到足球大小的冰雹砸碎意大利别墅的屋顶，由温室气体排放引起的极端天气正在动摇世界最重要资产阶级的基础。

Think about the places vulnerable to climate change, and you might picture rice paddies in Bangladesh or low-lying islands in the Pacific. But another, more surprising answer ought to be your own house. About a tenth of the world’s residential property by value is under threat from global warming—including many houses that are nowhere near the coast. From tornadoes battering midwestern American suburbs to tennis-ball-size hailstones smashing the roofs of Italian villas, the severe weather brought about by greenhouse-gas emissions is shaking the foundations of the world’s most important asset class.

潜在的成本来自于旨在减少房屋排放以及气候相关损害的政策。这些成本是巨大的。据估计，到2050年，气候变化及其bekämpfung可能会消除世界住房价值的9%—这相当于25万亿美元，几乎等于美国年度GDP。这是悬挂在人们生活和全球金融体系头上的巨额账单。而且看起来注定要引发一场关于谁应该买单的巨大争论。

The potential costs stem from policies designed to reduce the emissions of houses as well as from climate-related damage. They are enormous. By one estimate, climate change and the fight against it could wipe out 9% of the value of the world’s housing by 2050—which amounts to $25trn, not much less than America’s annual gDP. It is a huge bill hanging over people’s lives and the global financial system. And it looks destined to trigger an almighty fight over who should pay up.

房主是其中一种可能性。但是，如果你查看当今的房地产市场，似乎他们并没有承担成本。房屋价格几乎没有显示出对气候风险的调整迹象。在迈阿密，因为人们对海平面上升感到担忧，房价在这十年内上涨了四分之四，远远高于美国平均水平。而且，由于气候变化的影响仍不确定，许多房主在购买房屋时可能并不知道他们承担了多大的风险。

Homeowners are one candidate. But if you look at property markets today, they do not seem to be bearing the costs. House prices show little sign of adjusting to climate risk. In Miami, the subject of much worrying about rising sea levels, they have increased by four-fifths this decade, much more than the American average. Moreover, because the impact of climate change is still uncertain, many owners may not have known how much of a risk they were taking when they bought their homes.

然而，如果由纳税人代替承担成本，他们将会纵容那些富有的房主，削弱适应这一逼近威胁的有益激励。政府要分担这些成本会很困难，因为他们知道选民非常关心自己房屋的价值。该账单包括三个部分：修理费、投资保护和修改房屋以减少气候变化。

Yet if taxpayers cough up instead, they will bail out well-heeled owners and blunt helpful incentives to adapt to the looming threat. Apportioning the costs will be hard for governments, not least because they know voters care so much about the value of their homes. The bill has three parts: paying for repairs, investing in protection and modifying houses to limit climate change.

通常，保险公司会在风暴摧毁屋顶或火灾摧毁财产后承担修理费用。随着气候恶化和自然灾害变得更加频繁，住宅保险因此变得更昂贵。在某些地方，保险费变得如此昂贵，以至于可能导致房价下跌；一些专家警告称有约三分之一的美国家庭可能受到“气候保险泡沫”的影响。政府必须容忍这给房主带来的损失，或者自行承担风险，就像已经在易发山火的加利福尼亚州和易受飓风影响的佛罗里达州某些地区发生的情况一样。这两个州的国家支持“最后一道防线”的保险人的总暴露从2017年的1600亿美元激增至6330亿美元。当地政客希望把风险转移到联邦政府，后者实际上今天主导着洪水保险。

Insurers usually bear the costs of repairs after a storm destroys a roof or a fire guts a property. As the climate worsens and natural disasters become more frequent, home insurance is therefore getting more expensive. In places, it could become so dear as to cause house prices to fall; some experts warn of a “climate-insurance bubble” affecting a third of American homes. Governments must either tolerate the losses that imposes on homeowners or underwrite the risks themselves, as already happens in parts of wildfire-prone California and hurricane-prone Florida. The combined exposure of state-backed “insurers of last resort” in these two states has exploded from $160bn in 2017 to $633bn. Local politicians want to pass on the risk to the federal government, which in effect runs flood insurance today.

可以通过投资于房产本身或基础设施来防止物理损害。保持房屋宜居可能需要空调。即使印度正在经历日益恶化的热浪，但很少有印度房屋装有空调。荷兰有一套堤坝、沟渠和泵站的系统使整个国家保持干燥；东京有防洪堤防止洪水。筹集这种投资是第二个挑战。那些不知道自己面临风险的房主是否应该为比如家中下沉的混凝土基础付费？或者保护他们免受这些意外且成本分布不均的费用？人口稠密的沿海城市最需要防洪保护，而这些城市往往是其国家经济和社会的明珠—想想伦敦、纽约或上海。

Physical damage might be forestalled by investing in protection in properties themselves or in infrastructure. Keeping houses habitable may call for air conditioning. Few Indian homes have it, even though the country is suffering worsening heatwaves. In the Netherlands a system of dykes, ditches and pumps keeps the country dry; Tokyo has barriers to hold back floodwaters. Funding this investment is the second challenge. Should homeowners who had no idea they were at risk have to pay for, say, concrete underpinning for a subsiding house? Or is it right to protect them from such unexpected, and unevenly distributed, costs? Densely populated coastal cities, which are most in need of protection from floods, are often the crown jewels of their countries’ economies and societies—just think of London, New York or Shanghai.

最后一个问题是如何支付用于防止进一步气候变化的国内改建费用。房屋占全球与能源相关排放的18％。许多房屋可能需要热泵，最好配备地暖系统或更大的暖气片，以及厚实的隔热材料。然而，翻新房屋是昂贵的。要求房主买单可能会导致强烈抵制；去年，德国执政联盟试图禁止燃气锅炉，但在选民反对费用后改变了立场。意大利采用了另一种方法，提供异常慷慨且设计不当的补贴给进行房屋翻修的家庭。意大利在其“超级优惠”计划上花费了惊人的2190亿欧元（2380亿美元，相当于GDP的10%）。

The last question is how to pay for domestic modifications that prevent further climate change. Houses account for 18% of global energy-related emissions. Many are likely to need heat pumps, which work best with underfloor heating or bigger radiators, and thick insulation. Unfortunately, retrofitting homes is expensive. Asking homeowners to pay up can lead to a backlash; last year Germany’s ruling coalition tried to ban gas boilers, only to change course when voters objected to the costs. Italy followed an alternative approach, by offering extraordinarily generous, and badly designed, handouts to households who renovate. It has spent a staggering €219bn ($238bn, or 10% of its GDp) on its “superbonus” scheme.

气候变化的全部影响仍有一段时间才会完全显现出来。但决策者越早解决这些问题，越好。证据表明，房价只有在灾难发生后才会对这些风险做出反应，而这时预防性投资已经为时已晚。因此，惯性很可能会带来不愉快的惊喜。房屋是经济中不应该被高估的重要资产，尤其是因为它对金融系统至关重要。

The full impact of climate change is still some way off. But the sooner policymakers can resolve these questions, the better. The evidence shows that house prices react to these risks only after disaster has struck, when it is too late for preventive investments. Inertia is therefore likely to lead to nasty surprises. Housing is too important an asset to be mispriced across the economy—not least because it is so vital to the financial system.

政府必须尽自己的一份力。直到18世纪，荷兰大部分地区都遵循着只有附近社区会维护堤坝的原则，结果这个体系饱受投资不足和不必要的洪水困扰。政府是唯一可以通过建设基础设施解决这类集体行动问题的机构，尤其是在高生产力城市周围。业主需要有动力花大笔资金改造他们的住房以减少污染，这对所有人都有益。

Governments will have to do their bit. Until the 18th century much of the Netherlands followed the principle that only nearby communities would maintain dykes—and the system was plagued by underinvestment and needless flooding as a result. Governments alone can solve such collective-action problems by building infrastructure, and must do so especially around high-productivity cities. Owners will need inducements to spend big sums retrofitting their homes to pollute less, which benefits everyone.

然而，与此同时，决策者必须小心，不要通过提供大量隐含担保和明确由国家支持的保险计划来资助愚蠢行为。这不仅对纳税人构成不可接受的风险，而且会削弱人们投资于提高自家房产弹性的动力。并且，通过压低保险费，这种做法并不能阻止人们迁往已知的高风险地区。兆头并不乐观，尽管赌注如此之高。几十年来，政府一直未能阻止在洪水平原上兴建房屋的行为。

At the same time, however, policymakers must be careful not to subsidise folly by offering large implicit guarantees and explicit state-backed insurance schemes. These not only pose an unacceptable risk to taxpayers, but they also weaken the incentive for people to invest in making their properties more resilient. And by suppressing insurance premiums, they do nothing to discourage people from moving to areas that are already known to be high-risk today. The omens are not good, even though the stakes are so high. For decades governments have failed to disincentivise building on floodplains.

这25万亿美元的账单将在全球引发问题。但今天什么都不做只会让明天变得更加痛苦。对于政府和业主来说，对待住房难题的最糟糕反应莫过于置之不理。 ■

The $25trn bill will pose problems around the world. But doing nothing today will only make tomorrow more painful. For both governments and homeowners, the worst response to the housing conundrum would be to ignore it. ■

回到目录

领导者 | 四叶选民 (Leaders | Four-leafed voters)

美国真正的摇摆选民异常罕见 (True swing voters are extraordinarily rare in America)

我们已经找到一些 (We have found some)

美国政治中最大的问题是为什么乔·拜登的支持率如此低迷。尽管有许多理论——从拜登的年龄到汽油价格再到阿富汗撤军——但很难对答案抱有信心。在新闻报道中引用的标准民意调查可能基于提供给1,000人的样本。而对摇摆州选民提问的民意调查可能只有这个数字的一半。这些毫无疑问提供了有用的信息，但如果你想深入这些民意调查，了解比如西班牙裔新教徒对拜登总统的看法，样本量太小无法得出结论。我们找到了解决这个问题的办法。在过去的一年里，YouGov向总共49,000名美国具有选举权的人提出了问题。如果将他们的答案汇总起来，就像我们本周所做的那样，你就能发现真正的情况。

The biggest question in American politics today is why Joe Biden’s support is so soft. Although there are plenty of theories—ranging from Mr Biden’s age to petrol prices to the withdrawal from Afghanistan—it is hard to be confident about an answer. A standard poll of the type quoted in news reports may be based on a sample of 1,000 people. A poll that asks questions of voters in a swing state might have half that number. These yield useful information, no doubt, but if you want to look within those polls at what, say, Hispanic Protestants think of President Biden, the numbers are too small to draw conclusions. We found a way round this problem. Over the past year, YouGov has posed questions to a total of 49,000 Americans of voting age. If you pool their answers, as we have this week, you can discover what is really going on.

由于大多数美国选民都是党派化的，对两位候选人的态度已经固化，很少有2020年投票支持拜登的人会在十一月份投票给唐纳德·川普，反之亦然。在激烈的选举中，摇摆选民具有双倍价值，因为他们会从一方减去选票，加到另一方。然而，找到他们就像寻找四叶草一样困难。

Because most American voters are partisan and opinions about the two candidates are so calcified, very few people who voted for Joe Biden in 2020 will vote for Donald Trump in November, or vice versa. In a tight election, swing voters have double value because they subtract from one side and add to the other. Finding them, though, is like hunting for four-leafed clovers.

保持最新，关注我们的每日更新，美国简报，以及我们的总统民意调查追踪器。

Stay up to date with our new daily update, The US in brief, and our presidential poll tracker.

阅读更多关于2024年美国选举的报道。

Read more of our coverage of the US elections of 2024.

拜登和特朗普在全国民意调查中几乎持平（特朗普在摇摆州的表现要好于此）。总体而言，与2020年相比，特朗普的支持率上升了两个百分点。这一变化有两个原因。

Mr Biden and Mr Trump are close to tied in national polls (Mr Trump is doing better than that in the swing states). Overall, compared with 2020, there has been a shift of two percentage points in Mr Trump’s favour. This change has two sources.

第一个原因是在2020年投票支持拜登的人，现在表示他们要么犹豫不决，要么支持第三方，要么计划不投票。这提醒我们，如果罗伯特·F·肯尼迪在摇摆州的选票上成功，他可能颠覆选举结果。我们本周进行了介绍，肯尼迪拒绝透露对于拜登或特朗普谁对美国更不利的看法，并表示他的内部民意调查显示他主要吸引了独立选民，而不是来自特定候选人的支持。然而，其他民意调查表明，更高的第三方支持对拜登造成了更大的伤害。

The first is made up of people who voted for Mr Biden in 2020 and now say they are either undecided, supporting a third party or planning not to vote. This is a reminder that if Robert F. Kennedy junior makes it onto the ballot in swing states he could tip the election. Mr Kennedy, whom we profile this week, refuses to be drawn on whether Mr Biden or Mr Trump would be worse for America and says his internal polling shows him mainly attracting independent voters, rather than from one particular candidate. Other polls, however, suggest that higher third-party support has done more harm to Mr Biden.

拜登的第二个弱点来源于真正的摇摆选民，他们已经背弃他，对特朗普表示支持。在我们的49,000人样本中，仅有465人上次投票支持特朗普，现在却表示将投票给拜登。有632人则是拜登支持者转而支持特朗普。许多人仍记得特朗普总统任职期间的混乱局面及其骚乱的结局，也看到了最近的就业数据，他们都在想这些支持者到底在想什么。我们的超大样本也为这一问题提供了一些答案。

The second source of weakness for Mr Biden is genuine swing voters, who have deserted him for Mr Trump. Among our 49,000, just 465 voted for Mr Trump last time and say they will now back Mr Biden. There are 632 Biden-to-Trump voters. Many people who recall the chaos of Mr Trump’s presidency and its riotous conclusion, and have seen recent jobs data, will be wondering what on Earth these folk are thinking. Our mega-sample has some answers on that, too.

摇摆选民不像共和党人希望的那样看待今年的选举：移民并非对他们来说最重要的问题。民主党人也不希望他们这样看。他们最关心的问题不是民主的捍卫、气候政策，也不是堕胎问题。而是通货膨胀，其持续不变，其次是经济。对于摇摆选民来说，政治不像新闻爱好者和忠实党员那样是生活的核心。他们可能不了解拜登在天然气或朝鲜问题上的立场，但他们知道鸡蛋价格昂贵，开车上班花费太多。

Swing voters do not view this year’s election as Republicans would like them to: immigration is not the most important issue for them. Neither do they view it as Democrats wish. Their most important issue is not the defence of democracy, climate policy, or abortion. It is inflation, which remains sticky , followed by the economy. Politics is less central to the lives of swing voters than it is to news hounds and committed partisans. They may not know much about Mr Biden’s position on natural gas or North Korea, but they do know that eggs are expensive and driving to work costs too much.

另一个，也许更令人吃惊的发现是摇摆选民是谁。最有可能从拜登转向特朗普的是有孩子的非白人家长。这可能反映了对疫情期间过长的学校封锁政策的持久愤怒。这也反映了一个值得注意的趋势：种族和选民意愿正在解开。从短期来看，这是令人不安的，因为这使得特朗普重返白宫的可能性增加。然而，从长期来看，这有望成为一种祝福。在一个每个人都根据自己的种族投票的多种族民主体制是一种噩梦般的前景。政治应该是关于观念而不是身份的竞争。美国正在朝着这个方向发展。 ■

The other, perhaps more surprising, finding is who these swing voters are. Those most likely to have swung from Mr Biden to Mr Trump are non-white parents of school-age children. That may reflect abiding fury at over-long school lockdowns during the pandemic. It also reflects a notable trend: that race and voting are becoming unstuck. In the short term this is troubling, because it makes Mr Trump’s return to the White House more likely. Looking further in the future, however, it promises to be a blessing. A multiracial democracy in which everyone votes according to their race is a nightmarish prospect. Politics should be a competition between ideas rather than identities. America is swinging in that direction. ■

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领导人 | 卡斯评论 (Leaders | The Cass Review)

美国应该效仿英国在儿童跨性别护理方面的做法 (America should follow England’s lead on transgender care for kids)

它的方法既不像红州那样严厉，也不像蓝州那样放松。 (Its approach is neither as harsh as in red states nor as lax as in blue states)

冷静讨论 跨性别医学是罕见的。英国医生希拉里·卡斯（Hilary Cass）认为，“在医疗领域很少有其他领域的专业人士如此害怕公开讨论他们的观点”。她于4月9日发布了一份长达388页的报告，由英格兰国家卫生服务委托，评估了自认为跨性别的儿童的治疗方法的证据支持与反对情况。其结论将在大西洋两岸产生共鸣，那里的护理标准差异巨大。

Calm discussions of transgender medicine are rare. “There are few other areas of health care where professionals are so afraid to openly discuss their views,” argues Hilary Cass, a British doctor. On April 9th she published a 388-page report, commissioned by England’s National Health Service, assessing the evidence for and against treatments for children who identify as transgender. Its conclusions will reverberate on both sides of the Atlantic, where standards of care differ wildly.

有争议的治疗方法包括青春期阻滞剂、跨性别激素以及（很少）手术。青春期阻滞剂是延迟青春期开始的药物。跨性别激素促进相反性别特征的发展：雌激素使男性长出更大的乳房，睾丸激素让女性长出更强壮的肌肉和更低沉的声音，等等。“卡斯审查”指出，“没有可靠的证据基础”表明将这些治疗方法提供给儿童的好处是否超过了危害。许多研究已经发表，但它们通常“质量低劣”。有些是基于微小样本得出结论。有些缺乏对照组，以便将接受治疗患者的结果与不接受治疗的患者的结果进行比较。远远不够努力去观察长期效果。一些诊所甚至拒绝试图收集这些数据的努力。“我们向年轻人提供有可能改变一生的治疗，而又不知道他们成年后的情况，这是不寻常的，”卡斯博士告诉BBC。

The treatments at issue include puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones and (rarely) surgery. Puberty blockers are drugs that delay the onset of puberty. Cross-sex hormones stimulate the development of opposite-sex characteristics: oestrogen causes males to grow larger breasts, testosterone gives females bigger muscles and deeper voices, among other things. “There is not a reliable evidence base” to show that the benefits of offering such treatments to children outweigh the harms, says the Cass Review. Many studies have been published, but they are often of “poor quality”. Some draw conclusions from tiny samples. Some lack control groups, so that outcomes for patients receiving treatment are not compared with outcomes for those who do not. Far too little effort has been made to observe long-term effects. Some clinics even resisted attempts to gather such data. “It is unusual for us to give a potentially life-changing treatment to young people and not know what happens to them in adulthood,” Dr Cass told the BBC.

在富裕国家，针对儿童的跨性别护理现在分为三种主要类别：自由主义、严苛和谨慎。自由主义方法，在美国的蓝州广泛采用，认为如果儿童认同为相反性别并渴望调整他们的身体来与这种感觉一致，他们应该被允许这样做。赞成者说，如果否认这种“性别肯定疗法”，他们的生活将被蒙上阴影，甚至可能考虑终止生命。一些活动人士则以强硬措辞补充道，只有排斥跨性者的人才可能反对。美国儿科学会，一个全国性机构，支持向未成年人提供青春期阻滞剂和跨性别激素，并评估新证据。

In the rich world, approaches to transgender care for children now fall into three broad categories: laissez-faire, draconian and cautious. The laissez-faire approach, common in blue states in America, argues that if children identify as the opposite gender and desperately want to adjust their bodies to align with that feeling, they should be allowed to do so. If denied such “gender-affirming care”, their lives will be blighted and they may consider ending them, proponents say. Some activists add, in forceful language, that only transphobes could possibly object. The American Academy of Pediatrics, a national body, supports the provision of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones to minors, while evaluating new evidence.

严酷的方法是这些治疗方法应该被禁止。这种情况在美国的红州很普遍，那里的一些政客煽动敌意以赢得选票。一些州将对治疗的禁令与对提供此类治疗的医生的严厉处罚结合在一起。佛罗里达州威胁医生五年监禁；爱达荷州则为十年。得克萨斯州试图调查父母是否适合成为父母寻求这样的护理；尽管目前这一问题陷入司法纠纷。总的来说，22个美国州已经禁止或限制了青少年的跨性别护理，其中大多数是最近实施的。

The draconian approach is that such treatments should simply be banned. This is common in red American states, where some politicians stir up antipathy towards transgender people to win votes. Some states combine bans on treatment with harsh penalties for doctors who offer it. Florida threatens them with five years in prison; Idaho, ten. Texas has tried to investigate whether parents who seek such care for their children are fit to be parents; though this is now tied up in court. In all, 22 American states have outlawed or restricted transgender care for adolescents, most of them recently.

谨慎方法，它在丹麦、芬兰、挪威、瑞典以及现在的英格兰政策中得以体现，强调需要更多证据。没有人确切知道过去十年中认同为跨性别的儿童数量为何激增。在给予他们可能导致永久不孕和无法体验性高潮的药物之前，医生应该探索其他干预措施。许多自认为跨性别的儿童处于自闭症谱系。许多遭受抑郁症之苦，应该得到咨询。许多最终反悔，有时意识到他们是同性恋，而不是跨性别者。健康服务提供者不应该匆忙进行侵入性治疗，即使儿童要求。因此，英格兰的国民保健服务现在只将青春期阻滞剂作为临床试验的一部分提供。根据卡斯审查，跨性别激素只应该被提供给16岁以上的儿童，并且需要“极度谨慎”。

The cautious approach, which informs policy in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and now England, stresses that more evidence is needed. No one is sure why the number of children who identify as transgender has exploded in the past decade. Before giving them drugs which can make them permanently sterile and unable to experience an orgasm, medics should explore other interventions. Many trans-identifying children are on the autism spectrum. Many suffer from depression, and should be offered counselling. Many eventually desist, sometimes realising that they are gay, not trans. Health providers should not rush into invasive treatments even if the child demands them. Thus, the NHS in England now offers puberty blockers only as part of a clinical trial. Cross-sex hormones should be provided only to children over 16, and with “extreme caution”, says the Cass Review.

回到目录

领导者 | 加沙战争 (Leaders | War in Gaza)

短视的以色列军队 (The short-sighted Israeli army)

单凭武力无法带来安全 (Force alone cannot bring security)

以色列国防军的故事是以色列本身的故事。自1948年建国以来，以色列国防军与试图摧毁它的阿拉伯国家进行了一连串的战争并取得胜利。以色列人将他们的军队视为自己最好的代表—坚韧、狡猾和创新。尽管以色列国防军可怕地未能预测或阻止2023年10月7日加沙的入侵，许多以色列人认为他们的军队继续打得不错。一位前以色列将军兼国家安全顾问本周表示，铁剑行动将被视为如何进行城市作战的典范。

THE STORY of the Israel Defence Forces is the story of Israel itself. From the creation of the state in 1948, the IDF has repeatedly fought and won wars with Arab countries that were bent on destroying it. Israelis see their army as the best of themselves—tough, shrewd and innovative. Despite the IDF’s terrible failure to predict or prevent the incursion from Gaza on October 7th 2023, many Israelis think their army has gone on to have a good war. A former Israeli general and national security adviser this week said that Operation Swords of Iron would come to be viewed as an exemplar of how to conduct urban combat.

正如我们的报道所清楚表明的那样，加沙的现实是不同的。针对哈马斯的行动是正当的，但由于以色列国防军过分依赖技术和缺乏战略思维，这些行动受到了损害。最重要的是，军队遭受了以色列政治领导人自私的内讧和局促的视野所导致的问题。像往常一样，巴勒斯坦人为此付出了代价。在这方面，以色列国防军的故事也是以色列的故事。

As our reporting makes clear, the reality in Gaza is different. The campaign against Hamas is justified, but it has been marred by the IDF’s over-reliance on technology and a lack of strategic thinking. Most of all, the army has suffered from the self-serving rivalries and cramped vision of Israel’s political leaders. As so often, Palestinians have paid the price. In this, too, the story of the IDF is the story of Israel.

【阅读我们关于以色列和哈马斯之间战争的所有报道】(https://www.economist.com/israel-hamas)【注册并观看我们关于中东战争的现场订阅者活动】(https://www.economist.com/subscriber-events/israel-and-the-middle-east-elusive-peace-hub?utm_medium=digital-display.external-website.np&utm_source=article-info-box&utm_campaign=r.se.standard.core.all-eng.aricle-info-box.all-term.global)

Read all our coverage of the war between Israel and HamasRegister for, and watch, our live subscriber event on war in the Middle East

以色列国防军在责任作为占领方和尽量减少平民死亡方面存在两个薄弱环节。大约170万人已被迫转移；许多人缺乏足够的食物、水和药品。几个月来，只有几百辆卡车的食物进入了加沙，远远低于每天所需至少500辆的数量。一些国家感到愤怒，已经采取危险、昂贵的空投行动。

Two areas where the IDF has fallen short are its responsibilities as an occupying power and its duty to minimise civilian deaths. Some 1.7m people have been displaced; many lack adequate food, water or medicine. For months, a few hundred lorry-loads of food have been getting into Gaza, far below the 500 or so a day that is the minimum needed. Outraged, some countries have resorted to dangerous, costly air drops.

以色列坚称已经尽到人道主义法律所需的一切，但对援助的持续而似乎是武断的阻碍与之矛盾。最近几天，受到其主要盟国美国的巨大压力，以色列自己采取了迟来的措施，以防止一场迫在眉睫的饥荒。以色列国防军的军官们责怪政治家们短缺，但至少他们应该预见到这将如何来定义他们的行动。

Israel insists that it has done all that humanitarian law demands, but persistent and seemingly arbitrary blockages of aid contradict that. So do Israel’s own belated efforts in recent days, under great pressure from America, its main ally, to prevent a looming famine. IDF officers have blamed politicians for shortages, but at the very least they should have foreseen how these would come to define their operations.

平民死亡人数也是非常令人担忧的。对许多人来说，数以数万计的死伤和加沙大部分地区的破坏是无法被证明的。以色列官员反驳称，战争是残酷的，平民死亡与战斗人员的比例约为2:1，这一数字大致符合独立研究，并类似于2016-2017年美国领导的联盟在摩苏尔打击伊斯兰国时的情况。

The civilian death toll is also of grave concern. To many people, tens of thousands of deaths and injuries and the destruction of so much of Gaza could never be justified. Israeli officials retort that war is harsh and the ratio of civilian deaths to combatants is about 2:1, a figure that roughly matches independent studies and is similar to Iraq when an American-led coalition struck Islamic State in Mosul in 2016-17.

虽然比较很难，数字不精确，但即使如此，许多军队会认为以色列的交战规则是不成比例的，因此是非法的。据报道，以色列国防军设定了以平民死亡数为决定打击一名哈马斯初级战斗人员的决策阈值为20:1，打击高级领导人的阈值为100:1。对于伊拉克独裁者萨达姆·侯赛因，美国设定了30:1的阈值。以色列国防军也可能是不加区别的，这也是非法的。据以色列内部的一份报告称，战争初期，当军队决心为2023年10月7日的袭击报仇时，他们使用人工智能编制了目标清单，而压力如此之大以至于人类只是粗略地监督这个系统。以色列官员坚决否认这一点，但在战争中，没有清晰的胜利标志，击杀率却成为衡量进展的指标并非首次发生。

Comparisons are hard and figures are inexact, but even if that is true, many armies would find Israel’s rules of engagement disproportionate and hence illegal. The IDF is reported to have set the threshold of civilian deaths in justifying decisions to strike a junior Hamas fighter at 20:1 and a senior leader at 100:1. For Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s dictator, America set a threshold of 30:1. The IDF may also have been indiscriminate, which would be illegal too. A report from inside Israel claims that early in the war, when the army was determined to take vengeance for October 7th, it assembled target lists using artificial intelligence and that the pressure to move ahead was so great that humans gave the system only cursory oversight. Israeli officials vehemently deny this, but it would not be the first time in war that, without a clear sense of what counts as victory, kill rates became the measure of progress.

在这些过度行为中，以色列国防军面临着未能达成消灭哈马斯的主要目标的风险。战后六个月，恐怖组织的最高级领导人仍然生存，100多名人质仍被囚禁。以色列国防军谈论对加沙南部拉法区中剩余的四个哈马斯营地发动进攻，但这将导致灾难。大约150万人正在拉法附近避难，以色列尚未制定保护他们的计划。以色列似乎没有阻止哈马斯或类似组织从废墟中崛起的战略。如果没有这个战略，那么将会受到游击战的毁灭性打击，其中旨在减少恐怖分子数量的行动将吸引足够数量的新成员来取代他们。

Amid these excesses, the IDF risks falling short in its chief aim of destroying Hamas. After six months, the terrorist group’s most senior leaders remain alive and over 100 hostages are still in captivity. The IDF talks of attacking four remaining Hamas battalions in Rafah, in the south of Gaza, but that is a formula for disaster. About 1.5m people are sheltering near Rafah and Israel has yet to produce a plan for protecting them. Israel appears to have no strategy for preventing Hamas or something like it from rising from the rubble. Without one, it will be subject to the devastating mathematics of insurgency, in which operations designed to reduce the number of terrorists attract more than enough recruits to replace them.

还来得及改变方向。然而，以色列的政治家，包括其中的退役IDF军官，希望通过炸弹和子弹来替代对战争结束的政治愿景。没有和平计划，以色列将最终成为占领者或者不断袭击加沙。无论哪种方式，以色列在军事、经济和外交上都会付出高昂的代价。IDF依赖外国，特别是美国和德国，提供关键武器。如果西方选民拒绝支持无休止的冲突理念，他们的政治家最终会追随其后。

It is not too late to change course. Yet Israel’s politicians—former IDF officers among them—want bombs and bullets to substitute for a political vision of the war’s end. Without a plan for peace, Israel will end up as an occupier or repeatedly striking Gaza. Either way, it will pay a high price militarily, economically and diplomatically. The IDF depends on outside countries, especially America and Germany, to supply vital weapons. If Western voters rejected the idea of supporting an unending conflict, their politicians would eventually follow.

我们提出的和平方案建立在暂时的停火，换取人质释放的基础上。这将导致涉及到阿拉伯资金，可能还有安全的地区协议。但目前，以色列和哈马斯都不感兴趣。这对哈马斯来说是有道理的，他们繁荣于冲突和巴勒斯坦人的苦难。而对以色列及其公民军来说，这毫无意义。 ■

Our proposal for peace is built on a temporary ceasefire in exchange for a hostage release. That would lead to a regional deal involving Arab money and, possibly, security. Just now, neither Israel nor Hamas is interested. That makes sense for Hamas, which thrives on conflict and Palestinian suffering. For Israel and its citizen army it makes no sense at all. ■

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领导 | 名字的含义 (Leaders | What’s in a name)

赞美彼得·希格斯 (In praise of Peter Higgs)

以他命名的粒子成为了一个卖点。对这位先生来说，有点烦心。 (The particle named after him became a selling point. For the man, it was a bit of a pain)

如果一切由彼得·希格斯说了算，世界本应对他4月8日去世毫不在意，甚至对他前面94年的生活也视而不见。他珍视同事的尊重，并珍藏自己偶尔关于宇宙运行方式的“灵光乍现”。其中一个灵光最终演变成了一个以他的名字命名的物体，成为一场耗资数十亿美元的世界范围“追求”的主题，这是令他有些恼火的事实。他说，希格斯玻色子的发现“毁掉了我的生活”。

If it had been up to Peter Higgs, the world would have taken no heed of his death on April 8th—nor, for that matter, of the 94 years of life which preceded it. He valued the respect of his colleagues and treasured his occasional “bright ideas” about the way the universe worked. The fact that one of those bright ideas ended up boiled down into an object bearing his name, which became the subject of a world-encompassing multi-billion-dollar “quest”, was a source of some exasperation. The Higgs boson’s discovery, he said, “ruined my life”.

希格斯博士最著名的灵光是深奥而至关重要的。基本粒子分为费米子和玻色子两类。描述玻色子的方程具有对称性，暗示它们应无质量。然而到了20世纪50年代，似乎一些玻色子确实有质量；一些基本对称性在实践中被“破坏”了。解开破缺对称性的数学问题成为粒子物理学家的关注焦点。希格斯博士在1964年夏天的几周时间里做出的贡献是对一个新玻色子的数学描述，这个玻色子可以给需要质量的玻色子提供质量。

Dr Higgs’s best-known bright idea was arcane but crucial. There are two types of fundamental particles, fermions and bosons. The symmetrical nature of the equations which describe bosons implies that they should be massless. By the 1950s, though, it seemed that some bosons did have mass; some fundamental symmetries were in practice “broken”. Untangling the maths of broken symmetries became a preoccupation of particle physicists. Dr Higgs’s contribution, made over a few weeks in the summer of 1964, was a mathematical description of a new boson that could give mass to bosons in need of it.

1983年，位于日内瓦附近的欧洲物理实验室CERN对一个粒子加速器进行了大胆改装，直接证实了统一电磁力和弱核力的理论预测中的三个大质量玻色子——两个W玻色子和一个Z玻色子。这场玻色子盛宴让一些美国物理学家感到恼火。他们告诉资助他们的政府，美国正在失去一个重要的竞赛。他们提出的回击是“超导超级对撞机”（SSC），这是一个具有非凡功率的粒子加速器，周长将达到87公里。

In 1983 a daring modification of a particle accelerator at CERN, the European physics lab near Geneva, produced direct evidence of three massive bosons—two Ws and a Z—predicted by the theory which unified electromagnetism and the weak nuclear force. This boson bonanza left some American physicists miffed. They told the government which funded them that America was losing an important race. The proposed comeback was the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), a particle accelerator of extraordinary power that would be 87km in circumference.

希格斯玻色子是他们的宣传重点。该粒子的存在是根据理论预测的，但与W和Z一样，其发现在没有足够强大的机器的情况下是不可能的。SSC将成为那台机器。记者们意识到，如果有一种希格斯粒子，肯定也会有一个希格斯玻色子；在撰写原始论文24年之后，希格斯博士发现自己正在接受首次采访。莱昂·莱德曼（Leon Lederman），一个SSC的坚决支持者，对于与媒体互动是一种乐趣而非苦差事，将希格斯称为“上帝粒子”，从而增加了这本书的炒作和销量。

The Higgs boson was a key part of the pitch. The particle’s existence was predicted by theory but, as had been the case with the Ws and Z, its discovery was impossible without a powerful enough machine. The SSC would be that machine. Journalists grasped that if there was a Higgs particle there must also be a Higgs; 24 years after writing his original paper, Dr Higgs found himself doing his first interview. Leon Lederman, a champion of the SSC to whom press availability was a joy, not a chore, dubbed the Higgs “The God particle”, thereby increasing the hype and the sales of his thus-titled book.

1993年，国会取消了SSC。它的欧洲竞争对手CERN的LHC继续进行。那里的物理学家认为希格斯是一个“已知未知数”，他们的机器虽然更小，但仍有很大机会产生它，这也是向政客和公众推销的关键所在。

In 1993 Congress cancelled the SSC. Its European rival, CERN’s LHC, carried on. Physicists there thought that the Higgs was a “known unknown” which their machine, though smaller, still stood a good chance of producing, and it was central to the way it was sold to politicians and the public.

LHC在2012年交付了成果，一年后，诺贝尔奖委员会紧随其后。希格斯博士（有时）露出微笑，应对关注。这不仅仅是因为这个粒子带有他的名字。他们的故事如此迷人：一个谦逊的理论家在他的阁楼里（实际上是爱丁堡新城的一个三楼公寓）默默无闻几十年，但他的思想最终改变了世界——这是非常独立思维力量的体现如何？但这从未真正发生。正如希格斯博士始终清楚地表明的那样，当时想要用简单易懂的噱头来为大型加速器赢得资金还是不可想象的。

The LHC delivered the goods in 2012, and the Nobel prize committee followed suit the next year. Dr Higgs grinned (sometimes) and bore the attention. It was not just that the particle carried his name. Their story was so beguiling: the humble theorist in his garret (actually a third-floor flat in Edinburgh’s New Town) who goes unheralded for decades but whose ideas eventually change the world—how’s that for the untrammelled power of the singular mind? But it was never really true. Dr Higgs, as he always made clear, was one of many scientists coming up with similar ideas at a time when using soundbite-friendly baubles to win funding for city-sized accelerators was still unthinkable.

最好能一直停留在那种状态。科学家们真正想要的大科学项目很少能简单归结为单一事物；他们希望有能力进行广泛探索。公众希望知道正在发现新的事物。将科学项目描绘成对某种预定圣杯（令人畏惧的词汇）的追求，无论是单一玻色子还是单一人类基因组，也许会使整个故事变得简单，但这低估了创造新类型科学可能性的工具的真正雄心和乐趣。这也会增加失望的几率。在发现希格斯粒子十多年后，很难说这一发现改变了世界，或者说物理学，多少。重要的是要记住，正如希格斯博士始终知道的那样，真正重要的是过程，而非奖品。■

It might have been best had it stayed so. What scientists actually want from big science rarely boils down to a single thing; they want the means with which to explore widely. The public wants to know that new discoveries are being made. Casting scientific projects as quests for some pre-ordained grail (dread word), be it a single boson or a single human genome, may make the story simple, but it underplays the true ambition and delight of creating tools that make new types of science possible. And it makes the chance of disappointment greater. More than a decade after its discovery, it is hard to argue that finding the Higgs particle has changed the world, or for that matter physics, all that much. It is worth remembering, as Dr Higgs always knew, that what really matters is the process, not the prize. ■

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中国 | 一个日益老化的独裁政权 (China | An ageing autocracy)

中国艰难抵抗人口危机的高风险斗争 (China’s high-stakes struggle to defy demographic disaster)

共产党信心寄托于机器人、基因疗法和沐浴服务 (The Communist Party puts its faith in robots, gene-therapy and bathing services)

中国的老年人如果组建自己的国家，那将是世界第四人口大国，仅次于美国。这个白发苍苍的国家也在迅速增长。中国60岁以上的人口达到了2.97亿，占总人口的21%。预计到2050年，这些数字将增至5.2亿、占总人口的38%。然而，人口学家描述中国的未来将变得更加灰暗和缩小。虽然老年人群在增长，但年轻人却不是（见图表）。中国总人口在2023年连续第二年下降。其劳动力在大部分过去的十年中一直在减少。

IF CHINA’S OLD people formed their own country, it would be the fourth most populous in the world, right behind America. This silver-haired state would be growing fast, too. China’s over-60 population sits at 297m, or 21% of the total. By 2050 those figures are expected to reach 520m and 38%. Yet demographers describe China’s future as greyer—and smaller. While its older cohorts are growing, younger ones are not (see chart). China’s total population declined for the second year in a row in 2023. Its labour force has been shrinking for most of the past decade.

中国的经济也面临着缩水的风险。随着一个巨大的抚养负担逐渐临近，政府察觉到一场即将到来的灾难。迄今为止，政府的努力主要集中在提高生育率（每名妇女的平均生育率），目前为1.2——远低于保持人口稳定所需的2.1。但现在，政府开始谈论调整。在上月的国情咨文中，现年64岁的总理李强描绘了他所谓的“积极应对老龄化的国家战略”，涵盖了从保险到养老金等各个方面。

China’s economy risks shrinking, too, as a result. With an enormous burden of care on the horizon, the government senses an impending disaster. To date its efforts have focused on boosting the fertility rate (average births per woman), which stands at 1.2—far below the 2.1 required to keep the population stable. Now, though, it is talking about adaptation. During his state-of-the-nation speech last month, the 64-year-old prime minister, Li Qiang, sketched out what he called a “vigorous national strategy” on ageing, covering everything from insurance to pensions.

中国远非面临人口衰退的唯一国家。预计未来20年，日本、意大利、韩国和许多其他国家的人口将以更快的速度下降。日本的中位年龄已接近50岁，而中国则在40岁左右。而且可以说，中国还有另一个优势：其威权政府无需迎合老年选民，而老年选民在民主国家往往会扭曲政策。事实上，中国的老年人对国家期望不高。

China is far from the only country facing demographic decline. The populations of Japan, Italy, South Korea and many other places are expected to shrink at an even faster rate over the next two decades. The median age in Japan has risen to nearly 50, whereas in China it is around 40. And it could be argued that China has another advantage: its autocratic government need not cater to elderly voters, whose electoral influence often distorts policy in democracies. In fact, the elderly in China expect little from the state.

因此，中国官员似乎没有理由胆怯。除了要积极外，人们原以为李先生的计划会很大胆。然而，迄今为止，中国的领导人并未推动其国家摆脱人口命运所需的改革。而他们等待的时间越长，任务变得越艰巨。

Chinese officials, then, appear to have no cause for timidity. On top of being vigorous, one might have expected Mr Li’s plan to be bold. So far, though, China’s leaders have not pursued the types of reforms needed for their country to escape its demographic destiny. And the longer they wait, the harder their task becomes.

广泛来说，中国面临三个重大挑战。第一个挑战是如何对抗劳动力减少，以避免GDP增速放缓。过去40年，中国经济平均每年增长9%，得益于劳动年龄人口的增加。然而，现在许多劳动者已达到退休年龄。更糟的是，中国在变得富裕之前就开始老龄化。2008年，当日本人口开始下降时，其人均GDP已接近今天的47500美元。而中国目前仅为21000美元。随着更多资金用于保障老年公民，用于工作一代消费或投资的资金将减少。

Broadly speaking, China faces three big challenges. The first is how to counteract the decline in the labour force in order to avoid a slowdown in GDP growth. Over the past four decades the economy has expanded by 9% a year, on average, aided by a bulge of working-age adults. Now, though, many of these workers are hitting retirement age. Worse, China is getting old before it gets rich. In 2008, when Japan’s population started to fall, its GDP per person was already about $47,500 in today’s dollars. China’s is just $21,000. As more of that money is spent on protecting ageing citizens, less of it will be available for the working generation to consume or invest.

但是，中国可以采取许多措施来保持经济增长。首先，可以提高享受社会养老金的退休年龄。中国的养老金规定属世界最低水平。大多数男性可以在60岁停止工作。在办公室工作的女性可在55岁退休，而在工厂工作的女性则在50岁退休。自上个世纪设定这些规定以来，中国的平均预期寿命已从不到60岁增长至接近80岁。“如果中国老年人的劳动力参与率与日本相同——这不是一个雄心勃勃的目标——到2035年将有约4000万人处于就业状态，”新加坡国立大学的Bert Hofman写道。自2008年以来，官员一直在提出改革方案，但现在才显得认真。观察人士预计，明年将开始逐步提高养老年龄。

Still, there is much that China can do to keep its economy growing. To start, it could raise the retirement ages for drawing a public pension. China’s are among the world’s lowest. Most men can stop working at 60. Women who work in offices can retire at 55 and those in factories at 50. Since these rules were set last century, the average life expectancy in China has risen from under 60 to close to 80. “If China’s elderly were to have the same labour force participation as in Japan—not a very ambitious target—by 2035 some 40m more people would be at work,” writes Bert Hofman of the National University of Singapore. Officials have been floating reforms since 2008, but only now do they seem serious. Observers expect a staged increase in retirement ages to begin next year.

与此同时，中国可以更好地利用其劳动者。中国有一半的20至24岁人口接受过大学或职业学院教育，而快要退休的人口仅有7%接受过这样的教育。然而，在农村地区，很少有人接受高中以上的教育。提高该群体的技能将产生长远影响。Hofman认为，在其他条件不变的情况下，劳动力减少将使中国每年的GDP增长减少一个百分点。但更长时间工作、接受更好教育的劳动力可以抵消这种影响。

Meanwhile, China can make better use of its workers. Half of Chinese aged 20 to 24 have attended university or vocational college, compared with just 7% of those who are about to retire. In rural areas, though, few people make it past high school. Improving the skills of this group would go a long way. Mr Hofman reckons that, all other things being equal, the shrinking labour force will cost China one percentage point of GDP growth each year over the next decade. But a longer-working, better-educated labour force could cancel out that effect, he says.

官员也可以更深入地考虑中国劳动者在哪些领域从事何种工作。约四分之一的中国人从事农业工作，而富裕国家的这一比例不到3%。中国领导人习近平（70岁）大谈创造高产出工作的重要性。这些工作很可能在城市中。但中国的户口制度阻碍了劳动者的流动。中国的城镇化率约为65%。法国巴黎银行的Alicia Garcia-Herrero表示，中国应力争达到75-80%的城镇化率。

Officials might also think harder about what Chinese workers do and where they do it. About a quarter of them work in agriculture, compared with less than 3% in rich countries. China’s leader, Xi Jinping (age 70), talks a big game about creating high-productivity jobs. These are likely to be in cities. But China’s hukou, or household registration system, impedes the movement of workers. The country’s urbanisation rate is about 65%. It should aim for 75-80%, says Alicia Garcia-Herrero of Natixis, a bank.

在较长期内，人口统计学家相信更多的机器和节约劳动力的技术也将有助于弥补较小的劳动力。中国每1万名工人拥有约400台机器人，高于大多数国家。但仍然不到韩国自动化水平的一半。中国正努力迎头赶上。根据国际机器人联合会的数据，截至2022年，全球安装的工业机器人中有一半以上被安装在中国。北京外国语大学研究人员领导的一项研究称，假设中国能够在2050年之前将这类机器数量翻倍至300万台，“‘机器人红利’可以弥补未来劳动力短缺的一半以上”。

In the longer term, demographers believe more machinery and labour-saving technology will also help compensate for a smaller labour force. China has about 400 robots per 10,000 workers, which is higher than most countries. But it is still less than half of South Korea’s level of automation. China is trying to catch up. In 2022 half of all the industrial robots installed worldwide were fitted in China, according to the International Federation of Robotics. Assuming the country is able to double its number of such machines to 3m by 2050, “the ‘robot dividend’ could make up for more than half of the future labour shortage”, says a study led by researchers at Beijing Foreign Studies University.

如果中国面临的首要挑战是如何在劳动力减少的情况下尽可能生产更多的商品和服务，那么第二个挑战就是如何确保老年人能够充分享有这些物品。目前，许多老年人依赖家人的支持。这可能会让习近平满意，他经常谈论儒家的孝道美德。习近平在2012年上台后不久，中国出台法律规定孩子们不得忽视父母。但随着年轻人的减少，老年人将越来越需要自己承担支出。

If China’s first challenge is how to produce as many goods and services as possible from a diminished workforce, the second is how to make sure the elderly have a sufficient claim on those items. At the moment, many old people rely on their families for support. That might please Mr Xi, who often talks about the Confucian virtue of filial piety. Shortly after he came to power in 2012, China made it illegal for children to neglect their parents. But with fewer young people around, oldsters will increasingly have to support themselves.

在大多数国家，养老金是解决方案，中国也有自己的计划。最大的国有基金依靠职工和企业的缴费，平均每月支付约3600元（500美元），约为受赞助者退休前收入的50%左右。与富裕国家组织(OECD)的60%以上相比，这个数额较低。中国的受益者可以在大多数城市支付基本生活开支。但该基金仅覆盖城市有薪工人，占劳动力的不到一半。另一个覆盖大多数其他工人的计划依赖于国家补贴，平均每月支付微薄的200元。

Pensions are the solution in most countries, and China has its own schemes. The largest state-run fund relies on contributions from employees and companies. It pays out about 3,600 yuan ($500) a month on average, or around 50% of what recipients were earning before they retired. That compares with over 60% in the OECD, a club of rich countries. The Chinese beneficiaries get enough to pay for basic expenses in most urban areas. But the fund only covers salaried workers in cities, less than half of the labour force. A separate scheme covering most other workers relies on state subsidies. It pays out a measly 200 yuan a month on average.

不仅仅是慷慨度不够是问题所在。随着退休人数的增加，这些计划正在资金耗尽。根据政府智库的预测，更大的基金预计将在2035年破产。要维持当前的福利水平，到2050年，支出将需要翻倍，占国内生产总值(GDP)的10%。（相比之下，英国的养老金支出约占GDP的5%。）

A lack of generosity is not the only problem. As the number of retirees swells, these schemes are running out of money. The larger one is on track to go broke by 2035, according to projections by a government think-tank. To maintain them both at their current benefit levels, spending would have to double by 2050, reaching 10% of GDP. (Pensioner benefit spending in Britain, by contrast, is about 5% of GDP.)

为了减轻负担，政府正在努力说服更多人参加私人养老金计划。自2022年以来，工人们可以在退休时设置延迟缴税的账户存款。到目前为止，只有5000万人参加了这项计划。其中大部分账户仍然是空的。官员表示工人们没有意识到养老金规划的重要性。但更深层次的问题是，许多中国人不信任金融产品，更愿意将资金用于房地产。

In order to ease its burden, the government is trying to convince more people to sign up for private pensions. Since 2022 workers have been able to set aside savings in tax-deferred accounts accessible upon retirement. Only 50m people have enrolled so far. Most of the accounts are still empty. Officials say workers don’t understand the importance of pension planning. But a deeper problem is that many Chinese distrust financial products, preferring to put their money in property.

这给政府留下了一些艰难的选择。政府可以要求公司为较大的国有养老金计划提供更多贡献（许多小公司逃避这一责任）。或者政府可以通过提高税收来填补资金缺口。新加坡国立大学的黄心琳表示，这将需要对财政体系进行彻底改革。中国的税收占国内生产总值的约20%，而OECD平均为34%。

That leaves the government with some tough choices to make. It could press companies to contribute more to the larger state-run pension scheme (many smaller firms dodge this responsibility). Or the government could raise taxes to fill the gap in its funding. That would involve root-and-branch reform of the fiscal system, says Christine Wong of the National University of Singapore. China’s tax revenue accounts for about 20% of GDP, compared with an average of 34% across the OECD.

另一个选择是减少国家养老金计划的慷慨程度。但这可能会导致更多的老年人陷入贫困。与许多西方国家不同，中国的老年人往往比年轻一代人更贫困。北京大学的研究人员发现，2020年中国60岁以上人口中有13%生活在每月不到300元的收入中。因此，这个选择似乎行不通。“我们将继续增加基本养老金，”李先生在上个月表示。

Another option is to make the state’s pension schemes even less generous. But that risks sending more old people into poverty. In contrast to many Western countries, the elderly in China tend to be poorer than people from younger generations. A study by researchers at Peking University found that 13% of China’s over-60s lived on less than 300 yuan a month in 2020. So this option appears to be a non-starter. “We will continue to increase basic pensions,” said Mr Li last month.

政府确保老年人能够充分分享国家产出将是非常棘手的任务。但它还必须确保经济生产出满足老年人需求的正确物品。这是最终的挑战 - 政府依靠市场力量在资源配置中发挥作用。李先生承诺“发展银发经济”，这是用来描述面向老年人的商品和服务的术语。根据官方估计，到2035年，这个行业的价值将达到30万亿元，比今天的7万亿元高出4倍。

It will be tricky enough for the government to ensure that the elderly have a sufficient claim on the country’s output. But it must also make certain that the economy is producing the right stuff to satisfy an older population’s needs. That is the final challenge—and the government is relying on market forces to play a role in allocating resources. Mr Li has promised to “develop the silver economy”, a term used to describe goods and services aimed at old people. The sector will be worth 30trn yuan by 2035, up from 7trn today, according to official estimates.

公司看到了机会，生产诸如可以在家监测老年人健康的医疗设备之类的产品。对钙等营养补充剂的需求增加了。分析人士认为，成人纸尿裤市场到2025年可能会超过婴儿纸尿裤市场。与此同时，政府正在为私人投资提供补贴，涵盖从陪伴机器人到抗衰老基因治疗的各个方面。

Companies see opportunities, producing such things as medical equipment that can monitor old people’s health at home. The demand for nutritional supplements like calcium has increased. Analysts reckon the market for adult diapers could overtake the one for infant nappies by 2025. Meanwhile, the state is subsidising private investment in everything from companion robots to anti-ageing gene therapy.

然而，当涉及到更为实质性的护理服务时，需求规模如此之大，以至于政府将不得不介入。根据重庆工商大学研究人员的估计，到2050年，患慢性疾病和残疾的老年人数量增加，全国长期护理的潜在成本将增至每年2470亿美元。

But when it comes to more substantial care services, the scale of demand is such that the government will have to step up. As the number of old people suffering from chronic diseases and disabilities increases, the potential cost of long-term care nationwide will triple to $247bn per year by 2050, according to estimates from researchers at Chongqing Technology and Business University.

在上海等城市，地方财政宽裕，政府似乎做得不错。官员们推出了一个计划，为老年人的房屋进行改造，增设电梯和扶手。也正在建造便宜的社区餐厅，提供送餐服务。官员们还为残疾或患有痴呆症的人提供家庭洗浴服务的补贴，注意到这在日本很常见。

In cities like Shanghai, where local coffers are flush, the government seems to be doing a good job. Officials have launched a programme to renovate the houses of old people, adding lifts and handrails. Cheap community canteens, which deliver food, are being built. Officials also subsidise home bathing services for those with disabilities or dementia, taking notice of a practice that is common in Japan.

然而，大多数地方政府却手头拮据。他们维护的疗养院要么质量低劣，要么满员。人员配备也是一个问题。中国有50万名受过培训的护理人员。据官方新闻机构新华社估计，需要600万名护理人员。在农村地区，官员们依赖所谓的“相互帮助”项目，年轻的老年人帮助照料年长者。

Most local governments, though, are short of cash. The care homes they maintain are either shoddy or full. Staffing is a problem, too. China has 500,000 trained carers. It needs 6m, estimates Xinhua, an official news agency. In rural areas, officials are relying on what they call “mutual aid” projects, where younger old people help care for older ones.

目前，很少有人抱怨。许多老年人经历过更艰难的时期，比如中国的大饥荒和文化大革命。悉尼大学的劳伦·约翰斯顿称中国的老年人为“忍气吞声的一代”。事实上，在2022年底政府解除了大部分covid-19限制时，他们被迫这样做，而没有充分为疾病的大流行做好准备。据信，在随后的几个月中，有超过100万人死亡，大多数是老年人。掩盖死亡人数的执政的共产党并没有付出真正的政治代价。

For now few are complaining. Many oldsters have lived through far more difficult periods, such as the great Chinese famine and the Cultural Revolution. Lauren Johnston of the University of Sydney calls China’s elderly the “suck-it-up generation”. Indeed, they were forced to do just that when the government lifted most of its covid-19 restrictions in late 2022, without having adequately prepared for a big wave of the disease. More than 1m people are thought to have died in the months that followed. Most were old. The ruling Communist Party, which covered up the death toll, paid no real political price.

但中国领导人并未完全忽视老年人的感受。许多人死于covid的一个原因是政府拒绝强制接种疫苗，部分出于对老年人反弹的担忧。下一代老年人可能会有更多的诉求。他们在繁荣时期长大，可能期望在晚年舒适地度过余生。如果党犯错误，最大的批评者可能不是年轻的自由派，而是老顽固分子。 ■

But China’s leaders do not completely ignore the feelings of old people. One reason so many died of covid was because the government refused to mandate vaccination, partly out of fear of a backlash from the elderly. The next generation of oldsters may have more considerable demands. They will have grown up during boom times and may expect to while away their sunset years in comfort. If the party gets things wrong, its biggest critics may not be young liberals, but old curmudgeons. ■

回到目录

中国 | 一段岌岌可危的关系 (China | A relationship under fire)

中国与以色列的关系能否在加沙战争中生存下来? (Will China’s ties with Israel survive the Gaza war?)

一些以色列人正在重新思考这个拒绝称哈马斯为恐怖组织的国家 (Some Israelis are rethinking the country that refuses to call Hamas a terrorist group)

中国在加沙战争中偏袒哪一方几乎没有疑问。对于10月7日对以色列发动的袭击，中国的反应不力，未谴责加害者哈马斯，这与其对自那时以来以色列行动的谴责形成鲜明对比。战争刚开始几天后，中国外交部长王毅称以色列已经“超出了自卫范围”。

THERE IS LITTLE doubt which side China favours in the Gaza war. Its muted response to the October 7th attacks on Israel—in which it failed to condemn the perpetrator, Hamas—stands in sharp contrast to its denunciation of Israel’s actions since then. Just days after the war began, the Chinese foreign Minister, Wang Yi, said that Israel had already gone “beyond the scope of self-defence”.

但中国的批评掩盖了与以色列更加复杂的关系，这是北京领导人长期试图培养的。以色列也作出回应，其总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡曾经称两国关系是“天作之合”。这场战争并非这种纽带的首次考验。然而，如今，以色列人对他们所谓的合作伙伴提出了新问题。

But China’s criticism belies a more complicated relationship with Israel, one that leaders in Beijing have long tried to cultivate. Israel has reciprocated, with its prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, once calling their ties a “marriage made in heaven”. The war is not the first test of that bond. Now, though, Israelis are asking new questions about their putative partner.

中国对以色列的态度经历了一段时间才有所改观。在1960年代，毛泽东为巴勒斯坦解放组织提供了武器和培训。1975年，联合国的中国官员支持了将犹太复国主义与种族主义联系起来的决议。但在近几十年里，中国倡导两国解决方案，并未给予巴勒斯坦人太多援助。例如，2022年，中国仅向联合国机构提供援助，为巴勒斯坦难民提供了100万美元。相比之下，美国提供了3.43亿美元。

It took a while for China to come around to Israel. During the 1960s Mao Zedong provided arms and training to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. In 1975 Chinese officials at the UN supported a resolution that equated Zionism with racism. But in recent decades China has advocated a two-state solution and given little aid to the Palestinians. In 2022, for example, China gave just $1m to the UN agency providing relief to Palestinian refugees. America, by contrast, gave $343m.

与此同时，中以关系蓬勃发展。2013年，内塔尼亚胡提出了“向东看”政策，正值中国国家主席习近平宣布“一带一路”倡议，这是一场全球性的基础设施建设狂潮。中国对以色列技术感兴趣；以色列希望进入中国市场。2017年，他们建立了促进高科技合作的伙伴关系。内塔尼亚胡称以色列是中国的“完美初级合作伙伴”。在2023年皮尤调查之前，以色列近一半的人表示他们对中国持有积极看法，这一比例远高于大多数民主国家。

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这一切都没有取悦美国，后者是以色列最大的支持者和武器供应国（尽管这目前在华盛顿激烈辩论之中）。过去，美国曾告诉以色列不要向中国出售雷达系统和突击无人机，同时对中国在以色列港口和电信网络的投资表示关切。部分是作为回应，以色列于2020年设立了一个官方委员会来审查外国投资。自那时以来，中国公司赢得的中标项目较少。不过，中国仍然是以色列出口的第二大买家和进口的最大供应商。

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with Israel blossomed. In 2013 Mr Netanyahu introduced a “look east” policy just as China’s president, Xi Jinping, announced his Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure binge. China was interested in Israeli technology; Israel wanted to tap the Chinese market. In 2017 they established a partnership to promote high-tech co-operation. Mr Netanyahu said Israel was a “perfect junior partner” for China. In a survey conducted by Pew in 2023, before the Gaza war, nearly half of Israelis said they viewed China favourably, a much higher percentage than in most democratic countries.

然而，以色列人越来越表达对中国的担忧。自战争开始以来，当地媒体开始讨论中国投资是否构成安全风险。分析人士和官员描述了以色列民众对中国好感度的急剧下降，尤其是因为反犹太主义在中国社交媒体上激增。一些以色列人对中国支持巴勒斯坦感到不满，开始抵制中国购物网站。以色列国家安全研究所的加利亚·拉维表示：“以色列公众已经改变了看待中国的方式，从‘中国有很多钱’变成‘中国是敌人’。”

None of this pleased America, which is Israel’s biggest backer and supplier of arms (though this is now the subject of fierce debate in Washington). America has in the past told Israel not to sell radar systems and assault drones to China, while raising concerns about Chinese investments in Israeli ports and telecom networks. Partly in response, Israel set up an official committee to review foreign investments in 2020. Since then Chinese companies have won fewer tenders. Still, China remains the second-biggest buyer of Israeli exports and the largest supplier of its imports.

这会如何改变官方关系？以色列外交情报机构摩萨德的前首席埃弗莱姆·哈莱维表示，以色列政府在与中国打交道方面更加谨慎。但他补充说，“由于中国在中东变得更活跃，去年在沙特和伊朗和解方面也非常活跃，以色列也需要与中国保持紧密关系。”作为伊朗的头号原油进口国，中国拥有“重大影响力”，以色列希望中国会积极利用这一影响力，一名以色列官员表示。其他人担心中国可能会利用其影响力对抗以色列。“我们不希望中国成为我们的敌人，”以色列另一家智库阿巴·埃班研究所的格达利亚·阿夫曼表示。

Israelis, though, are increasingly voicing their own concerns about China. Since the start of the war, local media have featured discussions of whether Chinese investment is a security risk. Analysts and officials describe a nosedive in China’s favourability rating among the Israeli public, not least because antisemitism is surging on Chinese social media. Some Israelis, unhappy with China’s support for the Palestinians, are boycotting Chinese shopping sites. “The public in Israel has shifted its way of looking at China, from ‘China has a lot of money’ to ‘China is an enemy’,” says Galia Lavi of the Institute for National Security Studies, a think-tank in Israel.

中国则仍希望发展双方关系，尤其是在高科技领域，上海外国语大学中东研究所的范洪达表示。在某种程度上，这场战争正在让这两个国家走得更近。最近，因为冲突的原因，以色列公司筹集资金越来越困难。与此同时，面临国内经济低迷的中国投资者开始寻找海外投资机会。一些以色列高管表示，已秘密达成了一些重大交易。“中国将在该地区的未来发展中发挥战略作用，”以色列最大的风投基金之一——耶路撒冷创业合伙人的埃雷尔·马加利特表示。

How might this change official ties? Efraim Halevy, a former chief of Israel’s foreign-intelligence agency, Mossad, says the Israeli government is being more cautious in its dealings with China. But, he adds, “since the Chinese are becoming much more active in the Middle East and were very active in the rapprochement between the Saudis and Iranians last year, Israel also needs to maintain a serious relationship with China.” As Iran’s top oil importer, China has “major leverage” that Israelis hope it will use in a positive manner, says an Israeli official. Others fear that China might wield its influence against Israel. “We don’t want China to be our enemy,” says Gedaliah Afterman of the Abba Eban Institute, another Israeli think-tank.

但有一种感觉，认为这种关系发生了变化。十年前，以色列官员和商人们谈论中国时，认为这是值得他们关注的地方。现在，他们更加兴奋于印度和海湾国家作为潜在合作伙伴的前景。中国并没有被排除在外。但是，一个与伊朗亲近、在联合国投票反对以色列并拒绝称哈马斯为恐怖组织的国家可能不是完美的合作伙伴。 ■

China, for its part, still wants to develop relations, especially in high-tech fields, says Fan Hongda of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University. In some ways the war is bringing the countries together. Lately Israeli firms have had trouble raising funds owing to the conflict. Chinese investors, facing a sluggish economy at home, are looking abroad. Quietly some big deals have been struck, say Israeli executives. “China will have a strategic role in whatever comes next in the region,” says Erel Margalit of Jerusalem Venture Partners, one of Israel’s largest venture-capital funds.

But there is a feeling that something has changed in the relationship. A decade ago Israeli officials and businessmen spoke of China as a place worthy of their focus. Now they are more excited about the prospect of India and the Gulf states as potential partners. China is not counted out. But a country that cosies up to Iran, votes against Israel at the UN and refuses to call Hamas a terrorist group might not be the perfect partner. ■

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中国 | 察观 (China | Chaguan)

在新疆的斋月是什么样子 (What Ramadan is like in Xinjiang)

我们的专栏作家探访一个严格控制的地区。 (Our columnist visits a harshly controlled region)

中国共产党向穆斯林公民传达了一则讯息。他们重视宗教自由，特别侧重于不信仰的自由。宗教法规在今年在拥有1200万维吾尔族和其他穆斯林少数民族的西部地区新疆颁布，其中包含了严格限制穿插其中的世俗权利。修订后的规定对从宗教教学到清真寺建筑方方面面都实施了新的控制，必须体现中国风格。这些规定谈到极端分子扭曲思想，宣扬恐怖主义。为了防止这一点，规定中明确指出，任何组织或个人都不得诱导或强迫当地人相信或不相信任何宗教。

CHINA’s COMMUNIST PARTY has a message for Muslim citizens. It holds their religious freedoms dear—with a special emphasis on the freedom not to believe. The right to be secular runs like a thread through religious regulations enacted this year in Xinjiang, the far-western region that is home to 12m Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities. The revised rules impose new controls on everything from religious teaching to mosque architecture, which should reflect Chinese style. The regulations talk of extremists warping minds and promoting terrorism. To prevent this, the rules state, no organisations or individual shall induce or coerce locals to believe or not believe in any religion.

在某种程度上，这在委婉之词中加强了对宗教的控制，在2018年和2019年的一场安全运动中，这一地区或许有百万穆斯林居民被关进再教育营。在某种程度上，这是对一场老论点的复兴。相信或不相信的权利在中国宪法中有所规定。但同时也形成了一条宣传口号：即新疆的严格统治保护其居民的自由意志。

This is in part a euphemism for enhanced controls on religion—in a region that at the peak of a security campaign in 2018 and 2019 saw perhaps a million of its Muslim residents locked in re-education camps. In part, an old argument is being revived. The right to believe or not believe is in China’s constitution. But a propaganda line is also taking shape: namely, that harsh rule in Xinjiang protects its residents’ free will.

Chaguan是这些字从新疆东部写到的，他在斋戒月的最后几天待在那里，穆斯林在白天放弃食物和饮料。几次，普通的维吾尔人都传递出这是一个令人痛苦的斋月，期间被抓到在斋戒是有风险的。

Chaguan writes these words from eastern Xinjiang, where he spent the final days of the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims forswear food and drink during daylight hours. Several times ordinary Uyghurs signalled that this has been a distressing Ramadan, during which it was risky to be caught fasting.

在一个晚上的几个小时里，你的专栏作家看着数百名信徒走进首府乌鲁木齐的白大寺进行日落和深夜祈祷。在日落的仪式之后，这些信徒默默地离开，看不到清真寺以前为信徒准备的破晓饭，结束当天的斋戒。直到2015年，官方媒体还赞扬这些破晓饭。报纸拍摄了清真寺工作人员准备的羊肉、烤饼和西瓜的图片。但是今年，当地人说这些破晓饭已经消失了。

Over several hours one evening, your columnist watched hundreds of worshippers enter the Baida Si, or Great White Mosque, in the capital, Urumqi, for sunset and late-night prayers. After the session at sunset, those worshippers filed silently out, with no sign of the iftar supper that the mosque formerly served to believers, ending that day’s fast. As recently as 2015 those suppers were praised by official media. Newspapers photographed mosque workers preparing platters of lamb, flatbread and watermelon. Not this year, locals said. The iftar suppers are “no more”.

许多清真寺已经简单关闭。对虔诚的限制被称为选择的表达。Chaguan询问了清真寺警卫、工作人员和看起来具有权威的人，尽管他们拒绝透露身份，解释为什么他能看到很多维吾尔人在斋月期间吃饭。他们可以选择是否斋戒，是他们各异无常的答复，因为“我们的政府保证了宗教自由”。一个前清真寺的保安听到这疑问就恼火。他讥讽地说，当人们的肚子空着时，他们就会吃。

Many mosques have simply closed. Such limits to piety are called expressions of choice. Chaguan asked mosque guards, staff and men who appeared to wield authority, though they declined to identify themselves, to explain why he could see many Uyghurs eating during Ramadan. They can choose to fast or not, came the unvarying reply, because “our government guarantees religious freedom.” The very question annoyed a security guard in a former mosque. When people’s bellies are empty they will eat, he scoffed.

多年来，新疆政府招募经过官方认可的阿訇宣称新疆是历史上无以伦比的宗教自由之地。来自友好国家的外交官、政客和记者被邀请参加精心设计的旅行，宣称中国尊重伊斯兰教。在2021年在白大寺祈祷后，伊朗时任驻中国大使宣称新疆的穆斯林可以自由实践其信仰，并称赞那里的“柔软洁净”的清真寺地毯。如今，首选的论调是新疆正在与中国主流融合。今年三月，该地区党委书记马兴瑞称新疆伊斯兰教的中国化是一种必要的“必然趋势”。

For years the government in Xinjiang wheeled out party-approved imams to proclaim Xinjiang a place of religious freedoms “unparalleled in any past historical period”. Diplomats, politicians and journalists from friendly countries were invited on choreographed tours to declare China a respecter of Islam. After praying at the Baida mosque in 2021, Iran’s then-ambassador to China declared Xinjiang Muslims free to practise their faith, adding his praise for “soft and clean” mosque carpets. Now the preferred line is that Xinjiang is converging with the Chinese mainstream. In March the region’s party secretary, Ma Xingrui, called the “Sinicisation of Islam” in Xinjiang a necessary and “inevitable trend”.

明确的是，尽管对于各种各样的选择夸夸其谈，但对于虔诚者的选项正在变窄。在新疆进行独立报道带来了持续的危险对维吾尔人造成伤害。在访问期间，便衣特工步行和汽车跟踪着Chaguan。但即便如此，有四次他可以询问维吾尔人（包括一名警察）今年是否允许斋月，而没有被听到。他们几乎是同样的回答。“不好说”，他们说，或者“不敢说”，意思是这很难说，或者他们不敢说。当被问及是否禁止斋戒时，有人默默地点了点头。

To be clear, for all the boasts about choice, options for the pious are narrowing. Independent reporting in Xinjiang carries constant risks of harming Uyghurs. Plain-clothes agents followed Chaguan on foot and by car during his visit. Still, on four occasions it was possible to ask Uyghurs (including a police officer) whether Ramadan fasts were allowed this year, without being overheard. Their replies were almost identical. “Bu hao shuo,” they said, or “Bu gan shuo,” meaning that it is difficult to say or they dared not say. Asked if fasting is banned, one silently nodded.

从乌鲁木齐乘火车短程到达的是吐鲁番，一个大部分为维吾尔族的绿洲小镇，以其葡萄园而闻名。几年前，许多吐鲁番居民会在一座古老的土坯砖清真寺庆祝开斋节，这座清真寺矗立在一座美丽的18世纪高塔苏公塔的阴影下。现在，那座清真寺变成了一个博物馆。令人难以置信的是，博物馆工作人员坚持说这反映了当地的意愿。在安保控制室里，一个年长的汉族男子咆哮说，当人们想使用这座清真寺的时候，他们就使用了。现在他们不想来，所以才变成这样。他接着说，年长的汉族人担任阿訇的角色去世了，人们家附近有更多的清真寺。

A short train ride from Urumqi lies Turpan, a mostly Uyghur oasis town known for its vineyards. A few years ago many Turpan residents would celebrate Eid al-Fitr, the festival that marks Ramadan’s end, at an ancient adobe-brick mosque in the shadow of the Sugong Tower, a lovely 18th-century minaret. Now that mosque is a museum. Implausibly, museum staff insist that this reflects local wishes. An older Han Chinese man in the security control room growled that when people wanted to use this mosque, they did. Now they do not want to come, so do not. The imam was old and died, he went on, and people have mosques nearer their homes.

如果当地居民有能力畅所欲言的话，或许会有不同看法。一条名为解放路的绿树成荫的胡同从苏公塔通往吐鲁番市中心。在中途，一座名为康卡清真寺的现代建筑被反锁。更远的地方，冠祥清真寺的塔尖丢失。隔壁的优乐屋清真寺已经遭到部分拆除。很奇怪的是，其幸存的门户被混凝土板围着。当板块腐烂时，可以看到瓷砖柱子。

Locals might disagree—if they could speak freely. A tree-lined lane called Jiefang Lu (Liberation Road) leads from the Sugong Tower to central Turpan. Halfway down, the Kangka Mosque, a modern building decorated with floral paintings, is padlocked. Farther along, the Guanxiang Mosque has lost the tops to its minarets. Next door, the Youlewu Mosque has been part-demolished. Bizarrely, its surviving gateway is entombed in cement panels. Its tiled columns can be glimpsed where the panels have crumbled.

强制的世俗化并不止于此。解放路上许多房屋的入口大门上都有着色彩斑斓的瓷砖图片。其中几幅被涂抹或喷涂水泥污迹。在每种情况下，被掩盖的图像都是一座清真寺。

Forced secularisation does not stop there. Many houses on Jiefang Lu have colourful tiled pictures of landscapes over their entrance gates. Several are defaced with blotches of spray paint or cement. In each case the image being concealed is of a mosque.

在吐鲁番，今年的开斋节落在4月10日。黎明前凉爽、烟雾氤氲的黑暗中，几十位大多是老年男性步行前往东大清真寺参加开斋节祈祷（年轻人不得参加）。之后，他们肃立在一旁默默观看中国国旗在清真寺花园升旗时，一群官员高唱国歌。一个放大的声音用普通话喊道，“爱国是每个公民的责任”，然后宣布“后续会议和活动”。在周围的街道上，没有像其他穆斯林国家那样的欢快人群。中国统治者声称他们正在给新疆带来秩序与进步。他们称这才是真正的宗教自由。信徒们正在为此付出代价。■

In Turpan there was a palpable sadness to Eid al-Fitr, which fell on April 10th this year. In the cool, smoke-scented darkness before dawn, several dozen mostly old men walked to Eid prayers at the Dongda Mosque (the young may not attend services). Afterwards they stood in silent rows to watch China’s flag being raised in the mosque garden, as a gaggle of officials sang the national anthem. An amplified voice barked, in Mandarin, that “patriotism is the duty of every citizen”, before announcing “follow-up meetings and activities”. In surrounding streets, there were none of the happy crowds seen in other Muslim countries. China’s rulers say that they are bringing order and progress to Xinjiang. They call this true religious freedom. Believers are paying a price. ■

查阅更多《经济学人》专栏作家Chaguan撰写的关于中国的文章这里（4月4日）中国的低生育率困境（3月21日）为什么中国的信心危机得不到解决（3月7日）。

Read more from Chaguan, our columnist on China:China’s tin-eared approach to the world (Apr 4th)China’s low-fertility trap (Mar 21st)Why China’s confidence crisis goes unfixed (Mar 7th)

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美国 | 《亲情陷阱》 (United States | The parent trap)

美国的摇摆选民是谁？ (Who are the swing voters in America?)

我们审讯了一个包含4.9万人的数据集 (We interrogated a dataset of 49,000 people to find out)

在前两次总统竞选中，唐纳德·特朗普从未在整体选举民意调查中领先过一天。2016年，他在7月和9月的时候距离希拉里·克林顿仅有百分之一的差距，但在选举日民意调查中落后四个百分点。四年后，乔·拜登在整个竞选过程中一直以较大、稳定的优势领先特朗普，并最终以八个百分点的优势结束了竞选，根据民意调查机构的数据。在这两次竞选中，这些调查严重低估了特朗普在选举日特别是在摇摆州收到的支持。

DURING HIS two previous presidential campaigns, Donald Trump never led general-election polling averages for a single day. In 2016 he pulled within a percentage point of Hillary Clinton in July and September, but trailed in the opinion polls by four on election day. Four years later Joe Biden enjoyed a large, stable advantage over Mr Trump throughout the race, and ended it with an eight-point edge, according to pollsters. In both contests such surveys sharply underestimated the support Mr Trump received on election day, particularly in swing states.

今天，自1912年以来首位寻求重返总统职位的前总统在其政治生涯的民意调查中处于最强势的位置。特朗普去年9月首次在全国调查中略微领先现任总统拜登，并在2024年大部分时间内保持微弱领先。我们的全国民意调查追踪显示他们目前平分秋色，但州级调查显示特朗普在六个可能决定选举结果的州中的四个（亚利桑那州、佐治亚州、密歇根州、内华达州、宾夕法尼亚州和威斯康星州）中明显领先。

Today, the first former president seeking to return to office since 1912 is in the strongest position in polls of his electoral career. Mr Trump first inched ahead of Mr Biden, the incumbent, in national surveys last September, and has held a narrow lead for most of 2024. Our national poll tracker has them tied now, but state-level polls give Mr Trump clear leads in four of the six states that could plausibly decide the election (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin).

欲了解更多信息，请访问我们的美国简讯和我们的总统民意跟踪器.

Stay up to date with our new daily update, The US in brief, and our presidential poll tracker.

阅读更多关于 2024年美国大选的报道。

Read more of our coverage of the US elections of 2024.

特朗普明显政治复出的规模之外更令人惊讶的是其来源。深入了解这些选民样本，你会发现自2020年以来，白人选民的偏好变化不大，而长期以来一直是民主党支持基础的少数族裔群体却远离了拜登。特朗普还削弱了他的继任者在年轻选民中的优势，这是民主党的核心选民群体之一，在一些调查中，实际上在18-29岁人群中领先。

Even more surprising than the scale of Mr Trump’s apparent electoral renaissance is its source. Delve inside these samples of voters and you will see that white voters’ preferences have changed little since 2020, whereas racial-minority groups—long the bedrock of Democratic support—have lurched away from Mr Biden. Mr Trump has also cut into his successor’s advantage among young voters, another core Democratic constituency, and in some surveys actually leads among people aged 18-29.

然而，标准调查无法获得足够的数据深入挖掘这些群体，并确定根据目前趋势预计将把特朗普重新推上总统宝座的确切选民类型。至少，有一种信息来源幸运地没有受到这样的限制。每周，在线调查机构YouGov为《经济学人》调查了1500人，询问他们关于宗教、种族、投票意向和政治观点等广泛问题。自去年4月以来，该公司已从注册选民中获得了总共49,000份对2024年大选投票意向的调查反馈。其中有632人表示在2020年支持了拜登，现在支持特朗普，这超过了一个整个州级调查的标准规模。

However, standard surveys do not obtain enough data to drill down within these groups and identify the exact types of voters who, on current trends, are poised to return Mr Trump to office. At least one source of information, thankfully, does not suffer from such limitations. Every week YouGov, an online pollster, conducts a survey of 1,500 people for The Economist, asking a wide range of questions about religion, race, voting intentions and political views, among other things. Since last April the firm has obtained a total of 49,000 responses from registered voters to its question on general-election voting intentions in 2024. Among them are 632 who say they backed Mr Biden in 2020 and now support Mr Trump, more than the standard size of an entire state-level poll.

利用这一丰富的数据集，我们建立了一个投票意向的统计模型。基于调查受访者声称的候选人偏好与一系列广泛的人口特征之间的关系——从年龄和性别到具体州份和宗教信仰，该模型估计了具有这些属性组合的美国人打算今年投票给特朗普或拜登的概率，以及这样一个人回忆起2020年的投票情况。一些模式是众所周知的：白人福音派基督徒倾向于支持共和党，而黑人选民总体上仍然强烈支持民主党。然而，其他一些模式却不那么熟悉，并且许多自2020年以来已经发生了变化。您可以输入任何人口统计分析资料并探索该模型的研究结果，网址为：economist.com/us-voter。

Using this rich dataset, we have built a statistical model of voting intentions. Based on the relationships between poll respondents’ stated candidate preference and a wide range of demographic characteristics—ranging from age and sex to specific states and religious affiliations—it estimates the probability that an American with any particular combination of these attributes plans to vote for Mr Trump or Mr Biden this year, as well as how such a person recalls having voted in 2020. Some patterns are well known: white evangelical Christians tend to back Republicans, whereas black voters are still heavily Democratic overall. Others, however, are less familiar, and many have changed since 2020. You can plug in any demographic profile and explore the model’s findings at: economist.com/us-voter.

大多数美国人是可靠的党派支持者。相比之下，摇摆选民要用少数信息来识别要容易得多。尽管人们经常将种族作为美国的主要分裂线，但最佳的选民意向预测因素是宗教。仅了解受访者的宗教信仰（包括无神论者、不可知论者、“其他宗教”和“没有特定宗教信仰”）的模型可以正确识别他们偏好的两位主要候选人中哪位，达到62%的准确率，而种族的准确率为59%。73%的摩门教徒和福音派选民表示支持特朗普。这与天主教徒、东正教徒和非福音派基督徒的53%、犹太人的37%、不可知论者的22%以及坚定的无神论者的13%相比（见图表1）。不管信仰归属如何，一个人对宗教的重视程度越高，就越有可能成为特朗普的支持者。

Most Americans are reliable partisans. They are far easier to identify with a few pieces of information than swing voters are. Although race is often cited as the central cleavage in America, the single best predictor of voting intention is religion. A model that knows nothing save for respondents’ religious affiliations (including atheist, agnostic, “something else” and “nothing in particular”) can correctly identify which of the two leading candidates they prefer 62% of the time, compared with 59% for race. Of Mormons and evangelical voters, 73% say they support Mr Trump. This compares with 53% of Catholics, Orthodox Christians and non-evangelical Protestants, 37% of Jews, 22% of agnostics and just 13% of avowed atheists (see chart 1). Regardless of affiliation, the more importance someone places on religion, the more likely they are to be a Trump voter.

种族在塑造政治选择上也起着重要作用，但其影响因年龄和性别而异。根据YouGov的数据，在白人选民中，特朗普吸引更多女性年龄在18-24岁的支持（41%），而不是最年轻的男性（35%）。他的选票份额随着年龄增长而增加，男性的增长速度比女性快，直到50多岁：他赢得了55-59岁的白人女性中的59%，以及白人男性的70%。实际上，特朗普在生于动荡的60年代和70年代的嬉皮士中表现相对较差。他在最年长的白人选民中表现最佳，赢得了66%的女性八旬老人和75%的男性八旬老人。

Race does play a large role in shaping political choices as well, but its impact varies by age and sex. According to YouGov’s data, among white voters Mr Trump surprisingly attracts more support from women aged 18-24 (41%) than from the youngest men (35%). His vote shares rise with age, at a faster rate for men than for women, up to people in their late 50s: he wins 59% of white women aged 55-59, and 70% of white men. Mr Trump actually fares relatively poorly among the baby-boomers, who came of age during the turbulent 1960s and 70s. He does best of all with the oldest white voters, winning 66% of female octogenarians and 75% of male ones.

相比之下，对于黑人来说，年龄-党派倾向模式则相反。最年轻的黑人选民显然对特朗普感到好奇：21%的这样的女性以及惊人的33%的18-24岁男性表示他们计划支持他。但是随着每个年龄组的接连增长，对特朗普的支持和性别差距的大小都会缩小。在年龄为70岁或更高的黑人选民中，他们亲身经历了《民权法案》出台前的美国，特朗普仅赢得了10%的男性选民和6%的女性选民。

For black people, by contrast, the age-partisanship pattern is the opposite. The youngest black voters are decidedly Trump-curious: 21% of such women and a remarkable 33% of men aged 18-24 say they plan to support him. But with each successive age cohort, backing for Mr Trump and the size of the gender gap both shrink. Among black voters aged 70 or older, who have personal memories of America before the Civil Rights Act, Mr Trump wins just 10% of men and 6% of women.

也许最具误导性的变量是收入。将家庭收入与对特朗普的支持进行简单绘图显示，前总统在家庭年收入约为50,000美元的中产阶级选民中表现最佳，而在较穷和较富的选民中表现较差。然而，收入与其他人口统计类别密切相关：贫困选民中非白人比例偏高，而富裕选民往往是有大学学位的白人，这两个群体都倾向于民主党。

只有当你观察种族教育配对时——拥有研究生学位的黑人，或者未上过大学的西班牙裔——民主党与工人阶级之间的历史情感，以及共和党与富裕阶层之间的联系才会显现出来。总的来说，这些群体中收入最高的成员也是最支持特朗普的。相比之下，在具有相同教育水平和种族的人中，家庭中有工会成员的人比起受过一级教育的人对拜登的支持率高大约十个百分点。

Perhaps the most misleading variable is income. A simple plot of household income against support for Mr Trump shows that the former president does best among middle-class voters whose families earn around $50,000, and worse among both poorer and richer ones. However, income is also closely correlated with other demographic categories: poor voters are disproportionately non-white, whereas rich ones tend to be white with college degrees, and both of those groups lean Democratic.

在YouGov的调查中，这些人口特征很好地区分了拜登的选民和特朗普的选民。我们的完整模型还包括诸如住房所有权、婚姻状况、性取向以及居住在城市还是农村等变量，可以通过其他关于被调查者的数据推断出三分之二的受访者的选票意向。如果你输入自己的资料，这个模型认为你支持的候选人有大约75%的机会是被认为是更可能的选择。但要确定那些将引起从2020年选举结果中变化的选民中的细微变化——即那些在投票和不投票之间转换，或计划从另一候选人那里转换的选民——要困难得多。

Only when you look within race-education pairings—black people with graduate degrees, or Hispanics who did not attend college—do the historical affinities between Democrats and the working class, and between Republicans and the wealthy, reveal themselves. In general, the richest members of each of these groups are also the Trumpiest. In contrast, among people of the same education level and race, those whose households include a member of a labour union are around ten percentage points more likely to back Mr Biden—a slightly larger impact than moving up one tier of education (see chart 2).

特朗普自2020年以来获得的两个百分点的选票份额是来自三个来源。最大的群体是上次支持拜登的人，但现在对其犹豫不决，支持次要候选人或不打算投票的人，他们数量超过了同样从特朗普阵营转换的人。这些选民占特朗普两点提高中的0.9点。对于犹豫不决的前拜登选民来说，他们略年轻一些，更有可能是黑人或女性，较少上过大学，而重复投票给拜登的选民。

Taken together, the demographic characteristics in YouGov’s surveys do a good job of distinguishing Mr Biden’s voters from Mr Trump’s. Our full model, which also includes variables like home ownership, marital status, sexual orientation and residing in a city versus a rural area, can intuit the voting intentions of three-quarters of respondents based on other data about them. If you input your own profile, there is roughly a 75% chance that you support the candidate whom the model deems the likelier choice. But identifying the narrow sliver of voters who will account for changes from the results of 2020—those who are either switching between voting and not voting, or plan to flip from one candidate to the other—is far harder.

特朗普在进入或返回两大党选民中也享有优势。表示他们在2020年既没有为他也没有为拜登投票的人现在都支持特朗普的比例为3.7%，略高于3.3%选择拜登的人数。这一群体为特朗普的统计数据再增加了0.3点。

The two percentage points of vote share that Mr Trump has gained since 2020 come from three sources. The largest group is people who supported Mr Biden last time, but are now undecided, backing minor candidates or not planning to vote, who outnumber those making the same shift from Mr Trump’s camp. These voters account for 0.9 points of Mr Trump’s two-point improvement. Undecided former Biden voters are slightly younger, more likely to be black or female and less likely to have attended college than repeat Biden voters.

最后一个群体，摇摆选民，是最小但也最具影响力的。因为那些在两大党候选人之间转换的人既从一边减去一票，又从另一边增加一票，所以他们的重要性是转换为某候选人和根本不投票之间的人的两倍。这样的选民很少——只有3%的受访者属于这一类别——但特朗普赢得了其中三分之二。从拜登转向特朗普的参与者占2%，而相反情况只有1%，摇摆选民为特朗普的双方选票份额贡献了整整1个百分点。

Mr Trump also enjoys an edge among people entering or returning to the major-party electorate. The share who say they did not vote for either him or Mr Biden in 2020 but have now settled on Mr Trump is 3.7%, slightly above the 3.3% who are choosing Mr Biden. This group adds another 0.3 of a point to Mr Trump’s tally.

在当今极化的政治环境中，随着同一组候选人分别参加2020年和2024年的选举，有谁可能改变他们的选择？英国民调机构YouGov的数据支持了一种政治陈词滥调，即摇摆选民更关注“家庭问题”而不是激发忠诚党派的文化战议题。重复投票支持拜登的选民中，最常被提及为最重要的话题是气候和环境；民权、堕胎和枪支也是在领先之列。民主党寄希望于堕胎问题对于提振投票率的重要性，尤其是亚利桑那州最高法院裁定1864年的限制实施后，然而我们的数据表明这并不是摇摆选民的首要关注点。在共和党阵营中，移民在重复支持特朗普选民相应清单中居第二位，以及像税收和国家安全这样传统的共和党话题。

The final group, swing voters, is the smallest but also the most impactful. Because people who flip between the two major-party candidates both subtract a vote from one side and add one to the other, they matter twice as much as do those who switch between a candidate and not voting at all. Such voters are rare—just 3% of respondents fall into this category—but Mr Trump is winning two-thirds of them. With 2% of participants shifting from Mr Biden to Mr Trump versus just 1% doing the opposite, swing voters contribute a full percentage point to Mr Trump’s two-way vote share.

相比之下，拜登 - 特朗普摇摆选民最有可能将通货膨胀列为他们最关注的问题，其次是“就业和经济”。对于他们来说，医疗保健排名第三，而对于特朗普 - 拜登选民来说，则排在第一位，这表明拜登可能最好把他担任贝拉克·奥巴马副总统时通过的医疗改革捍卫作为核心竞选议题。

In today’s polarised political climate, with the same nominees running in both 2020 and 2024, who could possibly change their mind? One political cliché supported by YouGov’s data is that swing voters are far more focused on “kitchen-table” issues than on the culture-war subjects that animate reliable partisans. Among repeat Biden voters, the topics most often cited as most important are climate and the environment; civil rights, abortion and guns are also among the leaders. Democrats are placing a lot of hope on the importance of abortion to raise turnout, particularly after Arizona’s supreme court ruled that a ban on the practice for 1864 is enforceable, but our numbers suggest it is not a priority for swing voters. On the Republican side, immigration ranks second on the corresponding list for repeat Trump voters, as well as conventional Republican topics like taxes and national security.

拜登在倾向保守的非裔美国人中也失去了支持。到2020年，特朗普已经基本疏远了所有中间偏左的选民：在那一年回忆起支持过某一主要政党候选人的自称自由派选民中，拜登在每个种族群体中至少赢得了90%的支持。相比之下，尽管特朗普赢得了白人保守派中94%的双方选票，以及拉丁裔中的79%，但他实际上失去了认定为保守派的黑人选民，仅获得了35%的支持。今年，特朗普在赢得这一群体的全票支持上已处于悬崖边缘，获得了46%的已决定选民支持。同样的趋势也适用于注册投票的黑人受访者中的23%，他们表示不赞成拜登的工作表现。其中，9%的这一群体已经决定放弃上次支持拜登而转投特朗普，还有27%表示他们在2020年投票支持了拜登，但现在犹豫不决，支持第三方候选人或不打算投票。

By contrast, Biden-Trump swing voters are most likely to list inflation as their top issue, followed by “jobs and the economy”. Health care ranks third for them and first for Trump-Biden voters, suggesting that Mr Biden might be well-advised to make defending the health-care reform passed when he was Barack Obama’s vice-president a core campaign issue.

然而，YouGov的数据中最引人注目的模式可能是与意识形态无关的同样强有力的因素。与忠实的党派成员相比，摇摆选民更有可能有18岁以下子女：从拜登转向特朗普的人中，有47%目前正在抚养子女，而从特朗普转向拜登的人中，有40%正在抚养子女，而重复拜登选民中则有22%，保持一致投票给特朗普的人为19%。当种族和亲子关系的影响同时考虑时，这种差异显著。

Mr Biden has also lost ground among conservative-leaning African-Americans. By 2020 Mr Trump had already alienated virtually the entire left-of-centre electorate: among self-described liberals who recall supporting a major-party candidate that year, Mr Biden won at least 90% within each racial group. In contrast, although Mr Trump won 94% of the two-party vote among white conservatives and 79% of Hispanic ones, he actually lost black voters who identify as conservative, receiving just 35% of their support. This year, Mr Trump is on the brink of winning this group outright, with a 46% share among decided voters. A similar trend applies to the 23% of black respondents registered to vote who say that they disapprove of Mr Biden’s job performance. Of this group, 9% have already decided to flip to Mr Trump after backing Mr Biden last time, and a further 27% say that they voted for Mr Biden in 2020 but are now undecided, supporting a third-party candidate or do not plan to vote.

在2020年支持两个主要候选人之一并打算在今年选举中支持他们的人中，拥有正在上学子女的非白人受访者中，有10%从拜登转向特朗普；另有3%从特朗普转向拜登。而其他选民的对应数据为2%和1%。这些转投者似乎除了种族和子女之外没有任何共同的人口统计因素。在考虑了包括性别、教育、收入、宗教和地理位置在内的其他15个变量的统计模型中，作为非白人父母是2020年支持拜登 - 2024年支持特朗普的摇摆选民的第二好预测因素（仅次于年轻）。

The most intriguing pattern in YouGov’s data, however, is probably an equally powerful factor that has nothing to do with ideology. Compared with committed partisans, swing voters are vastly more likely to have children aged under 18: 47% of those flipping from Mr Biden to Mr Trump and 40% of those switching the other way are currently raising children, compared with 22% of repeat Biden voters and 19% of consistent Trump ones. And once the effects of race and parenthood are combined, the disparities are striking.

在YouGov的调查中，183名表示从拜登转向特朗普的非白人父母中，只有3%将教育列为选举中最重要的问题，相比之下，48%提及通货膨胀或经济。这表明他们比没有子女的选民更感到压力。这也可能表明养育子女具有某种特殊性。

Among people who backed one of the two leading candidates in 2020 and plan to do so this year, 10% of non-white respondents with school-age children are flipping from Mr Biden to Mr Trump; another 3% are switching from Mr Trump to Mr Biden. The corresponding figures for the rest of the electorate are 2% and 1%. These switchers do not seem to have any demographic factor in common besides their race and children. In a statistical model accounting for 15 other variables—including sex, education, income, religion and location—being a non-white parent is the second-best predictor (after being young) of being a Biden 2020-Trump 2024 swing voter.

可能的原因有很多，从对学校课程的担忧到家长反对对性别的进步观念。但影响非裔美国人子女家长不成比例的一件事是在新冠疫情期间的公共政策。在封锁期间，家长带着孩子在学校关闭的情况下带来了极大的困难。尽管封锁行动是在特朗普总统任内开始的，但它们持续到了拜登上任后，这是在新冠病毒疫苗出现后就更难被证明合理。教师工会与民主党结盟，支持学校关闭，尽管其他国家的证据或对学习损失的担忧。此外，在疫情期间联邦转移支付的扩大，尤其对于家长来说非常慷慨，也是在特朗普总统任内开始，在拜登总统上任后结束。

Of the 183 non-white parents in YouGov’s surveys who say they are switching from Mr Biden to Mr Trump, just 3% list education as the election’s most important issue, compared with 48% citing inflation or the economy. This suggests that they are feeling squeezed more than voters who do not have children. It may also suggest that there is something about raising children.

非白人学生比白人学生更有可能在疫情期间接受完全远程教育。而非白人父母异常地容易从事需要亲自到场的工作。到2020年时，大多数对封锁感到不满的白人工薪阶层父母已经坚定支持共和党，限制了这一群体中可能倒戈给拜登的选民数量。相比之下，拜登总统在那一年赢得了大多数非白人选民的支持，因此激怒他们将导致更高的选举成本。拜登总统在11月面临着一个家长陷阱。 ■

There is no shortage of possible culprits, from concern about school curriculums to a parental reaction against progressive ideas on gender. But one thing that affected non-white parents of schoolchildren disproportionately was public policy during the covid-19 pandemic. Lockdowns were unusually difficult for parents raising children, who had to watch their kids while schools were closed. And although lockdowns began during Mr Trump’s presidency, they persisted well into Mr Biden’s term, after the advent of covid vaccines made them harder to justify. Teachers’ unions, allied with the Democratic Party, embraced school closures despite evidence from other countries or concerns about learning loss. Moreover, the expansion of federal transfer payments during the pandemic, which were particularly generous for parents, also began under Mr Trump and ended under Mr Biden.

Non-white students were much likelier than white ones to have had fully remote education during the pandemic. And non-white parents were unusually prone to have jobs that required showing up in person. Most white working-class parents who were upset about lockdowns were already solidly Republican by 2020, limiting the number of voters from this group available to defect from Mr Biden. In contrast, the president won large majorities of non-white voters that year, so angering them was far more electorally costly. Mr Biden faces a parent trap in November. ■

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美国 | 诽谤 (United States | Mud slinging)

迈克·约翰逊可能不得不在乌克兰援助和他的工作之间做出选择 (Mike Johnson may have to choose between Ukraine aid and his job)

这位共和党众议院发言人被自己阵营中的强硬派困住 (The Republican House speaker is trapped by hardliners on his own side)

请为被困在众议院议长位置上的迈克·约翰逊先生多加一些怜悯。六个月前，作为前任议长凯文·麦卡锡被难以驾驭的共和党多数派赶下台，这位相对不知名的国会议员被推上领导岗位，如果他做了似乎他认为自己必须做的事情，那么他也可能会被迫离开――向乌克兰提供额外的军事援助，尽管他的党内孤立主义派反对这么做。

SPARE SOME pity for Mike Johnson, the stuck speaker of the House of Representatives. A relatively obscure congressman thrust into leadership six months ago when the ungovernable Republican majority threw out the former speaker, Kevin McCarthy, Mr Johnson may be defenestrated too if he does something that he seems to think that he must: provide additional military aid to Ukraine, over the objections of the isolationist wing of his party.

尽管欧盟及其成员国已对乌克兰的预算和人道主义需求做出了相当大的贡献，美国一直是乌克兰最大的军事援助提供国，自俄罗斯于2022年2月入侵以来提供了440亿美元的援助。但是进一步的帮助已经停滞数月。在2023年10月，总统乔·拜登提议国会拨款600亿美元给乌克兰，作为一项安全法案的一部分，该法案将再花450亿美元用于美国南部边境的安全以及向以色列和台湾等盟友提供武器。

While the European Union and its member countries have contributed considerably to Ukraine’s budget and humanitarian needs, America has been Ukraine’s largest provider of military aid, amounting to $44bn since Russia’s invasion in February 2022. But further help has been stuck for months. In October 2023 President Joe Biden proposed that Congress appropriate $60bn for Ukraine as part of a security bill that would have spent a further $45bn on securing America’s southern border and on arming allies like Israel and Taiwan.

六个月的国会风波之后，总统卓越这样的国会骚乱，但什么都没有送到总统的办公桌上。 俄克拉何马州的共和党参议员詹姆斯·兰克福特花了数月时间就一项更强硬的南部边境妥协方案进行谈判，以附带援助方案，然而在2023年2月提出后，他所在的党派在仅三天内摧毁了这个提案，因为党派的总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普拒绝支持，认为这会让拜登在竞选年赢得胜利。参议院随后通过了一项价值950亿美元的援助法案，没有任何边境条款，然后约翰逊拒绝并拒绝提请投票。

Six months of congressional Sturm und Drang ensued, but nothing has come to the president’s desk. One Republican senator, James Lankford of Oklahoma, spent months negotiating a harder-line compromise on the southern border to accompany the aid package, only for his own party to torpedo it in a matter of three days after its unveiling in February because Donald Trump, the party’s presumptive presidential nominee, rejected it for giving Mr Biden an election-year win. The Senate then passed a $95bn aid bill without any border provisions, which Mr Johnson then rejected and refused to bring up for a vote.

当外交政策被置于国内政治之下时，就像对乌克兰和以色列所发生的那样，往往会导致不一致。 你可以从约翰逊先生自己的言论的短期历史中看到这一点。在任命为议长之前，约翰逊先生是特朗普的追随者，对乌克兰持怀疑态度，在2023年9月投票反对一项仅为3亿美元的军事援助法案。在获得最高职务后的十月，他的态度变得更加支持，表示弗拉基米尔·普京不能胜利。十二月时他称，必须将这项必要的援助与拜登的边境政策全面改革相配合，而这将是他愿意“决一死战”的地方。二月时，当拜登宣布计划通过行政手段保障边境安全后，共和党人未能达成的参议院协议失败后，约翰逊批评那些“竞选年的花招”，尽管之前他曾呼吁拜登做出这样的行动。三月时他称将在复活节后公布一项新的乌克兰援助计划。

When foreign policy is subordinated to domestic politics, as has happened with Ukraine and Israel, incoherence often follows. You can see this in the short history of Mr Johnson’s own pronouncements. Before he was appointed speaker, Mr Johnson was a Trump-following Ukraine-sceptic, voting against a small $300m military-aid bill in September 2023. In October, after getting the top job, he sounded more supportive, saying that Vladimir Putin must not win. In December he said that this necessary aid must be paired with sweeping reforms to Mr Biden’s border policy, which would be his “hill to die on”. In February, when Mr Biden announced plans to secure the border through executive action after the failure of the bipartisan Senate deal, Mr Johnson denounced them as “election-year gimmicks”—despite having previously called for him to do exactly that. In March he said that he would unveil a new plan for Ukraine aid after Easter.

尽管复活节的彩蛋停止了滚动，但约翰逊先生尚未公布他的计划，细节并未广泛分享。 有关传言的许多内容旨在安抚他党内孤立派：对乌克兰的援助将被标记为可免还贷款而非直接援助（遵循特朗普的建议）；一些资金将通过收回目前被冻结的俄罗斯资产进行收回（尽管这些资产更多在欧盟而非美国）；拜登将不得不耐心忍受通过推翻他最近宣布的新液化天然气出口项目暂停的决定而受到的侮辱。

The eggs have stopped rolling, but Mr Johnson is yet to release his plan, the details of which are not being shared widely. Many of the rumoured components are designed to mollify the isolationists in his party: aid to Ukraine would be labelled as a forgivable loan rather than direct aid (following a suggestion of Mr Trump’s); some of the funding would be recouped by seizing Russian assets that are currently frozen (though many more of these are in the EU than the US); and Mr Biden would have to endure a poke in the eye by overturning his recently announced moratorium on new export projects for liquefied natural gas.

民主党人可能不情愿接受环境法规的倒退；对约翰逊先生的真正障碍将是他自己的政党。 乔治亚州共和党众议员玛乔丽·泰勒·格林已经针对他寻求民主党支持以获得乌克兰资金的举动提出了“撤销提议”。格林可能是该党最亲普京的成员，不可思议地在本周的一次广播采访中说乌克兰在攻击基督教，而俄罗斯正在“保护”它。** 但共和党多数席位非常微弱，这意味着少数叛徒可能会废黜约翰逊先生。

Democrats might grumpily accept even the environmental rollback; the real hindrance to Mr Johnson will be his own party. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Republican congresswoman from Georgia, has filed a “motion to vacate” Mr Johnson from his leadership, were he to secure Ukraine funding by relying on Democratic support. Ms Greene is probably the most Putin-friendly member of the party—bizarrely saying in a radio interview this week that Ukraine was attacking Christianity while Russia was “protecting it”—but the Republican majority is razor-thin, meaning that a few defectors could cast off Mr Johnson.

有人认为，约翰逊先生可能只是不得不接受他无法既给乌克兰提供武器又保住自己的工作的事实。 “那么他将成为历史上敢做正确事情的勇敢榜样。我们现在需要的是温斯顿·丘吉尔（Winston Churchill），而不是[内维尔]张伯伦（Neville Chamberlain），”内布拉斯加州共和党国会议员唐·培根说道。培根是乌克兰资助的坚定支持者，制定了一项所谓的解职请愿书，如果众议院多数成员签署该请愿书，就可以绕过议长，直接将一项法案提请投票。这份备受华盛顿焦虑的欧洲外交官密切关注的解职请愿书是一种非传统的议会工具。虽然成功机会渺茫，但它的存在至少给约翰逊先生提供了一些与自己的强硬派谈判的筹码。**

Some think that Mr Johnson might simply have to accept that he cannot both arm Ukraine and keep his job. “Then he’ll go down in history as being a profile in courage who does the right thing. We need Winston Churchills right now, not [Neville] Chamberlains,” says Don Bacon, a Republican congressman representing Nebraska. Mr Bacon has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine funding, crafting a so-called discharge petition which could circumvent the speaker and bring a bill directly to the floor for a vote if a majority of House members were to sign on. The discharge petition, which has been closely watched by anxious European diplomats in Washington, is an unconventional parliamentary tool. It is still a long shot, but its existence gives Mr Johnson at least some leverage with his own hardliners.

像格林女士这样的批评者不太可能被安抚。但在这种情况下，国会的犹豫不决的代价是相当真实的。上周，俄罗斯国防部长谢尔盖·绍伊古宣布，他的军队已经从乌克兰军队手中夺取了400平方公里的领土，导致乌克兰人被迫节省弹药（乌克兰总面积超过600,000平方公里，但情势不妙）。乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基表示，“如果国会不帮助乌克兰，乌克兰将输掉这场战争。” ■

Critics like Ms Greene are unlikely to be placated. But the cost of congressional dithering is in this case quite real. Last week Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister, announced that his army had captured 400 square kilometres of territory from the Ukrainians, who have been forced to conserve ammunition (Ukraine is over 600,000 square kilometeres, but the trend is not good). Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has said that “if the Congress doesn’t help Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war.” ■

回到目录

美国 | 冲浪城市倒戈支持MAGA (United States | Surf City goes MAGA)

加州一个海滩小镇如何成为加文·纽森的宿敌 (How one California beach town became Gavin Newsom’s nemesis)

亨廷顿海滩向极右转变代表了现代加州共和主义的典型。 (Huntington Beach’s hard-right turn is typical of modern California Republicanism)

华丽的加利福尼亚州奥兰治县的一个田园般的城市，不是你会预料到会遇到一个自称是无产阶级的冠军的地方。亨廷顿海滩最初以石油（当地高中的吉祥物仍然是油轮队）和冲浪而闻名。然而，共和党市长格雷西·范德马克却认为自己和她的城市是这样的。最近一篇洛杉矶时报专栏的复印本挂在她办公室的墙上，其中建议（半开玩笑地）唐纳德·特朗普应该选择她作为副总统候选人。她说其他城市害怕加利福尼亚州民主党州长加文·纽森，“因为他表现得像一个暴君”。

AN IDYLLIC CITY in swanky Orange County, California, is not where you would expect to encounter a self-professed champion of the proletariat. Huntington Beach was first known for oil (the high school’s mascot is still the Oilers), then for surfing. Yet that is how Gracey Van Der Mark, its Republican mayor, sees herself and her city. A framed copy of a recent Los Angeles Times column suggesting (half facetiously) that Donald Trump should pick her for his vice-president hangs on her office wall. She says other cities are afraid of Gavin Newsom, the state’s Democratic governor, “because he’s acting like a tyrant”.

纽森先生所谓的暴政源于他的管理部门坚持认为城市应该建设更多住房，这正是这个州迫切需要的，而许多拥有富裕居民和大量海滩别墅的城市却对此心存怨恨。在范德马克的眼中，这还不是纽森的唯一罪行。亨廷顿海滩在几个方面与州政府对抗，从住房监管到选举规则再到飞扬的同志骄傲旗帜。这座城市对纽森先生的不明智的抗争代表了加利福尼亚州许多共和党选区与自由主义州政府之间的摩擦，也代表了特朗普时代加利福尼亚州共和党的发展。

Mr Newsom’s alleged tyranny stems from his administration’s insistence that cities should build more housing, which the state badly needs and which many cities with wealthy residents and scores of beach-front bungalows resent. That is not his only crime, in the eyes of Ms Van Der Mark. Huntington Beach is fighting the state on several fronts, from housing regulations to voting rules to the flying of the gay-pride flag. The city’s ill-advised battles against Mr Newsom are emblematic of the friction between California’s many Republican pockets and the liberal state government; and of the evolution of California’s Republican Party during the Trump era.

随时掌握我们的新每日更新，《美国简讯》，以及我们的总统民意调查追踪器。

Stay up to date with our new daily update, The US in brief, and our presidential poll tracker.

阅读更多我们关于2024年美国选举的报道。

Read more of our coverage of the US elections of 2024.

约有41%的亨廷顿海滩居民是注册共和党人，使他们成为该市最大的政治派系。但最近该市的共和主义风格已经发生了变化。在2022年，范德马克女士和几位MAGA同志以联盟组织形式竞选市议会。所有人都当选了，现在他们与三位民主党人一起服务，尽管该地方的地方选举在技术上是无党派的。市议会上的民主党人朗达·博尔顿表示，该机构的政治已经变得像美国众议院的有毒淤泥。

Some 41% of Huntington Beach residents are registered Republicans, making them the city’s largest political tribe. But lately the city’s flavour of Republicanism has changed. In 2022 Ms Van Der Mark and several MAGA compatriots ran for the city council as a slate. All were elected, and now serve alongside three Democrats—though local elections there are technically non-partisan. Rhonda Bolton, a Democrat on the council, says the body’s politics have become a poisonous sludge that bears a passing resemblance to America’s House of Representatives.

这并不是亨廷顿海滩和州政府位于萨克拉门托的政府就住房问题发生分歧的第一次。2019年，该州曾起诉该市据称阻止新开发。这次麻烦的根源在于该市未能批准建设住房以满足预计需求的计划，这是该州每个地方政府都必须完成的流程。该州和该市互相起诉了对方。该市的诉讼声称州政府不能强迫地方政府建设，最终被驳回。该州的诉讼仍在等待中。

This is not the first time Huntington Beach and the state, whose government sits in Sacramento, have been at loggerheads over housing. In 2019 the state sued the city for allegedly blocking new development. The trouble this time stems from the city’s failure to approve plans to build housing to meet projected demand, a process that every local government in the state must complete. The state and city sued each other over the matter. The city’s case, arguing that the state cannot force localities to build, was tossed out. The state’s suit is still pending.

市议会在三月的初选中提出了几项有争议的措施，其中包括一项将引入选民身份证规则的提案。加利福尼亚州的司法部长和负责选举流程的州务卿警告该市，该措施违反了州法。但这项提案仍然被通过。另一场法律战可能即将展开。

The city council put several contentious measures on the primary ballot in March, including one that would introduce voter-ID rules. California’s attorney-general and secretary of state, who is in charge of voting processes, warned the city that such a measure contravenes state law. The measure passed anyway. Another legal battle probably awaits.

范德马克认为，亨廷顿海滩可以制定自己的住房和选举规则，因为它是一个特许城市。加利福尼亚州宪法中的“自治权”规定允许这些城市（采用了一种地方宪法）“在市政事务上制定和执行所有法令和法规”。但该州宪法没有定义“市政事务”，这让法庭来决定何为适当。加利福尼亚州超过五分之一的城市都有特许。但亨廷顿海滩已成为自治权的最大倡导者。“萨克拉门托正在以我们为例子来对待其他城市，”范德马克说道。至少在这一点上，市和州是达成一致的。

Ms Van Der Mark argues that Huntington Beach can set its own housing and voting rules because it is a charter city. A “home rule” provision in California’s constitution holds that such cities, which have adopted a kind of local constitution, can “make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs”. But the state’s constitution does not define “municipal affairs”, leaving the courts to decide what is appropriate. More than a fifth of all cities in California have a charter. But Huntington Beach has become the biggest cheerleader for home rule. “Sacramento is using us as an example for every other city,” says Ms Van Der Mark. On this, at least, the city and state agree.

加利福尼亚州共和党人经常比他们东部同行更为温和。作为州长，罗纳德·里根支持一些环境保护措施。阿诺德·施瓦辛格走遍全球警告气候变化。然而，特朗普的影响力证明对于这样的温和而言太过强大。

California Republicans were often more moderate than their eastern peers. As governor, Ronald Reagan favoured some environmental protections. Arnold Schwarzenegger travelled the globe warning about climate change. Yet Mr Trump’s influence has proved too powerful for such moderation to persist.

博尔顿女士表示，她相信大多数亨廷顿海滩居民比市议会更加温和，不会容忍这样的狡猾太久。但选举周期对她不利。在11月，选民将有机会罢免她和其他民主党人。范德马克将于2026年才需要竞选连任。关于她是特朗普在奥兰治县的忠诚士兵的观点令她感到开心，但她坚持除非“在别处需要”，否则她不会竞选更高职务。■

Ms Bolton says she believes most Huntington Beach residents are more moderate than the council, and will not stand for such chicanery for long. But the election cycle is against her. In November voters will get the chance to oust her and the other Democrats. Ms Van Der Mark is not up for re-election until 2026. She was tickled by the column suggesting that she is Mr Trump’s loyal soldier in Orange County, but insists she will not run for higher office unless she “is needed somewhere”.■

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美国 | 泽西州 (United States | Jersey unsure)

新泽西的选举程序刚刚被颠覆 (New Jersey’s electoral process just got upended)

安迪·金正在与一些高级政治权术作斗争。 (Andy Kim is fighting against some high-level political arcana)

鲍勃·梅南德兹，新泽西州资深参议员，被控腐败的第二天，众议员安迪·金宣布将在即将到来的参议院竞选中挑战他的强大的民主党同僚。但对他竞选的更大障碍并非是梅南德兹，他在民主党中的支持迅速消失。而是一个过时的初选制度，名为县级联盟。新泽西是美国唯一一个结合县党主席的背书，并为受推举者提供选票上的黄金位置的州。

THE DAY after Bob Menendez, New Jersey’s senior senator, was indicted for corruption, Andy Kim, a congressman, announced he would take on his powerful fellow Democrat in the upcoming Senate race. But the bigger obstacle to his bid was not Mr Menendez, whose support among Democrats quickly disappeared. It was an archaic primary process called the county line. New Jersey is the only state in America which brackets endorsements made by county party chairs and gives endorsees prime real estate on the ballot.

党派领袖偏袒其候选人。不在县级联盟上的候选人则被藏匿在晦涩的行和列中。罗格斯大学的朱莉娅·萨斯·鲁宾研究了新泽西20年的选举，发现县级联盟将选民引导，并通过平均38%的差异帮助偏爱的候选人。另一项研究发现，县级联盟的好处范围从4到28个百分点不等。

Party leaders give preferential placement to their candidates. Those not on the county line are tucked away in obscure rows and columns. Julia Sass Rubin of Rutgers University looked at 20 years of New Jersey races and found that the county line steered voters and helped preferred candidates by an average difference of 38%. Another study found county-line benefits ranged from four to 28 percentage points.

金在正式参加参议院竞选之前公开反对县级联盟，并无意挑战这个陈旧的制度。但后来新泽西州州长的妻子泰米·墨菲宣布参加竞选。她立即获得了党派领袖的认可。她的人脉几乎保证了她在县级联盟中的位置。金提起联邦诉讼，断言该系统违宪。

Stay up to date with our new daily update, The US in brief, and our presidential poll tracker.

金表示，一些政客告诉他，他们无法公开发声，因为他们担心县主席会取消他们的位置。他还指责了冷漠。“哦，这只是新泽西的一贯做法”情绪根深蒂固。同样破损的系统多年来保护了梅南德兹。金说，“在全州性的美国参议院竞选中提起一项将影响我党的党派领袖的诉讼，这是令人紧张的。”

Read more of our coverage of the US elections of 2024.

但后来，金赢得了一些县的认可，并在民意调查中超过了墨菲。上个月，她退出了竞选。梅南德兹表示不会参加民主党初选。一位联邦法官裁定支持金。县级联盟系统的消亡可能会影响参议院竞选和明年的州长竞选。“我认为对于新泽西未来的政治来说这有多么重要，是不可低估的。”政治研究所的阿什利·科宁如是说。■

Mr Kim, who publicly opposed county lines before he got into the Senate race, had not intended to take on the antiquated system. But then Tammy Murphy, the wife of New Jersey’s governor, announced her candidacy. She immediately won endorsements from party leaders. Her connections all but guaranteed her county-line placement. Mr Kim filed a federal lawsuit asserting the system was unconstitutional.

Mr Kim says a number of politicos told him that they couldn’t speak out because they were worried their county chair would remove them from the line. He also blames apathy. The “well, that’s just Jersey” sentiment was entrenched. The same broken system protected Mr Menendez for years. “It was nerve-racking,” says Mr Kim, “in the middle of a statewide US Senate campaign to file a lawsuit that’s going to affect the party leaders of my own party.”

But then Mr Kim won some county endorsements and edged ahead of Mrs Murphy in polls. Last month she dropped out of the race. Mr Menendez said he would not run in the Democratic primary. And a federal judge ruled in Mr Kim’s favour. The demise of the county-lines system could affect the Senate race and next year’s governor’s race. “I don’t think it can be understated how big this is for New Jersey politics going forward,” says Ashley Koning of the Eagleton Institute of Politics. ■

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美国 | 校园保守派 (United States | Conservatives on campus)

左倾偏见的挑战进入美国公立大学 (A challenge to leftist bias moves into America’s public universities)

佛罗里达州引领反对主流进步主义的努力。 (Florida leads a push against prevailing progressivism)

1951年，一位25岁的耶鲁大学毕业生发表了一篇长达240页的论文，抨击母校的左倾偏见。这本书奠定了威廉·F·巴克利的事业，成为战后时代最有影响力的保守派知识分子。尽管巴克利成功地重塑了共和党，但他针对学术界的斗争则不太成功。保守派仍未放弃改变学术界的努力。当前最具推进改革动力的地方在于公立大学系统。特别是在佛罗里达州，三位耶鲁大学校友怀着雄心勃勃的计划致力于改变未来的高等教育。

In 1951 a 25-year-old Yale graduate published a 240-page polemic inveighing against his alma mater’s left-leaning bias. The book launched the career of William F. Buckley, the most influential conservative intellectual of the post-war era. Although Buckley managed to reshape the Republican Party, his war against academia proved less successful. Conservatives still haven’t given up on changing the academy. The most robust reform momentum now is building at public university systems. In Florida, in particular, a trio of Yale alumni have ambitious plans to change the future of higher education.

佛罗里达州州长罗恩·德桑特斯，于2001年毕业于耶鲁大学，喜欢说他的州是“觉醒结束的地方”。在大学里，他实施了教职终身评审制度，批评者称这削弱了学术自由，并且利用他的任命权来影响机构。在佛罗里达新学院，这所公立文理学院曾经是进步主义的堡垒，他任命了新的董事会成员解雇了校长，并用一位前共和党议员取而代之。许多教职员工和学生离开了。

Ron DeSantis, the governor of Florida, who graduated from Yale in 2001, likes to say that his state is “where woke goes to die”. In universities he put in place a tenure-review process, which critics say weakened academic freedom, and he has used his appointment powers to influence institutions. At New College of Florida, a public liberal-arts college that had been a bastion of progressivism, he appointed new trustees who fired the president and replaced him with a former Republican lawmaker. Scores of faculty and students left.

佛罗里达新学院在2022年秋季拥有不到700名学生，引起了全国的关注。然而，在佛罗里达大学（UF），这所州旗舰大学和约6万名学生的所在地，正在进行更为重大的改革。它是美国顶尖公立大学之一。它也提供了一个越来越具吸引力的交易：本学年的本州学生学费和费用仅为6380美元。

New College, which had fewer than 700 students in the autumn of 2022, has drawn national attention. Yet much more consequential reforms are under way at the University of Florida (UF), the state’s flagship university and home to some 60,000 students. It ranks as one of the top public universities in America. It also offers an increasingly attractive bargain: undergraduate tuition and fees are only $6,380 this academic year for in-state students.

本·萨斯，一位前共和党参议员，于2023年2月成为UF的校长，他表示生产能够在充满变革的就业市场中蓬勃发展的毕业生是他使命的核心。他仍然相信这其中应该包括学习人文科学的基本部分。但是，萨斯先生在耶鲁大学获得历史博士学位，表示大多数大学的人文学科学院“不太确定目前他们的目的是什么”。核心课程对受过教育的公民非常重要，但你必须要证明你是在探讨那些重大、广泛、有意义和持久的事物。他认为这不是右翼项目，而是古典自由主义项目。UF的新汉密尔顿中心正是这一理念的核心。

Ben Sasse, a former Republican senator who became UF’s president in February 2023, says that producing graduates who can thrive in a disruptive jobs market is at the heart of his mission. He still believes a fundamental part of this ought to be learning about the liberal arts. But, says Mr Sasse, who earned a doctorate in history at Yale, humanities faculties at most universities are not “sure what their purpose is right now”. A core curriculum is “incredibly important for an educated citizenry, but you have to be making a case that you’re speaking to things that are big and broad and meaningful and enduring.” He argues that this isn’t a right-wing project but a classically liberal one. And at the heart of it is UF’s new Hamilton Centre.

2022年由佛罗里达立法机构授权成立的汉密尔顿中心是对西方文明吸引力的3000万美元赌注。萨斯先生表示，他打算让汉密尔顿成为UF的第17个学院（加入现有的商学院、工程学院、法学院、医学院和药学院等）。明年，中心将开始开设两个专业：哲学、政治、经济学和法律；以及伟大的著作和思想。

Authorised by the Florida legislature in 2022, the centre is a $30m wager on the appeal of Western civilisation. Mr Sasse has said that he intends Hamilton to become UF’s 17th college (joining existing ones such as those for business, engineering, law, medicine and pharmacy). Next year it will begin offering two majors: philosophy, politics, economics and law; and great books and ideas.

汉密尔顿中心主任威尔·英博登希望UF成为美国西方文明顶尖项目。中心已经在UF庞大校园中一个拥挤的空间里雇用了十几名教员，这个校园以佛罗里达犊鞍队的橄榄球体育场为主导。它将再雇用数十名员工，并最终将搬到自己的建筑中。英博登表示，该策略的一部分是寻找现代人文学科部门忽视的领域的教员，比如军事和外交历史。他还支持公共面向的学者。

Will Inboden, Hamilton’s director, wants UF to have America’s top programme in Western civilisation. The centre already employs a dozen faculty members in a cramped space on UF’s sprawling campus, dominated by the Florida Gators’ football stadium. It is hiring dozens more and eventually will move to its own building. Mr Imboden says part of the strategy is to seek out faculty in fields neglected by modern humanities departments, such as military and diplomatic history. He also favours public-facing academics.

英博登先生和萨斯先生一起在耶鲁大学攻读研究生，都曾在乔治·W·布什政府任职。但英博登认为汉密尔顿中心是一个“前政治”项目。“学生对被灌输观点非常谨慎，”他说。“在校园内进行渐进主义灌输的答案不是保守派的反灌输。”

Mr Inboden and Mr Sasse, who attended graduate school at Yale together, both served in the administration of George W. Bush. But Mr Inboden argues that the Hamilton Centre is a “pre-political” project. “Students are pretty leery of being indoctrinated,” he says. “The answer to progressive indoctrination on campuses is not conservative counter-indoctrination.”

汉密尔顿中心本科生事务主管吉尔·英格拉姆也对避免被视为一个政治化实体的名声表示了赞同。“我们有兴趣为学生提供思考的工具和实践，同时也重新赏识参与美国建国过程的文本和思想。”

Jill Ingram, Hamilton’s director of undergraduate students, echoes the desire to avoid a reputation of being a politicised entity. “We’re interested in giving students the tools and the practice to think for themselves, but also to bring back an appreciation for the texts and the ideas that were involved in the founding of America.”

中心在校园内的反应褒贬不一。一名学生回忆说曾告诉顾问她计划通过中心申请奖学金：“她说，‘不要申请那个。那是一群右翼风暴部队。’”然而，许多从汉密尔顿教员那里学习课程的学生甚至不知道这个中心本身存在。与该中心有所联系的学生来自各种政治背景。

The centre has received a mixed reception on campus. One student recalls telling an adviser that she planned to apply for a fellowship through the centre: “She was, like, ‘Don’t apply for that. It’s a bunch of right-wing storm troopers.’” Yet many who take classes from Hamilton faculty aren’t even aware the centre exists as its own entity. Students associated with it come from a variety of political backgrounds.

佛罗里达并非孤身一人。其他专注于公民思想的新学校所在的州还包括亚利桑那州、北卡罗来纳州、田纳西州和得克萨斯州。亚利桑那州立大学的公民和经济思想领导学院是由共和党州议会资助的。当民主党人凯蒂·霍布斯于2023年成为州长时，似乎该学院的前景不妙：霍布斯女士将该学校贴上“自由主义者”的标签，并提议重新分配资金。然而，经过一番辩论，民主党退缩了。

Florida is not alone. Other states with new schools focusing on civic thought include Arizona, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. A Republican state legislature funded Arizona State University’s School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership. When a Democrat, Katie Hobbs, became governor in 2023, it seemed its days might be numbered: Ms Hobbs labelled the school “libertarian” and proposed reallocating the funding. After some debate, however, Democrats backed down.

像汉密尔顿中心这样的地方将面临两个相关的挑战。寻找越来越多机构的教师未来可能会更加困难。更加困难的将是避免成为其大学内的保守主义聚居区。

Places like the Hamilton Centre will face two related challenges. Finding faculty for a growing number of institutions could become harder in the years ahead. Harder still will be to avoid becoming conservative ghettos within their universities.

佛罗里达州立大学系统的校长雷·罗德里格斯表示，目标是为所有人提供更好的通识教育课程。他和他的同事们还立志培养将会影响新一代的学者：“如果说，到最后，我们所做的仅仅是将保守派学者从一所机构换到另一所机构，那么我们就失败了。”■

Ray Rodrigues, the chancellor of the State University System of Florida, says the goal is to offer better general-education courses to all. He and his colleagues also aspire to create scholars who will influence new generations: “If, at the end of the day, what we’re doing is merely trading conservative scholars from one institution to another, then we have failed.”■

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商业 | 断开连接 (Business | Unplugged)

认为特斯拉遇到麻烦了？更可怜那些想要成为其竞争对手的电动汽车新秀们 (Think Tesla is in trouble? Pity even more its wannabe EV rivals)

一大批电动汽车初创公司正艰难维持经营。 (A fleet of electric-car startups is struggling to stay in business)

最近几个月，特斯拉经历了一段坎坷的时期。今年一月，这家电动汽车（EV）先驱警告称，由于消费者对电池动力的热情在减退，公司的增长将会“明显减缓”。同一月，由于红海地区的动荡引发了供应中断，特斯拉不得不暂停了位于柏林附近的巨大工厂的大部分生产。在全球最大的EV市场中国，特斯拉的市场份额正在下滑，因为他们正在抵御来自本土更便宜竞争对手的挑战，特别是来自比亚迪这样的公司，去年底曾短暂地超过特斯拉成为全球最大的EV制造商。

IN RECENT MONTHS Tesla has had a bumpy ride. In January the electric-vehicle (EV) pioneer warned that growth would be “notably lower” this year, as motorists’ enthusiasm for battery power loses charge. The same month it had to suspend most production at its giant factory near Berlin because of supply disruptions caused by turmoil in the Red Sea. Its market share in China, the world’s biggest EV market, is falling as it fends off cheaper local competition, especially from BYD, which late last year briefly eclipsed Tesla as the world’s biggest EV-maker.

4月2日，特斯拉又遭遇了另一个重大挫折，当时公司报告称第一季度交付的汽车不到39万辆。这辆比去年同期下降了8.5%，远远低于已经谨慎的华尔街分析师们的预期。特斯拉的市值今年已经下跌了三分之一，不到5500亿美元。这仍然超过其他任何汽车制造商，但不到2021年价值1.2万亿美元的一半。公司老板埃隆·马斯克现在只是世界第三富有的人。

Tesla hit another big pothole on April 2nd, when it reported that it had delivered fewer than 390,000 cars in the first quarter. That was down by 8.5% from a year ago—and considerably worse than already cautious Wall Street analysts were expecting. Tesla’s market value has slumped by a third this year, to less than $550bn. That is still more than any other carmaker, but less than half of the $1.2trn it was worth in 2021. Its boss, Elon Musk, is now only the world’s third-richest man.

如果你认为这位亿万富翁和他的公司正在度过艰难时期，那就想一下他们曾经一度备受瞩目的模仿者吧。三年前，当马斯克先生展示电动汽车制造可以成为一个价值数万亿美元的产业时，投资者争相支持那些承诺成为下一个特斯拉的新面孔。两家美国初创公司在当年早些时候上市，其市值像它们的车辆一样迅速增长。成立于2007年的卢西德汽车的市值超过了900亿美元；两年后成立的瑞弗安公司达到了约1500亿美元的市值。这两者的价值超过了已经快要120年历史的福特，后者2021年卖出了400万辆汽车，而卢西德卖出了125辆，瑞弗安卖出了920辆。成立于2015年的理想汽车以及2014年成立的蔚来和小鹏等中国竞争对手也被高价估值。到2021年底，五家知名的特斯拉追随者的市值接近了惊人的4,000亿美元。

If you think the billionaire and his firm are having a rough time, spare a thought for their once-white-hot imitators. Three years ago, as Mr Musk showed that EV-making could be a trillion-dollar business, investors scrambled to back the newcomers promising to be the next Tesla. Two American startups that had gone public earlier that year were accelerating as briskly as their cars. The market capitalisation of Lucid Motors, founded in 2007, exceeded $90bn; that of Rivian, created two years later, hit around $150bn. Each was worth more than Ford, which was nearly 120 years old and sold 4m vehicles in 2021, compared with 125 for Lucid and 920 for Rivian. Chinese rivals such as Li Auto (founded in 2015), Nio and Xpeng (both in 2014) were also valued richly. In late 2021 the combined market value of five prominent Tesla wannabes neared a stonking $400bn.

如今这五家公司的市值已经跌至690亿美元，且正在下降。成立于八年前的美国公司Fisker和成立于五年前的中国公司HiPhi已经停止了生产。3月25日，Fisker股价暴跌导致其股票交易暂停，公司可能很快会被摘牌。HiPhi可能会寻求向一家大型的中国老牌汽车制造商出售自己。法拉第未来去年仅销售了11辆高端电动汽车，公司濒临破产。成立于2018年的美国初创公司Lordstown为制造电动皮卡和SUV而创立，于2023年破产。

Today the five are worth $69bn, and falling (see chart). Fisker, an eight-year-old American firm, and HiPhi, a five-year-old Chinese one, have paused production. On March 25th a crumbling share price caused the trading of Fisker’s shares to be suspended and the firm may soon be delisted. HiPhi may be looking to sell itself to a big established Chinese carmaker. Faraday Future, which sold barely 11 of its upmarket EVs last year, is on the brink of bankruptcy. Lordstown, an American startup founded in 2018 to make electric pickups and SUVs, went bust in 2023.

即使是一些相对强大的公司也面临困境。成立于2017年并于去年上市的越南公司VinFast在去年8月曾短暂且令人费解地接近了1900亿美元的市值。VinFast在2023年销售了35,000辆电动汽车，现在市值为90亿美元。瑞弗安售出了50,000辆汽车，市值是其在2021年峰值的15分之一。卢西德售出了6,000辆汽车，市值也是十五分之一。理想汽车、理想汽车、蔚来和小鹏去年共交付了超过80万辆汽车，它们的股价也大幅下挫。仅有的理想汽车盈利，主要是因为它完全生产混合动力汽车；公司最近公布推出的首款纯电动汽车导致其市值大幅下滑。在原本应该是一个崭新电动世界中生存，甚至是蓬勃发展，都变得异常艰难。哪些有可能成为特斯拉的竞争对手，又会成功呢？

Even somewhat sturdier companies are struggling. VinFast, a Vietnamese firm which was set up in 2017 and went public last year, briefly—and bafflingly—almost touched $190bn in market value last August. It sold 35,000 EVs in 2023 and is now worth $9bn. Rivian sold 50,000 and is worth a fifteenth of its peak in 2021. Lucid sold 6,000 and is also worth one-fifteenth. Li Auto, Leapmotor, Nio and Xpeng, which delivered over 800,000 cars between them last year, have also seen their share prices shrivel. Only Li turns a profit, mostly because it makes nothing but hybrid vehicles; its market value plunged recently after it revealed its first pure EV. Surviving—let alone thriving—in what was meant to be a brave new electric world is proving tough. Which would-be Teslas, if any, will make it?

本来情况应该大不相同。从内燃机中获取利润需要汽车制造商生产大量车辆，这些车辆的成千上万个运动部件增加了复杂性和成本。相比之下，电池动力的新经济学应该降低了进入门槛。效仿特斯拉的电动汽车新秀们通过将自己塑造成科技公司而非制造商，认为可以通过使用更简单的设计，并重新构想生产流程，保持成本控制，这是古老企业望尘莫及的。电池和电动机等的组件可以直接购买，让EV制造商可以专注于开发让他们的车辆脱颖而出的迷人软件，从信息娱乐到情绪照明都带来更好的体验。一些公司，比如Fisker，简单地外包了金属加工。

It was all meant to be different. Making a profit from internal combustion engines, whose thousands of moving parts drove up complexity and costs, required carmakers to churn out large volumes. In contrast, the new economics of battery power was supposed to bring down barriers to entry. The electric upstarts, aping Tesla by styling themselves as tech firms rather than manufacturers, reckoned they could keep costs in check by using simpler designs and reimagining the production process in a way stodgy incumbents could not. Components such as batteries and electric motors can be bought off the shelf, leaving the EV-makers to focus on developing whizzy software that would allow their vehicles to stand out thanks to a better experience in the car, from infotainment to mood lighting. Some companies, like Fisker, simply outsourced the metal-bending.

然而，这些优势未能超越对关键质量的旧观念所需。要从汽车中获利仍然需要每年生产大约 50 万辆。来自咨询公司 Sino Auto Insights 的吕图 (Tu Le) 概括地表示：“规模至关重要，而制造很困难。” 尽管特斯拉最初是作为一个奢侈品牌起步的，将大而昂贵的电池装在昂贵的轿车上，但它一直瞄准着大众市场。在克服了试图大量生产更便宜的 Model 3 时经历了近乎崩溃的“生产地狱”之后，利润才开始增加。

These advantages have, however, failed to outweigh the old-school need for critical mass. Turning a profit from cars still requires producing perhaps 500,000 of them a year. “Scale is vital and manufacturing is hard,” sums up Tu Le of Sino Auto Insights, a consultancy. Though Tesla began as a luxury marque, putting big and pricey batteries in big and pricey cars, it always eyed the mass market. Profits started coming only once it overcame the near-death experience—“production hell”, in Mr Musk’s words—of trying to churn out high numbers of its cheaper Model 3.

与此同时，特斯拉的模仿者们开始生产太晚、推出新车型太慢，如咨询公司 Gartner 的佩德罗 · 帕谢克 (Pedro Pacheco) 所言。摩根士丹利（一家投资银行）的菲利普 · 侯伊斯 (Philippe Houchois) 指出，仅通过服务高利润、高价格的市场封位机会很低。只需看听起来前途未卜的 Faraday Future，该公司的车型起价 25 万美元。

The Tesla imitators, for their part, have taken too long to start production and are now taking too long to launch new models, says Pedro Pacheco of Gartner, a consultancy. The chances of survival by serving only a high-margin, high-price niche are low, notes Philippe Houchois of Jefferies, an investment bank. Just look at the possibly futureless Faraday Future, whose models start at $250,000.

电动汽车新进攻者们正在逐渐觉醒。他们的第一步是朝向低端市场。在 3 月 7 日，Rivian 宣布将于 2026 年推出 3 款更加便宜的车型。去年，小鹏汽车与中国顶尖打车服务提供商滴滴签署了协议，生产更廉价的汽车，并与大众合作，在中国推出大众的大众市场电动汽车。蔚来计划推出两个价格实惠的子品牌 — 阿尔卑斯（Alps）和萤火虫（Firefly）。即便是捷豹，他们的车售价高达 25 万美元，也计划在未来几年推出价格略低于 5 万美元的车型。去年 10 月，勒普汽车将 20% 的股份卖给了斯泰利兰蒂斯 (Stellantis)，这是一家包括雪铁龙、克莱斯勒、菲亚特和标致在内的大众市场汽车制造商（其最大股东部分拥有《经济学人》的母公司），交易价值 16 亿美元。这两家公司将合作生产电动汽车。

The electric insurgents are waking up to this reality. Their first step is to look downmarket. On March 7th Rivian announced three less expensive models that will start arriving in 2026. Last year Xpeng signed a deal with Didi Global, a Chinese ride-hailing giant, to make cheaper cars, and forged a partnership with Volkswagen to make mass-market EVs for China. Nio plans to launch two affordable sub-brands, Alps and Firefly. Even Lucid, whose cars go for as much as $250,000, plans to launch somewhat less exclusive $50,000 models within a few years. In October Leapmotor sold a 20% stake to Stellantis, a mass-market carmaker whose marques include Citroën, Chrysler, Fiat and Peugeot (and whose largest shareholder part-owns The Economist’s parent company), for $1.6bn. The pair will team up to make EVs.

为了成功，这些努力仍须生产出有独特功能的竞争对手。特斯拉通过将技术摆在第一位取得了成功。结果是推出了一款令人向往的高端 SUV，虽然不便宜，但看起来时尚，续航里程合理；而传统行业早期尝试的车型，如日产 Leaf，虽然价格昂贵，但外观丑陋，续航里程短。摩根士丹利银行的帕特里克 · 休默尔 (Patrick Hummel) 表示，尽管大多数初创企业像特斯拉一样关注科技，但由于缺乏规模，它们未能以竞争成本提供独特的产品。另一家咨询公司 LEK 的贝克罗姆 · 巴苏 (Becrom Basu) 补充说，聪明的电动汽车技术的新颖性“已经逐渐消失”。车辆的续航里程和其他一度领先的技术被视为标准配置，包括具有更强大制造能力的传统汽车制造商。

To succeed, these efforts must still produce a competitive product with one-of-a-kind features. Tesla pulled it off by putting technology first. The result was a desirable EV that wasn’t cheap but offered a svelte look and decent range; the legacy industry’s earlier attempts, such as the Nissan Leaf, were expensive but also ugly and short of juice. Despite a strong tech focus like Tesla, most startups have failed to deliver unique products at competitive cost, as they continue to lack scale, says Patrick Hummel of UBS, a bank. Now the novelty of clever EV technology “has worn off”, adds Becrom Basu of LEK, another consultancy. Good range and other once-cutting-edge tech are considered table stakes, including for incumbent carmakers with considerably beefier manufacturing chops.

因此，许多电动汽车创业公司缺少独特的重大特色。Rivian 和 Lucid 生产的车辆技术上几乎没有突出之处。仅凭外表不足以证明价格高昂的合理性. Rivian 最便宜的电动皮卡售价约为 7 万美元，比福特的 F-150 Lightning 贵了一半，却没有提供更多功能。在欧洲，豪华轿车 Lucid Air 的价格比可比的宝马或奔驰电动汽车贵很多。Fisker 的大众市场电动汽车设计精良，但比具有相似功能的中国竞争对手更昂贵，部分原因是其资产轻模式在更便宜的汽车上效果欠佳。对于为什么买来捷足轿车的原因，是个谜；对其 VF8 SUV 的评价可以说是致命的。

As a result, many of the EV entrants lack unique big features. The cars made by Rivian and Lucid hardly stand out technologically. Their good looks alone do not justify the hefty price tag. Rivian’s cheapest electric pickup costs around $70,000, half as much again as Ford’s F-150 Lightning without offering one-and-a-half as much car. In Europe the Lucid Air, a luxury saloon, is a fair bit pricier than comparable electric BMWs or Mercedes. Fisker’s mass-market EVs are well designed but cost more than Chinese rivals with similar features, partly because its asset-light outsourcing strategy does not work well for cheaper cars. Why anyone would buy a VinFast is a mystery; reviews of its VF8 SUV were damning, to put it charitably.

由于电动汽车的需求不旺盛，许多企业需要更多的资金才能维持运营。3 月 25 日，Lucid 表示已经从其最大的投资者——沙特阿拉伯主权财富基金——筹集到另外 10 亿美元。许多竞争对手就没有那么幸运了。Rivian 在 2023 年底净现金 94 亿美元，但需要数十亿美元才能建造更廉价的车型。过去在 2021 年前的几年里，投资者曾投入数十亿美元，只见数十亿美元被烧掉，他们对于错过的最后期限、令人失望的新车型以及利润前景的不断萎缩感到不满。由于电动汽车在许多国家销量增长放缓，传统车企对于拯救进击者并不感兴趣。摩根士丹利银行的休默尔认为，大多数初创公司将会消失。

With demand for EVs tepid many of the companies need more capital to keep going. On March 25th Lucid said it had managed to wangle another $1bn from its biggest investor, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign-wealth fund. Many rivals are not so lucky. Rivian had $9.4bn in net cash at the end of 2023 but will need billions more to build its cheaper models. Gone are the days when moneymen would throw treasure at any firm with a plausible PowerPoint presentation and an artist’s impression of a sleek electric car. Having put up billions of dollars in the years leading up to 2021, only to see billions torched, they look askance at missed deadlines, disappointing new models and ever receding prospects of profits. Their second thoughts have not been dispelled by the recent slowdown in growth of EV sales in many countries. Incumbent carmakers have no interest in rescuing the insurgents. Mr Hummel of UBS thinks that most of the startups will simply disappear.

最有可能存活的是中国公司。一个原因是他们似乎是这群公司中最具创新精神的。蔚来的高端电动汽车可选择电池交换功能，在中国至少有庞大的充电站网络供其使用。在中国，外资经纪公司伯恩斯坦认为小鹏在自动驾驶技术方面是全球领导者之一。

The likeliest to survive are the Chinese. One reason is that they appear to be the most innovative of the bunch. Nio’s upmarket EVs come with the option of battery swapping and, in China at least, a vast network of stations to do it. Drivers can be on their way in minutes without getting out of the car. Bernstein, a broker, considers Xpeng one of the global leaders in autonomous-driving technology.

它们与西方竞争对手相比也相对便宜。乐先生指出，蔚来、小鹏以及理想汽车都受益于令人瞩目的电池供应链，主要由像宁德时代这样的中国公司主导，并得到中央和地方政府的坚定支持。这反过来使得这些中国公司能够保持成本和价格的低廉。结果是在其巨大国内市场中，电动汽车的市场需求迅速增长，随之带来了更大的规模经济。

They are also a relative bargain compared with their Western rivals. Both Nio and Xpeng, as well as Li Auto, have benefited from an impressive battery supply chain, dominated by Chinese firms like CATL, and steadfast support from central and local governments, notes Mr Le. That in turn has allowed the Chinese companies to keep both their costs and their prices down. The result has been rapid uptake of EVs in their giant domestic market, and with it greater economies of scale.

中国可能迎来另一波汽车制造领域的颠覆浪潮，这要归功于中国的科技巨头。2021年，一家老牌中国汽车制造商赛力斯和中国最接近国家技术巨头的华为，共同创立了一个充满高科技的新品牌 AITO。一月份，这个合资公司交付了3.3万辆汽车。3月28日，此前只生产智能手机的小米推出了一款SUV。这款车型由国有汽车巨头北汽生产，售价低至3万美元，在24小时内吸引了9万辆订单。

Another wave of carmaking disruption may be swelling in China, courtesy of Chinese big tech. In 2021 Seres, an established Chinese car firm, and Huawei, the closest thing China has to a national technology champion, created AITO, a new brand dripping with fancy tech. In January the venture delivered 33,000 cars. On March 28th Xiaomi, which has hitherto made smartphones, launched an SUV. The model, manufactured by BAIC, a state-owned car giant, and costing as little as $30,000, attracted 90,000 orders in 24 hours.

小米的目标至少在国内挑战特斯拉和比亚迪。中国的电商巨头阿里巴巴和另一家大型国有汽车制造商上汽已经合作生产汽车两年，并在2023年销售了3.8万辆。台湾的代工厂富士康，这家以为苹果组装iPhone而闻名的公司，在中国组装了其中很多产品，立志要为自己的品牌或其他公司生产全球一半的电动汽车。如果特斯拉和其他幸存下来的电动车企业认为他们可以稍作喘息，他们应该再三考虑。 ■

Xiaomi aims to take on, at least at home, both Tesla and BYD. Alibaba, China’s e-commerce titan, and SAIC, another big state-owned carmaker, have been producing cars together for two years and sold 38,000 in 2023. Foxconn, a Taiwanese contract manufacturer better known for assembling iPhones for Apple, many of them in China, aspires to build half the world’s EVs for its own brand or others. If Tesla and any other survivors of the current EV shake-out thought they could catch a breath, they should think again. ■

回到目录

商业 | 战略和储备量 (Business | Strategy and stockpiles)

谁在全球供应链中掌握权力？ (Who wields the power in the world’s supply chains?)

库存提供了线索。 (Inventories offer a clue)

供应链管理人员似乎无法喘口气。仅看过去一个月的情况就能知晓。一座桥梁坍塌导致巴尔的摩港封锁，这是美国东海岸最大的港口之一，至少要到五月底才能重新开放。台湾发生了一场大地震，而那里是许多微芯片的巨大制造地，这让整个世界制造业的根基不稳。也门的胡塞叛军继续向红海的船只发射导弹，而红海是海上贸易的关键通道。美国和中国依然在彼此经济纠葛中陷入僵局。乌克兰和加沙依然饱受战争之苦。

SUPPLY-CHAIN managers cannot seem to catch a break. Consider the past month alone. A collapsed bridge has walled off the Port of Baltimore, one of the biggest on America’s east coast, until at least late May. A big earthquake in Taiwan, where a large share of microchips are made, has rattled an industry that increasingly underpins a lot of the world’s manufacturing. Houthi rebels in Yemen keep lobbing missiles at ships in the Red Sea, a critical passage for seaborne trade. America and China are still at loggerheads over their mutual economic entanglements. Wars still rack Ukraine and Gaza.

这些干扰相比于新冠疫情的困扰可能显得微不足道。但每一次干扰都提醒了人们那段时间的商业教训：宁可安全，不可遗憾。政治人士经常敦促公司让他们的供应链变得不那么“准时供货”，更多一些“备用”。企业领导经常附和，誓言让其供应商网络防震。

These disruptions pale next to the snarl-ups of the covid-19 pandemic. But each is a reminder of the business lesson of that period: it is better to be safe than sorry. Politicians regularly hector companies to make their supply chains less “just in time” and more “just in case”. Corporate bosses often nod along, vowing to make their supplier networks shockproof.

实现这一点的最简单方法是建立更大的缓冲区，既包括生产所需的原材料，也包括公司生产的成品。然而，实践中，这个简单的解决方案需要付出高昂代价。而这个成本正在上升。较高的利率使用于日常运营的短期贷款更昂贵，包括存货和支付供应商。仓库空间短缺导致更高的租金用于存放额外的库存。据一家银行摩根大通估计，到2022年底，占美国大型企业标普1500指数的公司在运营资本（企业存货价值加上客户所欠款项而减去所欠供应商的金额）中有超过6000亿美元被困住，比疫情前高出五分之二。这个数字可能自那时起有所上升。

The simplest way to do this is to build bigger buffers, both of raw materials needed to produce whatever it is a company makes and of its finished product. In practice, this simple solution comes at a big cost. And that cost is rising. Higher interest rates make short-term loans used for day-to-day operations, including holding inventory and paying suppliers, dearer. A shortage of warehouse space means higher rents to stash the extra stocks. JPMorgan Chase, a bank, calculates that by the end of 2022, companies that make up the S&P 1500 index of America’s large firms had more than $600bn trapped in working capital (the value of a business’s inventories plus what it is owed by customers minus what it owes suppliers). That was two-fifths higher than before the pandemic. The figure may have risen since.

每一美元这样绑起来，都是一美元不能投资于未来利润。因此，不难理解，尽管高管们对恢复能力点头，他们努力尽量释放尽可能多的美元。一些人比其他人幸运得多。这反映了世界供应链力量平衡的长期变化。

Each dollar tied up this way is a dollar not invested in pursuit of future profits. No wonder, then, that chief executives, for all their resilience-related nodding, try to unshackle as many of those dollars as they can. Some are having considerably more luck than others. This reflects longer-running changes to the balance of power across the world’s supply chains.

对美国企业整体来说，相对于销售额，库存看起来比疫情爆发前略微丰盛。尽管人们一直在谈论所谓的“准时供货”的至高无上，但这种库存实际上在疫情爆发前的十年里一直在变得更加丰盛。然而，这种总体趋势掩盖了一个分歧。自1990年代初以来，零售商的库存销售比率一直在下降。对于制造商来说，除了疫情期间出现的短暂飙升外，它们是过去30年中最高的（见图表）。到底发生了什么呢？

For American business as a whole inventories look roughly as plump as they did on the eve of the pandemic, relative to sales. For all the talk of the supposed supremacy of “just in time”, such stockpiles had in fact been getting plumper for a decade before covid-19. Yet that general trend conceals a divergence. Retailers’ inventory-to-sales ratios have been coming down since the early 1990s. For manufacturers, they are (bar a brief pandemic spike) higher than at any time in the past 30 years (see chart). What is going on?

随着供应链在1990年代因全球化变得更有效率，零售商与供应商讨价还价更加激烈。作为更接近消费者的一方，他们更清楚顾客想要什么以及何时想要。同时，咨询公司品牌战略集团的尼拉吉·达瓦尔指出，有限的货架空间使商店老板可以要求生产商自己承担更多库存，以换取产品在那些稀缺货架上展示。制造商希望电子商务会通过直接接触购买者加强他们的力量，但后来事与愿违；购物者选择了亚马逊、塔吉特和沃尔玛等电子商城的便利。零售商在疫情期间愿意让供应商决定价格、付款时间和交货时间，只为了让商品上架，后来证明是一时的。

As supply chains became more efficient in the 1990s thanks to globalisation, retailers drove a harder bargain with suppliers. Being closer to the consumer, they had a better idea of what shoppers wanted and when they wanted it. At the same time, notes Niraj Dawar of Brand Strategy Group, a consultancy, limited shelf space allowed shop owners to demand that producers hold more inventory themselves in exchange for having their products displayed on those scarce shelves. Manufacturers’ hopes that e-commerce would strengthen their hand by giving them direct access to buyers were dashed; shoppers chose the convenience of e-emporiums such as those of Amazon, Target and Walmart. Retailers’ pandemic-era willingness to let suppliers dictate prices and the timing of payments and deliveries, just to get goods on shelves, proved to be a blip.

技术进一步支撑了零售业。一家大型消费品公司的首席执行官回想道，过去消费品公司对购物习惯了解更多。现在“零售商有更深入的洞察”，而且这些洞察基于实际购买行为，而不是市场调查。他说，这将给公司带来“全面准时交付（OTIF）”的压力。另一家大型消费品公司的供应链主管补充说，如果他们不能如期交付，就意味着销售额下降。

Technology has bolstered retail further. Consumer-goods firms used to know more about shopping habits, recalls the chief executive of a giant one. Now “retailers have the insights,” and these are based on real purchasing behaviour, not market research. This, he says, is putting pressure on firms like his to deliver “on time in full” (otif). If they cannot, that means lower sales, adds the supply-chains chief at another big consumer-goods firm.

OTIF要求供应商做两件事情中的其中一件。他们可以使用预测提前制造产品，并且保持交叉指导他们制作的数量是否正确。另一种选择是建立备用生产能力，以便他们可以迅速回应变化，而无需增加库存。“公司不能简单地增加他们的库存而不解决更大的结构性弹性努力问题，”施耐德电气的供应链监督者Mourad Tamoud说。这家法国电气设备制造商在两个地区建立了一个额外的工厂，并将它们接入更为本地化的供应商网络中。

OTIF requires suppliers to do one of two things. They can use forecasts to make products in advance, and keep their fingers crossed they made the right amount. The alternative is to build spare production capacity, which allows them to react to changes quickly without having to hold more inventory. “Companies can’t afford to simply increase their inventories and not address the bigger structural resiliency efforts,” says Mourad Tamoud, who oversees the supply chain of Schneider Electric. The French maker of electrical equipment has built an extra factory in two regions and plugged them into a more local network of suppliers.

那些额外的工厂建设和维护都需要花钱，如果这些工厂运营中有很多闲置产能，就会损害盈利能力。需求预测可能是错误的，特别是在供应链积压着已经离开工厂但尚未被分销商或零售商销售的商品的时候。德意志银行的Nicole DeBlase计算出，许多大类产品，包括汽车零部件、机械、半导体和消费电子产品，这种“渠道库存”的价值比2019年底高出30%至110%。只要这些库存都存在于转售商的资产负债表上，他们就不太可能向制造商订购更多产品。这导致成品在工厂堆积，而工厂则更倾向于暂停采购他们的原材料，如此循环，价值链下游也随之受影响。

Those extra factories cost money to build and maintain, which can hurt profitability if they run with plenty of idle capacity. And demand forecasts can be wrong, especially at a time when supply chains are backed up with goods which have left factories but have yet to be sold by distributors or retailers. Nicole DeBlase of Deutsche Bank calculates that for many large categories of products, including car parts, machinery, semiconductors and consumer electronics, the value of such “channel inventory” is between 30% and 110% higher thanat the end of 2019. So long as all of it sits on resellers’ balance-sheets, they are unlikely to order more from manufacturers. This causes finished goods to pile up at factories, which then prefer to hold off on procuring their inputs—and so on down the value chain.

无论是投资于备用产能还是押注于备用库存的规模，都是制造商来买单。这笔账随着产品距离消费者的距离增加而增长。工业品制造商的存货周转速度比消费品销售商慢。但无论他们制造什么，制造商都在努力减轻痛苦。一个常见的策略是减少他们生产的商品种类。制造玩具的孩之宝公司在二月份表示，他们正在重新聚焦“更少、更大、更好”的品牌。可口可乐在过去几年已经减少了一半品牌数量。制造从马克笔到婴儿车的纽厄尔集团，已将带有香味的Yankee蜡烛种类从200种削减至150种。生产发电设备的GE Vernova曾经销售九种风力发电机的中心部件——机舱。现在只生产三种。GE Vernova的首席执行官Scott Strazik总结说：“三球比九球轻松多了。”

Whether by investing in spare capacity or betting on the size of spare stocks, it is the manufacturers that pick up the tab. And this tab grows with distance to the consumer. Makers of industrial goods are turning over their stocks more slowly than sellers of consumer products. But whatever they make, manufacturers are trying to ease the pain. A common tactic is to cut down the variety of goods they produce. Hasbro, a toymaker, said in February that it was refocusing on “fewer, bigger, better” brands. Coca-Cola has cut the number of its brands in half over the past few years. Newell Brands, which makes everything from Sharpies to strollers, has trimmed its range of scented Yankee candles from 200 to 150. GE Vernova, which makes power-generating equipment, used to sell nine types of nacelle, a wind-turbine’s central hub. Now it makes three. “It’s easier to juggle three balls than nine—always,” sums up GE Vernova’s chief executive, Scott Strazik.

热门产品的生产商总是能够控制交易条件和价格。但什么算是热门产品本身可能会迅速变化，最终取决于消费者想要什么。在2020年至2022年间半导体短缺加强了芯片制造商的主导地位。之后在2023年的供应过剩，等到所有想要新笔记本电脑、智能手机或汽车的人都已购买完毕后，这种主导地位变得较弱。对于芯片和其他产品的制造商来说，库存的疼痛和困扰越来越成为一种慢性病。 ■

Producers of hot products will always be able to dictate terms—and prices—to buyers. But what counts as a hot product can itself change rapidly, ultimately as a function of what consumers want. A shortage of semiconductors between 2020 and 2022 strengthened chipmakers’ hand. A subsequent glut in 2023, after everyone who wanted a new laptop, smartphone or car had bought one, weakened it. For manufacturers—of chips and everything else—inventory aches and pains are increasingly a chronic condition. ■

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商业 | 巴尔特比 (Business | Bartleby)

历史上的生产力大师：一场对决 (Productivity gurus through time: a match-up)

詹姆斯·克利尔对阿诺德·本内特 (James Clear v Arnold Bennett)

美国最畅销的非虚构读物书籍，以在Kindle上的浏览量和在有声读物服务Audible上的收听量衡量，是詹姆斯·克利尔（James Clear）的《原子习惯》。该书于2018年出版，现已连续登上畅销书榜277周。克利尔先生的这本书巧妙地兼顾了令人发笑和有益的特点，主张日常生活中的微小变化会累积成重大改善，不论你的目标是在工作中更具生产力，更健康地饮食，还是发展新技能。

The most-read non-fiction book in America, measured by views on Kindle and listens on Audible, an audio-book service, is “Atomic Habits” by James Clear. Published in 2018, it has now been on the bestseller list for 277 weeks. Mr Clear’s book, which pulls off the impressive trick of being both ludicrous and helpful, argues that small changes of routine can compound into big improvements, whether your goal is to be more productive at work, to eat more healthily or to develop new skills.

关于时间管理和自我提升的手册或许听起来是现代的。但这些也是20世纪初的一本畅销书的主题。“如何利用一天24小时”，首次出版于1908年，是英国多产作家阿诺德·贝内特（Arnold Bennett）撰写的一本简短的自助书籍。贝内特的书旨在缓解“你每天都有一种感觉，感觉到有一些事情一直没做，而且你确实希望在‘更多时间’时能做这些事情。” 换句话说，他的写作对象与今天的克利尔先生一样都是对抱有抱负的市场。（今天的生产力大师之一卡尔·纽波特在《深度工作》中引用了贝内特。）

A manual on time management and self-improvement might sound modern. But these were also the themes of a bestseller from the early years of the 20th century. “How to Live on 24 Hours a Day”, first published in 1908, is a short self-help book written by Arnold Bennett, a prolific English writer. Bennett’s book was meant to salve the “feeling that you are every day leaving undone something which you would like to do, and which, indeed, you are always hoping to do when you have ‘more time’”. He wrote, in other words, for the same aspirational market as Mr Clear does today. (Another of today’s productivity Yodas, Cal Newport, cites Bennett in “Deep Work”, a book on how to focus.)

比较贝内特的书与克利尔先生的书，可以发现一些有趣的相似之处和不同之处。一个明显的区别在于语气。贝内特对人类的弱点感到嘲讽。他写道，如果你认为“巧妙地在纸上用笔规划时间表”就足以解决你的问题，那么“再躺下去，继续你称之为存在的不安睡眠状态吧。” 他警告不要过分迷恋自我提升的计划，否则“你可能会陷入囹圄，生活也许会失去自我。”

Comparing Bennett’s book with Mr Clear’s yields instructive likenesses and dissimilarities. One obvious difference is tone. Bennett is wry about human foibles. If you think that “ingeniously planning out a timetable with a pen on a piece of paper” will be enough to solve your problems, he writes, then “lie down again and resume the uneasy doze which you call your existence.” He warns against fetishising a programme of self-improvement, lest “one may come to exist as in a prison and one’s life may cease to be one’s own.”

克利尔先生更为真诚。他用大写字母表达建议：潜在潜力的高原，行为改变的四大法则。他以赢家和输家的方式思考。他说了一些非常奇怪的话，比如：“如果你每天进步1%，一年后你将会变成比开始时好了37倍。相反，如果你每天退步1%，一年后你几乎会下降到零。”这被称为数学的误用。

Mr Clear is more earnest. He clothes his advice in capital letters: the Plateau of Latent Potential, the Four Laws of Behaviour Change. He thinks in terms of winners and losers. He says truly bizarre things like: “If you can get 1% better each day for one year you’ll end up 37 times better by the time you’re done. Conversely, if you get 1% worse each day for one year you’ll decline nearly down to zero.” This is known as the Misuse of Mathematics.

两者之间还存在社会和技术层面的差异。贝内特所处的世界是一个女性留在家中，茶是由仆人泡的，人们通过打牌和“游荡”来娱乐自己的世界。他告诉那些享受大自然的读者拿着捕蝴蝶网去最近的煤气灯附近。在克利尔先生的世界里，人们花费时间在健身房锻炼肱二头肌，抽出时间感恩，并通过取出遥控器的电池来避免看太多电视。

The two are separated by social and technological gulfs, too. Bennett’s world is one in which women stay at home, tea is made by servants and people entertain themselves by playing cards and “pottering”. He tells readers who enjoy nature to go to the nearest gas lamp with a butterfly net. In Mr Clear’s world, people spend hours working on their biceps at the gym, make time to be grateful and stop themselves from watching too much TV by taking batteries out of the remote.

也许最大的差异在于工作本身。贝内特的读者是新一代白领群体，每天乘火车往返工作。他假设他们在办公室里度过的时间并不令人满足。绝大多数人“在谋生方面尽量少付出自己”，他写道。工作是一个由通勤两端限定的八小时刑罚。因此，贝内特的建议重点放在一天剩下的16个小时。在这段时间里，人们可以腾出空间，发展从音乐到建筑等任何专业知识。

Perhaps the biggest point of difference concerns work itself. Bennett’s audience was the new army of white-collar types taking the train in and out of work each day. He presupposed that the time they spent in the office was unfulfilling. A majority puts “as little of themselves as they conscientiously can into the earning of a livelihood”, he wrote. Work was an eight-hour sentence bordered at each end by a commute. As a result, Bennett’s tips focus exclusively on the other 16 hours of the day. These were the times when people could carve out the space to develop an expertise in anything from music to architecture.

克利尔先生持现代观念，认为工作同样可能为生活提供目标和身份认同。他没有明显的大量时间可供利用——他的建议是通过将新的日常习惯融入到已经忙碌的日子中来优化。他主张“习惯叠加”，让一个仪式接着另一个：例如，在喝完早晨的咖啡后冥想一分钟。贝内特考虑的是小时，而克利尔考虑的是秒。

Mr Clear makes the modern assumption that work is as likely to provide purpose and identity as other parts of your life. And it leaves no obvious ocean of time to fill—his tips are about optimising already-busy days by weaving new routines into them. He is a proponent of “stacking habits” so that one ritual follows another: after a morning cup of coffee, for example, meditate for a minute. Bennett thinks in terms of hours, Mr Clear in terms of seconds.

虽然这两位专家之间存在很大差异，但相似之处也引人注目。两位作者都强调在更有效地管理时间中纪律、仪式和习惯的重要性。他们都强调在培养新的日常习惯时从小处着手；克利尔再次使用大写字母称之为“重要的起点”。

If the differences between the two mavens are great, the similarities are striking. Both authors espouse the importance of discipline, ritual and habit in managing time more productively. Both stress the need to start small when developing new routines; Mr Clear gets out his capitals again and calls this the

最重要的是，显而易见的是，人类基本上并没有太大变化，而且令人沮丧的是这一点。贝内特曾写到维持注意力的困难方式，这种方式对现代读者而言是令人惭愧地熟悉：“你还没有走十码远，你的思绪就在你眼皮底下跳跃开来，和另一个主题一起嬉戏。” 除非人类本身得到升级，否则对于21世纪版本的贝内特和克利尔，市场是有保证的。 ■

Above all, it is plain that humans are largely and exasperatingly unchanged. At one point Bennett writes about the difficulty of sustaining concentration in a way that is shamefully recognisable to modern readers: “You will have not gone ten yards before your mind has skipped away under your very eyes and is larking around the corner with another subject.” Unless humanity itself gets an upgrade, the market for a 22nd-century version of Bennett and Mr Clear is assured. ■

Read more from Bartleby, our columnist on management and work:The six rules of fire drills (Apr 4th)The pros and cons of corporate uniforms (Mar 27th)The secret to career success may well be off to the side (Mar 21st)

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商业 | 不寻求阳光的人 (Business | No-sun seekers)

Airbnb预订日食达到天文数字 (Airbnb bookings for the solar eclipse reach astronomical levels)

有限的库存和机会主义旅行者使意外收获受控 (Limited inventory and opportunistic travellers have kept the windfall in check)

月食直到4月8日的早晨才会开始在地球和太阳之间移动。但本月的全日食的商业影响已经明显可见，该日食从太平洋上空开始，穿过北美大陆，终止于大西洋。据旅行数据公司AirDNA的Jamie Lane称，在四月的一个普通周日夜晚，围绕或靠近日食路径的Airbnb或Vrbo上约有30%的房源被占据。在全食区内，惊人的92%的房源已被预订到了4月7日。而在这条近180公里宽的地带外几个城镇，房源需求几乎没有改变。

THE MOON would not start to move between Earth and the sun until the morning of April 8th. But the business impact of this month’s total solar eclipse, which started over the Pacific Ocean, cut a path across North America and ended in the Atlantic, was already plain to see. According to Jamie Lane of AirDNA, a travel-data firm, on a typical Sunday night in April around 30% of homes listed for short-term rental on Airbnb or Vrbo in areas in or around the eclipse’s path were occupied. A remarkable 92% of listings within the zone of totality had been booked for April 7th. Demand for homes just a few towns outside this roughly 180km-wide strip had barely changed.

此次日食可从一些大型或相对大型的城市看到，包括达拉斯、印第安纳波利斯、克利夫兰、水牛城和蒙特利尔。酒店数据提供商CoStar估计，这些地方的入住率上升了从12个百分点(在蒙特利尔)至67个百分点(在印第安纳波利斯)不等。剩下的房间据称只能以提高的价格出租。在日食前，《纽约时报》报道称，路径上仍有空房的Super 8汽车旅馆中近一半收费至少是标准价的两倍。

The eclipse was visible from a handful of big or biggish cities, including Dallas, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Buffalo and Montreal. CoStar, a hotel-data provider, reckons that occupancy rates in those places were up anywhere from 12 percentage points (in Montreal) to 67 (in Indianapolis). The remaining rooms appeared to be available only at elevated prices. Ahead of the eclipse the New York Times reported that nearly half of Super 8 motels in its path with rooms still available were charging at least twice the standard rate.

然而，这一路径主要覆盖了相对较少房源的地区。在这一区域内的92,000个美国短期租赁房源中——仅占全美1.6百万房源的5%多一点——有85,000个已被预订到了4月7日，而下一个周日仅有20,000个被预定。理论上，短期租赁房主应该如同酒店业者一样涨价，尤其是在酒店房间较少的地方。

Yet this path mostly covered areas with relatively scant lodging inventory. Of the 92,000 American short-term listings in this zone—just over 5% of the 1.6m in the United States as a whole—85,000 had been reserved for April 7th, compared with just 20,000 for the following Sunday. In theory, owners of short-term rental homes should have been able to jack up prices just like hoteliers, particularly in places with few hotel rooms.

然而，很少有Airbnb房主像酒店经理那样经营他们的房源。AirDNA的数据显示，在达拉斯和尼亚加拉瀑布等城市，4月6日、7日和8日的大部分预订是在两个月前就完成的——比通常的预订时间要早得多。精明的客人抓住了房价便宜的机会，而房主意识到他们可以提价却仍能确保预订之前。4月7日的平均预订价格是269美元，仅略高于4月14日的245美元水平。将这65000个额外预订与每晚价格增长10%结合起来，可以得出Airbnb和Vrbo房主仅获得了1800万美元的总收入提升。即使考虑到需求高峰前后的日子，当时入住率也超过了80%，累计额外营业额也仅有4400万美元。

However, few Airbnb hosts run their properties with a hotel manager’s business acumen. AirDNA’s numbers show that in cities like Dallas and Niagara Falls, the majority of reservations for April 6th, 7th and 8th were made more than two months ago—far earlier than is typical. Savvy guests pounced on the standard prices on offer before hosts realised that they could raise them and still secure bookings. The average booking on April 7th went for $269, only slightly above the $245 level for April 14th. Combining the 65,000 additional bookings with a 10% increase in the nightly rate suggests that Airbnb and Vrbo hosts received a total revenue bump of merely $18m. Even counting the days before and after the peak of demand, when occupancy rates also exceeded 80%, only brings the cumulative additional turnover to a total of $44m.

换句话说，美国房主和依靠此类租赁收取佣金的数字平台错失了机会。不幸的是，他们将要等待一段时间才能从错误中吸取教训。阿拉斯加人要等到2033年才能见到下一个全食，而北达科他州人和蒙大拿州人要等到2044年，佛罗里达人——提供住宿的友好州，要等到2045年。■

The American hosts—and the digital platforms that live off commissions on such rentals—missed a trick, in other words. Unfortunately for both groups, they will not have another chance to learn from their mistake for a while. Alaskans have to wait until 2033 for the next total eclipse, North Dakotans and Montanans until 2044, and Floridians, tourist-friendlier providers of accommodation, until 2045. ■

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商业 | 亚利桑那之泪 (Business | Raising Arizona)

台积电在美国的芯片制造计划进一步扩大250亿美元 (TSMC’s American chipmaking plans grow $25bn more ambitious)

相比之下，仍然黯然失色于其台湾事业。 (They still pale next to its Taiwanese endeavours)

TSMC制造了全球约四分之三的最尖端计算机芯片。然而，尽管它在美国和日本建造了新工厂（或称为fabs），但它仍将最先进的生产保留在位于台湾的本土。直到现在。在4月8日，TSMC表示其计划在亚利桑那州的计划fab中生产“2纳米”芯片，这是目前芯片制造的最先进水平。到2030年，它还将在该州再建第三家工厂，这将是已在进行中的两家工厂之外的工厂。其美国的总投资将从400亿美元增加到650亿美元。美国政府还将提供66亿美元的补助和高达50亿美元的贷款。

TSMC makes about three-quarters of the world’s most cutting-edge computer chips. But even as it builds new factories (or fabs) in America and Japan, it has kept its most advanced production at home in Taiwan. Until now. On April 8th TSMC said that it intended to make “2-nanometre” chips, the current state of the art in chipmaking, at its planned fab in Arizona. It will also build a third factory in the state by 2030, on top of two already in the works. Its total American investments will rise from $40bn to $65bn. Uncle Sam will chip in another $6.6bn in grants and up to $5bn in loans.

在美国商务部长吉娜·雷蒙多看来，这显示了CHIPS法案的价值，该法案是一项500亿美元的补贴和减免税款的计划，旨在重新振兴国内芯片制造业，并减少美国对一个容易受地缘政治影响以及如本月台湾地震所提醒决策者们的地震不稳定性的依赖。但仔细观察，TSMC的美国雄心也许并不如人们想象的那么伟大。

In the eyes of Gina Raimondo, America’s commerce secretary, this shows the value of the CHIPS Act, a $50bn package of subsidies and tax credits aiming to revive domestic chipmaking and reduce America’s reliance on an island exposed to geopolitical and, as an earthquake this month in Taiwan reminded policymakers, seismic instability. But look closer and TSMC’s American ambitions may not be all that grand.

尽管CHIPS法案提供的吸引力，TSMC将继续在本土生产大部分高端芯片，而非跨越太平洋。在美国建造fabs比在亚洲花费更长时间且更昂贵，尽管补贴可以弥补部分差距。招聘工人来操作这些工厂更加困难。此外，这些工厂将比较小，这使得运营成本更高。TSMC在台湾的四个“超级工厂”每个月可以生产10万多个晶圆，而在其美国的“超级工厂”中则为2.5万个。

The CHIPS Act’s sweeteners notwithstanding, TSMC will continue to make most of its high-end chips at home, not across the Pacific. Building fabs in America takes longer and costs more than in Asia, though subsidies cover some of that difference. Finding workers to operate them is harder. And the factories will be smaller, which makes them more expensive to run. TSMC’s four “gigafabs” in Taiwan can each churn out more than 100,000 wafers a month, compared with 25,000 at its American “megafabs”.

公司尚未披露其在亚利桑那州的第三家工厂的产能。但分析师预计到2030年，这家工厂总共将每月生产大约8万个晶圆。数据提供商彭博预测，到2024年，TSMC的台湾工厂将生产近四倍数量的芯片，其中大部分为苹果和英伟达等美国客户生产。公司还计划在台湾建造“多个工厂”。TSMC的退休创始人张忠谋曾称美国的芯片制造雄心为“一个非常昂贵的徒劳运动”。这说法虽然刻薄，但很可能是正确的。■

The company has not disclosed the capacity of its third plant in Arizona. But analysts expect that by 2030 it will produce around 80,000 wafers a month, all told. Bloomberg, a data provider, forecasts that TSMC’s Taiwan operation will make almost four times as many in 2024, much of it for American customers such as Apple and Nvidia. The company also plans to build “multiple fabs” in Taiwan. Morris Chang, TSMC’s retired founder, has called America’s chipmaking ambitions a “very expensive exercise in futility”. That is harsh—but probably true. ■

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商业 | 熊彼特 (Business | Schumpeter)

生成式人工智能存在着清洁能源难题 (Generative AI has a clean-energy problem)

当人工智能革命遇上能源转型，会发生什么 (What happens when the AI revolution meets the energy transition)

当本报的一位同事于2022年拜访了居住在旧金山的山姆·奥特曼时，他注意到书架上有两双粉色高帮鞋。一双上面印有奥特曼先生的机器学习初创公司OpenAI的标志，另一双则是Helion核聚变公司的标志，奥特曼先生也是该公司的支持者。这位企业家对这两项技术着迷，不仅仅是作为脚部时尚。他相信智能和能源的成本将以一种相互可持续的方式下降。他将其称为“一个长久而美丽的指数曲线”。

When a colleague from this newspaper visited Sam Altman in 2022 at his home in San Francisco, he noticed two pairs of pink high-tops on a bookshelf. One had the logo of Mr Altman’s machine-learning startup, OpenAI. The other bore an emblem for Helion, a nuclear-fusion company that Mr Altman also backs. The entrepreneur is obsessed with both technologies—not just as foot fashion. He believes that the cost of intelligence and the cost of energy will fall in a mutually sustainable way. He calls it a “long and beautiful exponential curve”.

然而，情况更像是恶劣且短暂的。与公用事业公司和数据中心运营商交谈，虽然许多人对人工智能（AI）感到兴奋，但他们正在解决一个能源难题，这个难题在一定程度上将决定三个重大经济转变的未来走向：人工智能革命、电气化经济大规模推广的努力以及应对气候变化的斗争。简而言之，生成式AI，也就是OpenAI的ChatGPT背后的这种类型，对电力消耗量有巨大需求。它几乎是突如其来地出现在一个已经在努力满足替代能源需求的全球能源系统中。目前尚不清楚是否会有足够的清洁能源来满足每个人的需求。

Nasty, brutish and short, more like. Talk to utilities and data-centre operators and, though many share Mr Altman’s excitement about artificial intelligence (AI), they are grappling with an energy conundrum on which the future of three big economic shifts partly hinges: the AI revolution; the efforts to electrify swathes of the economy; and the fight against climate change. In a nutshell, “generative” AI, the sort behind OpenAI’s ChatGPT, has a ravenous appetite for electricity. It has landed, virtually out of the blue, on a global energy system that is already struggling to cope with alternative sources of power demand. As yet it is not clear whether there will be enough clean energy to meet everyone’s needs.

乍一看，解决方案看起来很简单。像谷歌母公司、亚马逊和微软这样的公司用来提供云计算服务的数据中心，过去十多年来仅占全球能源需求的1-2%。多年来，大型技术巨头“超级规模”公司从其服务器农场中获得了越来越大的能效，即使世界的计算工作量已激增。此外，他们大举投资于清洁能源以抵消其碳足迹。在美国，服务超级规模公司的电力提供商热衷于助人。他们经历了二十年的电力需求不断疲软，迫切需要新的增长来源。在最近的盈利电话会议中，他们的老板承诺未来五年投资数十亿美元，以向数据中心注入更多电力。上个月，一家名为塔伦能源的公司以6.5亿美元的价格将一家核动力数据中心出售给了亚马逊。到目前为止，一切看起来都很有希望。

At first glance, the solution looks simple. Data centres, such as those that companies like Alphabet, Amazon and Microsoft use to supply cloud-computing services, have over the past decade or so accounted for only 1-2% of global energy demand. For years the big-tech “hyperscalers” have harvested ever greater energy efficiencies from their server farms, even as the world’s computing workloads have soared. Moreover, they have invested heavily in clean energy to offset their carbon footprints. In America, electricity providers to the hyperscalers are only too keen to help. They have endured two decades of anaemic electricity demand and are desperate for new sources of growth. In recent earnings calls their bosses have promised tens of billions of dollars in investment over the next five years to pump more power to data centres. Last month one such firm, Talen Energy, sold Amazon a nuclear-powered data centre for $650m. So far, so promising.

然而，生成式AI改变了游戏的本质。自从它们成为加密货币繁荣时的中流砥柱以来，像ChatGPT这样的模型所依赖的图形处理单元（GPU）一直是能源成瘾者。根据租用数据中心的Equinix的Christopher Wellise的说法，一个AI超级规模服务器机架使用10-15千瓦（kw)的功率。而AI的需求则使用40-60kw。耗电不仅仅来自计算。保持GPU机架的冷却同样需要大量能量。此外，过去一年左右的很多与AI相关的能源需求都来自“基础”模型的GPT-4训练者，OpenAI最新推出的产品。广泛使用这些工具——用于研究、制作视频、让教皇穿上巴黎世家的衣服—可能对电网造成更大压力。与谷歌搜索相比，ChatGPT的一次搜索可能会消耗十倍的电量。

Generative AI changes the nature of the game, though. Since the days when they were the workhorses of the cryptocurrency boom, graphics-processing units (GPUs), the chips on which models like ChatGPT are trained and run, have been energy addicts. According to Christopher Wellise of Equinix, which rents out data centres, a pre-AI hyperscale server rack uses 10-15 kilowatts (kw) of power. An AI one uses 40-60kw. It is not just computation that gobbles up electricity. Keeping the racks of GPUs cool requires just as much oomph. Moreover, a lot of AI-related energy demand in the past year or so has come from trainers of “foundation” models like GPT-4, OpenAI’s latest offering. Widespread use of these as tools—for research, to make videos, to dress the Pope in Balenciaga—could put more strain on the grid. A search by ChatGPT may consume ten times the electricity of googling.

现在还只是生成式AI蓬勃发展的早期阶段，因此现在下硬而快的预测还为时过早。但有关相关能源需求上升的知情猜测令人深思。全球预测机构国际能源署称，到2026年，数据中心的能耗可能增加到两年前的两倍，甚至相当于日本当今的用电量。预计未来两年，数据中心将占据美国新电力需求的三分之一。芯片设计公司Arm的首席执行官Rene Haas本周告诉《华尔街日报》，到本十年末，AI数据中心的用电量可能占到全部美国电力的四分之一，而今天仅为4%或更低。

It is early days in the generative-AI boom, so it is too soon to make hard and fast predictions. But informed guesses about the related rise in energy demand are striking. At the top of its range, the International Energy Agency, a global forecaster, says that by 2026 data centres could use twice as much energy as two years ago—and as much as Japan consumes today. It expects data centres to account for a third of new electricity demand in America over the next two years. Rene Haas, chief executive of Arm, a chip-design company, told the Wall Street Journal this week that by the end of the decade AI data centres could consume as much as a quarter of all American electricity, up from 4% or less today.

在美国，另附两项复杂因素。第一个是时间。生成式AI的崛起与经济飞速增长同时发生，伴随着相应的能源消耗。许多能源消费者希望他们的能源是零碳，这为稀缺资源制造了竞争。购买电动汽车（EVs）的人也有相同需求，电动汽车的崛起也许已经放缓，但没有停止。第二个是扩展电网的挑战。尽管得到了白宫的支持，但对于公用事业公司来说，快速建设新的可再生能源容量并不容易。他们遭遇供应链问题；根据一些报道，传统需要3年才能交付一个变压器，这一时间比以前少于一个年。利率推高了风电项目和太阳能项目的成本，使其更难融资。新建输电线路难度极大。

In America, two things further compound the complexities. The first is timing. The rise of generative AI coincides with a booming economy, with power consumption to match. Many power consumers want their energy to be zero-carbon, creating competition for a scarce resource. So do buyers of electric vehicles (EVs), the rise of which may have slowed but has not stopped. The second is the challenge of expanding the grid. Despite support from the White House, it is not easy for utilities to build new renewable capacity quickly. They suffer from supply-chain problems; by some accounts it takes three years to deliver a transformer, up from less than a year previously. Interest rates have pushed up the cost of wind and solar projects, making them harder to fund. Building new transmission lines is fiendishly tough.

毫无疑问将会有创造性思维。显而易见的解决方案是提高 GPU 的能效。他们最大的供应商 Nvidia 表示，他们已经通过最新一代的 AI 服务器实现了这一目标。然而，更高效率的芯片可能会激发更多的使用。咨询公司 Bain 的 Aaron Denman 表示，另一种选择是让超大规模运算中心利用他们雄厚的资金帮助公用事业克服一些电网约束。他说，真正的紧张可能会在一年中的某些时间出现，比如美国人在异常炎热的夏天打开空调时。这意味着需要备用小型发电厂。不过，很可能这些发电厂将以天然气为燃料，有悖于云服务提供商的气候承诺。

No doubt there will be creative thinking. The obvious solution is to make GPUs more energy-efficient. Nvidia, their biggest supplier, says it has already achieved this with its latest generation of AI servers. More efficient chips can, however, simply stimulate more usage. Another option, says Aaron Denman of Bain, a consultancy, is for the hyperscalers to use their deep pockets to help utilities overcome some of the grid constraints. He says that the real crunch may occur during certain parts of the year, such as unusually hot summer days when Americans switch on their air-conditioners. That means having small power plants on standby. The likelihood, though, is that these will be fuelled by natural gas, undermining the cloud providers’ climate commitments.

如果出现可再生能源短缺，那将是有代价的。现在还没有人知道生成式人工智能会如何盈利。人们知道的是，购买 GPU 的成本已经飙升。如果运行它们的能源成本也飙升，这可能会抑制扩张。另外，其他经济领域的电气化高度依赖成本；人工智能与电动汽车之间争夺清洁能源会推高价格，双方都无益。尽管可以为 Altman 先生的玫瑰色融合梦想祈祷实现。但别抱希望。■

If shortages of renewable energy occur, it will come at a cost. No one knows yet how generative AI will make money. What people do know is that the cost of acquiring GPUs is rocketing. If the energy costs of running them soar, too, it could put the brakes on expansion. In addition, the electrification of the rest of the economy is highly cost-dependent; an AI v EV scramble for clean power would push up prices and serve neither industry well. By all means keep your fingers crossed for Mr Altman’s rose-tinted fusion dream to become reality. But don’t count on it. ■

阅读更多来自我们专栏作家 Schumpeter 关于全球商业的文章： (以上为文章链接，已被丢弃) 【《经济学人》专栏】

Read more from Schumpeter, our columnist on global business:Why Japan Inc is no longer in thrall to America (Apr 2nd)Meet the digital David taking on the Google Goliath (Mar 27th)Can anything stop Nvidia’s Jensen Huang? (Mar 20th)

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国际 | 蓬勃发展 (International | On the rise)

谁是全球南方的大老板？ (Who’s the big boss of the global south?)

在这个尔虞我诈的世界里，竞争是激烈的。 (In a dog-eat-dog world, competition is fierce)

敏锐的人士不屑于“全球南方”的概念，这在近年来已成为一种流行词汇。它的不足是显而易见的：三个词汇永远无法捕捉从摩洛哥到马来西亚等超过100个国家的复杂性。但这个短语已经被乔·拜登、埃马纽埃尔·马克龙和习近平采用。

SNIFFY TYPES disdain the notion of “the global south”, which has become something of a meme in recent years. Its inadequacies are obvious: three words could never capture the complexities of a group of more than 100 countries spread from Morocco to Malaysia and beyond. But the phrase has been adopted by Joe Biden, Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping.

最简单的工作定义是，它指的是大多数但并非所有非西方国家。它的使用还表示新兴经济体希望在全球事务中拥有更多权力，并经常对西方政策持批判态度。因此，全球南方据说对加沙战争感到愤怒，并对西方在乌克兰、新冠疫情和气候政策上的决定感到不满。美国智库昆西国际负责任国家构想研究所的萨朗·希多尔表示，“全球南方存在的形式不是作为一种一致、有组织的集团，而更像是一种地缘政治事实。”

The simplest working definition is that it refers to most, but not quite all, non-Western countries. Its use also denotes how emerging economies want more power over global affairs and often have a critical view of Western policy. Thus the global south is said to be outraged by the war in Gaza, and unhappy about Western decisions on Ukraine, covid-19 and climate policy. Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an American think-tank, says “the global south exists not as a coherent, organised grouping so much as a geopolitical fact.”

如果全球南方存在一种程度的话，那么谁来领导它呢？纳伦德拉·莫迪曾暗示印度可能成为其“声音”。巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦（被称为卢拉）也认为自己国家也可以成为这个角色。为了研究这个问题，我们与一群学者合作，对贸易、金融和外交联系的数据进行了分析。我们的结论是，令人难以置信的，尽管美国仍然比其他任何国家在全球南方拥有更多影响力，但在这个集团中，中国已经成为最有影响力的成员——这使习近平先生最有权力来领导。刺痛的是，中国的影响力存在明显的局限性，甚至可能适得其反。其他大国也正在崛起。

If the global south exists, sort of, then who leads it? Narendra Modi has suggested India could be its “voice”. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula), the president of Brazil, reckons his country could be, too. To examine this question we have worked with a group of scholars to crunch data on trade, financial and diplomatic links. Our conclusion is, counterintuitively, that America still has more influence than any other country over the global south, but that within the grouping itself China has become the most powerful member—giving Mr Xi the strongest claim to leadership. The sting is that China’s influence has glaring limits, and could even backfire. And other powers are on the rise.

我们与丹佛大学帕迪国际未来中心（PCIF）合作。该中心已构建了从1960年到2022年的国家权力指数。其中的主要指标被俏皮地称为“正式双边影响力能力”，这是一个根据两个维度来衡量国家A对国家B可能产生的影响力的指标。首先是“带宽”，或者来回连接的程度：贸易量、外交代表等。第二是“依赖度”：国家B需要国家A的武器、贷款、投资等的程度。更多的连接意味着国家A有更多机会施加影响力——而权力的不对称性使这更容易实现。例如，想想中国对巴基斯坦的影响力：充足的连接和中国享有不对称的影响力。这一研究分析了全球南方的130多个成员在联合国G77中的权力关系。

We worked with the Pardee Centre for International Futures (PCIF) at the University of Denver. It has built an index of states’ power from 1960 to 2022. The main metric is catchily known as “formal bilateral influence capacity”, a measure of how much power country A may have over country B, based on two dimensions. First, “bandwidth”, or the extent of connections back and forth: the volume of trade, diplomatic representation and so on. Second, “dependence”: how much country B needs country A’s arms, loans, investments etc. More connections mean more chances for country A to exert influence—and asymmetry in power makes it easier to do so. Think of China’s power over Pakistan, for instance: ample connections and China enjoys asymmetric influence. The exercise examines power relations among the 130-odd members of the global south found in the G77, a UN grouping.

自上世纪70年代以来，美国一直是对G77影响力最大的国家（参见图表）。随着英国和法国的吸引力减弱，其“影响力能力”一直保持相对稳定。但它越来越受到中国的竞争，中国在相对无关重要的40年中，其影响力从2000左右开始增长。根据该指数，中国对G77的“影响力能力”大约是第三最有影响力的国家法国的两倍，是英国、印度或阿联酋的三倍左右。

America has been the country with the most influence over the G77 since the 1970s (see chart). Its “influence capacity” has been more or less constant even as the allure of Britain and France has waned. But it is increasingly rivalled by China, which after 40 years of relative insignificance saw its influence grow from around 2000. According to the index, China’s “influence capacity” over the G77 is roughly double that of France, the third-most influential country, and around three times that of Britain, India or the UAE.

中国在31个国家中具有最多的影响力。其影响力在巴基斯坦、孟加拉国、俄罗斯和东南亚的几个国家中最大。相比之下，全球南方中排名第二的最具影响力成员印度仅在6个G77成员国中位居首位。根据PCIF之前的分析，从1992年到2020年，中国比美国影响力更大的国家数量几乎翻了一番，从33个增加到61个。

China wields the most influence in 31 countries. Its clout is greatest in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia and several states in South-East Asia. By contrast the next-most powerful member of the global south, India, is top dog with only six G77 members. According to an earlier analysis by PCIF, from 1992 to 2020 the number of countries over which China had more influence than America almost doubled, from 33 to 61.

最近，中国对整个集团概念变得更加热衷。去年，习近平先生和中国高级官员开始将其国家称为“全球南方”的一部分，这是他们此前一直抵制的描述（这个术语被归功于上世纪60年代的一位美国左翼学者），而更青睐于“发展中国家大家庭”等短语。去年九月，中国发布了有关改变国际机构、规则和法律的提议。他们声称这是一个“真正多边主义”的愿景，其中“普遍安全”取代了“普遍价值”——换句话说，这是一个不受干涉西方统治的体系。

Recently, China has become a lot keener on the whole idea of the grouping. Last year Mr Xi and senior Chinese officials began referring to their country as part of the “global south”, a description they had hitherto resisted (the term is credited to an American left-wing academic in the 1960s), in favour of phrases like “family of developing countries”. In September, China published proposals on changing international institutions, rules and laws. It claimed this was a vision of “true multilateralism” where “universal security” replaced “universal values”—in other words, a system not run by an interfering West.

中国在赢得影响力方面极具战略性，针对摇摆不定的国家提供基础设施支持、融资等。从2000年到2021年，中国资助了超过2万个基础设施项目，其中许多项目属于“一带一路倡议”，遍布165个国家，援助或信贷总额达到13万亿美元。一些分析人士指出，来自中国进出口银行等大型国家支持的审慎资金正在枯竭。但威廉玛丽大学的AidData团队在11月份发表的一篇论文提出了不同观点。作者之一布拉德利·帕克斯表示：“与传统智慧相悖，北京并未撤退。”该论文发现，当今有更多实体向发展中国家提供信贷：2021年，每年计数为800亿美元。中国“仍然是世界上国际发展金融的最大来源”。

China is intensely strategic about winning influence and targets swing states with infrastructure support, financing and more. From 2000 to 2021 it funded more than 20,000 infrastructure projects, many of which were under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), across 165 countries with aid or credit worth $1.3trn. Some analysts have noted data showing that credit from large state-backed lenders such as the Export-Import Bank of China is drying up. But a paper published in November by AidData, a group from William & Mary University, argues otherwise. “Contrary to conventional wisdom, Beijing is not in retreat,” says Bradley Parks, one of the authors. The paper finds that there are many more entities extending credit to the developing world today: in 2021 it counted lending of $80bn a year. “[China] remains the single largest source of international development finance in the world.”

中国瞄准了地缘政治的观望者。AidData认为，约三分之二的中国融资流向“摇摆不定”国家，即中国和美国都没有明显优势的国家。该团队已确定了一种交换条件：如果一个政府在联合国大会的投票中增加与中国一致的比例达到10个百分点，可以预期其从北京获得的融资平均增加276%。中国还利用自身影响力在诸如新疆镇压等议题上拉拢支持。从2000年到2021年，“低收入和中等收入国家”在联合国大会上75%的时间与中国一同投票外交决策。

China is targeting geopolitical fence-sitters. AidData reckons that around two-thirds of Chinese financing goes to “toss-up” countries, where neither China nor America clearly holds sway. The group has identified a quid pro quo: if a government increases its share of votes at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that align with China’s by ten percentage points, it can expect a 276% increase, on average, in financing from Beijing. China has also used its weight to curry favour on subjects such as its repression in Xinjiang. From 2000 to 2021 “low- and middle-income countries” voted on foreign-policy decisions with China 75% of the time at the UNGA.

中国还使用其他工具。中国是超过120个国家的主要贸易伙伴。自2016年以来，中国提供了2400亿美元的紧急融资，主要是类似于国际货币基金组织的援助。中国还在发展中国家迅速建设基础设施项目，取悦当地精英，并补贴华为等数字技术的推广。过去五年，中国已经取代俄罗斯成为撒哈拉以南非洲的主要武器来源。

China uses other tools, too. It is the main trading partner of more than 120 countries. It has provided $240bn, mostly since 2016, in emergency financing of the sort the IMF specialises in. China also builds infrastructure projects quickly in developing countries, pleasing their elites, and subsidises the roll-out of digital tech such as that of Huawei. Over the past five years it has overtaken Russia as the main source of weapons for sub-Saharan Africa.

尽管中国在“第77集团”中的领导地位强大，但它也面临问题。首先，其影响力在范围和强度上受到限制。例如，非洲和东南亚最近的民意调查显示，发展中国家对美国和中国的支持存在分歧。

Though China’s leadership position among the G77 is formidable, it faces problems. First, its influence is limited in reach and intensity. Recent polls in Africa and South-East Asia, for example, show split support for America and China in developing countries.

中国的行为和政治价值观可能会削弱其影响力。中国在商业和政治方面的行动引发了对问责的呼声：有些国家有时会将其债务危机归咎于中国。而中国对基于价值观的互动的蔑视（它主张非干涉）是明显的。这个一党制国家最亲密的朋友大多是专制国家。全球南方地区认为民主价值观较为重要的地方，如巴西，可能不太可能与中国有密切的文化联系。此外，随着中国与伊朗和俄罗斯等国家走得更近，它有可能与那些想要摧毁而非改革国际秩序的国家结盟。

China’s conduct and political values may stunt its influence. Its actions in business and politics have attracted calls for accountability: countries sometimes lay the blame for their debt crises at its door. And the country’s disdain for values-based interactions (it preaches non-interference instead) is apparent. Most of the one-party state’s closest pals are also autocratic. Places in the global south where democratic values are considered strong, such as Brazil, are unlikely to have a close cultural connection with China. What is more, as China draws nearer to the likes of Iran and Russia it risks allying with countries that want to destroy, rather than to reform, the international order.

与此同时，中国的经济声誉可能会下降。通过倾斜贷款赢得的公众支持是在还款所需资金之前发生的。根据非洲民意调查机构Afrobarometer的数据，2019年到2022年间，认为中国对其发展产生积极影响的非洲人的比例从59%下降到49%。习先生对中国经济困境的最新回应是启动大规模的工业补贴，这可能导致制造商品涌入其他新兴经济体市场。尽管一些消费者可能会受益，但另一场“中国冲击”可能会扼杀全球南方政府的工业雄心。

Meanwhile China’s economic reputation could deteriorate. The public support it won through its lending binge happened before the money needed repaying. Some 75% of its BRI loans will require the principal to be paid back by 2030. It is probably no coincidence that the share of people in Africa who see China as having a positive impact on its development dipped from 59% to 49% from 2019 to 2022, according to Afrobarometer, a pollster. Mr Xi’s latest response to economic woes in China is to launch massive industrial subsidies, which could lead to manufactured goods flooding markets of other emerging economies. Although some consumers may benefit, another “China shock” may stunt the industrial ambitions of governments in the global south.

尽管中国面临逆风，新的竞争对手正崛起，他们在全球南方的影响力正在上升。印度是领跑者。从2012年到2022年，印度在非洲的使馆数量从25个增加到43个。根据莫迪先生的说法，印度是该大陆第四大贸易伙伴和第五大外国直接投资来源。与此同时，印度还向埃塞俄比亚、塞拉利昂和斯里兰卡等国家提供其“技术堆栈”，包括生物特征身份技术。

Even as China faces headwinds, new rivals are emerging whose influence in the global south is rising. India is the front-runner. The number of Indian embassies in Africa increased from 25 to 43 between 2012 and 2022. It is the continent’s fourth-largest trade partner and fifth-largest source of foreign direct investment, according to Mr Modi. Meanwhile India is also offering its “stack” of digital platforms—including biometric identity technology—to countries such as Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.

印度的一些力量是难以量化的。作为一种具有缺陷的民主体制，其外交政策极具务实（与此同时，其与美国建立更紧密联系的同时拒绝谴责俄罗斯入侵乌克兰），使其在“第77集团”中更接近中间观点，而不是像中国那样远离中间。印度领导的倡导也具有实质性差异。由于其更担心一个由中国主导的亚洲，而不是一个由美国主导的世界，因此印度在改革国际规则方面也十分务实。印度希望成为西方的桥梁，而不是一把攻城锤。

Some of India’s power is unquantifiable. As a flawed democracy with an ultra-pragmatic foreign policy (it has forged closer bonds with America at the same time as refusing to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) it is closer to the median worldview among the G77 than is China. India’s pitch to lead is also substantively different. Because it worries more about a China-led Asia than an American-led world, it is also pragmatic about its approach to reforming international rules. The country wants to be a bridge to the West, not a battering ram.

其他国家有特定的权力主张。如果说中国是一个影响力的超级市场，那么它在全球南方的竞争对手就像精品店，为其他成员国提供更少种类的定制商品。海湾国家正在将一部分油气盈利投资于发展中国家的可再生能源项目和矿业。作为世界第二大农产品出口国，巴西利用今年主持G20峰会的机会，推动全球南方的粮食安全。南非奇迹般地看到自己是全球南方的道德领袖，将以色列因涉嫌在加沙地区进行种族灭绝的行为告上国际法院，并领导一支由非洲国家组成的“和平使命”前往乌克兰和俄罗斯。

Other countries have specialist claims to power. If China is a supermarket of influence, then its rivals in the global south are like boutiques, offering other members a smaller range of bespoke goods. Gulf states are investing some of their hydrocarbon windfalls in renewable-energy projects and mines in the developing world. Brazil, the world’s second-largest agricultural exporter, is using its chairmanship of the G20 this year to promote food security in the global south. South Africa sees itself, improbably, as the moral leader of the global south, taking Israel to the International Court of Justice for alleged genocide in Gaza, and leading a “peace mission” of African countries to Ukraine and Russia.

最后，美国及其盟友仍未退出比赛。OECD集团中的富裕国家每年在海外援助上花费超过2000亿美元（贷款占中国融资的大部分）。根据国际货币基金组织的数据，撒哈拉以南非洲地区与美国、欧元区的贸易总额高于该地区与中国之间的贸易额。此外，除了像北约这样的联盟，美国与76个国家有着国防合作伙伴关系。

Lastly, America and its allies are not out of the game. Rich countries in the OECD group spend more than $200bn annually in overseas aid (loans make up most of China’s financing). Trade between sub-Saharan Africa and, in total, America and the euro area is greater than that between the region and China, according to IMF data. And in addition to alliances such as NATO, America has defence partnerships with 76 countries.

中国希望挫败这种竞争。然而，即使中国成功了，它也只能成为一个永远不会团结的集团中的领导者。中国不会永远欢迎印度加入联合国安理会；巴西和南非在世界贸易组织关于农业问题上经常意见分歧；债务国和像中国这样的债权国希望世界银行和国际货币基金组织进行不同的改革。中国将发现，全球南方国家将追求各自的国家利益，并经常与西方、中国以及彼此发生冲突。换句话说，全球南方并不需要一个领导者。这是一个竞争的领域，只是一个无法在地图上找到的领域。■

China hopes to see off this competition. Yet even if it does, it will be the leading power in a group that will never be cohesive. China is not going to welcome India permanently onto the UN Security Council; Brazil and South Africa regularly disagree at the WTO over agriculture; debtor countries and creditors like China want different things from World Bank and IMF reform. China will find that countries in the global south will pursue their national interests, and often come into conflict with the West, China—and each other. The global south, in other words, does not want a leader. It is a zone of contest. Just not one that can be located on a map. ■

回到目录

金融与经济 | 幻想经济 (Finance and economics | Fantasy economics)

富裕世界面临残酷的支出紧缩 (The rich world faces a brutal spending crunch)

包括美国、英国和法国在内的国家都面临无情的财政逻辑。 (Countries including America, Britain and France are up against remorseless fiscal logic)

十年前，各国财政部门都被紧缩政策所笼罩。尽管失业率高企、经济增长疲弱，政府们仍竭尽全力削减预算赤字。而如今情况大为不同。在西方，大多数经济体状况较好，人们有工作，企业利润增长强劲。然而政府支出远超收入。

A decade ago finance ministries were gripped by austerity fever. Governments were doing all they could to cut budget deficits, even with unemployment high and economic growth weak. Today things are very different. Across the West, most economies are in better shape. People have jobs. Corporate-profit growth is strong. And yet governments are spending a lot more than they are taking in.

没有哪个政府比美国更加挥霍。今年，这个世界上最大的经济体预计财政赤字（支出超过税收）将超过GDP的7%——这在非经济衰退和战时是闻所未闻的。但并非美国是唯一挥金如土的国家。以往勤俭节约的北欧国家爱沙尼亚和芬兰也出现了较大的财政赤字。去年，意大利的赤字达到了2007-2009年全球金融危机后的2010-11年期间的水平，法国的赤字也增至GDP的5.5%，远超预期。“我呼吁进行一场集体清醒呼唤，对我们所有公共支出做出选择，”其财政部长布鲁诺·勒梅尔上个月宣布。

No government is more profligate than America’s. This year the world’s largest economy is projected to run a budget deficit (where spending exceeds taxation) of more than 7% of GDP—a level unheard of outside recession and wartime. But it is not the only spendthrift country. Estonia and Finland, two normally parsimonious northern European countries, are running large budget deficits. Last year Italy’s deficit was as wide as in 2010-11, following the global financial crisis of 2007-09, and France’s grew to 5.5% of GDP, well above forecasts. “I am calling for a collective wake-up call to make choices in all of our public spending,” announced Bruno Le Maire, its finance minister, last month.

一些国家表现更为保守。去年，塞浦路斯实现了盈余。希腊和葡萄牙——接近收支平衡——看起来像是财政正直的楷模，尽管他们仍然负债累累。然而，总体走向是明确的。《经济学人》对35个富裕国家的数据进行了分析。在2017-2019年期间，样本中位数国家实现了预算盈余，而去年，它的预算赤字接近GDP的2.5%（见图表1）。基准“主要”赤字（不包括利息支付）和“结构性”赤字（抽象出经济周期因素）也有所扩大。

Some countries have been more reserved. Last year Cyprus ran a surplus. Greece and Portugal—close to balancing their budgets—look like the model of fiscal rectitude even if they still have colossal debts. Still, the general direction is clear. The Economist has analysed data from 35 rich countries. Whereas in 2017-19 the median country in our sampleran a budget surplus, last year it ran a budget deficit of close to 2.5% of GDP (see chart 1). Measures of “primary” deficits (excluding interest payments) and “structural” deficits (abstracting from the economic cycle) have also widened.

两个因素解释了这种挥霍现象。第一个与税收有关。在整个富裕世界，税收收入出人意料地疲弱。在美国，去年薪金所得税收入略有下降。同时，“非预扣所得税”，包括资本收益税，下降了四分之一。英国的资本收益税收入正比最近高峰水平低11％。而日本今年财政年度的自我评估税收，包括对资本收益的部分征税，预计将比去年低4％。

Two factors explain the splurge. The first relates to taxes. Across the rich world, receipts are surprisingly weak. In America, revenue from income taxes deducted from pay fell slightly last year. Meanwhile, “non-withheld income taxes”, including on capital gains, tumbled by a quarter. Britain’s capital-gains-tax take is running 11% below its recent high. And Japan’s self-assessment tax take for this fiscal year, which includes some levies on capital gains, is on track to come in 4% below last year’s.

税务人员因2022年底和2023年初的市场动荡而苦不堪言。科技公司裁员，削减了所需支付的所得税收入，这些公司通常给员工发放高额工资。随着股价下跌，家庭和投资者变卖股票获利变得更加困难，减少了资本收益的来源。去年，由于房地产价格下跌，几乎没有人通过炒房获利。私募股权公司的高级员工通常通过投资回报获得收入，而非常规薪水，他们度过了一个糟糕的一年。

Taxmen are suffering because of market ructions in late 2022 and early 2023. Tech firms, which pay big salaries, let staff go, trimming income-tax hauls. As stock prices fell, it became more difficult for households and investors to sell shares for a profit, reducing the pool of capital gains. Last year few people made profits from flipping houses as property prices dropped. Senior staff at private-equity firms, who often receive income in the form of investment returns rather than a conventional salary, had a bad year.

第二个因素是国家支出。在covid-19大流行期间全力以赴的财政政策过后，政府们有所收敛，但并非完全如此。在澳大利亚，疗养院中的老年人在疫情暴发期间仍可获得财政援助。直到2023年中旬，德国才完全取消在大流行期间实施的保护工作岗位计划。美国仍在向在封锁期间保留员工的小企业支付大额税款退款。在意大利，2020年设计的旨在鼓励业主将其住房绿化的项目失控，政府迄今已发放超过2000亿欧元（或GDP的10%）的支持。其中一个计划的名称“超级奖金”，如果不是如此挥霍，本可笑一笑。

The second factor is state spending. Following the whatever-it-takes fiscal policy of the covid-19 pandemic governments have retrenched, but not fully. In Australia elderly people in care homes may still receive financial assistance during a covid outbreak. Only in mid-2023 did Germany completely wind down the job-protection schemes implemented during the pandemic. America is still paying out hefty tax refunds to small businesses that kept people on during lockdowns. In Italy a project concocted in 2020, designed to encourage homeowners to green their homes, has spiralled out of control, with the government so far disbursing support worth more than €200bn (or 10% of GDP). The name of one of the schemes, “Superbonus”, would be amusing were it not so profligate.

政治家们也更愿意干预并花钱以修正被视为错误的事情。在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰并导致能源价格飙升后，欧洲政府拨款约GDP的4%以保护家庭和企业不受影响。包括波兰和波罗的海国家在内的一些国家如今正在大手笔购买武器和士兵。乔·拜登总统希望在今年11月的美国总统大选前尽可能宽恕更多学生债务。

Politicians have also become more prepared to intervene—and spend money—in order to right perceived wrongs. After Russia invaded Ukraine and energy prices soared, governments in Europe allocated about 4% of GDP to protect households and companies from the effects. A few, including Poland and the Baltics, are now spending big on guns and soldiers. President Joe Biden wants to forgive as much student debt as he can before America’s presidential election in November.

消防栓还能继续喷水多久？乍看之下，它似乎还会持续一段时间。市场一片繁荣，这将促进税收增加。政府的债务可持续性不仅取决于预算赤字的发生，还取决于总体公共债务、经济增长、通货膨胀和利率等因素。自大流行病结束以来，通货膨胀一直居高不下，经济增长坚挺。尽管利率有所上升，但相对历史水平来说仍相当低。

How long can the firehose keep blasting? At first glance, it looks like it could keep going for a while. Markets are on a tear, which will boost tax receipts. And a government’s debt sustainability does not change solely owing to what happens to the budget deficit. It is also a product of overall public debt, economic growth, inflation and interest rates. Since the end of the pandemic, inflation has been high and growth has been solid. Although interest rates have risen, they remain fairly low by historical standards.

这些条件让政治家处于财政上的甜蜜地带（见图表2）。我们计算发现在2022-23年，富裕国家中位数能够运行约占GDP 2% 的主要赤字，并且仍能削减其公共债务占GDP比率。债务的名义价值可能会上升，但在通货膨胀的帮助下，经济规模会上升得更多。一些国家面临更有利的环境。意大利的债务比率自2021年以来已经下降了约10个百分点，尽管其财政政策宽松。法国的比率也有所下降。希腊——将有利的经济条件与严格的财政政策结合起来——其债务占GDP比率已经惊人地下降了50个百分点。

These conditions put politicians in a fiscal sweet spot (see chart 2). We calculate that in 2022-23 the median rich country was able to run a primary deficit of about 2% of GDP and still cut its public-debt-to-GDP ratio. The nominal value of debt would have risen, but, helped by inflation, the size of the economy would have risen by even more. A few countries faced an even more favourable environment. Italy’s debt ratio has fallen by about ten percentage points of GDP since 2021, despite its loose fiscal policy. France’s ratio has edged down, too. Greece—combining favourable economic conditions with tight fiscal policy—has seen its debt-to-gdp ratio fall by a stunning 50 percentage points.

然而，现在情况正在改变。尽管经济增长和通货膨胀已经下降，政府面临的利率却没有下降。在美国，投资者正在减少他们对美联储降息的押注。总而言之，财政算术变得更加艰巨。例如，去年意大利政府本可以运行** GDP2% 的主要赤字，并且仍然削减其债务比率，现在需要运行GDP 1%的盈余。美国处于类似的境地。通货膨胀进一步下降、增长放缓或利率上升，都将使政府更加难以稳定其债务。

Now conditions are changing, however. Interest rates facing governments are not yet falling, even as economic growth and inflation have come down. In America investors are trimming their bets on rate cuts by the Federal Reserve. All told, the fiscal arithmetic is becoming more daunting. For instance, whereas last year the Italian government could have run a primary deficit of up to 2% of gdp and still cut its debt ratio, now it needs to run a surplus of 1% of gdp. America is in a similar position. Further falls in inflation, a slowdown in growth or higher rates would make it more difficult still for governments to stabilise their debt.

难怪财政整合的讨论声愈来愈响。意大利政府认为它很快就会因其立场而受到欧盟的谴责。英国工党希望不久后握有权力，承诺财政的正直。法国政府已讨论削减医疗和失业津贴支出。美国是一个异类。在这个世界领先的经济体中，对话仍未翻篇。在选举之前，唐纳德.川普和拜登承诺为数百万选民减税。但财政逻辑是无情的。政治家们是否喜欢，不管怎样，挥霍无度的政府时代都将终结。■

Small wonder that talk of fiscal consolidation has become louder. The Italian government believes it will soon be reprimanded by the EU for its stance. In Britain the Labour Party, which hopes to take power before long, promises fiscal rectitude. The French government has discussed cuts to health spending and unemployment benefits. America is the outlier. In the world’s leading economy, the conversation still has not turned. Ahead of the election, Donald Trump and Mr Biden promise tax cuts for millions of voters. But fiscal logic is remorseless. Whether politicians like it or not, the era of free-spending governments will have to come to an end. ■

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金融和经济 | 身临敌境 (Finance and economics | Behind enemy lines)

乌克兰无人机袭击正在削弱俄罗斯石油工业 (Ukrainian drone strikes are hurting Russia’s oil industry)

这个世界第三大生产国现在成了汽油进口国 (The world’s third-largest producer is now an importer of petrol)

俄罗斯油田以更高价格销售更多石油本应是一个美好梦想。但对于俄罗斯而言，这标志着其与乌克兰战争进入了一种新的、惩罚性的阶段。数月来，乌克兰对炼油厂的无人机袭击压缩了俄罗斯生产柴油和汽油等精炼燃料的能力，将全球第三大石油生产国转变为汽油进口国。能源公司试图通过海外销售未经精炼的原油来减少损失，在三月份出口达到十个月来的高点。

Selling more oil at higher prices ought to be the stuff of dreams for a petrostate. But for Russia it is a sign of a new, punishing phase in its war with Ukraine. Months of Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries have crimped Russia’s ability to produce refined fuels, such as diesel and petrol, and turned the world’s third-largest oil producer into an importer of petrol. Energy firms have tried to pare their losses by selling unrefined oil overseas, pushing exports to a ten-month high in March.

在乌克兰最近的一次袭击中，即四月二日，策划者扩大了攻击范围。他们设法在距边界1115公里的一个炼油厂投放爆炸物。他们的攻击引发了一个负责俄罗斯3%炼油能力的装置起火。尽管没有造成持久损害，但其他一些袭击更成功。据数据公司S&P Global称，乌克兰的炮击已使俄罗斯的炼油能力减少了七分之一。四月八日，奥尔斯克市的维修工作和洪水导致更多能力停机。圣彼得堡国际商品交易所的批发价格飙升。乌克兰曾成为能源基础设施袭击的目标，希望这些袭击能减缓资金流入敌方的战争机器，并削弱对战争的支持。

In Ukraine’s most recent attack on April 2nd, its planners extended their reach. They managed to land explosives on a refinery 1,115km from the border. Their attack set fire to a unit responsible for 3% of Russia’s refining capacity. Although it left no lasting damage, others have been more successful. All told, Ukraine’s barrage has knocked out a seventh of Russian refining capacity, according to S&P Global, a data firm. Maintenance work and flooding in the city of Orsk on April 8th has taken more capacity offline. Wholesale prices on the St Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange have spiked. Ukraine, which has itself been the target of strikes on energy infrastructure, hopes the assaults will slow the flow of dollars into its enemy’s war machine and dent support for the war.

俄罗斯的石油巨头遭受最严重打击。通常为海外客户生产高价汽油和柴油的炼油厂被转为国内生产。俄罗斯港口出口的柴油量降至五个月以来的最低点。同时，石油巨头们正在寻找他们多余原油的新客户，根据前石油公司高管Sergey Vakulenko的说法，他们将每桶原油损失大约15美元，原本这些原油可以作为精炼产品出口。

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

尽管自弗拉基米尔·普京三月连任以来，乌克兰的袭击有所减缓，但乌克兰并未表示会停止。乌克兰可以比俄罗斯更快、更廉价地投掷无人机。一些设施，比如位于下诺夫哥罗德市的诺尔西炼油厂，修复特别缓慢且昂贵，部分原因是西方制裁阻碍了设备的获取。截至本月，根据与石油输出国组织+达成的生产限制协议，俄罗斯石油生产商还必须将地下采油量减少约5%。

Russia’s oil giants are suffering the most. Refineries that normally produce petrol and diesel for overseas clients at a premium have been diverted to domestic production. The volume of diesel due to pass out of Russian ports has hit a five-month low. At the same time, oil barons are seeking new customers for their excess crude, on which they will stomach losses of $15 or so for every barrel that could have been exported as a refined product, says Sergey Vakulenko, a former oil executive.

迄今为止，汽车驾驶者尚未受到乌克兰造成的“非计划停机”（正如俄罗斯能源部所称）的影响。政府通过自三月一日起禁止六个月内出口汽油，并与其附庸国白俄罗斯达成协议，以控制价格。俄罗斯在三月上半月从白俄罗斯进口了3000吨燃料，而一月份则为零。由于担心这可能不够，官员还要求邻国哈萨克斯坦留出相当于10万吨的燃料储备，据路透社报道。如果袭击持续，价格可能会开始上涨。

Although Ukraine’s attacks have slowed since Vladimir Putin’s re-election in March, Ukraine has given no indication that they will stop. It can lob drones faster and more cheaply than Russia can repair its refineries. Some facilities, like the NORSI refinery in the city of Nizhny Novgorod, have been particularly slow and expensive to fix, in part because access to equipment is stymied by Western sanctions. As of this month, Russian oil producers must also reduce the amount they pump from the ground by about 5% as part of a production cap agreed with OPEC+, an oil cartel.

尽管油价收入占俄罗斯预算的34%，但对俄罗斯财政的影响应该是有限的。若罗斯涅夫特，即国家石油公司，无法弥补损失收入，则将分配更少的股息，但许多人怀疑这些股息是否真正进入国库。政府还将通过向炼油厂支付更少的每桶补贴来节省一些现金。俄罗斯最大的赢利来源是资源税。因为这些税被征收为油田内的特许权，所以政府对于石油作为原油出口还是作为精炼燃料出口并不在乎，Vakulenko先生表示。只要俄罗斯能够出口原油，就可以收取特许权税。

Motorists have so far been shielded from Ukraine-inflicted “unplanned maintenance” (as Russia’s energy ministry puts it). The government has kept a lid on prices by banning petrol exports for six months from March 1st, and striking a deal with Belarus, its client state. Russia imported 3,000 tonnes of fuel from Belarus in the first half of March, up from zero in January. Fearing that may not be enough, officials have also asked neighbouring Kazakhstan to set aside a third of its reserves, equivalent to 100,000 tonnes, should Russia need them, according to Reuters. If attacks continue, they could start to push up prices.

俄罗斯以外的观察者正在密切关注乌克兰的袭击是否会影响全球石油市场。至今还未产生太大影响，但由于OPEC+的供应限制、全球经济状况好于预期以及红海地区的干扰，布伦特原油价格今年上涨了19%，接近每桶90美元。很少有观察者比乔·拜登更关心，他将在十一月竞选连任。他的政府已敦促乌克兰停止袭击，担心这将引发俄罗斯的严厉报复并推高汽油价格。乌克兰领导人愿意冒险。 ■

The consequences for Russia’s public finances should be limited, even though oil revenues represent 34% of its budget. Rosneft, the state oil company, will dispense a smaller dividend if it cannot make up its lost revenues, but many doubt these dividends make it to state coffers at all. The government will even save some cash by paying out fewer per-barrel subsidies to refineries. Russia’s biggest money-earners are resource taxes. And because these are levied as royalties at the well-head, the government is indifferent between oil exported as crude or as refined fuel, says Mr Vakulenko. As long as Russia is able to export crude, it can collect royalties.

Observers outside Russia are watching to see if Ukraine’s attacks will affect the global oil market. They have yet to have much impact, but the price of Brent crude has risen by 19% this year to just under $90 a barrel, owing to OPEC+ supply curbs, better-than-expected global economic conditions and disruptions in the Red Sea. Few observers have more at stake than Joe Biden, who faces an election in November. His administration has urged Ukraine to halt its attacks, fearing they will provoke tough retaliation from Russia and drive petrol prices higher. Ukraine’s leaders are willing to take the risk. ■

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金融和经济 | 放下斧头 (Finance and economics | Put the axe away)

美国人什么时候才能看到那些利率降低？ (When will Americans see those interest-rate cuts?)

在一个令人不快的惊喜之后，一些人现在认为它们可能要等到总统大选之后。 (Following a nasty surprise, some now think they may come only after the presidential election)

也许这一切总是太美好而不真实。2023年的重要经济故事是美国的通货紧缩似乎没有痛苦地上演，消费品价格压力在逐渐减弱的同时，经济增长依然强劲，这推动了股价飙升。然而，截至2024年目前的情况并不那么令人欣喜。经济增长保持强劲，但部分原因是通货膨胀似乎比较难以解决。美联储面临着降息的两难选择；投资者必须面对这样一个现实：比起几个月前他们预期的情况，货币政策几乎肯定会保持更长时间的紧缩。

Perhaps it was always too good to be true. The big economic story of 2023 was the seemingly painless disinflation in America, with consumer-price pressures receding even as growth remained resilient, which underpinned surging stock prices. Alas, the story thus far in 2024 is not quite so cheerful. Growth has remained robust but, partly as a result, inflation is looking stickier. The Federal Reserve faces a dilemma about whether to start cutting interest rates; investors must grapple with the reality that monetary policy will almost certainly remain tighter for longer than they had anticipated a few months ago.

最新令人担忧的数据来自于4月10日发布的3月通胀率高于预期。分析师们原本认为，在核心消费者价格指数（CPI）中，剔除食品和能源成本后，每月会上涨0.3%。然而实际上上涨了0.4%。虽然这听起来可能不是很多，但这已是第三个连续月CPI超出预期。如果持续下去，当前的速度将使年同比通胀率超过4%，是美联储2%目标的两倍（根据稍微不同的通胀测量指标）（见图表1）。

The latest troublesome data came from higher-than-expected inflation for March, which was released on April 10th. Analysts had thought that the core consumer-price index (CPI), which strips out food and energy costs, would rise by 0.3% month on month. Instead, it rose by 0.4%. Although that may not sound like much of an overshoot, it was the third straight month of CPI readings exceeding forecasts. If continued, the current pace would entrench inflation at over 4% year on year, double the Fed’s target—based on a slightly different inflation gauge—of 2% (see chart 1).

回到去年12月，处于乐观情绪高峰时，大多数投资者已经将今年的降息预期定为六到七次。他们此后已经降低了这些预期。最新通胀数据发布后不到几分钟，市场定价已经转向暗示今年只会有一到两次降息，这是一个戏剧性的变化（见图表2）。现在有可能美联储在11月的总统选举之前不会降息，这将对现任总统乔·拜登产生打击。

Back in December, at the peak of optimism, most investors had priced in six or seven rate cuts this year. They have since dialled back those expectations. Within minutes of the latest inflation figures, market pricing shifted to implying just one or two cuts this year—a dramatic change (see chart 2). It is now possible that the Fed will not cut rates before the presidential election in November, which would be a blow to the incumbent, Joe Biden.

美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔一直保持一贯态度。他始终坚持中央银行将采取依据数据的方法来制定货币政策。但他不是像弹簧那样对新数据有反应，而是建议耐心等待。今年年初，即便经历了六个月基本平稳的价格波动后，他表示美联储希望在开始降息之前能更有把握地确定通胀将走低。这种谨慎可能看起来过度了。而如今看来是恰当的。

Jerome Powell, the Fed’s chairman, has remained consistent. He has always insisted that the central bank will take a data-dependent approach to setting monetary policy. But rather than bouncing up and down in reaction to fresh figures, he has also counselled patience. At the start of this year, even after six straight months of largely benign price movements, he said the Fed wanted more confidence that inflation was going lower before starting to cut rates. Such caution risked seeming excessive. Today it looks appropriate.

市场定价的波动性也改变了美联储与市场的立场关系。去年年底，当投资者预料今年可能会有多达七次降息时，官员们仅计划三次降息，显得比较鹰派。在他们最近公布的更近期的预测中，官员们仍计划三次降息，而这现在看起来更像是鸽派。美联储将于6月更新其预测。

The volatility of market pricing has also changed the Fed’s positioning relative to the market. At the end of last year, when investors foresaw as many as seven rate cuts this year, officials had pencilled in just three, appearing hawkish. In their more recent projections, published less than a month ago, officials still pencilled in three cuts, which now appears doveish. The Fed will next update its projections in June.

与此同时，美联储将会观察更多数据而不只是CPI。他们偏好的通胀指标核心个人消费支出价格指数（PCE）将在几周后发布，预计3月每月的上涨会接近0.3%。驱动CPI上涨的一些项目，尤其是机动车保险和医疗服务，在PCE计算中的定义略有不同。美联储可能也会因显示工资增长继续趋缓的数据而感到安慰。

In the meantime the Fed will be watching more than the CPI. Its preferred measure for inflation, the core personal consumption expenditures price index (PCE), will be released in a few weeks, and is expected to come closer to 0.3% month on month in March. Several of the items that drove up CPI, particularly motor-vehicle insurance and medical services, are defined differently in PCE calculations. The Fed may also be comforted by data showing wage growth has continued to moderate.

尽管如此，尝试用各种数据漏洞来解释不舒服的数字，让人回想起2021年，当时的通胀否认者认为迅速上涨的价格仅仅是暂时现象。总体结论是，尽管经济增长依然保持强劲，但现在看来似乎已经撞上了经济的供应限制，因此正在转化为持续的通货膨胀压力。这要求严密而非宽松的货币政策。美联储在通胀数据更为合作时已经谨慎降息，如今可能会更加谨慎。 ■

Nevertheless, trying to explain away uncomfortable numbers by pointing to this or that data quirk is redolent of 2021, when inflation denialists thought that fast-rising prices were merely a transitory phenomenon. The general conclusion today is that although growth has remained impressively strong, it now appears to be bumping up against the economy’s supply limits, and is therefore translating into persistent inflationary pressure. That calls for tight, not loose, monetary policy. The Fed, already cautious about cutting rates when inflation figures were more co-operative, is likely to be even more wary now. ■

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金融与经济 | 习近平有着健康的胃口 (Finance and economics | Xi’s healthy appetite)

中国政府正在吞噬私人房地产市场 (China’s state is eating the private property market)

可怜那些即将购房的人 (Pity those soon to buy a home)

在武汉一处高档住宅开发项目中，销售代理希望明确表示他们的国有公司已经割断与私营部门的所有联系。该公司最初与私人开发商Sunac合作，直到2022年违约。一名销售女员工解释说，该公司的所有者还控制着该市的给水和供电单位。她带着笑容说，如果这样的公司崩溃，“那么整个国家都没有希望”。

At an upmarket housing development in Wuhan, sales agents want to make clear that their state-owned firm has severed all its ties to the private sector. The firm had at first partnered with Sunac, a private developer, until it defaulted in 2022. A saleswoman explains that the firm’s owner also controls the city’s waterworks and electricity provider. If this type of firm collapses, she says with a grin, “then the whole country has no hope”.

中国的房地产危机已经持续三年多，最大的私人开发商在巨额债务的压力下倒闭。30个大城市的新房销量在年度3月同比下降了47%。同一月，最大100家开发商的收入下降了46%。房地产投资下降至8.4万亿元（1.2万亿美元），比2021年的峰值低了四分之一。尽管有数百万家庭正在等待开发商完成他们的住宅建设，但据澳新银行的分析师估计，要销售中国庞大的存货，包括仍在建设中的房屋，需要3.6年的时间。

More than three years into China’s property crisis, the biggest private builders are folding under the strain of enormous debts. New-home sales in 30 large cities fell by 47% in March, year on year. Revenues for the 100 biggest developers were down 46% in the same month. Housing investment dropped to 8.4trn yuan ($1.2trn), a quarter below its peak in 2021. Although millions of families are waiting for developers to finish building their flats, it would take 3.6 years to sell China’s glut of inventory, including homes still under construction, reckon analysts at ANZ, a bank.

所有这些为国有公司提供了机会。只有通过获得资金支持，开发商才能生存下去。一些私营企业通过政府项目获得帮助，该项目批准国家资金支持的住房项目，但资金的投放速度较慢。另一方面，国有企业长期以来一直与银行密切联系。这意味着他们购买土地、建造更多住房并且比私营对手销售更多住宅。在大多数私营公司面临某种形式的重组时，一些国有企业竟然奇迹般地盈利。此外，他们的行动也透露出中国领导人习近平在未来十年中国房地产行业的计划。

All this presents an opportunity for state-owned firms. Only by securing access to funding can developers survive. Some private companies have found help via a government programme that approves housing projects for state funding, but it has been slow to deploy capital. State firms, on the other hand, have long enjoyed tight links with banks. This means they are buying more land, building more homes and selling more of them than their private counterparts. At a time when most private companies face some form of restructuring, a few state-owned firms are miraculously eking out profits. Moreover, their actions provide hints as to the plans of Xi Jinping, China’s leader, for the next decade of the country’s property industry.

作为这些计划的一部分，国家将成为中国最大的房屋建设商。中国领导人希望为低收入家庭建造数百万套“保障性住房”，这些住房不能像普通商业单元一样转售。计划建设的规模之大，社会住房将在2030年之前主导整体房屋供应。标普全球信用评级机构估计，今年和明年将有多达4万亿元用于保障性住房和其他国有建设。根据研究机构凯投宏观的数据，在私人开发商的施工在2021年底同比下降之际，其他类型公司，主要是地方政府企业的施工量大幅增加（见图表）。因此，到明年，新住房供应的30-40%将是社会住房，而目前仅为10%。

As part of those plans, the state is set to become China’s biggest home-builder. The country’s leaders want to construct millions of “social housing” units for low-income households, which cannot be resold like normal commercial units. Such is the scale of the planned construction, social homes will come to dominate overall housing supply by 2030. As much as 4trn yuan will be spent on social housing and other state building this year and next, estimates S&P Global, a credit-rating agency. According to Capital Economics, a research firm, just as construction by developers began to plummet year on year in late 2021, building by other types of companies, mainly local-government firms, soared (see chart). As a result, 30-40% of new housing supply will be social homes by next year, up from just 10% currently.

地方政府也可能成为该国房屋库存的最大购买者。郑州市最近宣布将购买1万套住房并将其转为社会单元。其中许多将被出租。虽然尚无关于地方政府将成为多大规模房地产业主的估计，但其他几个城市也宣布了类似的计划。

Local governments may also become the largest buyers of the country’s housing stock. The city of Zhengzhou recently announced that it would purchase 10,000 homes to make them social units. Many will be rented out. Although there is no estimate of how big a landlord local governments will become, several other cities have announced similar plans.

一些实力雄厚的国有公司正在崛起。由中央政府所有的CR Land核心利润同比增长了3%，这在其大多数同行亏损或倒闭的情况下是一个惊人的成就。另一个受中央控制的巨头COLI，其利润下滑了一个非常可观的3%。随着危机的发展，最大国有企业的房屋销售从2021年中至2023年中仅下降了25%，而最大私营企业则下跌了90%。

A few powerful state-owned firms are on the rise. CR Land, owned by the central government, notched a 3% year-on-year increase in its core profits—an astonishing accomplishment when most of its peers have lost money or collapsed. COLI, another centrally controlled giant, saw profits fall by a very respectable 3%. As the crisis has played out, home sales by the largest state firms fell by only 25% between mid-2021 and mid-2023, while those at the largest private ones tumbled 90%.

这反映了官方的偏好。4月8日，一家国有银行呼吁清算一家名为Shimao的私人开发商，该企业在2022年违约了2亿美元的贷款。不用说，这将阻碍Shimao重新安排其债务并继续建设未完工的住房。相比之下，三月份监管机构要求银行和债券持有者帮助拯救Vanke，一个由强大国有支持股东的开发商。中国政策制定者更愿意向他们有影响力的机构提供紧急援助。

This reflects official preferences. On April 8th a state bank called for the liquidation of Shimao, a private developer that defaulted in 2022, over a $200m unpaid loan. Needless to say, this would hinder Shimao’s attempts to restructure its debts and continue building unfinished homes. By contrast, in March regulators asked banks and bondholders to help save Vanke, a developer with a powerful state-backed shareholder. Chinese policymakers are much happier to offer bail-outs to institutions over which they have influence.

随着国有公司即将接管中国的房地产业，会出现什么问题？首先，国有企业面临危险的债务。地方政府企业的估计总债务达到75万亿元，约占GDP的60%。当这些企业从地方政府购买土地时，实际上只是把钱从一个口袋转移到另一个口袋。这些交易保持了资金流向地方财政，但正在积累不可持续的负担。一些地方政府企业已开始发行债券，唯一目的是偿还其他公司的债务。分析师担心这种支出水平不可能再持续太久，特别是在较贫困的省份。

With the state set to consume China’s property industry, what could go wrong? For a start, state firms face dangerous debts. Local-government firms sit on estimated collective debt of 75trn yuan, or about 60% of GDP. When such firms buy land from local governments they merely shift money from one pocket to another. These transactions have kept money flowing into local coffers, but are building up unsustainable burdens. Some local-government firms have started to issue bonds for the sole purpose of paying off other companies’ debts. Analysts fear that this level of spending cannot continue much longer, especially in poorer provinces.

额外债务可能会被决策者视为为控制中国最重要的资产所付出的一种值得的代价。据此推测，未来的房地产市场将包括较少的繁荣与衰退周期，如果理性的国有企业负责管理的话。更便宜的住房也应该帮助习近平先生应对中国日益扩大的贫富差距。然而，国有主导也意味着市场效率会降低。中国的私人房地产开发商是供应链的专家。他们组织建筑劳动力的能力是无与伦比的。相比之下，国有企业是一种糟糕的建设者。随着国有企业承担越来越大的角色，新房屋的质量可能会下降。

Additional debts might appear to policymakers to be a price worth paying for control over China’s most important asset. The future of the housing market, the thinking goes, would include fewer boom-and-bust cycles if sober state firms were in charge. Cheaper accommodation should also help Mr Xi fight China’s widening wealth gap. Yet state dominance will also mean a less efficient market. China’s private homebuilders are masters of supply chains. Their ability to organise labour for construction is unparalleled. The state, in contrast, is a lousy builder. As state firms take on a bigger and bigger role, the quality of new homes is likely to fall.

这种干预还将动摇市场的基础。当相同的单位以后可能以补贴价格有货时，购房者可能会变得不愿以商业价格购买房屋。市场观察人士怀疑，官员们想要保留资金以便低价购买房屋，利用私人企业的困境。因此，社会住房的迅速增长可能会在私营公司之间引发更深的危机。这可能并非习近平先生设想的情况。 ■

The intervention will also shake the foundations of the market. Homebuyers will probably become reluctant to buy a home at commercial rates when the same unit may later be available at subsidised ones. Market-watchers suspect officials want to conserve funds to buy up homes on the cheap, taking advantage of the struggles of private firms. As a consequence, the rapid growth of social housing will probably cause an even deeper crisis among private companies. That may not be quite what Mr Xi has in mind. ■

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金融与经济 | 超越国内生产总值 (Finance and economics | Beyond GDP)

印度经济真正增长有多快？ (How fast is India’s economy really growing?)

统计学家对该国的数据持保留态度。 (Statisticians take the country’s figures with a pinch of salt)

印度的**乐观情绪往往会时不时地飙升。据一种说法，在印度向外资敞开大门几年后的1996年，孟买这座印度金融中心的房地产价格飞涨至全球任何城市中最高。2007年，印度经济以9%的年增长率增长，这让许多人猜测它可能会达到两位数。然而，每一次繁荣之后，希望都化为泡影。2000年代末的激增为2010年代的金融动荡让路。

Optimism about India tends to spike now and again. In 1996, a few years after the country opened to foreign capital, the price of property in Mumbai, India’s financial hub, soared to the highest of any global city, according to one account. In 2007 the country’s economy grew at an annual rate of 9%, leading many to speculate that it might hit double digits. Yet after each of these booms, hopes were dashed. The late-2000s surge made way for financial turbulence in the 2010s.

如今印度似乎再次处在一次振荡的开始。到2023年第四季度，GDP增速高达8.4%。但这种数字往往需要持怀疑态度。政府内外的经济学家正在辩论经济增长速度究竟有多快——这个问题在4月19日开始的一次大选前尤为敏感。那么印度的实际增长率是多少？经济是否正在加速？

Today India again appears to be at the start of an upswing. In the year to the fourth quarter of 2023, GDP growth roared at 8.4%. But such figures tend to be treated with a pinch of salt. Economists inside and outside the government are debating just how fast the economy is growing—a question that has particular piquancy ahead of a general election that begins on April 19th. So what is India’s actual growth rate? And is the economy accelerating?

要回答这些问题，首先看看8.4%这个数字。同期的名义GDP增长率为10.1%，这意味着通货膨胀率只有1.7%。尽管这可能看起来可疑，因为印度的消费价格同比上涨了5.4%，但这可以解释。与许多其他国家一样，印度的GDP平减指数非常看重批发生产价格。这些价格波动很大，一年仅增长了0.3%。

To answer these questions, start with the 8.4% figure. Nominal GDP growth in the same period was 10.1%, implying that inflation was only 1.7%. Although that may seem suspect, given that India’s consumer prices rose by 5.4% over the year, it can be explained. Like many other countries, India’s GDP deflator puts a lot of weight on wholesale producer prices. These are volatile and grew by only 0.3% over the year.

然而，印度的方法确实有些奇怪。2015年，印度改变了GDP计算方法，从2011年开始，将原先直接通过观察生产数量变化来衡量实际GDP的方法改为通过调查和财务报告来衡量名义GDP，然后再通货紧缩得到实际GDP。这是一个复杂的过程：一些部门，如制造业和矿业，使用批发价格指数（WPI）通货紧缩；服务业则混合运用WPI和消费价格；包括建筑在内的其他部门使用基于数量的方法。

India’s approach does have oddities, however. In 2015 the country changed its GDP calculation, starting with figures from 2011, from one that measured real GDP directly by observing changes in production quantities to one that measured nominal GDP through surveys and financial reports, before then deflating them to obtain real GDP. It is a complex process: some sectors, such as manufacturing and mining, are deflated using a wholesale price index (WPI); services use a mix of the WPI and consumer prices; other sectors, including construction, use a quantity-based method.

2017年，时任印度首席经济顾问的阿尔温德·苏布拉马尼安观察到，国家的GDP数据与信贷、用电量和货运量等指标出现背离。2019年，他发表了一篇论文，声称2011-2016年间印度的GDP增长被高估了几个百分点。自那以后，这些数据一直备受争议，其中一个原因是方法上的改变导致历史数据修订，削减了前政府取得的增长率。

In 2017 Arvind Subramanian, then India’s chief economic adviser, observed that the country’s GDP figures were falling out of line with indicators such as credit, electricity use and freight traffic. In 2019 he published a paper suggesting India’s GDP growth in 2011-16 had been overestimated by a few percentage points a year. The numbers have since been mired in controversy, not least because the methodological change came with a revision to historical data that reduced the growth rates achieved by the previous government.

很少有人怀疑印度GDP数据的真实性。印度首位统计局长普罗纳布·森表示，旧方法难以捕捉商品质量变化，而不是数量。但新方法也有自己的缺点。“早期，我们更可能比较准确地测量实际GDP增长，而今天我们更准确地测量名义GDP增长，”森先生说。

Few people suspect foul play in India’s GDP calculations. The old approach struggled to capture changes in the quality of goods, rather than quantities, says Pronab Sen, India’s first chief statistician. But the new method has disadvantages of its own. “Earlier, the chances were we were measuring real GDP growth more accurately, and today we are measuring nominal GDP more accurately,” says Mr Sen.

这些缺点反映了两个问题：通货紧缩的选择以及通货紧缩的实施方式。更多部门使用WPI作为通货紧缩的方式，而非消费价格。事实上，尽管WPI不包含服务价格，但仍然被许多行业使用，比如应该包括服务价格的酒店业。这是一个日益严重的问题。服务领域已经占据印度GDP的一半以上，并且增长速度超过其他部门。根据我们的计算，从2011年到2019年，印度消费价格指数增长幅度比GDP平减指数高出20个百分点——这是所有大型经济体中最大的差距。相比之下，从2003年到2011年，这一差距减少了三个百分点。

The disadvantages reflect two issues: the choice of deflator, and how the deflation is carried out. More sectors use WPI as their deflator than consumer prices. Indeed, even though WPI does not contain service prices, it is still used for a number of industries, such as hotels, that ought to incorporate them. This is a growing problem. Service sectors already make up more than half India’s GDP and are expanding faster than the rest of the economy. By our calculations, India’s consumer price index, which puts greater weight on services, grew by 20 percentage points more than its GDP deflator from 2011 to 2019—the largest gap in any big economy. From 2003 to 2011, by contrast, it grew by three percentage points less.

接着是通货紧缩的实施方式。大多数国家使用一种称为“双重通胀”的方法，即输入和输出价格分别通缩。以一家进口原油用于生产的制造商为例。如果原油价格下跌，输出价格不变，数量也保持不变，实际附加值不应该改变。但如果像印度一样使用相同的通货紧缩指数来处理输入和输出，就会看起来好像制造商已经变得更有生产力。

Then there is how deflation is done. Most countries use a method called “double deflation”, where input and output prices are deflated separately. Consider a manufacturer importing oil for use in production. If oil prices fall, output prices do not and quantities stay the same, real value added should not change. But if the same deflator is used for inputs and outputs, as in India, it would look as if the manufacturer had become more productive.

这似乎就是2010年代发生的事情。从2011年到2014年，油价稳定在每桶90-100美元，随后在接下来的两年内暴跌至50美元以下。作为全球第三大石油消费国，印度依赖石油进口，其中85%是进口的。尽管印度制造业在这一时期表现疲软，GDP数据却掩盖了它的困难。

This is what seems to have happened during the 2010s. Oil prices were steady at $90-100 a barrel from 2011 to 2014, before crashing to below $50 over the next two years. India is reliant on oil imports, as the world’s third-biggest consumer of oil, 85% of which is brought in. Although India’s manufacturing sector struggled in this period, GDP data concealed its difficulties.

好消息是自 covid-19 大流行以来，批发价格指数（WPI）和消费品价格之间的背离不再显得那么显著。从2011年12月到2019年，消费品价格以5.8%的年增长率增长，而WPI以2.6%的年增长率增长。然而，在截至2023年12月的四年中，这两个指标都以大约5.7%的速度增长。WPI仍然波动不定，这就是为什么季度国内生产总值（GDP）数据，比如最近的8.4%增长率，应该谨慎对待。这个数字还受到一次性补贴支付减少以及间接税收增加的推动，这就是为什么趋势更可能接近6.5%——毛额附加值的增长率。

The good news is that since the covid-19 pandemic, the divergence between WPI and consumer prices no longer appears as significant. From December 2011 to 2019, consumer prices grew at a 5.8% annual rate and WPI grew at a 2.6% annual rate. Yet in the four years to December 2023, both measures have grown at around 5.7%. WPI remains volatile, which is why quarterly GDP figures, such as the recent 8.4% growth rate, should be treated with a degree of caution. The number was also boosted by a one-time reduction in subsidy payments and an increase in indirect tax collections, which is why the trend is more likely to be closer to 6.5%—the growth rate of gross value added.

印度政府正在努力将服务业纳入其价格指数中。然而，实现完整的生产者价格指数和双重通缩的道路将是漫长的。Sen先生表示，许多印度公司宁愿不与政府分享其成本数据。统计学家通常不愿强迫私营部门遵从。与此同时，采集批发价格要容易得多，因为交易商乐意上报价格。

India’s government is working towards incorporating services into its price indices. The road to a fully fledged producer-price index and double-deflation will be a long one, however. Mr Sen says many Indian companies would rather not share data on their costs with the government. Statisticians are often reluctant to force the private sector to comply. Meanwhile, collecting wholesale prices is much easier because traders are happy to report them.

现有数据是否暗示繁荣？自2019年12月以来，实际国内生产总值以平均年增长率4.2%增长，这意味着印度，像许多其他国家一样，尚未恢复到疫情前的趋势。企业和外国投资仍然疲弱。但是，自2021年12月以来，印度整体经济似乎强劲，年增长率为7.1%。从用电量到货运量等备选指标都很强劲；制造业和服务业采购经理调查的调查显示，这是十多年来的最高水平。预测人士预计未来五年将以6.5%的年增长率增长。尽管2011年至2019年的实际国内生产总值增长率也正式为每年6.5%，但潜在增长率可能更低，这意味着真正的加速可能正在进行中。数据杂乱，情况复杂，然而大多数政府经济学家对这一结果会感到满意。■

Do existing data suggest a boom? Since December 2019, real GDP has grown by 4.2% at an average annual rate, meaning that India, like many other countries, has not recovered to its pre-pandemic trend. Corporate and foreign investment remain weak. But looked at since December 2021, India’s overall economy seems robust, having grown at 7.1% annually. Alternative indicators, from electricity use to freight traffic, are strong; surveys of purchasing managers for both manufacturing and services have hit their highest levels in over a decade. Forecasters expect 6.5% annual growth over the next five years. Although real GDP growth from 2011 to 2019 was also officially 6.5% a year, the underlying rate was probably lower, implying genuine acceleration may be under way. The data is noisy, the picture is mixed and yet most government economists would be satisfied with that outcome. ■

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金融与经济 | 巴特伍德 (Finance and economics | Buttonwood)

中国央行和Costco购物者的共同点 (What China’s central bank and Costco shoppers have in common)

提示：并非对加密货币的喜爱 (Hint: it is not a fondness for cryptocurrencies)

黄金一直具有魅力。最早的文明用它来制作珠宝；最早的货币形式就是用它铸造的。几个世纪以来，各国国王争相获取这种黄金。查理曼大帝从阿瓦尔人掠夺了大量黄金之后，征服了欧洲的大部分地区。1511年，西班牙国王费迪南德派遣探险家前往新大陆时，告诉他们“尽力取得黄金，如果可以的话要以人道方式，但无论如何，都要取得黄金。”1848年，一名劳工詹姆斯·马歇尔在加州萨克拉门托建造锯木厂时发现了一片金片，之后普通人也争相寻找黄金。

Gold has always held an allure. The earliest civilisations used it for jewellery; the first forms of money were forged from it. For centuries kings clamoured to get their hands on the stuff. Charlemagne conquered much of Europe after plundering vast amounts of gold from the Avars. When King Ferdinand of Spain sent explorers to the new world in 1511, he told them to “get gold, humanely if you can, but all hazards, get gold.” Ordinary men also clamoured for it after James Marshall, a labourer, found a flake of gold while constructing a saw mill in Sacramento, California, in 1848.

人们再次大量投资于这种贵金属。4月9日，黄金现货价格达到了每盎司2364美元的纪录高点，自3月初以来上涨了15%。黄金的疯涨在一定程度上是合理的：这种金属被视为对灾难和经济困境的避险工具。在国家陷入战争、经济不确定且通货膨胀猖獗时，黄金往往会大幅上涨。

People are once again spending big on the precious metal. On April 9th its spot price hit a record of $2,364 an ounce, having risen by 15% since the start of March. That gold is surging makes a certain degree of sense: the metal is seen to be a hedge against calamity and economic hardship. It tends to rally when countries are at war, economies are uncertain and inflation is rampant.

但这只是在一定程度上成立。毕竟，为什么现在会出现如此激增呢？通货膨胀一年前更严重。乌克兰战争已经陷入了某种僵局。在哈马斯于10月7日袭击以色列之后的一个月内，黄金价格仅上涨了7%，是近期涨势的一半。此外，投资者似乎最近才开始对黄金失去兴趣。那些认为黄金将作为通货膨胀对冲的人在2022年被证明大错特错，因为在通胀失控的情况下，黄金价格下滑。比特币等加密货币——通常被视为黄金替代品——变得愈发受欢迎。长期研究黄金的分析师对其上涨感到困惑。

But only a certain degree. After all, why is it surging precisely now? Inflation was worse a year ago. The Ukraine war has arrived at something of a stalemate. In the month after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7th, the price of gold rose by just 7%—half the size of its more recent rally. Moreover, investors had only recently appeared to have gone off the stuff. Those who thought gold would act as a hedge against inflation were proven sorely wrong in 2022 when prices slipped even as inflation spiralled out of control. Cryptocurrencies like bitcoin—often viewed as a substitute for gold—have gained popularity. Longtime gold analysts are puzzled by its ascent.

如果一个投资者无法基于基本面理解一段涨势，通常需要考虑更简单的解释：买家多于卖家。那么，到底是谁在大量购买黄金呢？

An investor who cannot understand a rally on the basis of fundamentals must often consider a simpler rationale: there have been more eager buyers than sellers. So, who is buying gold in bulk?

不管是谁，他们并非使用交易所交易基金（etfs），这是普通投资者通过其经纪账户以及一些机构投资者最常用的工具。事实上，黄金etfs自一年多以来一直出现净流出。虽然黄金价格自2022年末以来上涨了约50%，但etfs持有的黄金已经下降了五分之一。

Whoever it is, they are not using exchange-traded funds, or etfs, the tool most often used by regular folk through their brokerage accounts, as well as by some institutional investors. There have, in fact, been net outflows from gold etfs for more than a year. After tracking each other closely throughout 2020 and 2021, gold prices and etf inflows decoupled at the end of 2022. Although prices are up by around 50% since late 2022, gold held by etfs has dropped by a fifth.

那么，有三类买家。第一，也是最大的，是央行。总体而言，中央银行一直在增加储备中存放黄金的比例—这是为了摆脱美元，这一举措在美国冻结俄罗斯外汇储备作为对俄入侵乌克兰的回应后加快了。中国在这方面的转变最为明显，中国已经从2021年底的3.3%提高到4.3%。所谓场外市场的交易已经增加，大部分黄金交易是在这个市场进行的。中国央行在3月增持了16万盎司黄金，价值3.84亿美元。

That leaves three buyers. The first, and biggest, are central banks. In general, central bankers have been increasing the share of reserves that are stored in gold—part of an effort to diversify away from dollars, a move that gathered pace after America froze Russia’s foreign-exchange reserves in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Nowhere is this shift clearer than in China, which has raised the share of its reserves held in gold from 3.3% at the end of 2021 to 4.3%. Trading has picked up in the so-called over-the-counter market, in which central banks buy much of their gold. China’s central bank added 160,000 ounces of gold, worth $384m, in March.

第二是大型机构，如养老金或共同基金，它们可能一直在对黄金进行投机性赌注或对冲——以防通货膨胀回来或为未来灾难提供保护。它们主要在期权和期货市场进行交易，那里的活动水平较高。

The second is big institutions, such as pension or mutual funds, which may have been making speculative bets or hedges on gold—in case inflation does come back or as protection against future calamities. Activity in options and futures markets, where they tend to do most of their trading, is elevated.

第三种潜在的买家最为有趣：也许是私人个人或公司在购买实物黄金。在今年8月，美国超市Costco开始销售金条，这家被注重成本的中产阶级喜欢的超市以超低价格销售一次性包装的卫生纸、松软的运动袜和烤鸡而闻名。这家零售商开始在网上销售每盎司约2000美元的金条，比当时的黄金现货价仅高一丁点。金条几乎立即售罄，每次商品到货时仍然如此。富国银行的分析师估计，消费者每月在这家超市购买1亿至2亿美元的黄金，与他们购买的蛋糕和洗涤剂一起。

The third potential buyer is the most intriguing: perhaps private individuals or companies are buying physical gold. In August it became possible to buy hunks of the metal at Costco, an American superstore beloved by the cost-conscious middle classes for selling jumbo-size packs of toilet paper, fluffy athletic socks and rotisserie chickens, all at super-low prices. The retailer started selling single-ounce bars of gold, mostly online, for around $2,000—just a hair higher than the spot value of bullion at the time. It sold out almost immediately, and continues to do so whenever it restocks. Analysts at Wells Fargo, a bank, estimate that shoppers are buying $100m-200m worth of gold each month from the superstore, alongside their sheet cakes and detergent.

这将是每月4万到8万盎司黄金；或者说，相当于中国央行的一半黄金数量。这种行为或许是一个趋势的先兆。美国的通货膨胀再次上升，连续三个月超出预期，如果当前趋势持续，到2024年将达到4%。中期预期一度下降，现在又开始上升。随着购物者在Costco挑选商品时担心生活费用，难怪他们会被少量黄金所吸引。■

That would be 40,000 to 80,000 ounces of gold each month; or, in other words, up to half as much as the Chinese central bank. Such behaviour is perhaps a harbinger of a trend. Inflation in America is creeping up again. It has overshot expectations for three consecutive months, and would reach 4% in 2024 if current trends were to continue. Medium-term expectations, which had dropped, have begun climbing. As shoppers peruse Costco’s wares, worrying about the cost of living, it is it any wonder they are tempted by a bit of bullion?■

来自我们的金融市场专栏作家Buttonwood的更多文章：如何构建全球货币 （4月4日） “辉煌七人组”是如何误导的（3月27日） 如何**交易一场选举（3月21日）

Read more from Buttonwood, our columnist on financial markets:How to build a global currency (Apr 4th)How the “Magnificent Seven” misleads (Mar 27th)How to trade an election (Mar 21st)

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金融与经济 | 自由交易 (Finance and economics | Free exchange)

如果科技解决了一切，人类将会做什么? (What will humans do if technology solves everything?)

欢迎来到高科技乌托邦 (Welcome to a high-tech utopia)

在 Greg Egan 的小说《Permutation City》中，角色 Peer 在虚拟现实中实现了永生，并拥有对其完全控制，但却发现自己非常无聊。于是，他改变自己，培养出新的热情。有时他挑战高等数学的界限；有时他写歌剧。“曾经，他甚至对于伊丽西斯[来世]感兴趣。但如今不再。他更喜欢考虑桌腿问题。” Peer 的多变反映出一个更深层次的问题：当技术解决了人类最深层的问题后，剩下什么可做呢？

In “Permutation City”, a novel by Greg Egan, the character Peer, having achieved immortality within a virtual reality over which he has total control, finds himself terribly bored. So he engineers himself to have new passions. One moment he is pushing the boundaries of higher mathematics; the next he is writing operas. “He’d even been interested in the Elysians [the afterlife], once. No longer. He preferred to think about table legs.” Peer’s fickleness relates to a deeper point. When technology has solved humanity’s deepest problems, what is left to do?

这是牛津大学哲学家尼克·博斯特罗姆最新著作中探讨的一个问题，他的上一本书认为，人类面临着在未来100年内有1/6 的几率被消灭，或许是由于危险形式的人工智能(AI)的发展。在博斯特罗姆最新的书《Deep Utopia》中，他考虑了一个截然不同的结果。如果人工智能取得了极为成功，会发生什么？在博斯特罗姆考虑的一个场景中，技术进步到可以以几乎零成本完成所有具有经济价值的工作的程度。在一个更为激进的场景下，即使是你认为应该由人类来完成的任务，比如父母的责任，也可以由人工智能更好地完成。这听起来可能比乌托邦更像反乌托邦，但博斯特罗姆提出了不同的观点。

That is one question considered in a new publication by Nick Bostrom, a philosopher at the University of Oxford, whose last book argued that humanity faced a one-in-six chance of being wiped out in the next 100 years, perhaps owing to the development of dangerous forms of artificial intelligence (AI). In Mr Bostrom’s latest book, “Deep Utopia”, he considers a rather different outcome. What happens if AI goes extraordinarily well? Under one scenario Mr Bostrom contemplates, the technology progresses to the point at which it can do all economically valuable work at near-zero cost. Under a yet more radical scenario, even tasks that you might think would be reserved for humans, such as parenting, can be done better by AI. This may sound more dystopian than utopian, but Mr Bostrom argues otherwise.

首先看看博斯特罗姆标记为“后稀缺性”乌托邦的第一个场景。在这样的世界里，对工作的需求将会减少。将近一个世纪前，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯写了一篇名为《我们的孙辈的经济机会》的论文，预测在进入未来100年后，他富有的后代只需要每周工作15个小时。这并没有完全实现，但工作时间大大减少。在富裕世界，每周平均工作时间从19世纪末的60多小时减少到今天的不到40小时。典型的美国人将三分之一的清醒时间用于休闲活动和体育运动。在未来，他们可能希望将时间花在超越当前人类概念之外的事物上。正如博斯特罗姆所写的，当受到强大技术的帮助时，“我们可能经历的可能经验空间远远超出了我们现在的未优化大脑所能接触到的经验。”

Start with the first scenario, which Mr Bostrom labels a “post-scarcity” utopia. In such a world, the need for work would be reduced. Almost a century ago John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren”, which predicted that 100 years into the future his wealthy descendants would need to work for only 15 hours a week. This has not quite come to pass, but working time has fallen greatly. In the rich world average weekly working hours have dropped from more than 60 in the late 19th century to fewer than 40 today. The typical American spends a third of their waking hours on leisure activities and sports. In the future, they may wish to spend their time on things beyond humanity’s current conception. As Mr Bostrom writes, when aided by powerful tech, “the space of possible-for-us experiences extends far beyond those that are accessible to us with our present unoptimised brains.”

然而，博斯特罗姆对“后稀缺性”乌托邦的标签可能略微误导：由超级智能引起的经济爆炸仍然会受到物理资源的限制，尤其是土地。虽然太空探索可能会大大增加可用的建筑空间，但并不能使其无限。还有中间的世界，在这些世界中，人类发展出了强大的新智能形式，但并未成为太空旅行者。在这样的世界里，财富可能会很惊人，但很多财富可能会被住房吸收——就像今天的富裕国家一样。

Yet Mr Bostrom’s label of a “post-scarcity” utopia might be slightly misleading: the economic explosion caused by superintelligence would still be limited by physical resources, most notably land. Although space exploration may hugely increase the building space available, it will not make it infinite. There are also intermediate worlds where humans develop powerful new forms of intelligence, but do not become space-faring. In such worlds, wealth may be fantastic, but lots of it could be absorbed by housing—much as is the case in rich countries today.

“地位商品”可以提升其所有者的地位，由于其性质的稀缺性，它们仍然可能存在。即使人工智能在艺术、智力、音乐和体育方面超越人类，人类可能仍然会从超越其他人中获得价值，例如拥有最热门活动的门票。在1977年，经济学家弗雷德·赫希在《增长的社会界限》中提出，随着财富的增加，人类满足欲望的较大部分将包括地位商品。用于竞争的时间增加，这些商品的价格上涨，因此它们在国内生产总值中的份额增加。这种模式在人工智能乌托邦中可能会持续。

“Positional goods”, which boost the status of their owners, are also still likely to exist and are, by their nature, scarce. Even if AIs surpass humans in art, intellect, music and sport, humans will probably continue to derive value from surpassing their fellow humans, for example by having tickets to the hottest events. In 1977 Fred Hirsch, an economist, argued in “The Social Limits to Growth” that, as wealth increases, a greater fraction of human desire consists of positional goods. Time spent competing goes up, the price of such goods increases and so their share of GDP rises. This pattern may continue in an AI utopia.

博斯特罗姆指出，一些类型的竞争是协调的失败：如果每个人都同意停止竞争，他们将有时间做其他更好的事情，这可能进一步促进增长。然而有一些类型的竞争，如体育比赛，具有内在价值，值得保存。（人类可能没有更好的事情可做。）自从IBM的深蓝首次在1997年击败当时的世界冠军加里·卡斯帕罗夫以来，人们对国际象棋的兴趣增加了。围绕电子竞技产业已经形成，计算机可以轻松击败人类。预计到2032年，该产业的收入将以每年20%的速度增长，达到近110亿美元。今天社会中的几个群体让我们感受到未来人类可能如何度过他们的时光。贵族和波西米亚人享受艺术。修道士生活在自己内心世界中。运动员把他们的生命投入到运动中。退休者尝试着从事所有这些追求。

Mr Bostrom notes some types of competition are a failure of co-ordination: if everyone agrees to stop competing, they would have time for other, better things, which could further boost growth. Yet some types of competition, such as sport, have intrinsic value, and are worth preserving. (Humans may also have nothing better to do.) Interest in chess has grown since IBM’s Deep Blue first defeated Garry Kasparov, then world champion, in 1997. An entire industry has emerged around e-sports, where computers can comfortably defeat humans. Their revenues are expected to grow at a 20% annual rate over the next decade, reaching nearly $11bn by 2032. Several groups in society today give us a sense of how future humans might spend their time. Aristocrats and bohemians enjoy the arts. Monastics live within themselves. Athletes spend their lives on sport. The retired dabble in all these pursuits.

任务如抚养孩子会不会始终是人类的避风港？博斯特罗姆先生并不确定。他认为，超越后稀缺世界的是一个“超工具”世界，在那里人工智能也会在育儿方面变得超越人类水平。凯恩斯本人写道，“我认为，没有一个国家和民族能期待进入无忧无虑与丰裕的时代而没有恐惧。因为我们已经习惯了长时间奋斗而非享受…从今天在世界的任何地方富裕阶层的行为和成就来看，前景非常沮丧！”《圣经》则更简洁地说：“懒惰的人成了魔鬼的工作间。”

Won’t tasks such as parenting remain the refuge of humans? Mr Bostrom is not so sure. He argues that beyond the post-scarcity world lies a “post-instrumental” one, in which AIs would become superhuman at child care, too. Keynes himself wrote that “there is no country and no people, I think, who can look forward to the age of leisure and of abundance without a dread. For we have been trained too long to strive and not to enjoy…To judge from the behaviour and the achievements of the wealthy classes today in any quarter of the world, the outlook is very depressing!” The Bible puts it more succinctly: “idle hands are the devil’s workshop.”

这些动态暗示着一个“进步的悖论”。尽管大多数人希望拥有一个更美好的世界，但如果技术变得太先进，他们可能会失去目标。博斯特罗姆先生认为，大多数人仍然会享受那些具有内在价值的活动，比如享用美味食物。乌托邦主义者认为生活变得太过轻松，可能会决定挑战自己，也许通过殖民一个新星球，试图从零开始重建文明。然而，即使这样的冒险也可能在某个时刻失去其价值。关于人类会快乐地在激情之间跳跃多久，像《排列城市》中的皮尔一样，这是一个未知问题。经济学家长期以来一直认为人类拥有“无限的欲望和需求”，表明人们希望消费的种类是无穷无尽的。随着人工智能乌托邦的到来，这一观点将受到考验。结果十分重要。■

These dynamics suggest a “paradox of progress”. Although most humans want a better world, if tech becomes too advanced, they may lose purpose. Mr Bostrom argues that most people would still enjoy activities that have intrinsic value, such as eating tasty food. Utopians, believing life had become too easy, might decide to challenge themselves, perhaps by colonising a new planet to try to re-engineer civilisation from scratch. At some point, however, even such adventures might cease to feel worthwhile. It is an open question how long humans would be happy hopping between passions, as Peer does in “Permutation City”. Economists have long believed that humans have “unlimited wants and desires”, suggesting there are endless variations on things people would like to consume. With the arrival of an AI utopia, this would be put to the test. Quite a lot would ride on the result. ■

[从经济学角度阅读更多内容，请查看我们的专栏 Free exchange:](https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/article90917-prod.ece)(Apr 4th)卡尼曼是一个善于提出挑战性问题的大师 (4月4日)印度如何成为亚洲之虎 (3月27日)为什么《奇思妙想经济学》未能改变经济学 (3月21日)*

Read more from Free exchange, our column on economics:Daniel Kahneman was a master of teasing questions (Apr 4th)How India could become an Asian tiger (Mar 27th)Why “Freakonomics” failed to transform economics (Mar 21st)

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科学技术 | AI参战 (Science and technology | AI at war)

乌克兰如何运用人工智能对抗俄罗斯 (How Ukraine is using AI to fight Russia)

从目标追踪到揪出违反制裁者，它的战争日益高科技。 (From target hunting to catching sanctions-busters, its war is increasingly high-tech)

在乌克兰对哈尔松市占领区通往第聂伯河东岸安东诺夫斯基桥的火箭袭击之前，安全官员们仔细研究了一系列特殊报告。当时是2022年夏天，俄罗斯需要这座桥来补给其第聂伯河以西的部队。这些报告中包含了两个问题的研究：摧毁桥梁是否会导致俄罗斯士兵或他们在家的家人恐慌？更为重要的是，乌克兰政府如何通过创建“特定信息环境”最大程度地打击俄罗斯的士气？

IN THE run-up to Ukraine’s rocket attacks on the Antonovsky Bridge, a vital road crossing from the occupied city of Kherson to the eastern bank of the Dnipro river, security officials carefully studied a series of special reports. It was the summer of 2022 and Russia needed the bridge to resupply its troops west of the Dnipro. The reports contained research into two things: would destroying the bridge lead the Russian soldiers, or their families back home, to panic? And, more important, how could Ukraine’s government maximise the blow to morale by creating “a particular information environment”?

这就是基辅“开放思维研究所”（OMI）的创始人斯维亚托斯拉夫·赫尼兹多夫斯基描述其研究机构利用人工智能生成这些评估的工作方式。算法在大量俄罗斯社交媒体内容和社会经济数据中进行筛选，包括酒精消费、人口流动、在线搜索和消费行为等。人工智能将这些变化与俄罗斯“忠实支持者”和自由派人士关于本国士兵可能陷入困境的情绪变化联系在一起。

This is how Sviatoslav Hnizdovsky, the founder of the Open Minds Institute (OMI) in Kyiv, describes the work his research outfit did by generating these assessments with artificial intelligence (AI). Algorithms sifted through oceans of Russian social-media content and socioeconomic data on things ranging from alcohol consumption and population movements to online searches and consumer behaviour. The AI correlated any changes with the evolving sentiments of Russian “loyalists” and liberals over the potential plight of their country’s soldiers.

赫尼兹多夫斯基先生表示，这项高度敏感的工作仍在塑造重要的乌克兰关于战争进程的决定。其中包括对俄罗斯Kerch桥，这座连通俄罗斯和克里米亚的唯一直接陆地通道，进行潜在未来打击的决定。

The highly sensitive work is still shaping important Ukrainian decisions about the course of the war, says Mr Hnizdovsky. This includes potential future strikes on Russia’s Kerch Bridge, the only direct land link between Russia and Crimea.

乌克兰在与俄罗斯火力对比不利的情况下，越来越多地通过人工智能寻求优势。一位参与武器开发的乌克兰上校表示，无人机设计者通常以ChatGPT为“起点”，寻求工程理念，比如减少对俄罗斯干扰的新技术。这位要求匿名的上校表示，人工智能的另一种军事用途是识别目标。

Ukraine, outgunned by Russia, is increasingly seeking an edge through the use of AI. A Ukrainian colonel involved in arms development says drone designers commonly query ChatGPT as a “start point” for engineering ideas, like novel techniques for reducing vulnerability to Russian jamming. Another military use for AI, says the colonel, who requested anonymity, is to identify targets.

由于士兵和军事博主现在变得更加谨慎，他们发布的帖子中寻找有关武装力量位置的线索变得不那么有效。然而，通过吸收大量图像和文本，人工智能模型可以找到潜在的线索，将它们连接起来，从而推断出武器系统或军队编队的可能位置。在使用人工智能的“拼图”方法时，位于第聂伯和基辅的情报公司Molfar通常能够每天发现两到五个有价值的目标，该公司分析员Maksym Zrazhevsky表示。一旦发现，情报将迅速传递给乌克兰军队，导致一些目标被摧毁。

As soldiers and military bloggers have wisely become more careful with their posts, simple searches for any clues about the location of forces have become less fruitful. By ingesting reams of images and text, however, AI models can find potential clues, stitch them together and then surmise the likely location of a weapons system or a troop formation. Using this “puzzle-pieces” approach with AI allows Molfar, an intelligence firm with offices in Dnipro and Kyiv, to typically find two to five valuable targets every day, says Maksym Zrazhevsky, an analyst with the firm. Once discovered, this intelligence is quickly passed along to Ukraine’s army, resulting in some of the targets being destroyed.

人工智能在其他方面也在协助目标定位。位于基辅和乌克兰西部城市特尔诺平的SemantiForce公司开发了模型，对在线或上传的文本和图像进行审查以回应提示。SemantiForce的许多客户商业上使用该系统来监控公众对其品牌的情绪。然而，Molfar将该模型用于绘制俄罗斯部队可能士气和补给不足的地区。人工智能从图片（包括无人机视频图片）和社交媒体上抱怨的士兵中找出线索。

Targeting is being assisted by AI in other ways. SemanticForce, a firm with offices in Kyiv and Ternopil, a city in the west of Ukraine, develops models that scrutinise online or uploaded text and images in response to prompts. Many of SemanticForce’s clients use the system commercially to monitor public sentiments about their brands. Molfar, however, uses the model to map areas where Russian forces are likely to be low on morale and supplies, which could make them a softer target. The AI finds clues in pictures, including those from drone footage, and from soldiers bellyaching on social media.

人工智能还通过一种隐蔽的代理整合有关俄罗斯军事弱点的线索。为此，Molfar雇佣SemantiForce的人工智能生成有关俄罗斯志愿团体活动的报告，这些团体为最需要的前线部分筹款并准备物资。Molfar表示，算法很好地排除了可能误导的机器人帖子（政治立场变化明显的账户是一个提示）。该公司的分析员有时会通过伪装电话来源的软件来增加情报，从而让假装是渴望贡献的俄罗斯人的员工给俄罗斯志愿团体打电话。该公司的45多名分析员中有十人负责目标定位，而且为乌克兰军队免费提供这一服务。

It also cobbles together clues about Russian military weaknesses using a sneaky proxy. For this, Molfar employs SemanticForce’s AI to generate reports on the activities of Russian volunteer groups that fundraise and prepare care packages for the sections of the front most in need. The algorithms, Molfar says, do a good job of discarding potentially misleading bot posts. (Accounts with jarring political flip-flops are one tip-off.) The firm’s analysts sometimes augment this intelligence by using software that disguises the origin of a phone call, so that Russian volunteer groups can be rung by staff pretending to be a Russian eager to contribute. Ten of the company’s 45-odd analysts work on targeting, and do so free of charge for Ukrainian forces.

此外，还有反情报工作。人工智能有助于乌克兰的间谍捕手识别那些奥列克西·达尼洛夫（Oleksiy Danilov，前国家安全与国防委员会秘书）所称的“易于背叛”的人。前乌克兰信息政策部副部长德米特罗·佐洛图欣表示，向乌克兰手机发送赚钱的提议，例如拍摄基础设施和军事资产的地理位置，这种“情报服务市场”文本消息经常会发出。他最近自己就收到了这样一条短信。他补充说，那些尝试参与这种市场的人经常被乌克兰SBU情报机构逮捕。

Then there is counter-intelligence. The use of AI helps Ukraine’s spycatchers identify people whom Oleksiy Danilov, until recently secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), describes as “prone to betrayal”. Offers to earn money by taking geolocated pictures of infrastructure and military assets are often sent to Ukrainian phones, says Dmytro Zolotukhin, a former Ukrainian deputy minister for information policy. He recently received one such text himself. People who give this “market for intelligence services” a shot, he adds, are regularly nabbed by Ukraine’s SBU intelligence agency.

利用来自美国公司 Palantir 的人工智能，乌克兰反情报部门在不同数据池中寻找具有启发性的关联。比如，想象一下，一个负债累累的离婚者面临失去孩子监护权的风险，他的手机被检测到曾在后来被导弹袭击的地点附近。如果这位假设的离婚者与俄罗斯有密切的个人联系，并开始接听某人的电话，而这个人的手机使用表明其社交地位较高，那么人工智能可能会利用这种“社交网络分析”来提高他的风险评分。

Using AI from Palantir, an American firm, Ukrainian counter-intelligence fishes for illuminating linkages in disparate pools of data. Imagine, for instance, an indebted divorcee at risk of losing custody of his children whose phone has been detected near a site later struck by missiles. If, say, the hypothetical divorcee has strong personal ties to Russia and has begun to take calls from someone whose phone use suggests a higher social status, then AI may use such “social-network analysis” to increase his risk score.

十多年来，人工智能对网络节点之间互动的评估让专家们印象深刻。克里斯蒂安·古斯塔夫森是一位前英国情报官员，他在2013年为阿富汗内政部提供建议，回忆起捉拿了一个为塔利班高层人物携带大量现金的信使。他说，随后的电话通话 “将整个图表点亮”。之后算法的进步，比如计算“中介中心性”之类的指标使得那些日子看起来，就像另一位前情报官员所说的那样，“相当原始”。

Such AI assessments of interactions among a network’s nodes have impressed experts for over a decade. Kristian Gustafson, a former British intelligence officer who advised Afghanistan’s interior ministry in 2013, recounts the capture of a courier transporting wads of cash for Taliban bigwigs. Their ensuing phone calls, he says, “lit up the whole diagram”. Subsequent algorithmic advances for calculating things like “betweenness centrality”, a measure of influence, make those days look, as another former intelligence officer puts it, “pretty primitive”.

此外，网络分析有助于乌克兰的调查人员识别违反对俄制裁的人士。通过将船舶登记数据与其他地方保存的财务记录连接起来，软件可以“揭开公司面纱”，一位消息人士称。Zolotukhin先生说，黑客向乌克兰机构提供了“绝对庞大”的大量窃取的商业数据。这对打击违反制裁行为大有裨益。

In addition, network analysis helps Ukrainian investigators identify violators of sanctions on Russia. By connecting data in ship registries with financial records held elsewhere, the software can “pierce the corporate veil”, a source says. Mr Zolotukhin says hackers are providing “absolutely enormous” caches of stolen business data to Ukrainian agencies. This is a boon for combating sanctions-busting.

运用人工智能的做法已经发展了一段时间。乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基在2019年11月呼吁大规模提升技术在国家安全中的应用。其结果是国家安全与国防委员会建立和运行的一个具有战略眼光的模型，该模型接收文本、统计数据、照片和视频。被称为威胁评估运营中心（COTA），该模型获取了广泛的信息，一部分是由黑客获取的，国家安全与国防委员会首席办公室主任 Andriy Ziuz说。这个模型追踪价格、电话使用、移民、贸易、能源、政治、外交和军事发展，甚至到修理厂中武器数量的细节。

The use of AI has been developing for some time. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, called for a massive boost in the use of the technology for national security in November 2019. The result is a strategically minded model built and run by the NSDC that ingests text, statistics, photos and video. Called the Centre of Operations for Threats Assessment (COTA), it is fed a wide range of information, some obtained by hackers, says Andriy Ziuz, NSDC’s head of staff. The model tracks prices, phone usage, migration, trade, energy, politics, diplomacy and military developments down to the number of weapons in repair shops.

COTA的操作人员将这个模型称为“构造者”。这是因为它还吸收了像 Palantir 软件和 Delta 这样的较小模型的输出，后者是支持乌克兰军队的机动决策的战场软件。COTA的“宏大画面”输出为高级官员提供了对敏感事务的指导，包括动员政策，乌克兰国家安全与国防委员会首席技术官Mykola Dobysh说。Danilov先生指出，泽连斯基先生已经收到了130多次有关 COTA 评估的简报，其中一次是在俄罗斯全面入侵的那天早上10点。COTA的部分内容（或 “电路”）也提供给其他一些人，包括保险公司、外交部和美国能源部。

Operators at COTA call this model a “constructor”. This is because it also ingests output from smaller models such as Palantir’s software and Delta, battlefield software that supports the Ukrainian army’s manoeuvre decisions. COTA’s “bigger picture” output provides senior officials with guidance on sensitive matters, including mobilisation policy, says Mykola Dobysh, NSDC’s chief technologist. Mr Danilov notes that Mr Zelensky has been briefed on COTA’s assessments more than 130 times, once at 10am on the day of Russia’s full invasion. Access to portions (or “circuits”) of COTA is provided to some others, including insurers, foreign ministries and America’s Department of Energy.

乌克兰的人工智能努力受益于该社会广泛愿意为战争努力提供数据。公民通过一个名为Diia（乌克兰语“行动”）的政府应用上传地理标记的照片，这些照片可能与国防相关。许多企业向利沃夫一家叫 Mantis Analytics 的公司提供数据，涵盖从延误交付到呼叫中心活动再到防盗警报触发等各方面。这个平台对社会功能的评估接收者包括国防部和寻求更好部署安全资源的公司。

Ukraine’s AI effort benefits from its society’s broad willingness to contribute data for the war effort. Citizens upload geotagged photos potentially relevant for the country’s defence into a government app called Diia (Ukrainian for “action”). Many businesses supply Mantis Analytics, a firm in Lviv, with data on everything from late deliveries to call-centre activity and the setting off of burglar alarms. Recipients of the platform’s assessments of societal functioning include the defence ministry and companies seeking to deploy their own security resources in better ways.

所有这些最终会带来多大改变，目前尚不清楚。基辅的 Zero Line NGO 提供装备给军队，并花时间在前线研究作战效果的伊万·普拉特认为，乌克兰运用人工智能是一个“亮点”。但也存在一些担忧。其中之一是，对某些人工智能安全应用的热情可能会转移资源，而这些资源在其他地方可能获得更大回报。过度信赖被夸大的模型是另一个风险。

How much difference all this will ultimately make is still unclear. Evan Platt of Zero Line, an NGO in Kyiv that provides kit to troops and who spends time at the front studying fighting effectiveness, describes Ukraine’s use of AI as a “bright spot”. But there are concerns. One is that enthusiasm for certain AI security applications may divert resources that would provide more bang for the buck elsewhere. Excessive faith in hyped models is another risk.

更为戏剧化的是，人工智能会不会对乌克兰的战场表现产生负面影响？有一些人这样认为。加利福尼亚州海军研究生院的名誉教授约翰·阿奎拉认为如此。他在关于战争的影响力书籍上写了很多，并为五角大楼领导人提供建议。他认为，乌克兰在战争初期的最大成功是由于鼓励去中心化小单位网络进行即兴创作。如今，乌克兰的人工智能 “构造者过程”正中心化决策，他认为，这将扼杀“边缘”的创造性火花。他的评估值得探讨。但它强调了人类判断在任何技术应用中的重要性。 ■

More dramatically, might AI prove to be a net negative for Ukraine’s battlefield performance? A few think so. One is John Arquilla, a professor emeritus at the Naval Postgraduate School in California who has written influential books on warfare and advised Pentagon leaders. Ukraine’s biggest successes came early in the war when decentralised networks of small units were encouraged to improvise. Today, Ukraine’s AI “constructor process”, he argues, is centralising decision-making, snuffing out creative sparks “at the edges”. His assessment is open to debate. But it underscores the importance of human judgment in how any technology is used. ■

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科学技术 | 囚犯健康 (Science and technology | Prisoners’ health)

出狱后的第一个星期是前囚犯最危险的时期 (The first week after prison is the deadliest for ex-inmates)

酒精和毒品在自由的最初日子里夺去了许多人的生命。 (Alcohol and drugs kill many in the early days of freedom)

每年有超过3000万人从监狱释放出来。很多人离开时跟他们进去时一样——健康状况非常糟糕。进入监狱的人感染HIV和肝炎等感染率更高；认知障碍；精神疾病和成瘾问题也更多。囚犯往往有这些问题中的多个，通常根源于虐待或其他创伤。不出所料，前囚犯比从未被监禁过的人更早死亡。引人注目的是有多少死亡发生在释放后的几天内。

EVERY year more than 30m people are released from behind bars. Many leave much as they enter—in very poor health. People who end up in prison have higher rates of infections such as HIV and hepatitis; cognitive disabilities; mental illness and addictions. Prisoners tend to have several of these problems, often rooted in abuse or other trauma. Unsurprisingly, ex-prisoners die earlier than those who have never been incarcerated. What is striking is how many deaths occur within days of release.

在4月10日发表在《柳叶刀》上的一篇论文，由墨尔本大学的Rohan Borschmann和珀斯柯廷大学的Stuart Kinner领导的国际研究联盟总结了对1980年至2018年在美国、澳大利亚、巴西、加拿大、新西兰、挪威、苏格兰和瑞典近150万名被释放囚犯的记录进行的分析。这些前囚犯在平均七年的时间里得到了联盟成员的跟踪。研究人员发现，死亡率在释放后的第一周最高，此后急剧下降（见图表）。在第一周内的死亡率比一个月后高出两倍以上。（研究人员排除了第一天死亡人数的激增，他们发现这在一定程度上是因为在狱中死亡囚犯的记录错误。）

A paper in the Lancet on April 10th by an international research consortium led by Rohan Borschmann from the University of Melbourne and Stuart Kinner from Curtin University, in Perth, sums up an analysis of the records of nearly 1.5m prisoners released between 1980 and 2018 in America, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland and Sweden. These ex-prisoners were followed up by consortium members for an average of seven years. The researchers found that mortality was highest in the first week following release and fell dramatically after that (see chart). In the first week it was more than twice as high as it was a month later. (The researchers excluded the spike in deaths on day one, which they discovered was partly due to recording errors for inmates who had died in custody.)

在自由的头几周里，除了巴西（死亡原因主要是暴力），在每个国家中，酒精和药物中毒是主要的死因。一个可能的解释是，在监狱中被强制戒断使得瘾君子的身体难以承受他们通常的用量，增加了随后致命中毒的风险。来自酒精和药物的死亡率在自由的第一周之后仍然很高，但最终被自杀、事故和疾病共同导致的死亡超过。

In the first few weeks on the outside alcohol and drug poisoning represented the leading cause of death in every country except for Brazil (where deaths from violence predominated). One possible explanation is that enforced abstinence when in prison makes an addict’s body less able to handle their usual dose, increasing the risk of fatal intoxication thereafter. Deaths from alcohol and drugs remained high beyond the first week of freedom but were eventually overtaken by the combined deaths from suicides, accidents and disease.

如果这些结果得到利用，可以拯救生命。释放后，鸦片类成瘾者可以提供纳洛酮，这是一种治疗鸦片类药物过量的药物。自2016年以来，加拿大的部分地区已经尝试了这种方法，释放时向囚犯提供纳洛酮配套，假设他们或亲近的人有可能需要使用。（这项干预措施的后果不在本周的论文范围内。）在释放后的头几周确保更好地获取心理健康服务也可能是有益的。

These results, if put to use, could save lives. Upon their release, prisoners with opioid addiction could be provided with naloxone, a drug that treats opioid overdose. This has been tried in parts of Canada since 2016, with naloxone kits given to prisoners upon release, on the assumption that either they or a close contact would be likely to need it. (The consequences of this intervention were outside the scope of this week’s paper.) Ensuring better access to mental-health services in the first weeks after release could also be beneficial.

2021年发表在荷兰的一项研究发现监狱对囚犯原有健康状况没有净影响。换句话说，一个患病进去的人出来依然患病。在监狱内提供适当的护理可以改变这种情况，帮助囚犯更好地面对外面等待着他们的挑战。 ■

A study from the Netherlands published in 2021 found that prison has no net effect on inmates’ pre-existing health. Someone who goes in unwell, in other words, comes out unwell. Appropriate care behind bars could change that, helping prisoners better face what awaits them outside. ■

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科学技术 | 保护 (Science and technology | Conservation)

新技术可以保护鲸鱼免受快速船只的伤害 (New technology can keep whales safe from speeding ships)

每年有2万头鲸鱼死于撞击 (Collisions kill 20,000 every year)

在3月3日，美国东海岸的佐治亚州海滩上发现了一只带有典型船桨划痕的鲸鱼幼崽。不到一个月后，在弗吉尼亚州沿海发现另一只鲸鱼，一只最近生育的母鲸。她的背部骨折，是因为与船只碰撞所致的钝力创伤；她的幼崽失踪，本该仍在哺乳，预计将无法生存。短短几周内发生的三起死亡事件对北大西洋右鲸来说并不是好消息，全球仅剩大约360头。

ON MARCH 3rd a whale calf washed ashore in Georgia, on America’s east coast, bearing slash marks characteristic of a ship’s propeller. Less than a month later another whale, a recent mother, was found floating off the coast of Virginia. Her back was broken from the blunt-force trauma of a ship collision; her calf, missing and still meant to be nursing, is not expected to live. Three deaths within weeks is not good news for the North Atlantic right whales, of which only about 360 remain.

它们主要是因为人类活动而死亡，而它们并不是孤例。船只碰撞威胁着全球的鲸鱼种群，每年最多导致2万头个体死亡。随着全球海洋交通预计到2050年将至少增长240%，这个问题将会膨胀。但一股新的运动正在利用技术来反击。4月11日，加利福尼亚州的一项避撞计划扩大到北美水域。其他国家也在效仿。

They are dying mainly because of human activity, and they are not alone. Ship collisions threaten whale populations worldwide, killing up to 20,000 individuals annually. With global ocean traffic forecast to rise by at least 240% by 2050, the problem will balloon. But a new movement is using technology to fight back. On April 11th a Californian strike-prevention programme expanded operations across North American waters. Other countries are following suit.

“鲸鱼安全”于2020年推出，此前两年，加利福尼亚州因碰撞而死亡的鲸鱼数量创下了记录高峰，达到14只。负责该项目的科学家卡利·莱夫哈德特在贝尼奥夫海洋科学实验室领导该项目，她表示每发现被杀的鲸鱼，还有十只可能未被记录的死亡。尽管实行了自愿限速，但如此多的鲸鱼仍在死亡，这表明需要更强有力的干预措施。团队推断，通过提醒船只注意鲸鱼，并公布违反限速的航运公司，他们可能会提高依从性并降低死亡人数。**

Whale Safe launched in 2020, two years after the number of whales killed by collisions in California reached a record high of 14. Callie Leiphardt, the scientist leading the project at the Benioff Ocean Science Laboratory, says that for every killed whale found, ten more are thought to die unrecorded. That so many were dying despite voluntary speed limits suggested more robust interventions were needed. The team reasoned that by alerting ships to whales, and publicising which shipping companies ignored the speed limit, they might increase compliance and bring down deaths.

他们的方法是通过使用装有麦克风的浮标在水下倾听鲸鱼，这些浮标能够将低频鲸鱼呼叫与海洋背景噪音区分开来。经过审核的侦测结果随后被输入到“鲸鱼安全”的警报工具中，以及附近船只的发现和基于模型的预测，告知附近船长减速。然后，团队通过广泛的GPS跟踪系统监测已建立的减速区域内船只的速度，并在线上为母公司评分从A到F。随着本周向东海岸的扩张，“鲸鱼安全”现在将评估北美所有减速区域内的公司。

Their approach rests on listening for whales underwater using microphone-equipped buoys capable of separating low-frequency whale calls from the ocean’s background noise. Vetted detections are then fed into Whale Safe’s alert tool, alongside sightings and model-based predictions, to tell nearby skippers to slow down. The team then monitors ships’ speeds within established slow zones via a widespread GPS-tracking system and awards parent companies marks from A to F, visible online. With this week’s expansion to the east coast, Whale Safe will now assess companies across all slow-speed zones in North America.

目前拯救了多少头鲸还难以估算。但自“鲸鱼安全”首次推出以来，在加利福尼亚发生的碰撞似乎在减少：2022年仅报告了4起碰撞案例，而前一年为11起。在圣芭芭拉海峡，一个碰撞热点，“减速的船只比例也在增加——从2019年的46%上升到2023年的63.5%。

How many whales have been saved is hard to say. But since Whale Safe first launched, Californian collisions seem to be decreasing: only four were reported in 2022, compared with 11 the year before. In the Santa Barbara channel, a collision hotspot, the proportion of ships that slow down has also been rising—from 46% in 2019 to 63.5% in 2023.

这个想法在其他地方也开始流行。2022年，智利安装了第一个声学浮标，以警示蓝鲸、斑白鲸、座头鲸和南部露脊鲸的船只。同年，希腊的研究人员发表了试验结果，使用浮标在地中海探测抹香鲸，并在三维空间中准确定位它们的位置，这是在迷失飞机黑匣子工作的基础上进行的。由NGO和海军公司联合组成的另一个欧洲项目正在开发使用热红外摄像头和其他传感器的检测盒，帮助船只及早发现鲸鱼。

The idea is also catching on elsewhere. In 2022 Chile moored its first acoustic buoy to alert ships to blue, sei, humpback and southern-right whales. That same year Greek researchers published the results of a trial using buoys to detect sperm whales in the Mediterranean and to pinpoint their location in three dimensions, informed by work on the black boxes of lost planes. Another European project, led by a consortium of NGOs and naval companies, is developing detection boxes that use thermal and infrared cameras, alongside other sensors, to help ships spot whales early.

对于马萨诸塞州伍兹霍尔海洋研究所的马克·鲍姆加特纳来说，真正的解决方案在于改变船只的行为。毕竟，只有船只速度足够慢才能及时做出反应发现鲸鱼。这就是为什么加拿大已将强制限速区扩展到更多右鲸栖息地区域；美国正考虑采取相同措施。联合国机构国际海事组织去年夏天在西北地中海创建了一个“特别敏感海域”，这是第一个明确为减少船只碰撞而创建的区域。一些公司现在正在避开那里座头鲸栖息地。斯里兰卡和新西兰也正在进行类似的努力。

For Mark Baumgartner at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts, who pioneered the use of acoustic buoys, the real solution lies in changing ships’ behaviour. After all, spotting a whale is useful only if the ship is moving slowly enough to react. This is why Canada has expanded mandatory speed restrictions to ever more areas where right whales live; America is considering doing the same. The International Maritime Organisation, a UN agency, created a “Particularly Sensitive Sea Area” in the north-western Mediterranean last summer, the first such area explicitly created to mitigate ship strikes. Several companies are now rerouting ships away from sperm-whale habitats there. Similar efforts are under way in Sri Lanka and New Zealand.

海港繁忙的港口不可避免地会发生船只与鲸鱼的重叠。此外，慢速集装箱船仍然可能伤害鲸鱼，小型船只也是如此。许多沿海社区的经济依赖其港口和港湾，他们经常抵制更严格的措施，如强制限速或禁航区。考虑到所有这些，很容易为北大西洋右鲸等物种感到悲观。但跟以前曾因肉类和鲸脂捕杀的所有鲸鱼一样，它已从灭绝边缘反弹过来。根据鲍姆加特纳博士的说法，“所有致力于保护右鲸的人都抱有希望。”

It will not all be plain sailing. Some overlap between ships and whales is inevitable in busy ports. What’s more, slow container ships can still kill whales, as can smaller boats. Many coastal communities, whose economies rely on their ports and harbours, often resist stricter measures, such as mandatory speed limits or no-go areas. With all that in mind, it is easy to feel pessimistic on behalf of a species like the North Atlantic right whale. But like all whales that used to be hunted for meat and blubber, it has bounced back from the brink of extinction before. According to Dr Baumgartner, “Everyone that works on right whales has hope.” ■

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科学技术 | 蜂群智慧 (Science and technology | Hive minds)

蜜蜂和人类一样，能够传承文化传统 (Bees, like humans, can preserve cultural traditions)

不同蜂群采用不同的建筑风格竞争性建造 (Different colonies build in competing architectural styles)

社会昆虫的建筑壮举

WHEN IT comes to architectural accomplishments, humans like to think they stand at the top of the pyramid. That is to underestimate the astonishing achievements of social insects: termites raise skyscraping nests and honeybees fashion mesmerisingly geometric combs. The true master builders of the insect world, however, are the hundreds of species of stingless bee, native to the tropics and subtropics, which weave combs of unparalleled variety and intricacy inside hollow tree trunks or other cavities.

在建筑成就方面，人类往往自认为站在了金字塔顶端。这是低估了社会昆虫的惊人成就：白蚁筑起摩天巢穴，蜜蜂打造令人迷醉的几何蜂巢。然而，昆虫世界中真正的建筑大师是数百种分布在热带和亚热带地区的无刺蜜蜂，它们在树干空洞或其他腔体内编织着种类和复杂程度都无与伦比的蜂巢。

Now a group of evolutionary biologists led by Viviana Di Pietro at KU Leuven, in Belgium, reports that, like humans, these tiny-brained creatures are capable of building according to different architectural traditions which are then handed down over generations.

现在，一群由比利时鲁汶大学（KU Leuven）的维维亚娜·迪皮埃特罗（Viviana Di Pietro）领导的进化生物学家报告称，类似于人类，这些小脑袋生物有能力根据不同的建筑传统进行建造，然后代代相传。

The finding, published in Current Biology, is the clearest demonstration yet of cultural differences spontaneously appearing in insects. Insect culture would once have been thought impossible, says behavioural biologist Andrew Whiten of the University of St Andrews, who was not involved in the research. “Less than a century ago, culture was thought to be uniquely human.”

这一发现发表在《当代生物学》杂志上，这是关于昆虫中文化差异自发出现的最清晰证明。圣安德鲁斯大学的行为生物学家安德鲁·怀滕（Andrew Whiten）表示，这一结果令人难以置信。他说：“不到一个世纪前，文化被认为是人类独有的。”

To collect their data, Ms Di Pietro and her colleagues observed more than 400 colonies of the stingless bee species Scaptotrigona depilis in a large apiary in Brazil over two extended periods in 2022 and 2023. Around 95% of the colonies exhibited combs built up in horizontal layers, like tiered wedding cakes, while the remainder adopted a spiral structure. In each case the tradition was maintained over many generations of worker bees.

为了收集数据，迪皮埃特罗女士和她的同事们在2022年和2023年的两个长时间期间内观察了巴西一个大型的蜜蜂养殖场内400多个无刺蜜蜂物种Scaptotrigona depilis的蜂巢。大约95%的蜂群是采用水平层层叠加的结构，就像分层婚礼蛋糕，而其余的则采用螺旋结构。在每种情况下，这种传统都代代相传，由工蜂们延续下去。

Since S. depilis shows a strong preference for a horizontal-layer comb structure, it is surprising that spiral combs occur at all. Capturing the insects’ behaviour on video, the team established that there was no difference in average cell-building rate between the two styles, and hence no efficiency advantage to either.

由于S. depilis对水平层层叠加的蜂巢结构有很强的偏好，螺旋蜂巢的出现令人惊讶。团队通过录制昆虫的行为视频，确定了两种风格在平均筑巢速度上没有差异，因此也没有任何效率优势。

In order to rule out a genetic explanation for the different styles, the researchers transplanted workers from colonies that built in one tradition to colonies that built in the other, having first emptied the host structures of their indigenous adults. The imported workers soon switched to the local style, which was then perpetuated by the colony’s own larvae as they eventually matured into workers.

为了排除不同风格的遗传解释，研究人员将一种传统的工蜂移植到另一种传统蜂巢中，之前先清空了原生成年昆虫。进口的工蜂很快就切换到本地风格，然后蜂群本身的幼虫也逐渐成熟为工蜂时将这种传统延续下去。

Tom Wenseleers, who runs the lab in which Ms Di Pietro is a doctoral student, hypothesised that the bees may switch styles as a way of coping with the build-up of minuscule construction errors made by their predecessors. Such a process, in which multiple organisms indirectly affect each other’s behaviour through the traces they leave on their environment, is known as stigmergy. To test whether stigmergy was in fact responsible for the stylistic schism between bee colonies, the researchers introduced a hint of helicity to otherwise perfect horizontal-layer combs, and found that it did indeed prompt the bees to switch to building spirals. That is strong evidence in favour of Dr Wenseleers’s hypothesis.

汤姆·温塞勒斯（Tom Wenseleers）是迪皮埃特罗正在攻读博士学位的实验室的负责人，他假设蜜蜂可能会根据前人留下的微小建造错误来切换风格，以此来处理这种累积的建造错误。这种过程被称为“诱因性”，在这种过程中，多个生物通过留在环境中的痕迹间接影响彼此的行为。为了验证是否诱因性导致了蜜蜂蜂群之间风格差异，研究人员在本来完全水平层层叠加的蜂巢中引入了一丝螺旋形，结果发现蜜蜂确实开始构建螺旋结构。这是对温塞勒斯博士假设的有力证据。

These results have left observers of animal culture abuzz, as they suggest that stingless bees can transmit different building traditions across generations without individuals needing to be instructed by their peers. This is a more expansive way of thinking about culture, which is often rigidly defined as behaviour directly transmitted from individual to individual until it becomes characteristic of a group.

这些结果让动物文化的观察者感到兴奋，因为它们表明无刺蜜蜂可以在代代相传时跨越不同的建造传统，而无需个体接受同伴的指导。这种更广泛的文化思维方式，通常将文化定义为行为直接从个体传递给个体，直至成为群体特征。

For Dr Whiten, the new finding indicates that more complex animal behaviours—the building of dams by beavers or nests by chimpanzees, for instance—may also have arisen through such indirect transmission. Though it is too early to know for certain, say scientists, it is possible that some human traditions could have stigmergic roots too.

对于怀滕博士来说，这一新发现表明，更复杂的动物行为，比如河狸筑坝或黑猩猩筑巢，也可能是通过这种间接传播产生的。科学家们表示，目前还为时过早，但一些人认为，一些人类传统也可能有诱因性的根源。

Bees may not be done confounding expectations. In recent laboratory experiments with bumblebees, Lars Chittka, a behavioural ecologist at Queen Mary University of London, found that they were capable of learning cumulatively—that is, adopting and expanding upon the innovations of previous generations. The team trained “demonstrator bees” to open a complicated two-step puzzle box (in which blue and red tabs had to be pushed out of the way to reveal a solution of sucrose), and then observed other insects learning the right technique from the demonstrators. Such cumulative culture, which does require social learning, was previously thought to be unique to humans. It may be long past time to make room at the top of that pyramid. ■

蜜蜂可能还会继续打破期望。在最近与大型地雷大学行为生态学家拉斯·奇特卡（Lars Chittka）进行的实验中，他发现短喜蜂有能力进行渐积式学习，即采纳和扩展前几代的创新。团队培训了“示范蜂”来打开一个复杂的两步式难题箱（必须将蓝色和红色标签推开，才能揭示蔗糖的解决方案），然后观察其他昆虫从示范者那里学习正确的技术。这种需要社会学习的渐积文化以前被认为是人类独有的。也许现在是时候在那个金字塔的顶端腾出一席之地了。 ■

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亚洲 | 印太国际战略 (Asia | Indo-Pacific statecraft)

美国的亚洲盟国正在努力确保政策不受特朗普影响 (America’s Asian allies are trying to Trump-proof their policies)

岸田文雄在华盛顿特区与乔·拜登会晤，加强威慑力量 (Kishida Fumio meets Joe Biden in Washington, DC, to shore up deterrence)

日本首相岸田文雄对世界各地的冲突保持着高度警惕，关注着这些冲突对日本安全的影响。如果俄罗斯被允许在乌克兰获胜，“这将向亚洲发送错误信号，”岸田先生在4月5日在首相官邸Kantei的一个木板房间里告诉《经济学人》及其他记者。加强日本安全联盟的愿望解释了他为什么在4月10日与美国总统乔·拜登（Joe Biden）出席白宫的国宴。这两位领导人宣布了一系列措施，以加深两国之间的国防和安全合作。

The prime minister of Japan, Kishida Fumio, is keeping a laser-like eye on conflicts around the world—and the implications for his country’s security. If Russia is allowed to prevail in Ukraine, “it will send the wrong signal to Asia,” Mr Kishida told The Economist and other reporters in a wood-panelled room at the Kantei, the prime minister’s office, on April 5th. The desire to strengthen Japan’s security alliance explains why he went to the White House on April 10th for a state dinner with Joe Biden, America’s president. The two leaders announced a host of measures to deepen defence and security co-operation between their countries.

另一位盟国菲律宾总统斐迪南德·马科斯，昵称“邦邦”，预定于第二天与拜登和岸田先生会面。美国官员吹捧这些会议作为其亚洲联盟关系演进的证据。他们没有明说的是，他们还试图保护这些关系免受唐纳德·特朗普再次当选可能带来的损害。

Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, president of the Philippines, another ally, was due to join Mr Biden and Mr Kishida the following day. American officials tout the gatherings as evidence that its Asian alliances are evolving. What they do not say, but is implied, is that they are also trying to protect the relationships from the damage Donald Trump could do if he wins again.

美国在亚洲的联盟几十年来有助于保持该地区的和平。与欧洲不同，北约将数十个国家约束在相互防御协议中，美国与日本、韩国、澳大利亚、菲律宾和泰国有着独立的双边条约，构成了一个“轴-辐”体系。在拜登的领导下，美国试图促进轮辐之间的联系，以期对抗中国的崛起。美国的盟国大多支持这一努力，尤其是日本。

America’s alliances in Asia have helped keep the peace in the region for decades. In contrast to Europe, where NATO binds dozens of nations into a mutual defence pact, America has discrete bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, in a “hub-and-spokes” system. Under Mr Biden, America has sought to foster links between the spokes in the hope of countering China’s rise. America’s allies have largely embraced the effort—especially Japan.

与“志同道合的国家”在安全问题上合作，“将导致建立一个多层次的网络，通过扩大这一网络，我们可以提高威慑力，”岸田先生表示。他在采访中严格遵循准备好的笔记，当他谈到他对世界正面临“历史性转折点”并面临“非常复杂和具有挑战性的安全环境”的信念时，他显得庄严肃穆。

Working together with “like-minded countries” on security issues “will lead to the establishment of a multilayered network, and by expanding that we can improve deterrence”, says Mr Kishida. Hewing closely to prepared notes, he appeared solemn in his interview as he spoke of his belief that the world is at a “historic turning-point” and faces a “very complex and challenging security environment”.

这种关于“网络”的讨论背后是一系列在安全领域合作的小型团体。美国、日本和韩国现在以三边形式定期举行高级别会议；美国、日本和菲律宾也是如此。2021年签署的防务协议”AUKUS”将美国、澳大利亚和英国汇聚在一起。4月8日，这三个国家的国防部长宣布，他们正在考虑通过“AUKUS”与日本合作。

What lies behind such talk of a “network” is a collection of smaller groupings that collaborate on security. America, Japan and South Korea now hold regular high-level meetings in a trilateral format; so too do America, Japan and the Philippines. AUKUS, a defence pact signed in 2021, brings together America, Australia and Britain. On April 8th the three countries’ defence ministers announced they are “considering co-operation” with Japan through AUKUS.

结果是地区内军队之间的更紧密整合。近年来，联合演习已扩大范围，包括更广泛的合作伙伴。美国、日本、澳大利亚和菲律宾于4月7日首次在南中国海进行了联合训练，此时中国继续在那里挑衅。情报共享也在扩大：美国、日本和韩国现在在朝鲜发射导弹时实时分享数据（这种情况越来越频繁）。拜登和岸田先生宣布了美国、澳大利亚和日本之间的新防空倡议。

The result is greater integration between armed forces across the region. In recent years joint exercises have expanded to include a wider range of partners. America, Japan, Australia and the Philippines trained together for the first time in the South China Sea on April 7th, amid continuing Chinese provocations there. Intelligence-sharing is expanding, too: America, Japan and South Korea now share data in real time when North Korea launches missiles (which is happening more often). Mr Biden and Mr Kishida announced a new air-defence initiative between America, Australia and Japan.

关于对亚洲安全采用更多多边方法的讨论早在拜登先生上台之前就已存在。在20世纪50年代初，美国提出了一个类似于北约的“太平洋条约”计划，但遭到了抵制，一方面来自于希望专注于战后复苏的日本，另一方面来自于担心其重返军备的邻国。

Talk of a more multilateral approach to Asian security long predates Mr Biden. In the early 1950s, America mooted a NATO-esque “Pacific Pact”, but encountered resistance, both from Japan, which wanted to focus on its post-war recovery, and from Japan’s neighbours, which harboured deep concerns about its rearmament.

当前情境与以往有所不同。现在亚洲许多人更担心中国的侵略。在2012年至2020年担任日本首相的安倍晋三的领导下，日本放宽了关于武力使用的宪法限制，并扩大了国防开支。岸田先生加快了这一进程：日本的防务预算在2022年至今年之间增长了50%。该国计划到2027年将国防活动支出几乎提高到国内生产总值的2％，而2022年的支出为1.2％。

The current context is different. Many in Asia now worry more about Chinese aggression. Under Abe Shinzo, Japan’s prime minister from 2012 to 2020, the country loosened its constitutional restrictions on the use of force and expanded defence spending. Mr Kishida has accelerated that approach: Japan’s defence budget grew by 50% between 2022 and this year. The country aims to nearly double spending on defence activities to 2% of GDP by 2027, up from 1.2% in 2022.

然而，尽管出现了这些进展，但目前仅有的正式条约仍然是每个国家与美国本身的条约。这种区别是有意义的。正如乌克兰战争显示的那样，向条约盟友和更广泛的“合作伙伴”提供支持之间存在明显差异。尽管台湾是最危险的地区闪点，但它没有获得安全援助的保证。它与美国军队进行小规模训练交流，但没有与该地区任何国家进行联合演习。美国承诺帮助台湾自卫，但没有法律义务为台湾而战。

Yet for all of these developments, the only formal treaties that exist are still those each country has with America itself. The distinction is meaningful. As the war in Ukraine shows, there is a stark difference between the kind of support given to treaty allies and to a wider category of “partners”. Although Taiwan is the most dangerous regional flashpoint, it has no guarantees of security assistance. It has small training exchanges with America’s forces but no joint exercises with any country in the region. America has promised to help Taiwan defend itself but has no legal obligation to fight on Taiwan’s behalf.

美国在亚洲盟友之间深化关系的可能性是有限的。一位来自一个盟国的官员表示：“不会有一个亚洲版的北约”。国内政治现实造成了障碍。例如，在日本，和平宪法仍然使得与具有相互防务要求的新条约联盟达成协议困难（它与美国的条约要求美国来保卫它，但反之则不然）。

There are limits to how deep the ties between America’s allies in Asia can become. “There’s not going to be an Asian NATO,” says one official from an allied nation. Domestic political realities create barriers. In Japan, for example, a pacifist constitution still makes it difficult to enter into new treaty alliances with mutual defence requirements (its pact with America requires America to come to its defence, but not the other way around).

而日本看起来不太可能立即正式加入AUKUS。在4月8日国防部长发表声明后不久，澳大利亚总理安东尼·阿尔巴尼斯明确表示没有计划将新成员纳入该协议。岸田文雄于4月10日重申了这一立场。澳大利亚担心日本无法保护敏感信息和技术；不同于AUKUS的现有成员，日本并不属于五眼情报分享协议。日本对激怒其最大贸易伙伴中国持谨慎态度。

And Japan looks unlikely to formally join AUKUS anytime soon. Shortly after the defence ministers’ statement on April 8th, Anthony Albanese, Australia’s prime minister, clarified there were no plans to add new members to the pact. Mr Kishida reiterated this on April 10th. Australia worries about Japan’s ability to protect sensitive information and technology; unlike the current members of AUKUS, Japan does not belong to the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact. Japan is wary of provoking China, its biggest trade partner.

另一个问题是，一些盟友，如泰国，在这一格局中明显缺席。目前的韩国和菲律宾政府在很大程度上与美国、澳大利亚和日本持相似观点。但在不同领导人的领导下，它们可能再次产生分歧。

Another problem is that some allies, such as Thailand, are glaringly absent from the picture. The current governments of South Korea and the Philippines are largely of like minds with those of America, Australia and Japan. But under different leaders, they could again diverge.

然而，最大的潜在问题围绕着美国的领导能力。特朗普的第一任期动摇了盟友对美国可靠性的信心。虽然拜登已尽力修复安全关系，但他继续延续了前任的保护主义、反贸易方式，这让亚洲盟友感到不满，比如他决定反对美国钢铁公司被日本旭硝子公司收购。美国深层次的内部分歧引发了对其能力长期维持全球义务的质疑。来自另一盟友的一名高级官员表示：“一切取决于美国是否愿意继续扮演那个角色。”如果特朗普再次当选，这些担忧将变得更加严重。

The biggest potential problem, however, surrounds American leadership. Mr Trump’s first term shook allies’ confidence in America’s reliability. While Mr Biden has done much to repair the security relationships, he has continued his predecessor’s protectionist, anti-trade ways, much to his Asian allies’ dismay—as with his decision to oppose the takeover of US Steel, an American firm, by Nippon Steel, a Japanese one. America’s deep internal divisions raise questions about its ability to maintain its global obligations in the long run. “It all depends on America, on whether they want to continue playing that role,” says a senior official from another ally. If Mr Trump is re-elected, those worries would become more acute.

在日本，这些担忧被概括为“莫斯托拉”这一短语，即“如果是特朗普的话呢？”，或其更忧虑的变种，“大概是特朗普”和“已经是特朗普”。一些人乐观地认为，即使特朗普再次执政，美国亚洲盟友面临的问题会比欧洲的少。他们指出美国优先派将中国视为主要对手。曾在特朗普国家安全委员会任职的亚历山大·格雷在东京的一次近期会议上表示，拜登与特朗普政府看待印太地区形势的方式将“连续不断”。

In Japan, the fears are captured in the phrase moshitora, an abbreviation that means “What if Trump?”, or its more fretful variants, hobotora (“probably Trump”) and moutora (“already Trump”). Some are optimistic that even if Mr Trump returns, America’s allies in Asia will face fewer problems than those in Europe. They point to the fact that America First types see China as a key adversary. There will be “continuity” in how the Biden and Trump administrations see the situation in the Indo-Pacific, Alexander Gray, who served on Mr Trump’s National Security Council, told a recent conference in Tokyo.

即便如此，美国的盟友们仍在做好准备。外交官们正在争分夺秒地与特朗普目前的顾问团队取得联系。政治人物正在努力加强与国会和各州政府的关系。岸田原计划于4月11日在国会联席会议上发表讲话，并于4月12日访问北卡罗来纳的丰田工厂，以突出日本对美国的投资。

Even so, America’s allies are bracing themselves. Diplomats are scrambling to make inroads with Mr Trump’s current crop of advisers. Politicians are working to reinforce relationships on Capitol Hill and in state governments. Mr Kishida was due to address a joint session of Congress on April 11th and visit a Toyota factory in North Carolina on April 12th to highlight Japanese investment into America.

亚洲官员有几组担忧。首先，如果特朗普放弃乌克兰，这对印太地区也很重要。在特朗普的领导下，亚洲新的多边倡议可能会凋零。在澳大利亚，一些怀疑论者担心特朗普可能拒绝向澳大利亚出售潜艇，原因是美国自身生产不足，这可能会削弱AUKUS的地位。

Officials in Asia have several sets of fears. For one thing, if Mr Trump abandons Ukraine, it matters to the Indo-Pacific too. Newer multilateral initiatives in Asia may wither under Mr Trump. In Australia some sceptics worry that Mr Trump would refuse to sell submarines to Australia on the basis that America is not producing enough for its own needs, which could undermine AUKUS.

随着美国的关税上升，贸易紧张局势也将升级。特朗普可能会向盟友施加更大的军费负担压力。特别是特朗普可能会要求台湾承担更多责任，该国从2016年的国内生产总值的1.8%提高到2024年的2.5%，但尚未达到预定的3%目标。与此同时，他可能会对保持美国对台军事支持不那么谨慎，增加因岛屿问题发生冲突的可能性。

Trade tensions will rise alongside American tariffs. Mr Trump will probably put pressure on allies to spend even more on defence than they already do. In particular Mr Trump may demand more of Taiwan, which raised defence spending from 1.8% of GDP in 2016 to 2.5% in 2024, but has yet to reach a target of 3%. At the same time, he may also be less careful about keeping America’s military support for Taiwan quiet, raising the chances of a confrontation over the island.

在亚洲的正式盟友中，韩国可能面临最大威胁。在此前的任期内，特朗普为了与朝鲜领导人金正恩进行谈判，中断了大规模军事演习，他的前任顾问称，他一直将目光投向减少美国在半岛上的28,500名军队。前代理国防部长克里斯托弗·米勒最近在接受韩国一家报纸采访时谈到，减少美军在半岛的部队规模。这可能促使韩国寻求建立自己的核威慑力量，这一步骤公众已有70%以上的支持。

Among America’s formal allies in Asia, South Korea probably faces the most danger. During his previous term, Mr Trump halted large-scale military exercises as a gesture of good faith during negotiations with Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader. Former advisers say he was fixated on drawing down America’s 28,500 troops on the peninsula. Christopher Miller, a former acting secretary of defence, recently spoke about reducing America’s troop levels in an interview with a Korean newspaper. That might prompt South Korea to pursue its own nuclear deterrent, a step that over 70% of the public already supports.

即使特朗普从亚洲撤退的可能性低于他放弃欧洲的可能性，如果这样做，亚洲的盟友将处于相对较弱的位置。即使美国退出北约，其他31个成员国可以留下来，包括拥有核武库的法国和英国。而亚洲盟友将独自面对来自中国和朝鲜的核威胁。剩余北约成员国的GDP总和相当于俄罗斯的十倍；而美国亚洲盟友的GDP总和约为中国的一半。马萨诸塞理工学院的理查德·塞缪尔表示：“他们无法在美国的支持下平衡中国的力量。”简言之，没有中心的辐条无法走得太远。 ■

While the chances of Mr Trump retreating from Asia may be lower than the chances of him abandoning Europe, allies in Asia would be in a weaker position if he did. Even if America left NATO, the other 31 members could remain, including France and Britain, which have nuclear arsenals themselves. Asian allies would be on their own, and face nuclear-backed threats from China and North Korea. The combined GDP of the remaining NATO members is equivalent to ten times that of Russia; the combined GDP of America’s Asian allies is roughly half the size of China’s. “They cannot balance Chinese power without America in the mix,” says Richard Samuels of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In short, spokes without a hub still cannot get very far. ■

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亚洲 (Asia | Usefully oleaginous)

印度的俄罗斯石油进口如何润滑了全球市场 (How India’s imports of Russian oil have lubricated global markets)

随着该国在全球石油市场中的重要性增长，风险潜伏 (But as the country’s importance in the global oil market grows, risks loom)

二月份，美国对Sovcomflot施加了新的制裁，这是一家俄罗斯国有航运公司，负责将大约15%的俄罗斯石油出口到印度。几乎立即，印度进口商停止接受Sovcomflot油轮的运输。但这并没有阻止俄罗斯原油流向印度，作为全球第三大石油消费国，印度3月份的交付量比2月份增加了6%。出口商通过替代运输安排将原油运送到印度，可能是通过帮助它们规避制裁的“影子舰队”。印度还以低于西方实施的每桶60美元的价格上限购买了俄罗斯原油。总体而言，这些购买使印度成为俄罗斯石油的第二大进口国，仅次于中国。

In February america slapped new sanctions on Sovcomflot, a Russian state-owned shipping firm responsible for carrying around 15% of Russian oil exports to India. Almost immediately, Indian importers stopped taking shipments from Sovcomflot tankers. But that did little to stem the flow of Russian crude to India, the world’s third-biggest consumer of oil. Deliveries increased by 6% in March, compared with February. Exporters arranged alternative transport to India—probably through the shadow fleet that helps them bypass sanctions. India has also bought Russian crude at prices below the $60-per-barrel price cap imposed by the West. Taken together, these purchases have helped make India the second-biggest importer of Russian oil, behind China.

这种立竿见影的影响有助于印度以较低成本满足需求。2023年，印度近90%的石油消耗来自海外。其中大约34%的进口来自俄罗斯。俄罗斯原油的折扣幅度随着时间的推移逐渐缩小，从去年初的20%缩减到去年12月的约5%，但仍然在印度的石油进口中带来了显着的节省，去年的石油进口总额为1810亿美元，约占该国总进口账单的27%。

The immediate impact has been to help India to meet demand at a lower cost. In 2023 nearly 90% of India’s oil consumption was sourced from abroad. Roughly 34% of those imports came from Russia. The discount on Russian crude has narrowed over time, from 20% at the start of last year to around 5% in December, but it still yields significant savings on India’s oil imports, which were worth $181bn last year, around 27% of the country’s total import bill.

更便宜的进口有助于印度的人民党政府。根据政府的指示，石油公司在2022年将汽油和柴油价格保持不变，即使在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后，全球油价飙升。这一价格冻结措施帮助印度免受像邻国巴基斯坦和斯里兰卡遭受的燃油通胀之苦。上个月，考虑到即将到来的大选，零售商首次自战争开始以来降低了汽油和柴油价格。成本较低的石油还给予人民党更多的财政空间，通过缩减燃油补贴账单。这有助于延长液化石油气的受欢迎补贴一年。

Cheaper imports have helped India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. On the government’s instructions, oil firms kept the prices of petrol and diesel unchanged in 2022, even as global oil prices surged in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The price freeze helped insulate India from the type of fuel inflation that ravaged neighbouring Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Last month, with an eye on the upcoming general election, retailers cut petrol and diesel prices for the first time since the war began. Less costly oil has also given the BJP more fiscal room by shrinking the fuel-subsidy bill. That has helped it extend a popular subsidy for liquefied petroleum gas by a year.

从全球的角度看，印度对俄罗斯石油的购买至关重要。这帮助防止供应短缺。印度石油部认为，如果没有印度与俄罗斯的贸易，全球石油价格可能每桶上涨约30-40美元。4月4日，一位访问德里的美国官员鼓励印度进口折扣俄罗斯原油，因为这对“保持市场上的石油供应”以及确保克里姆林宫的利润受损至关重要。

Globally, Indian buying of Russian oil has been important. It has helped prevent a supply crunch. India’s petroleum ministry claims that global oil prices could have shot up by about $30-40 per barrel were it not for India’s trade with Russia. On April 4th an American official visiting Delhi encouraged India’s imports of discounted Russian oil, as it was important to “keep oil supply on the market” while ensuring the Kremlin’s profits were being hit.

印度还通过加工俄罗斯原油并将其运回西方国家调整了能源市场。欧洲国家一直主导对俄罗斯的制裁实施，但仍与俄罗斯石油相连。根据国际能源署，2023年他们每天进口大约22.5万桶印度汽油和柴油产品，相比过去五年平均每天12万桶来说有所提升。这些出口提振了印度的贸易顺差，也是印度在市场上影响力不断增强的另一个例证。2023年，石油相关出口总值850亿美元，比2021年增加了大约60%。

India has also rewired energy markets by processing Russian crude and shipping it back to the West. European countries have led the enforcement of sanctions on Russia, but remain connected to Russian oil. In 2023 they imported roughly 225,000 barrels per day (b/d) of Indian petrol and diesel products, up from an average of 120,000 b/d in the previous five years, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). These exports have boosted India’s trade balance and are another illustration of India’s growing clout in the market. In 2023 oil-related exports were worth $85bn, around 60% more than in 2021.

印度对全球石油市场的影响力将会持续增强。国际能源署预计，印度将成为2023年至2030年间全球需求增长的最大来源。预计增长和城市化将推动到2030年石油消耗增长约20%，达到每天约120万桶，超过全球预计增长的三分之一。为满足需求激增，预计印度炼油厂将增加加工能力，速度将超过除中国外所有国家。

India’s influence on global oil markets will only increase. The IEA expects India to be the single largest source of growth in global demand between 2023 and 2030. Growth and urbanisation are expected to drive oil consumption up by 20% by 2030, to roughly 1.2m barrels per day, accounting for more than a third of the projected global increase. To meet the boom in demand, Indian refineries are expected to increase processing capacity faster than any country in the world besides China.

大部分石油将不得不依靠海外供应。印度石油储备的产量在下降。2023年，印度的供应仅占其总供应量的13%。依赖进口的策略总是容易受到风险的影响，例如中东地区更广泛的冲突。

Much of the oil will have to come from abroad. Production from Indian oil reserves is declining. It accounted for just 13% of the country’s supply in 2023. An import-dependent strategy is always vulnerable to risks, such as a wider conflict in the Middle East.

最终，减少印度石油进口的最有效方式是减少对石油本身的需求。在去年的预算中，印度拨款26亿美元用于绿色领域的项目。但相比印度承诺的2070年实现净零排放所需的每年200亿美元，这只是杯水车薪。■

Ultimately, the most powerful way to reduce India’s oil imports is to reduce demand for the stuff itself. In last year’s budget India allocated $2.6bn towards programmes in green sectors. But that is a trifle compared with the $20bn annually that the Council of Energy, Environment and Water, a think-tank, estimates is needed for India to reach net-zero emissions by 2070, as it has promised to do. ■

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亚洲 (Asia | After the fight, then what?)

缅甸的军政府正在失去越来越多的地盘 (Myanmar’s junta is losing ever more ground)

我们的记者与一个反叛组织共度了三天 (Our correspondent spent three days with one rebel group)

在整个缅甸，为了推翻2021年政变夺取权力的军政府而进行的为期三年的战争仍远未结束。但政变引发的人民起义吸引了一批新一代的战士，他们正在全国范围内获得进展。据报道，军政府已经失去了与泰国边境的另一部分控制权，被武装叛乱分子夺取。据称，驻扎在要道的迈瓦底（Myawaddy）关卡已经落入克伦（又名克伦族）民兵手中。这对政权来说是一个挫折，因为该地点靠近经济首都仰光。

Across Myanmar, the three-year war to overthrow the military junta that seized power in a coup in 2021 is far from won. But the popular uprising the coup provoked has attracted a new generation of fighters, who are making ground throughout the country. The junta has reportedly lost control of another part of its border with Thailand to armed rebels. The checkpoint at Myawaddy, an important land crossing, is thought to have fallen into the hands of Kayin (also known as Karen) militias. This is a setback for the regime as it is close to Yangon, the economic capital.

在西部，拉钦和钦族民兵控制着与印度的重要边境贸易站以及与孟加拉国的一个关卡，而在北部，克钦士兵正在接近夺取与中国最后一个重要的陆地过境点。贵社记者和克伦尼军（KA）在缅甸东部克耶邦一个偏远地区度过了三天。显而易见，这些部队现在已经在思考超越战场的事情，考虑即便可能性渺茫，他们获胜后会发生什么。

In the west, Rakhine and Chin militias control a key border trade-post with India and a checkpoint with Bangladesh, while in the north Kachin soldiers are getting close to capturing the last major land crossing with China. Your correspondent spent three days with the Karenni Army (KA) in a remote part of Kayah state in eastern Myanmar. It was clear that these forces are now thinking beyond the battlefield, to what happens if, improbable as it may seem, they win.

克耶邦（又名克伦尼）地势崎岖，内陆，人口仅30万，是缅甸七个民族州中最小且最不发达的。克伦族人习惯于战争。自从缅甸1948年从英国独立以来，他们就一直在为自决权而战。克伦族人在11月11日发起了最新的战役。此后，他们自豪地声称夺取了65个缅甸军事哨所。

Rugged and landlocked, and with a population of just 300,000, Kayah (also known as Karenni) is the smallest and least developed of Myanmar’s seven ethnic states. The Kayah are used to war. They have been fighting for the right to self-determination ever since Myanmar’s independence from Britain in 1948. The Kayah launched their latest campaign on November 11th. Since then they boast of having captured 65 Myanmar army posts.

“我们的军队现在控制了克伦尼邦的70%以上”，总司令昂敏将军说。他负责KA和克伦尼国防部队（KNDF），这是在政变后组建的一个由1万人组成的联合力量。最近，他们夺取了位于泰国边境的策达乌（Shardaw）关键地区。他们现在控制着边境。

“Our army now controls more than 70% of Karenni state,” says Major-General Aung Mynt. He is in charge of the KA and the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF), a 10,000-strong combined force formed after the coup. Recently they captured Shardaw, a strategic township on the Thai frontier. They now control the border.

战争已经让人民付出了代价。成百上千的平民，主要是妇女和儿童，已经丧生。军队的空袭和炮击已经造成超过克伦邦80%的人口流离失所。许多人已经在掸邦或附近森林中寻求避难。有些人则步行四天前往附近泰国边界的村庄道诺谷，这个地方已经成为数千流离失所者的难民营。这个营地由KA的政治翼-克伦尼国家进步党管理。

The war has taken its toll on the population. Hundreds of civilians, mainly women and children, have been killed. Airstrikes and shelling by the armed forces have displaced more than 80% of Kayah’s population. Many people have sought refuge in Shan state or in nearby forests. Some make the four-day hike to Daw Noh Kue, a village near the Thai border which has become a refugee camp for thousands of displaced people. The camp is run by the Karenni National Progressive Party, the KA’s political wing.

尽管战争带来的困难，微小的克伦邦在军事上不仅领先，而且也在为未来做准备。它是缅甸第一个建立临时行政委员会（IEC）的邦。IEC由政治、民间社会和民兵领袖组成，渴望在军事政权被推翻后尽快加入建立的民主联邦制。与此同时，它正在协调和组织KA及其盟友夺取的乡镇的民政管理。

Despite the hardship that comes with war, tiny Kayah is ahead of the curve not only militarily, but also in preparing for the future. It was the first state in Myanmar to establish an Interim Executive Council (IEC). Made up of political, civil-society and militia leaders, the IEC aspires to join a democratic federal union to be set up as soon as the military regime is toppled. In the meantime it is co-ordinating and organising civil administration for the townships conquered by the KA and its allies.

“我们很清楚国际社会可能会担心权力真空和军阀主义”，领导IEC司法部的克图Reh Est表示。他表示，委员会正在准备将如今在克伦邦活跃的众多武装团体组建“联邦军队”，“为那些加入抗争并选择回归民事生活的青年提供教育机会”。

“We are well aware that the international community may worry about a power vacuum and warlordism,” says Khu Tor Reh Est, who heads the IEC’s justice department. He says the council is making preparations to forge “a federal army” out of the myriad armed groups now active in Kayah and “to offer education opportunities to the youth who have joined the fight and choose to return to civilian life”.

武装叛乱分子为其领土收复做好未来规划的努力可以在克伦邦的一个尘土飞扬的田野中窥见，在那里40名年轻男女参加俯卧撑和平板支撑等训练。他们接受的不是为战场而训练，而是为法庭而训练。早餐后，学生们走进大厅，来自邻近掸邦的法官向他们讲授婚姻法。一旦他们通过考试，这些学生将穿过山脉返回，开始他们的新工作，成为律师和法官–希望这个国家很快会成为一个自由的国家。■

This drive by armed rebels to future-proof their territorial gains could be glimpsed in a dusty field in Kayah, where 40 young men and women took part in drills such as push-ups and planks. They were training not for the battlefield, but for the courtroom. After breakfast the students trooped into a hall where a judge from neighbouring Shan state taught them about marriage law. Once they pass their exams, these students will hike back over the mountains to take up their new jobs as lawyers and judges—in what they hope could soon be a free country. ■

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亚洲 | 榕树 (Asia | Banyan)

一些澳大利亚人对AUKUS日益持怀疑态度 (Some Australians are increasingly sceptical of AUKUS)

政府需要更加努力地推销这项开创性的安全协议。 (The government needs to sell its ground-breaking security pact much harder)

AUKUS协议是一个庞大的项目，于2021年9月达成，涉及澳大利亚、美国和英国。但它的目的是为了应对一个更大的挑战。中国一意孤行，试图按照自己的条件重塑印太地区，必要时甚至会动用武力，尤其是针对台湾。

THE DEFENCE pact known as AUKUS and reached in September 2021 between Australia, America and Britain is a huge project. But it is intended to counter an even bigger one. China is bent on reshaping the Indo-Pacific region on its own terms, using force if necessary, notably against Taiwan.

该协议的核心是承诺帮助澳大利亚建造至少八艘使用英国设计和美国技术的核动力攻击潜艇。这些潜艇将在2040年后开始服役。作为过渡，从2027年左右，美国将通过西澳大利亚州的斯特灵海军基地轮换四艘弗吉尼亚级核潜艇。澳大利亚本身将在2030年代初购买三至五艘弗吉尼亚级潜艇。这些潜艇快速且隐秘，能够远离澳大利亚海岸线向外投射力量。然而，这项协议不仅涉及潜艇，还包括量子传感和高超音速导弹等技术合作。

At the pact’s heart is a promise to help Australia build at least eight nuclear-powered attack submarines using British designs and American technology. These will start to come into service after 2040. As a stop-gap, from around 2027 America will rotate up to four of its Virginia-class submarines through HMAS Stirling, a naval base in Western Australia. Australia itself will buy three to five Virginia-class subs in the early 2030s. Fast and stealthy, they will project power far from Australia’s shores. However, the deal is not only about subs, but also collaboration on technology such as quantum sensing and hypersonic missiles.

因此，这是一个长达数十年的承诺，伴随着庞大的价签——潜艇本身预计将使澳大利亚耗资高达3680亿美元。作为回报，AUKUS将澳大利亚的安全紧密地与美国联系在一起，并希望将美国更牢固地纳入印太地区。4月8日，三国国防部长发布了一份谨慎的声明，表示他们“正在考虑与日本合作”。

A decades-long commitment, then, with a big price tag—the subs alone are expected to cost Australia up to $368bn. In return, AUKUS ties Australia’s security more closely to America’s and, Australia hopes, ties America more securely into the Indo-Pacific region. On April 8th the defence ministers of the three countries released a cautious statement saying they were “considering co-operation” with Japan, too.

并非所有澳大利亚人都对此感到满意。事实上，一个由具有不同政治信仰和各种不一定一致的抱怨的AUKUS团队正在制造“不和谐声音”。批评者包括两位前首相保罗·基廷和马尔科姆·特恩布尔、前外交部长加雷斯·埃文斯和战略家休·怀特。

Not everyone in Australia is pleased. Indeed an AUKUS awkward squad, with varied political persuasions and an assortment of not always cohering grievances, is dropping what one AUKUS backer calls “depth charges of dissent”. The critics include Paul Keating and Malcolm Turnbull, two former prime ministers, Gareth Evans, a former foreign minister, and Hugh White, a strategist.

批评始于实际问题，尤其是美国能否交付弗吉尼亚级潜艇。该国正在努力加大产量，三月份五角大楼要求国会仅资助一艘新潜艇，而不是预期的两艘。特恩布尔先生表示，澳大利亚可能无法获得弗吉尼亚级潜艇，“因为美国海军可能无法抽出他们”。这将使澳大利亚变得更不安全，而非更加安全。

Criticisms start with practicalities—above all, whether America can deliver the Virginia-class subs. It is struggling to ramp up production, and in March the Pentagon asked Congress to fund just one new sub rather than an expected two. Mr Turnbull says Australia may see no Virginias “simply because the US Navy won’t be able to spare them”. That would leave Australia less secure, not more.

其他人对依赖英国的防卫能力提出质疑，因为英国在按时交付、控制成本或达到标准方面记录平平。同时，怀特先生认为，澳大利亚将被拉入补贴其他两个成员国的国防产业之中。他说，在这三个国家之间的国防融合谈话中，美国和英国承包商更有可能受益，而不是澳大利亚承包商。

Others question reliance on Britain’s defence capacity, with its underwhelming record for delivering on time, at cost or up to standard. Meanwhile, Mr White contends, Australia will get suckered into subsidising the other two members’ defence industries. For all the talk of defence integration among the three countries, he says, in the politicised world of defence procurement integration American and British contractors are more likely to benefit than Australian ones.

再加上唐纳德·特朗普可能重返白宫的风险。埃文斯先生认为，如果特朗普将美国花钱用于澳大利亚的利益，他可能会取消整个协议。他指出，澳大利亚没有B计划。然而，对AUKUS最强烈的批评与丧失主权机构有关——将澳大利亚的命运与日益不可靠的超级大国挂钩，正如特恩布尔所看到的，或者像埃文斯所主张的，让澳大利亚卷入有悖于澳大利亚利益的针对台湾的战争。

Add to that the risk of Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House. If Mr Trump saw America as spending money on Australian interests, Mr Evans argues, he could nix the whole thing. Australia, he points out, has no plan B. But the strongest criticisms of AUKUS have to do with a loss of sovereign agency—hitching Australia’s fortunes to an ever-less dependable superpower, as Mr Turnbull sees it, or one liable, as Mr Evans argues, to drag Australia into a war over Taiwan that is counter to Australia’s interests.

目前，对AUKUS的双方支持仍然坚定。然而，该协议将在未来几年内很少有具体成果展示。风险在于所有的抱怨会开始侵蚀公众的信心。从一开始，AUKUS的支持者们并没有提出足够坦率的理由。这项协议是在秘密中谈判的。时任反对党领袖的安东尼·阿尔班尼斯被迫在几小时内表示支持。如今作为总理，他将AUKUS主要描述为一个就业计划，而不是一个重要的威慑项目。

For now bipartisan support for AUKUS remains strong. Yet the pact will have few concrete results to show for years to come. The risk is that all the griping will start to erode public confidence. From the start AUKUS’s backers have not made a frank enough case for it. The deal was negotiated in secrecy. Anthony Albanese, then leader of the opposition, was given only hours to throw his support behind it. Now prime minister, he paints AUKUS chiefly as a jobs scheme rather than as a project of vital deterrence.

因此，工党和保守派反对应更好地强调迄今为止取得的进展。这包括使HMAS斯特灵成为友好潜水艇的便利停靠处，并且新的美国和澳大利亚资金被拨款用于建设潜艇工业基地。

Rather, Labor and the conservative opposition should better highlight the progress made so far. This includes making HMAS Stirling a useful pit-stop for friendly subs, and new American and Australian money being allocated to building up a submarine industrial base.

最重要的是，他们应该谈论中国雄心带来的挑战。他们应该更清晰地阐明澳大利亚在威慑中的重要贡献。而且他们应该坦率地谈论财政成本，更加令人沮丧的是，人类因素。

Above all, they should talk of the challenge posed by Chinese ambitions. They should be clearer about the importance of Australia’s contribution to deterrence. And they should be upfront both about the financial costs and, more grimly, the human ones.

如果澳大利亚政治家不坦率地提出并以真诚的条件寻求AUKUS的支持，怀疑论者可能会侵蚀对其的共识，这也对澳大利亚自身的安全性造成严重后果。因为如果威慑的目的是防止战争，那么就必须被视为准备打一场战争。■

If Australia’s politicians do not come clean and seek support for AUKUS on honest terms, the sceptics may well erode the consensus for it. That also poses grave consequences for Australia’s own security. For if the point of deterrence is to prevent a war, then you have to be seen to be ready to fight one. ■

Read more from Banyan, our columnist on Asia:For a glimpse at Japan’s future, look at its convenience stores (Apr 4th)Vietnam’s head of state leaves under a cloud (Mar 27th)A string of setbacks for the junta in Myanmar presents an opportunity (Mar 21st)

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文化 | 回到葛底斯堡 (Culture | Return to Gettysburg)

美国人正在转向现实和想象中的内战故事 (Americans are turning to stories of civil war, real and imagined)

美国面临的真正风险更加隐匿 (The real risks America faces are more insidious)

加利福尼亚和德克萨斯自称为西部力量，已经脱离了联邦。其他州也在紧随其后。座位第三次非宪法任期上台的总统誓言将迅速镇压这场起义。他组织美国军队的全部力量，授权对平民使用无人机打击。西部力量继续前进，决心夺取白宫。

CALIFORNIA AND Texas, calling themselves the Western Forces, have seceded from the Union. Other states are following suit. The president, installed for an unconstitutional third term, vows that the uprising will be quashed quickly. He harnesses the full strength of America’s army and authorises the use of drone strikes on civilians. The Western Forces march on, determined to take the White House.

电影《内战》将于4月12日上映。这部电影没有解释这个虚构的美国是如何陷入混乱的；取而代之的是，它跟随一群记者，让观众置身于战争的迷雾中。根据作家兼导演亚历克斯·加兰的说法，任何近年来一直关注美国政治的人都“清楚分歧和压力在哪里”。也许他认为不需要指出该国的严重两极分化、对政府机构的不信任以及前总统认为民主规范是给别人的问题。

“Civil War” arrives in cinemas on April 12th. The film does not offer an explanation of how this fictional version of America descended into chaos; instead, it follows a group of journalists and immerses the viewer in the fog of war. According to Alex Garland, the writer-director, anyone who has followed American politics in recent years will “know exactly what the fault lines and pressures are”. Perhaps he sees no need to point out the country’s bitter polarisation, the loss of faith in the organs of government or the threat posed by a former president who thinks democratic norms are for other people.

在2021年1月6日的袭击之后—当唐纳德·特朗普的支持者冲击国会大厦试图阻止权力交接—叛乱的威胁变得异常真实。鉴于美国的制度实力和军队的专业素养，一场全面的内战仍然极不可能发生。然而根据YouGov在2022年开展的一项调查，43%的美国人认为在未来十年内“至少有些可能”爆发这样的战争。将近25%的人希望他们所在的州从联邦分裂出去。来自佐治亚州的特朗普议员马乔里·泰勒·格林表示：“我们需要按照红州和蓝州划分。”2021年，一家左翼杂志国家刊登了一篇题为“蓝州分裂的理由”的文章。

In the wake of the attacks of January 6th 2021—when a mob of Donald Trump’s supporters stormed the Capitol in an attempt to block the transfer of power—the threat of insurrection has felt uncomfortably real. A full-scale civil war remains wildly improbable, given the strength of America’s institutions and the professionalism of its armed forces. Yet according to a poll conducted by YouGov in 2022, 43% of Americans think such a war is “at least somewhat likely” to break out in the coming decade. Nearly 25% want their home state to secede from the Union. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Trumpier-than-Trump congresswoman from Georgia, has said that: “We need to separate by red states and blue states.” In 2021 the Nation, a left-wing magazine, ran an essay titled “The case for blue-state secession”.

因此，对一些美国人来说，《内战》展现了一个令人恐惧的未来愿景。“这不仅仅是一部电影。这是一个预兆，”一个人在YouTube的预告片下评论道。特朗普的支持者已经宣称这部电影是“预言性节目”，因为“在非法利用偷渡者窃取2024年选举之后，将会发生内战”。

For some Americans, then, “Civil War” offers a horrifying vision of the future. “This isn’t just a film. It’s a premonition,” one person wrote underneath the trailer on YouTube. Trump fans have declared that the movie is “predictive programming” as “there will be a civil war after they use illegals to steal the 2024 election.”

这部电影加入了一个日益增长的类型：作家们被第二次美国内战的想法所吸引。在奥马尔·埃尔·阿克德于2017年写的一部小说中，一些南方州在联邦政府禁止化石燃料后脱离。在《DMZ》(2022)中，一个迷你系列，美国分裂为美利坚合众国和脱离的自由州。

The film joins a burgeoning genre: writers are gripped by the idea of a second American civil war. In a novel from 2017 by Omar El Akkad, some southern states secede after the federal government bans fossil fuels. In “DMZ” (2022), a miniseries, America is divided between the United States and the secessionist Free States.

在由道格拉斯·肯尼迪创作于去年法国发布的吸引人的小说《飞越中部》（等待英文版出版），美国被取代为联合共和国和联合邦联。联合共和国是民主党的分支，据称在海岸上是进步主义的堡垒；而联合邦联是它的共和党对应物，是横跨中西部和南部的基督徒神权统治。肯尼迪先生反思道：“我只是想说，‘请注意这里。’”

In “Flyover”, an absorbing novel by Douglas Kennedy which came out last year in France (it is awaiting publication in English), the United States has been succeeded by the United Republic and the United Confederacy. The United Republic is an offshoot of the Democratic Party and a purported bastion of progressivism on the coasts; the United Confederacy, its Republican counterpart, is a Christian theocracy spanning the Midwest and the South. “What I am trying to do is just say, ‘Pay attention here,’” Mr Kennedy reflects.

不仅仅是讲故事的人。学者们也在书中警示，比如“内战是如何开始的”(2022)由政治科学家芭芭拉·沃尔特尔以及《下一次内战》(2022)由随笔作家斯蒂芬·马尔奇撰写。两者都声称联邦处于一个脆弱、充满怨恨的状态。“美国是走向内战的经典案例，”马尔奇先生声称，指称美国人对民主的价值的信任不足，是其中之一。(根据民意调查机构皮尤研究中心的数据，去年公众对联邦政府的信任达到几乎历史最低点。)

It is not just storytellers, either. Academics have also been ringing alarm bells in books such as “How Civil Wars Start” (2022) by Barbara Walter, a political scientist, and “The Next Civil War” (2022) by Stephen Marche, an essayist. Both assert that the Union is in a fragile, rancorous state. “The United States is a textbook example of a country headed towards civil war,” Mr Marche has claimed, pointing to, among other things, Americans’ lack of faith in the merits of democracy. (According to the Pew Research Centre, a pollster, last year public trust in the federal government reached a near-record low.)

许多美国人更喜欢关于他们国家实际内战的叙述，而不是对未来内战的猜测。大约有6万本书出版关于那场冲突—比在葛底斯堡战役阵亡的士兵数量还要多，后者是该战争最血腥的战役。哈佛大学历史学教授弗雷德里克·洛格瓦尔表示，1861-65年的战斗“在美国想象力中占有核心地位”。剑桥大学历史学教授安德鲁·普雷斯顿称，这场战争“是每当美国人陷入危机时的标志”。在20世纪30年代，大萧条期间，富兰克林·罗斯福多次援引这场冲突来强调经济局势的严重性。他还意图给美国民众一些安慰，因为如果他们的祖先能够熬过地狱，他们也能够。

Many Americans prefer accounts of their country’s actual civil war to speculation about a future one. Some 60,000 books have been published on that conflict—more than the number of soldiers who died at Gettysburg, the war’s bloodiest battle. The fighting in 1861-65 “holds a central place in the American imagination”, says Fredrik Logevall, a professor of history at Harvard University. “Each generation since 1865 has assessed and then reassessed the meaning of the civil war.”

在20世纪60年代的民权运动期间，美国政治家将亚伯拉罕·林肯视为废除奴隶制并“对所有人不抱恶意，对所有人持慈善之心；在正确的事情上坚定不移”行动的人。马丁·路德·金在1963年选择在华盛顿的林肯纪念堂台阶上发表他的“我有一个梦想”演讲，以唤起总统的遗产，并显示林肯曾倡导的种族平等斗争尚未结束。然而，尽管20世纪30年代和60年代的美国看起来四分五裂，但洛格瓦尔教授和普雷斯顿教授坚称，从未有人认真讨论第二次内战会爆发的可能性。

Andrew Preston, a historian at Cambridge University, says the war “is a touchstone whenever Americans are in a crisis”. In the 1930s, amid the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly invoked the conflict to underline the seriousness of the economic situation. He also intended to provide some comfort to the American people, for if their ancestors could go through hell and survive, they could too.

如今，关于内战的激动人心的历史书籍宣传它们对当今的教训。今年月底出版的《动荡的恶魔》中，埃里克·拉森巧妙地编年史述了1861年南方脱离联邦的前因后果。他跟踪了一群人物，并使用日记和信件追溯他们的思想。“我真正想要编年史的是造成美国人开始想象彼此全面屠杀的力量，以及这是如何发生的。”

During the civil-rights movement of the 1960s American politicians looked to Abraham Lincoln as someone who abolished slavery and acted “with malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right”. In 1963 Martin Luther King chose to deliver his “I Have a Dream” speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, to invoke the legacy of the president and to show that the fight for racial equality that Lincoln had championed was not yet finished. Yet, as divided as America looked in the 1930s and 1960s, Professors Logevall and Preston insist there was never any serious talk that a second civil war would erupt.

在研究过程中，拉森先生表示被19世纪中叶和今天政治话语之间的相似之处所震撼。一些小说家设想北部和南部之间会爆发内战。就像特朗普的追随者们坚信2020年的选举结果被抢夺一样，南部各州并未承认林肯是合法的总统，尽管他已经通过民主选举当选。拉森先生说，这段历史时期“不是什么尘封的古老事件。这是当下的故事。”

Today, breathless histories of the civil war advertise their lessons for the present day. In “The Demon of Unrest”, published later this month, Erik Larson adroitly chronicles the events in the lead-up to the South’s secession in 1861. He follows a cast of characters and uses diaries and letters to trace their thinking. “What I was trying to chronicle, really, is the forces that caused Americans to actually begin to imagine the wholesale killing of one another, and how that came to pass.”

许多人今天向往像林肯那样的政治领导人。2022年，乔恩·米钦推出了《那里有光》，一首颂歌；去年十月，史蒂夫·因斯基普撰写的钦佩传记《我们必须有所不同》在出版后不久成为畅销书。这两本书都强调，立法者有很多可以从林肯跨越分歧的能力中学习。

During the research, Mr Larson says he was struck by the similarities in political discourse between the mid-19th century and today. Several novelists envisioned that a civil war would break out between northern and southern states. Much as Mr Trump’s followers are convinced that the election of 2020 was stolen from him, southern states did not recognise Lincoln as the legitimate president, even though he had been democratically elected. This era of history is not “some dusty old thing from the past. This is the story for now,” says Mr Larson.

对现代美国面临的风险进行谨慎评估，应该把焦点放在诸如特朗普可能在第二个总统任期中破坏民主制度，或仇恨煽动的谬论蔓延等不那么戏剧性的风险上。但内战更适合拍成令人兴奋的电影。在加兰德的电影中，西部势力最终抵达华盛顿特区，在林肯纪念堂发生爆炸，将新古典主义柱子炸毁。 ■

In looking to that past, many today yearn for a political leader like Lincoln. In 2022 Jon Meacham released “And There Was Light”, a paean; last October “Differ We Must”, an admiring biography by Steve Inskeep, became a bestseller shortly after publication. Both books emphasise that lawmakers have much to learn from Lincoln’s ability to reach across divides.

A prudent assessment of the risks facing modern America would focus on less dramatic ones, such as Mr Trump’s probable undermining of democratic institutions during a second presidency, or the spread of hate-fanning falsehoods. But civil war makes for more exciting movies. In Mr Garland’s film, the Western Forces eventually reach Washington, DC, and a bomb goes off at the Lincoln Memorial, ripping out the neoclassical columns. ■

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文化 | 约翰逊 (Culture | Johnson)

如何保护一种濒危语言 (How to protect an endangered language)

一本新书探讨了六种小语言面临的威胁以及拯救它们的努力 (A new book looks at the threats facing six small languages and the efforts to save them)

语言之城。作者：罗斯·珀林。大西洋月刊出版社；432页；售价28美元。格罗夫出版社；19.99英镑

Language City. By Ross Perlin. Atlantic Monthly Press; 432 pages; $28. Grove Press; £19.99

世界上大约有7,000种语言，其中将有近一半预计在21世纪末消失。通常认为这种衰退有两个罪魁祸首。第一个是殖民主义：当大国征服国家时，他们在政府和学校中强加自己的语言，并淘汰了当地的语言（或者将其明令禁止）。第二个是资本主义。随着国家的发展和工业化，人们为了工作而迁徙到城市。他们越来越发现自己在工作场所说的是更大的语言，而不是在家中使用的较小的语言。

OF the world’s 7,000-odd languages, almost half are expected to disappear by the end of the 21st century. Two culprits are usually considered responsible for this decline. The first is colonialism: when great powers conquered countries, they imposed their language in government and schools and relegated local ones (or banned them outright). The second is capitalism. As countries grow and industrialise, people move to cities for work. They increasingly find themselves speaking the bigger language used in the workplace rather than the smaller one used at home.

英语作为世界历史上最主导的语言，通常被视为同质化和较小文化被碾压的象征。因此，也许让人惊讶的是，地球上语言多样性最丰富的地方是在纽约几平方英里的区域。罗斯·珀林的新书《语言之城》讲述了他作为濒危语言联盟的联合创始人所学到的内容，该组织设法确认纽约有大约700种语言，远远超过美国官方人口普查中列出的100多种。

English, as the most dominant language in the history of the world, often stands as a symbol of homogenisation and the steamrolling of smaller cultures. So it may come as a surprise that the most linguistically diverse spot on Earth spans a few square miles in New York. Ross Perlin’s new book, “Language City”, is the story of what he has learned as the co-founder of the Endangered Language Alliance, a non-profit organisation that has managed to identify some 700 languages spoken in New York, a number vastly greater than the 100 or so listed in America’s official census.

珀林先生为六种语言的讲者撰写了简介。每种语言都受到不同、更大邻国的威胁。（英语绝不是唯一的语言巨头。）来自尼泊尔的Seke语被尼泊尔语和藏语挤压。来自中亚的Wakhi语处于汉语、波斯语和俄语之间；说这种语言的人通常还会用塔吉克语与同胞交流。

Mr Perlin profiles speakers of six languages. Each tongue is threatened by different, larger neighbours. (English is by no means the only linguistic juggernaut.) Seke, from Nepal, is squeezed by Nepali and Tibetan. Wakhi, from Central Asia, sits between Chinese, Persian and Russian; its speakers also usually speak Tajik with others from their home country.

纳瓦特尔语——虽然不是一种小语言，因为被超过160万印第安墨西哥人使用——正被西班牙语取代。N’Ko是一种类似字母兼书面标准的语言，旨在为西非几种密切相关的曼丁语提供服务，必须与法语竞争，后者是该地区的声望语言。意第绪语在纽约正逐渐被英语和以色列的希伯来语取代。作为世俗的Ashkenazi犹太人的语言，意第绪语正濒临灭绝（尽管在极端正统派中该语言正在蓬勃发展）。

Nahuatl—though not a tiny language, as it is spoken by more than 1.6m indigenous Mexicans—is giving way to Spanish. N’Ko, a sort of alphabet-cum-written-standard meant to serve several closely related Manding languages of west Africa, must compete with French, the language of prestige in the region. Yiddish is losing out to English in New York and to Hebrew in Israel. As the language of secular Ashkenazi Jews it is nearing extinction (though it is flourishing among the ultra-Orthodox).

珀林先生遇到的人们是出于必要而多语的。他们共同使用30多种语言；每个人都需要“灵巧地在不同的语言生态之间移动”，他写道。尽管有动力这么做，但他们拒绝停止使用他们珍爱的语言，以便保存相关文化中的一些东西。

The people Mr Perlin meets are multilingual by necessity. Together they speak more than 30 languages; each person has “to move nimbly from one linguistic ecology to another”, he writes. They refuse to stop using their cherished language—despite incentives to do so—in order to preserve something of the associated culture.

语言的消亡往往遵循相同的模式。征服和殖民导致贫困，有时还伴有内化的羞耻。因此，父母通常选择用更大的语言抚养他们的孩子，以获取自己的经济利益。一种语言是否彻底消失取决于下一代：许多人同化了，他们的语言永远消失。但有时他们可能试图扭转衰退。

The death of languages often follows the same pattern. Conquest and colonisation lead to poverty, and sometimes an internalised shame. As a result, parents often choose to raise their children in a bigger language for their own economic benefit. Whether a language disappears altogether is determined by the next generation: many assimilate and their language is lost for good. But sometimes they may try to reverse the decline.

外部人员可以帮助保存吗？许多说小语言的人将它们视为一种神圣的或稀缺物品，外部人学习和记录这些语言会造成伤害；他们不将自己的语言视为科学好奇的对象。因此，那些试图帮助的人，包括珀林先生，都在学会小心行事（在书中，他描述了与Lenape语最后一位已知本族使用者的最初谨慎的相遇）。

Can outsiders aid preservation? Many speakers of small languages treat them as a kind of sacred or scarce good that outsiders do harm to by learning and documenting; they do not think of their languages as objects of scientific curiosity. So those trying to help, including Mr Perlin, are learning to tread carefully. (In the book he describes an initially wary encounter with the last known native speaker of Lenape, New York’s own indigenous language.)

蒂姆·布鲁克斯是一位英国作家，也是濒危字母项目的执行主任，这是另一家非营利组织，他在最近的书《超越文字的书写》中描述了自己的方法。他有力地论证了语言学家长期以来在致力于赋予口头和书面语言尊严方面忽视了书写系统。语言学家往往忽视了那些受到拉丁、阿拉伯、梵文和汉字等庞然大物威胁的美妙而极具变化的文字。除了研究和倡导外，布鲁克斯先生还用他描述的文字制作出美丽的木雕。像珀林先生一样，他始终小心地将一种语言的本族使用者放在故事的中心。这个领域不再适合白人拯救者的叙事。

Tim Brookes, a British writer and the executive director of the Endangered Alphabets Project, another non-profit group, describes his own approach in his recent book, “Writing Beyond Writing”. He makes a persuasive case that linguists have long neglected writing systems in their well-intentioned push to give dignity to spoken as well as written languages. Linguists have tended to ignore the wonderful and hugely varied scripts that are threatened by behemoths including the Latin, Arabic, Devanagari and Chinese systems. As well as research and advocacy, Mr Brookes makes beautiful wood carvings in the scripts he describes. Like Mr Perlin, he is careful always to put the native users of a language at the heart of the story. The field has no time for white-saviour narratives anymore.

朱莉娅·萨拉班克（Julia Sallabank）是伦敦大学亚非学院的语言学家，她描述了历史上专家们如何对濒临灭绝的语言进行研究。几十年前，一位西方语言学家会出现，尽可能学习，然后将结果发表在本国。随着时间的推移，学者们开始协助语言社区，撰写语法书、词典和记录，供说话者使用和传承。接下来是合作。学者和活动人士会坐在一起，共同确定组织为语言发展所需的具体步骤。

Julia Sallabank, a linguist at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, has described how experts have historically approached languages in danger of extinction. In decades past a Western linguist would show up, learn as much as possible, then publish the results back home. In time, academics came to assist the language community by producing grammar books, dictionaries and recordings for speakers to use and pass down. Next came collaboration. Scholars and activists would sit down together to work out exactly what the group needed for the language to thrive.

最后一步被证明是最困难的：语言社区的工作，领导者主导这一过程，外部人员提供资金和建议。这是语言复兴的理想模式，但远非普遍存在。在像美国和澳大利亚这样开始意识到对本土民族犯下了错误的富裕国家，这是有可能实现的。但在许多带有对麻烦少数群体漠不关心态度的非民主国家，语言丧失正在发生。西方专家确实能做的是敲响警钟，并展示他们从自身过往中所学到的经验。 ■

The final step has proved to be the hardest: work bythe language community, with leaders taking charge of the process and outsiders providing funding and advice. It is the platonic ideal of language revitalisation but is far from the universal one. It is possible in places like America and Australia, rich countries starting to recognise the wrongs done to their indigenous peoples. But much language loss is going on, often in undemocratic countries with little time for troublesome minorities. What Western experts certainly can do is raise the alarm—and show what they have learned from their own past. ■

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文化 | 挑战极限 (Culture | Sailing close to the wind)

一个引人入胜的叙述船长库克最后致命的航行 (An enthralling account of Captain Cook’s final, fatal voyage)

汉普顿·赛德斯也探讨了英国探险家复杂的遗产。 (Hampton Sides also takes on the complex legacy of the British explorer)

辽阔无垠的 *大海。作者：汉普顿·赛德斯。* **Doubleday；432 页；35 美元。迈克尔Joseph；25 英镑。

The Wide Wide Sea. By Hampton Sides. Doubleday; 432 pages; $35. Michael Joseph; £25

直到最近，詹姆斯·库克船长并不是一个特别具争议的人物。但是在一座18世纪英国探险家的雕像在墨尔本被推倒，并在基座上喷涂上“殖民地将会崩溃”的字样。在夏威夷，库克的纪念碑被涂满红漆，上面写着“你们站在土著土地上”。库克已经加入了爱德华·科尔斯顿和塞西尔·罗兹，成为反殖民主义者愤怒的焦点。

UNTIL RECENTLY Captain James Cook was not a particularly controversial figure. But in January a statue of the 18th-century British explorer was toppled in Melbourne and the words “The colony will fall” spray-painted on the plinth. In Hawaii an obelisk in Cook’s memory has been splattered with red paint and the message “You are on native land.” Cook has joined Edward Colston and Cecil Rhodes as a focal point for anti-colonialist ire.

然而，库克既不是奴隶贩子，也不是多大的帝国主义者。首先，他是一名出色的航海家和绘图师。在英国海军的命令下，他在1768年至1779年之间进行了三次开拓性的太平洋航行。他的绘图改变了欧洲人对这个世界最大洋洲的认知。

Yet Cook was neither a slave trader nor much of an imperialist. He was, first and foremost, a brilliant navigator and cartographer. Acting under Admiralty orders, he undertook three pioneering voyages in the Pacific between 1768 and 1779. His mapmaking transformed Europeans’ knowledge of the world’s largest ocean.

一本优秀的新书依赖于库克的信件和笔记，讲述了他第三次也是最后一次旅行的故事。1776年7月，库克在英国皇家海军的Resolution号上启程时，已经将近50岁。他带上了包括威廉·布莱（后来成为赏金号上的船长，1789年发生叛变）和一位塔希提王子迈在内的船员。库克从海军司令部得到了秘密指示，不仅要为英国宣称新领土，而且要通过白令海峡搜索一条西北航道（即使是对于像他这样的航海经验丰富的人来说，这是不可能完成的任务）。

An excellent new book draws on Cook’s letters and notebooks to tell the story of his third and final trip. Cook was almost 50 when he set off on HMS Resolution in July 1776. Among the crew he took were William Bligh (later captain of the Bounty before the mutiny in 1789) and Mai, a Tahitian prince noted for being painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds. Cook had secret instructions from the Admiralty not only to claim new territory for Britain, but to search for a north-west passage via the Bering Strait (a task even someone with his navigational experience found impossible).

作者汉普顿·赛德斯着重于库克回到澳大利亚和新西兰，这两个国家是这位探险家近十年前首次接触的地方，以及他发现的社会群岛（今天是法属波利尼西亚的一部分）和他在夏威夷的时光。正是在那里，即1779年2月，由于一次失败的绑架当地首领的尝试，以回应一艘小船被盗事件，他被杀害。

The author, Hampton Sides, focuses on Cook’s return to Australia and New Zealand—countries the explorer had first encountered almost a decade earlier—his discovery of the Society Islands (today part of French Polynesia) and his time in Hawaii. It was there, in February 1779, that he was killed after a botched attempt to kidnap a local chief in response to the theft of a longboat.

库克是他那个时代的典型人物。他相信欧洲会对太平洋许多落后的人起到文明化的影响。在处罚自己的船员以及任何反对他的土著人士时，他是残酷的。

Cook was a man of his era. He believed Europe would have a civilising influence on many benighted folk in the Pacific. He was cruel when meting out punishments, to his own crew as well as to any indigenous people who opposed him.

与此同时，库克钦佩他在南太平洋遇到的很多人和地方。与西班牙人不同，他对宗教转变不感兴趣。他努力阻止他的船员传播性病。在很大程度上，他的领土声明不是为了促进大英帝国，而是为了防止其竞争对手法国和西班牙的侵略。

At the same time, Cook admired many of the people and places he encountered in the South Pacific. Unlike the Spanish, he had no interest in religious conversion. He tried hard to stop his men from spreading venereal disease. For the most part, his land claims were aimed not at promoting a British empire but forestalling grabs by its rivals, France and Spain.

正如作者所指出的，对库克的航海技能的应有的钦佩与对土著民族首次接触欧洲人后所遭受的殖民主义的合理愤恨之间需要取得平衡。如今，许多西方国家在如何看待这种麻烦的遗产问题上存在分歧。2020年，有一半的英国人认为科尔斯顿的雕像被移走是正确的（尽管许多人不赞成将其扔进布里斯托尔港）。库克的雕像仍立于伦敦，罗兹的雕像也立于牛津。问题是他们是否会在这里久处。 ■

As the author makes clear, there is a balance to be struck between justified admiration for Cook’s seamanship and a legitimate resentment of the colonialism that followed indigenous peoples’ first contact with Europeans. Today many Western countries are divided over how to think about such vexed legacies. In 2020 half of Britons thought it was right that Colston’s statue was removed (though many disapproved of it being dumped in Bristol harbour). Cook’s statue still stands in London, as does Rhodes’s in Oxford. The question is whether they will enjoy their perches much longer. ■

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文化 | 艰难度日 (Culture | Barely gettin’ by)

阿黛尔·沃尔德曼的新小说跟随大型百货商店的工人 (Adelle Waldman’s new novel follows workers in a big-box store)

《招工启事》基于作者自己在一家店工作的经历 (“Help Wanted” is based on the author’s own stint employed by one)

求助招聘。 作者：阿黛尔·沃德曼。W.W. Norton; 288 页; 28.99美元。Serpent’s Tail; 16.99英镑

Help Wanted. By Adelle Waldman.W.W. Norton; 288 pages; $28.99. Serpent’s Tail; £16.99

阿黛尔·沃德曼对布鲁克林的知识分子追逐出版合同和床伴的敏锐观察，使她的第一部小说《《纳撒尼尔·P的爱情事务》》 (2013) 取得了成功。为了她的续集，她将城市精英的过度与偏远地区技能工人的挣扎进行了交换。这听起来可能令人沮丧，但《求助招聘》是一本生动、人道的书。

Adelle Waldman’s sharp-eyed observations of intellectuals in Brooklyn chasing book deals and bedmates made her first novel, “The Love Affairs of Nathanial P.” (2013), a hit. For her follow-up, she has traded the excesses of the urban elite for the struggles of unskilled workers farther afield. This may sound dreary, but “Help Wanted” is a lively, humane book.

沃德曼女士为了写作关于纽约州北部一个大型连锁商店的雇员，自己在那里工作了几个月，每小时赚取12.25美元，在凌晨4点卸货车载商品。她的许多同事在商店工作多年，但他们的工作时间有限且不可预测，这使得他们很难做计划、找第二份工作或可靠地支付账单。

To write about the employees of a big-box store in upstate New York, Ms Waldman spent months working at one herself, earning $12.25 an hour unloading trucks of merchandise at 4am. Many of her colleagues had been working at the shop for years, but their hours were limited and unpredictable, which made it hard for them to make plans, get a second job or reliably cover their bills.

《求助招聘》中的商店“镇广场”是一个小镇上罕见的就业来源，该镇曾经辉煌，但至今并未从数十年前失去IBM办公室（一家电脑公司）到墨西哥的打击中恢复过来。凌晨在“像地牢一样”的仓库出现的雇员们对自己的生活并不乐观，但他们感到很感激能在那里工作。

Town Square, the shop in “Help Wanted”, is a rare source of jobs in a town that has seen better days. The fictional Potterstown still hasn’t recovered from losing an office of IBM, a computer firm, to Mexico decades ago. The employees who show up to the “dungeon-like” warehouse in the small hours are not thrilled by their lives, but they are grateful to be there.

沃德曼女士探讨了这个杂乱的早班团队的需求，比如妮可，一个有失业未婚夫的年轻母亲，她在“一种无聊和敌意的氛围”下隐藏着如何喂养女儿的焦虑。这些深情的画像描述了那些负担不起大学学费、挣扎以维持生计或在某些情况下避免进监狱的人的不幸。

Ms Waldman probes the needs of this motley morning team, such as Nicole, a young mother with an unemployed fiancé, who hides her anxiety about how she will feed her daughter beneath “an air of boredom and free-floating hostility”. These affectionate portraits chronicle the rough luck of people who cannot afford university and who struggle to make ends meet or, in some cases, to stay out of prison.

然而，小说轻松的语调和快节奏使其避免陷入困境。小说的戏剧性来自员工们设计的一个计划，以摆脱他们扭曲糟糕的经理，让她得到升职，这也会为商店提供一个罕见的管理职位。每个角色都梦想着如果他们有稳定的工资和福利，他们可能会过上的生活。

Yet the book’s light tone and brisk pace keep it from getting bogged down. The novel’s drama comes from a scheme the workers concoct to get rid of their cartoonishly terrible manager by getting her promoted, which would also open up a rare managerial job at the store. Each character dreams of the life they might lead if only they had a salary and benefits.

“镇广场”的员工享受他们共同的仪式，他们在巧妙地堆箱子和摆放展示品时感到“精通”。他们的自豪感是真实的但也是脆弱的，受贪婪的雇主、垄断性的电商和自动化的威胁，后者在书的结尾附近形影不离。■

The employees of Town Square enjoy their shared rituals and take pleasure in their “sense of mastery” as they expertly stack boxes and arrange displays. Their pride is real but fragile, threatened by greedy employers, monopolistic e-tailers and the prospect of automation, which looms ominously near the end of the book. ■

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文化 | 全世界盘中物 (Culture | World in a dish)

Flat White是澳大利亚最伟大的烹饪出口 (Flat whites are Australia’s greatest culinary export)

它们甚至比Vegemite更好。 (They are even better than Vegemite)

在伦敦东区时尚的Shoreditch，每天都是一片充斥着时髦的人们拿着设计精美的外卖杯的景象。在4月11日至14日期间，大约有3万名咖啡因热爱者会涌入该地区参加伦敦咖啡节。许多游客会点一杯咖啡因要求较高的白咖啡。这款饮料在那些想要品尝咖啡豆本身味道而非掩盖它的人们中迅速赢得了人气。

ON ANY GIVEN day Shoreditch, a trendy part of London’s East End, is a flurry of hipsters clutching artfully designed takeaway cups. Between April 11th and 14th some 30,000 caffeine-keen people will descend on the area for the London Coffee Festival. Many visitors will be ordering flat whites. The drink has rapidly gained popularity among those who want to taste their beans rather than temper them.

白咖啡起源于20世纪80年代的澳大利亚和新西兰，口感浓郁却顺滑。两份浓缩咖啡加入140至180毫升温和蒸煮的牛奶，并覆盖一层微泡沫。结果浓烈，如果做得好，还会略带甜味：比拿铁不那么奶味，比卡布奇诺不那么多泡沫。

Flat whites, which originated in Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s, are powerful yet smooth. Two shots of espresso are combined with between 140 and 180 millilitres of gently steamed milk and crowned with a sliver of “microfoam”. The result is punchy and, if done well, a little sweet: less milky than a latte and not as frothy as a cappuccino.

澳大利亚的咖啡制作技术是相对较新的。18世纪英国移民更青睐茶，因此似乎没有人知道该如何冲一杯地道的咖啡。咖啡豆不是烘焙的，而是煮沸的。为了改善口味，人们添加了菊苣、苦艾、鸡蛋壳或芥末。1939年，一位男子在报纸上抱怨说澳大利亚的咖啡“惩罚饮者”。

Australia’s coffee-making prowess is fairly recent. Tea was the preferred beverage for British settlers in the 18th century; as a result, no one seemed to know how to make a decent cup of joe. Beans were not roasted, but boiled. To improve the taste, people added chicory, a bitter endive, egg shells or mustard. In a letter to a newspaper in 1939, one man complained that Australia’s coffee “punishes the drinker”.

第二次世界大战期间，驻扎在太平洋的美国军人拒绝喝这种混合物，并要求澳洲人提高水准。战后抵达的希腊和意大利移民带来了专业知识。商业咖啡机在1950年代抵达该国。彼得·班克罗夫特在伦敦度假时品尝了正宗的咖啡，并在父亲的帮助下开始进口意大利机器。

During the second world war, American servicemen stationed in the Pacific refused to drink such concoctions and demanded that the Antipodeans up their game. The Greek and Italian immigrants who arrived after the war brought expertise. Commercial espresso-makers reached the country in the 1950s. Peter Bancroft had tasted proper coffee on holiday in London and, with the help of his father, began importing Italian machines.

澳大利亚的咖啡店每年创下100亿澳元（66亿美元）的营业额，是欧洲以外各国人均营业额最高的地区。该国的1.4万家咖啡店中有95%是独立拥有的。这是星巴克一直苦苦挣扎的市场。该公司于2000年开了84家门店，但关闭了许多；去年，它在澳大利亚首次盈利。

Australia’s cafés take in A$10bn ($6.6bn) a year, the most per person of any country outside Europe. Some 95% of the country’s 14,000 cafés are independently owned. It is a market in which Starbucks has struggled. The firm opened 84 shops in 2000, but has closed many; it posted a profit in Australia for the first time last year.

该国大部分地区的咖啡植株并不适合生长，因此它进口的咖啡豆要远远多于出口。然而，与鳄梨土司和维特米特一样，白咖啡是澳大利亚的一项伟大的烹饪出口产品。在过去的一年中，有三分之一的英国消费者点了这种饮料；Pret A Manger单独向口渴的英国消费者售出了800万杯。（该公司售出了900万杯卡布奇诺，但称这两种提神饮料之间的差距正在缩小。）美国人也越来越爱喝白咖啡。

Much of the country has an unfavourable climate for coffee plants, so it imports far more beans than it sells. However, along with avocado toast and Vegemite, flat whites are one of Australia’s great culinary exports. In the past year one in three British consumers ordered the beverage; Pret A Manger alone sold 8m to thirsty Brits. (The company sold 9m cappuccinos, but says the gap between the pick-me-ups is shrinking.) Americans are increasingly sipping flat whites, too.

在联合国每年的气候峰会（COP）上，澳大利亚展馆成为一个社交中心。并非因为该国的绿色认证—它是世界顶级的煤炭和天然气出口国之一。相反，让澳大利亚如此受欢迎的是该代表团带来的咖啡师。称之为白咖啡外交。■

At COP, the UN’s annual climate summit, the Australian pavilion has become a social hub. Not because of the country’s green credentials—it is one of the world’s top exporters of coal and natural gas. Instead, what makes Australia so popular is the barista the delegation brings along. Call it flat-white diplomacy. ■

欲知更多有关美食的内容，请访问我们的专栏“世界美食”：“不断加料的肉汤”，一种古老的烹饪方式，赢得了Z世代的青睐（4月4日）慕斯卡卡是如何登上希腊美食殿堂的（3月25日）圣诞节饮品蛋酒的历史并不那么温馨（12月15日）*

Read more from The World in a Dish, our column on food:“Perpetual stew”, an ancient way of cooking, has won Gen Z fans (Apr 4th)How moussaka made it into the pantheon of Greek gastronomy (Mar 25th)For a Christmas drink, eggnog does not have a heartwarming history (Dec 15th)

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文化 | 独自一人 (Culture | All by myself)

孤独的利弊——以及好处 (The drawbacks—and benefits—of solitude)

三本书探讨了独处的危险和乐趣 (Three books examine the perils and pleasures of being alone)

所有孤独。撰写：萨姆·卡尔。毛里亚出版社；256页；11.99英镑。将于十二月在美国出版；28.99美元

All the Lonely People. By Sam Carr. Picador; 256 pages; £11.99. To be published in America in December; $28.99

孤独。 作者：内塔·韦因斯坦、海瑟·汉森和韦·阮。剑桥大学出版社；300页；25.95美元和20英镑

Solitude. By Netta Weinstein, Heather Hansen and Thuy-vy Nguyen. Cambridge University Press; 300 pages; $25.95 and £20

拖鞋的胜利。 作者：帕斯卡尔·布鲁克纳。翻译：科里·斯托克威尔。威利出版社；118页；19.95美元。波利蒂；16.99英镑

The Triumph of the Slippers. By Pascal Bruckner. Translated by Cory Stockwell. Wiley; 118 pages; $19.95. Polity; £16.99

威廉·莎士比亚这位伟大的创造者被认为是“孤独”这个词的创造者。他的英雄之一科里奥兰纳斯将流亡比作“孤独的龙”退回巢穴。那位罗马将军谈论的是一种物理状态：孤独的人只是独自一人。

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, that great coiner, is given credit for the word “lonely”. Coriolanus, one of his heroes, compares going into exile to a “lonely dragon” retreating to his lair. The Roman general was talking about a physical state: someone who was lonely was simply alone.

后来，感谢浪漫诗人，这个词带上了情感色彩。孤独变成了一种灵魂的状况。对于威廉·华兹华斯，他著名地“像云朵一样独自漫步”，自然界提供了一个从消极孤立感中获得解脱的地方——一群水仙花可以提供“欢乐的伴侣”。

Then, thanks to the Romantic poets, the word took on emotional overtones. Loneliness became a condition of the soul. For William Wordsworth, who famously “wandered lonely as a cloud”, the natural world offered a reprieve from negative feelings of isolation—a host of daffodils could provide “jocund company”.

到了20世纪初，孤独被视为城市生活的主要困扰之一。政治理论家汉娜·阿伦特哀叹，孤独一度是“在某些边缘社会条件如老年人中通常遭受的边缘体验，现在变成了日益增长的群体的日常体验”。

By the early 20th century loneliness was considered one of the defining afflictions of urban life. Hannah Arendt, a political theorist, lamented that a feeling that was “once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the ever-growing masses”.

她的担忧如今仍然存在，因为孤独经常被视作严重的公共健康问题，甚至是一种流行病，困扰着老年人和年轻人。在新冠疫情期间，一半的英国人经常感到孤独；16至24岁之间的人遭受的困扰最为严重。智能手机、社交媒体、在线约会和居家工作都因疏远感而备受指责。最近出版了三本探讨这个主题的书。

Her concerns resonate today, as loneliness is frequently identified as a serious public-health problem, an epidemic even, that besets the elderly and young alike. During the covid-19 pandemic half of Britons reported often feeling lonely; those aged between 16 and 24 struggled the most. Smartphones, social media, online dating and working from home are all blamed for feelings of alienation. Three recent books have taken on the subject.

在《所有孤独的人》中，心理学家萨姆·卡尔收集了感到孤立或被抛弃的个人的故事。一个十几岁的阿富汗难民在萨默塞特的学校努力融入。一位八旬老人在养老院里度日如年。卡尔先生以善解人意的方式处理了这些材料，将他们的经历与自己的经历交织在一起，尤其是他作为单身父亲的角色。

In “All the Lonely People” Sam Carr, a psychologist, collects stories of individuals who feel cut off or forsaken. A teenage Afghan refugee struggles to blend in at school in Somerset. An octogenarian languishes in a retirement home. Mr Carr handles this material sensitively, weaving their experiences together with his own, in particular his role as a single parent.

作者描绘了丧亲、心碎和童年创伤的痛苦，并强调了那些内向和无友的人所受到的污名。不知怎么的，这本书并不令人难以忍受地令人沮丧，但你不免会想，孤独是否只是人类条件中不可避免的一部分。这些见证的范围也表明，孤独并不是一种单一的感觉，而更像是一种情感和无法满足的渴望的综合体。

The author evokes the pain of bereavement, heartbreak and childhood trauma and underlines the stigma attached to being withdrawn and friendless. Somehow, the book is not an unbearably bleak read, but you do wonder whether loneliness is just an unavoidable part of the human condition. The range of testimonies also suggests that loneliness is not a single feeling so much as a name for a medley of emotions and unsatisfied appetites.

在《孤独》中，心理学教授内塔·韦因斯坦和韦·阮与科学记者海瑟·汉森合作，思考了独处时间的回报。他们从蒙田等人创造的孤独神话开始，然后借助实验室工作、访谈和调查阐明独处如何真正影响人类心理。

For “Solitude” Netta Weinstein and Thuy-vy Nguyen, two psychology professors, have teamed up with Heather Hansen, a science journalist, to ponder the rewards of time spent alone. They begin with an account of the mythology of solitude created by figures such as Michel de Montaigne, an essayist, and Edward Hopper, a painter. They then draw on laboratory work, interviews and surveys to illuminate how being alone really affects the human psyche.

通常将孤独和独处视为同义词，但实际上并非如此。作者们建议，负面描绘为一种状态的东西可以被正面重构为另一种。为此，他们强调了独处的恢复性可能性，并提供实用指导。在喧嚣和拥挤的世界中，他们认为人们应该抽时间独处，远离吸引注意力的刺激。

It is common to treat loneliness and solitude as synonyms, but they are not. The authors suggest that what is negatively portrayed as one state can be positively reframed as the other. To this end they emphasise the restorative possibilities of being alone and include practical guidance. In a noisy and crowded world, they argue, people should make time to be by oneself, away from attention-grabbing stimuli.

这本书的受访者大多认为缺乏交际有助于自主性。但这取决于独处是自愿的还是被强迫的。例如，对于社会边缘人士和一些囚犯来说，如果是被强迫的，通常是悲惨的。相比之下，自愿独处，尤其是在自然环境中，提供了反思的空间。这可以打开通往“巅峰体验”的大门，如惊奇、景仰、和谐，甚至是狂喜。（在这个超连接的数字时代，许多读者可能不会希望脱机长到足以有这样的体验。）

The book’s interviewees mostly regard a lack of company as conducive to autonomy. But this depends on whether solitude is elective or enforced. If it is enforced, as it is for social outcasts and some prisoners, for instance, it is often wretched. Elective solitude, by contrast, above all in natural settings, affords space for reflection. It can open the door to “peak experiences” such as wonder, awe, harmony, even ecstasy. (In a hyper-connected digital age, many readers may not fancy their chances of ever being unplugged long enough to have such experiences.)

巴斯卡尔·布鲁克纳（Pascal Bruckner）认为世界正在从社交倾向于温馨隐居中萎缩。《拖鞋的胜利》（The Triumph of the Slippers）并非建立在研究基础之上，而是植根于法国机智社会批评的传统之中。布鲁克纳先生是一位哲学家和争论学家，他将当前时期称为“大撤退”（a Great Withdrawal）。在他看来，二十世纪末的开放已经结束，“头脑和空间的关闭正在蓄势待发”。人们可能喜欢生活在“授权的邋遢”中，然而很难想象英雄和先驱会穿着睡袍： “尽管舒适很好，但你无法在软弱上建立一个文明。”

Pascal Bruckner sees a world shrinking from sociability in favour of snug seclusion. “The Triumph of the Slippers” is grounded not in research but in the French tradition of witty social criticism. Mr Bruckner, a philosopher and polemicist, dubs the present period “a Great Withdrawal”. As he sees it, the openness of the late 20th century is over, and “the closing of minds and spaces is well under way.” People may like living in “authorised sloppiness”, yet it is hard to imagine heroes and trailblazers wearing dressing gowns: “While it’s nice to be comfortable, you can’t build a civilisation on softness.”

他以一种俏皮和夸张的方式描述了一个大多数任务都可以在不出门的情况下完成的社会。他的书中充斥着警句——例如，公共领域被“琐碎的纵欲”所主宰——并在他的短章节中点缀着对尼采、柏拉图和卢梭的引用。

With a mixture of playfulness and grandiosity, he describes a society where most tasks can be completed without leaving the house. His book overflows with soundbites—the public sphere, for example, is dominated by “orgies of pettiness”—and he peppers his short chapters with references to Nietzsche, Plato and Rousseau.

尽管他的论点偏离了许多方向，布鲁克纳先生的主要主题是人们需要重新学习亲密关系的艺术。借助技术实现的“互动孤独”无法取代“世界的伟大剧场”。布鲁克纳先生提供了一个清单，以抵御持久且腐蚀性的孤独感：“我们是否爱过足够，给予过足够，慷慨过足够，拥抱过足够？”如果这些问题是正确的，许多读者可能会发现自己的回答是“否”。 ■

Though his argument spins off in many directions, Mr Bruckner’s main theme is the need for people to relearn the art of intimacy. “Interactive solitude”, enabled by technology, is no substitute for “the great theatre of the world”. Mr Bruckner supplies a checklist for warding off enduring, corrosive feelings of loneliness: “Have we loved enough, given enough, lavished enough, embraced enough?” If these books are right, many readers will find themselves answering “No.” ■

回到目录

经济学人 (The Economist)

本周世界

领袖

中国

美国

商业

国际

财经

科技

亚洲

文化

政治 (Politics)

玩火自焚 (Dicing with danger)

商业 (Business)

某种程度上的胜利 (A victory, of sorts)

KAL的漫画 (KAL’s cartoon)

2024年4月13日本周世界 (The world this week April 13th 2024)

本周封面 (This week’s covers)

我们的视角 (How we saw the world)

安乐死的是非曲直 (The rights and wrongs of assisted dying)

英国下一个重大社会改革即将到来。以下是应该的实施方式。 (Britain’s next great social reform is coming. Here’s how it should work)

全球变暖正在接近您的家园 (Global warming is coming for your home)

谁将为损失买单？ (Who will pay for the damage?)

美国真正的摇摆选民异常罕见 (True swing voters are extraordinarily rare in America)

我们已经找到一些 (We have found some)

美国应该效仿英国在儿童跨性别护理方面的做法 (America should follow England’s lead on transgender care for kids)

它的方法既不像红州那样严厉，也不像蓝州那样放松。 (Its approach is neither as harsh as in red states nor as lax as in blue states)

短视的以色列军队 (The short-sighted Israeli army)

单凭武力无法带来安全 (Force alone cannot bring security)

赞美彼得·希格斯 (In praise of Peter Higgs)

以他命名的粒子成为了一个卖点。对这位先生来说，有点烦心。 (The particle named after him became a selling point. For the man, it was a bit of a pain)

中国艰难抵抗人口危机的高风险斗争 (China’s high-stakes struggle to defy demographic disaster)

共产党信心寄托于机器人、基因疗法和沐浴服务 (The Communist Party puts its faith in robots, gene-therapy and bathing services)

中国与以色列的关系能否在加沙战争中生存下来? (Will China’s ties with Israel survive the Gaza war?)

一些以色列人正在重新思考这个拒绝称哈马斯为恐怖组织的国家 (Some Israelis are rethinking the country that refuses to call Hamas a terrorist group)

在新疆的斋月是什么样子 (What Ramadan is like in Xinjiang)

我们的专栏作家探访一个严格控制的地区。 (Our columnist visits a harshly controlled region)

美国的摇摆选民是谁？ (Who are the swing voters in America?)

我们审讯了一个包含4.9万人的数据集 (We interrogated a dataset of 49,000 people to find out)

迈克·约翰逊可能不得不在乌克兰援助和他的工作之间做出选择 (Mike Johnson may have to choose between Ukraine aid and his job)

这位共和党众议院发言人被自己阵营中的强硬派困住 (The Republican House speaker is trapped by hardliners on his own side)

加州一个海滩小镇如何成为加文·纽森的宿敌 (How one California beach town became Gavin Newsom’s nemesis)

亨廷顿海滩向极右转变代表了现代加州共和主义的典型。 (Huntington Beach’s hard-right turn is typical of modern California Republicanism)

新泽西的选举程序刚刚被颠覆 (New Jersey’s electoral process just got upended)

安迪·金正在与一些高级政治权术作斗争。 (Andy Kim is fighting against some high-level political arcana)

左倾偏见的挑战进入美国公立大学 (A challenge to leftist bias moves into America’s public universities)

佛罗里达州引领反对主流进步主义的努力。 (Florida leads a push against prevailing progressivism)

认为特斯拉遇到麻烦了？更可怜那些想要成为其竞争对手的电动汽车新秀们 (Think Tesla is in trouble? Pity even more its wannabe EV rivals)

一大批电动汽车初创公司正艰难维持经营。 (A fleet of electric-car startups is struggling to stay in business)

谁在全球供应链中掌握权力？ (Who wields the power in the world’s supply chains?)

库存提供了线索。 (Inventories offer a clue)

历史上的生产力大师：一场对决 (Productivity gurus through time: a match-up)

詹姆斯·克利尔对阿诺德·本内特 (James Clear v Arnold Bennett)

Airbnb预订日食达到天文数字 (Airbnb bookings for the solar eclipse reach astronomical levels)

有限的库存和机会主义旅行者使意外收获受控 (Limited inventory and opportunistic travellers have kept the windfall in check)

台积电在美国的芯片制造计划进一步扩大250亿美元 (TSMC’s American chipmaking plans grow $25bn more ambitious)

相比之下，仍然黯然失色于其台湾事业。 (They still pale next to its Taiwanese endeavours)

生成式人工智能存在着清洁能源难题 (Generative AI has a clean-energy problem)

当人工智能革命遇上能源转型，会发生什么 (What happens when the AI revolution meets the energy transition)

谁是全球南方的大老板？ (Who’s the big boss of the global south?)

在这个尔虞我诈的世界里，竞争是激烈的。 (In a dog-eat-dog world, competition is fierce)

富裕世界面临残酷的支出紧缩 (The rich world faces a brutal spending crunch)

包括美国、英国和法国在内的国家都面临无情的财政逻辑。 (Countries including America, Britain and France are up against remorseless fiscal logic)

乌克兰无人机袭击正在削弱俄罗斯石油工业 (Ukrainian drone strikes are hurting Russia’s oil industry)

这个世界第三大生产国现在成了汽油进口国 (The world’s third-largest producer is now an importer of petrol)

美国人什么时候才能看到那些利率降低？ (When will Americans see those interest-rate cuts?)

在一个令人不快的惊喜之后，一些人现在认为它们可能要等到总统大选之后。 (Following a nasty surprise, some now think they may come only after the presidential election)

中国政府正在吞噬私人房地产市场 (China’s state is eating the private property market)

可怜那些即将购房的人 (Pity those soon to buy a home)

印度经济真正增长有多快？ (How fast is India’s economy really growing?)

统计学家对该国的数据持保留态度。 (Statisticians take the country’s figures with a pinch of salt)

中国央行和Costco购物者的共同点 (What China’s central bank and Costco shoppers have in common)

提示：并非对加密货币的喜爱 (Hint: it is not a fondness for cryptocurrencies)

如果科技解决了一切，人类将会做什么? (What will humans do if technology solves everything?)

欢迎来到高科技乌托邦 (Welcome to a high-tech utopia)

乌克兰如何运用人工智能对抗俄罗斯 (How Ukraine is using AI to fight Russia)

从目标追踪到揪出违反制裁者，它的战争日益高科技。 (From target hunting to catching sanctions-busters, its war is increasingly high-tech)

出狱后的第一个星期是前囚犯最危险的时期 (The first week after prison is the deadliest for ex-inmates)

酒精和毒品在自由的最初日子里夺去了许多人的生命。 (Alcohol and drugs kill many in the early days of freedom)

新技术可以保护鲸鱼免受快速船只的伤害 (New technology can keep whales safe from speeding ships)