2024-04-06
经济学人 (The Economist)
本周世界
领袖
- 习近平错误的摆脱经济停滞计划 (Xi Jinping’s misguided plan to escape economic stagnation)
- 各国央行已消耗其信誉 (Central banks have spent down their credibility)
- 提防一个没有美国实力的世界 (Beware a world without American power)
- 一次令人不寒而栗的近失事表明当今数字基础设施的脆弱性 (A chilling near-miss shows how today’s digital infrastructure is vulnerable)
- 波音、迪士尼等公司可以从通用电气中学到什么 (What Boeing, Disney and others can learn from General Electric)
美国
- 拜登在密歇根的竞选活动拥有巨大的地面优势 (The Biden campaign in Michigan has a tremendous ground-game advantage)
- 一项堕胎裁决让民主党希望佛罗里达成为竞争目标 (An abortion ruling has Democrats hoping Florida is in play)
- 远程丈夫的崛起 (The rise of the remote husband)
- 乔·拜登对900美元抗儿童湿疹霜的攻击 (Joe Biden’s assault on the $900 child-eczema cream)
- 加利福尼亚深陷经济问题,没有简单的解决方案 (California is gripped by economic problems, with no easy fix)
- 美国进步派让自己变得悲伤吗? (Are American progressives making themselves sad?)
亚洲
- 为何印度精英喜爱纳伦德拉·莫迪 (Why India’s elite loves Narendra Modi)
- 日本在能登地震后100天仍然震惊不已 (Japan is still reeling 100 days after the Noto earthquake)
- 板球印度垄断的终结 (The end of cricket’s Indian monopoly)
- 亚洲“政治二代”正在主导政治 (Asian “nepo babies” are dominating its politics)
- 要一窥日本的未来,请看看它的便利店 (For a glimpse at Japan’s future, look at its convenience stores)
中国
- 中国政治家族如何决定其未来 (How China’s political clans might determine its future)
- 中国对世界的生硬态度 (China’s tin-eared approach to the world)
国际
商业
- 在中国做生意的全新颠覆性规则 (The mind-bending new rules for doing business in China)
- 鲍勃·艾格在迪士尼击败了纳尔逊·佩尔兹。现在怎么办? (Bob Iger has defeated Nelson Peltz at Disney. Now what?)
- 印度最大的企业集团开始涉足芯片制造 (India’s biggest conglomerate takes on chipmaking)
- 通用电气分为三家公司会比单一公司表现更好吗? (Will GE do better as three companies than as one?)
- 看看这家平衡增长和绿色的法国石油巨头 (Meet the French oil major that balances growth and greenery)
- 火灾演习的六条规定 (The six rules of fire drills)
- 为什么日本公司不再受制于美国 (Why Japan Inc is no longer in thrall to America)
财经
- 习近平如何计划超越美国 (How Xi Jinping plans to overtake America)
- 美联储清理其印钞混乱 (The Federal Reserve cleans up its money-printing mess)
- FTX的客户将被偿还吗? (Will FTX’s customers be repaid?)
- 如何打造全球货币 (How to build a global currency)
- 丹尼尔•卡尼曼是一个善于提出戏弄性问题的大师 (Daniel Kahneman was a master of teasing questions)
科技
- 减肥药物可能会吞噬世界吗? (Could weight-loss drugs eat the world?)
- 为什么机器人应该更多地从植物中获取灵感 (Why robots should take more inspiration from plants)
- 一场隐秘攻击险些威胁到全球电脑 (A stealth attack came close to compromising the world’s computers)
文化
- 21世纪的核战争会是什么样子? (What would nuclear war look like in the 21st century?)
- 哥斯拉在其70岁生日当天,重新回到人们视野 (On his 70th birthday, Godzilla has roared back to relevance)
- 如何从《圣经》赚钱 (How to make money from the Bible)
- 在英超联赛中,数据帮助小俱乐部挑战豪强 (In the Premier League, data help minor clubs take on the mighty)
- 保罗·卡加梅如何利用文化使卢旺达人保持一致 (How Paul Kagame uses culture to keep Rwandans on message)
本周世界上 (The world this week)
政治 (Politics)
Rolex门 (Rolexgate)
以色列袭击炸死了加沙的七名救援工作者。一架无人机向在最近几个月与以色列密切合作的慈善组织世界中央厨房的车队发射导弹。他们的路线经过了以色列军队的清扫。七人中有六名是外国救援员,可能是加沙战争中第一批死亡的外国救援人员(大约有200名救援人员已经丧生)。他们的死引发了愤怒的国际反应。乔·拜登表示以色列“没有尽到保护救援人员的责任”。本雅明·内塔尼亚胡承认在加沙的“悲剧事件”,但表示“这在战争中是正常现象。”世界中央厨房表示将暂停在加沙的运营,其他非政府组织也做出了同样的决定。
An Israeli strike killed seven aid workers in Gaza. A drone fired missiles at the car convoy of World Central Kitchen, a charity that has worked closely with Israel in recent months. Its route had been cleared with the Israeli army. Six of the seven were foreign aid-workers, thought to be the first to die in the Gaza war (around 200 aid workers have been killed). Their deaths provoked a furious international response. Joe Biden said that Israel “has not done enough to protect aid workers”. Binyamin Netanyahu acknowledged the “tragic event” in Gaza but said “this happens in war.” WCK said it was pausing its operations in Gaza, as have other NGOs.
在叙利亚,被怀疑是以色列空袭袭击了大马士革的伊朗大使馆。七人丧生,包括伊朗革命卫队外围武装部队圣城部队指挥官穆罕默德·雷扎·扎赫迪将军。他是自2020年1月美国用无人机袭击击毙卡西姆·苏莱曼尼以来被暗杀的最高级别伊朗指挥官。
In Syria a suspected Israeli air strike hit the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus. Seven people were killed, including General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a commander of the Quds Force, the expeditionary wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. He was the highest-ranking Iranian commander to be assassinated since America killed Qassem Suleimani with a drone strike in January 2020.
以色列战争内阁成员本尼·冈茨呼吁提前于9月举行选举以“恢复对政府的信任”。此前,数万人在耶路撒冷游行,呼吁罢免内塔尼亚胡担任总理。
Benny Gantz, a member of the Israeli war cabinet, called for an early election to be held in September to “renew trust” in the government. Earlier, tens of thousands of people marched in Jerusalem calling for the removal of Mr Netanyahu as prime minister.
以色列议会批准了一项允许政府禁止特定电视频道广播的法律。内塔尼亚胡表示他将立即行动关闭备受批评以色列的卡塔尔网络半岛电视台的地方办事处。
The Israeli parliament approved a law that would allow the government to ban broadcasts of particular televisions channels. Mr Netanyahu said that he would immediately act to close the local office of Al Jazeera, the Qatari network which has been extremely critical of Israel.
日本表示将恢复对联合国巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程局的资金援助。像其他国家一样,日本暂停了对UNWRA的援助,因为有人参与了10月7日针对以色列的恐怖袭击。日本是UNWRA的第六大捐助国。
Japan said it would resume its funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Like other countries Japan suspended its aid to UNWRA after it emerged that some of its staff had taken part in the October 7th terrorist attack on Israel. Japan is UNWRA’s sixth-largest donor.
国际特赦组织报告称,伊朗去年处决了853人,创下了八年来的最高纪录。超过一半的人涉及毒品相关罪行。国际特赦组织指出,该政权加大了使用死刑的力度,旨在通过在2022年的抗议活动后“灌输人民恐惧”。截至3月20日,今年已至少处决了95人。国际特赦组织认为其数据很可能是低估的。
Amnesty International reported that Iran executed 853 people last year, an eight-year high. More than half were for drug-related offences. Amnesty noted that the regime has stepped up its use of the death penalty “to instil fear among the population” after the protests in 2022. It executed at least 95 people by March 20th this year. Amnesty thinks its figures may well be an undercount.
乌干达的宪法法院维持了一项对“宣传同性恋”处以长期监禁并对“严重同性恋”处以死刑的法律。该法废除了一些条款,如要求向警察举报同性恋的义务。
Uganda’s Constitutional Court upheld a law that imposes long prison sentences for “promoting homosexuality” and the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality”. It struck down some sections of the law, such as a duty to report gay people to the police.
人权组织指责俄罗斯的瓦格纳雇佣兵协助政府部队进行无人机袭击和袭击,导致马里大量平民丧生。该国政党和非政府组织呼吁负责管理该国的军事政府制定一个返还民主的时间表,此前他们未能在2022年之前按期交还政权,违背了答应在今年三月底前将政权交还给民选政府的承诺。
Human-rights groups accused Russia’s Wagner mercenaries of assisting government forces in drone strikes and attacks that have killed large numbers of civilians in Mali. The country’s political parties and NGOs have called on the military government running the country to draw up a timetable for a return to democracy, after missing a deadline in 2022 and then breaching a promise to hand over to civilian rule by the end of March this year.
警方搜查了秘鲁总统迪娜·博尔瓦尔特的住所,以寻找与她办公室的劳力士手表来源有关的证据。博尔瓦尔特被指控在任上非法获取财富。她否认有任何不当行为,并将这次搜查描述为“滥用权力”。但六名部长突然辞职,导致她的政府陷入危机。
Police raided the home of Peru’s president, Dina Boluarte, in their search for evidence relating to the origin of her Rolex watches. Ms Boluarte is being investigated for allegedly enriching herself while in office. She denies wrongdoing and described the raid as “abusive”. But six ministers abruptly resigned, throwing her government into crisis.
总统乔·拜登及其中国同行习近平举行了双方都形容为“坦率和建设性”的电话交流。两位领导人讨论了合作领域,如打击毒品和气候变化。但他们在台湾和贸易等问题上存在分歧。
President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, held what both sides described as a “candid and constructive” phone call. The leaders discussed areas of co-operation, such as counter-narcotics and climate change. But they disagreed on Taiwan and trade, among other things.
中国再次通过将30个地点在印度阿鲁纳恰尔邦赋予中文名字,激起与印度的紧张关系,而阿鲁纳恰尔邦位于喜马拉雅山脉山麓。中国声称该地区是南藏的一部分。美国表示反对中国“推进对该地区的领土主张”的任何举动。
China stirred up tensions with India again by designating Chinese names to 30 places in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which lies in the foothills of the Himalayas. China claims the area is part of South Tibet. America said it opposed any attempt by China “to advance territorial claims” on the region.
泰国改革派的进步党更接近于被取缔,宪法法院决定审理一项旨在取缔该党的案件。法院已裁定该党修法以允许批评君主的政策违宪。进步党去年赢得了大选,但被皇家军队阵营阻止执政。
Thailand’s reformist Move Forward party came a step closer to being outlawed, after the Constitutional Court decided to hear a case that seeks to ban it. The court has already ruled that the party’s policy of reforming the law to allow criticism of the monarchy is unconstitutional. Move Forward won a general election last year, but it was blocked from taking power by the royalist-army establishment.
台湾遭遇了一场里氏7.4级地震,是该国25年来最强烈的地震。大部分损害发生在东海岸花莲县,至少九人丧生,一千人受伤。
Taiwan was hit by an earthquake of magnitude 7.4, the country’s strongest in 25 years. Most of the damage was in Hualien county, on the east coast. At least nine people were killed and a thousand injured.
在大选中遭遇重创不到一年之后,土耳其的反对派在地方选举中再度大获全胜。中间偏左的共和人民党(CHP)获得总选票的38%,而执政的正义与发展党(AKP)获得36%。选举结果被视为对雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安在经济方面处理不当的谴责。自去年五月再次当选总统以来,年通货膨胀率飙升至68.5%。
Less than a year after it lost heavily in a general election, Turkey’s opposition came roaring back to life in local elections. The Republican People’s Party (chp), which is on the centre-left, received 38% of the total vote compared with 36% for the ruling Justice and Development (ak) party. The vote is seen as a rebuke to Recep Tayyip Erdogan for his handling of the economy. Since his re-election as president last May, annual inflation has soared to 68.5%.
与此同时,至少有29人在伊斯坦布尔的一家夜总会火灾中丧生。伤亡者大多是在白天进行建筑翻修的工人。
Meanwhile, at least 29 people died in a fire at a nightclub in Istanbul. The casualties were mostly workers who were renovating the building during the day.
德国颁布的放宽大麻使用的新法律开始生效。人们可以携带高达25克大麻,家中可以种植三株大麻。但是他们不能在学校附近或步行区吸食大麻。
In Germany new laws that relax the use of cannabis came into force. People can carry up to 25 grams of the weed and grow three plants at home. But they can’t smoke it near schools or in pedestrian zones.
乌克兰对俄罗斯鞑靼斯坦共和国的一座炼油厂进行了无人机袭击,该炼油厂还设有生产用于袭击乌克兰的无人机的工厂。袭击目标位于俄罗斯境内约1300公里(800英里)处,这是乌克兰超越边境进行的最远袭击。与此同时,乌克兰签署了一项新法律,将动员年龄从27岁降低到25岁,允许武装部队扩大征兵。
Ukraine carried out a drone attack on an oil refinery in the Russian republic of Tatarstan, which also houses factories that produce drones for Russia to attack Ukraine. The target was around 1,300km (800 miles) inside Russian territory, the farthest strike that Ukraine has made across the border. Meanwhile a new law was signed in Ukraine that lowers the mobilisation age from 27 to 25, allowing the armed forces to expand the draft.
美国众议院发言人迈克·约翰逊表示,很快将就一项提供军事援助给乌克兰和以色列的法案进行投票。该法案在参议院获得通过,但在众议院因共和党反对而停滞不前。约翰逊先生希望将他所在党派对援助的支持与民主党在一些问题上的让步联系起来,比如解除新液化天然气设施的禁令,并暗示部分援助将是贷款形式。
Mike Johnson, the speaker of America’s House of Representatives, suggested that a vote on a bill that provides military aid to Ukraine and Israel would be held soon. The bill passed the Senate but has stalled in the House because of opposition from Republicans. Mr Johnson wants to tie his party’s support for the aid to concessions from Democrats on things like lifting a moratorium on new liquefied natural-gas facilities, and hinted that some of the aid will be a loan.
佛罗里达州最高法院裁定,六周后拥有堕胎权将于下个月生效。但也通过批准将在11月的大选中提交选民的公民投票措施,以恢复怀孕23-24周内的堕胎权利。这一问题将在整个南方引起共鸣。来自乔治亚州、得克萨斯州和其他地方的妇女已前往佛罗里达进行手术,因为她们所在州对堕胎实行了禁令。
Florida’s Supreme Court ruled that a state ban on abortion six weeks after conception could come into force next month. But it also sent the matter to voters by approving a ballot measure for November’s general election that would restore the right to an abortion up to 23-24 weeks into a pregnancy. The issue will resonate throughout the South. Women from Georgia, Texas and elsewhere have travelled to Florida for the procedure after their states banned it.
俄勒冈州的民主党州长蒂娜·科特克签署了一项重新对毒品实施刑事化的法律,三年前选民批准了将拥有药物罪定为非刑事犯罪的举措。该举措为戒毒服务提供更多公共资金,但这个实验被认为是失败的。
The Democratic governor of Oregon, Tina Kotek, signed a law that re-criminalises drugs, three years after voters approved a measure to decriminalise possession. That measure provided more public money for addiction services, but the experiment has been deemed a failure.
苏格兰的有争议的仇恨犯罪法已生效,禁止使用“威胁或辱骂”行为煽动基于某些特征(如跨性别)对人们的仇恨。这项法律引发了许多人的反对,包括J·K·罗琳和埃隆·马斯克,因为它限制了言论自由。苏格兰警察协会会长表示这项法律不可行,因为人们无法理解。警察苏格兰因一场奇怪的“仇恨怪兽”意识活动而受到批评。据报道,在最初几天内,已有4000起关于仇恨的投诉在网上根据该法律登记。
Scotland’s controversial hate-crime law came into effect, making it illegal to use “threatening or abusive” behaviour to stir up hatred against people on the basis of certain characteristics, such as being transgender. The law is opposed by many, including J.K. Rowling and Elon Musk, for curtailing free speech. The head of the Scottish Police Federation says it is unworkable because people won’t understand it. Police Scotland was criticised for a bizarre “hate monster” awareness campaign. Within the first few days 4,000 complaints of hate were reportedly registered under the law online.
本周世界 (The world this week)
商业 (Business)
头脑的碰撞 (A meeting of minds)
迪士尼在年度股东大会上成功击退了来自纳尔逊·佩尔兹的史诗级董事会挑战。通过他的对冲基金Trian,佩尔兹先生试图获取公司董事会的两个席位,以“恢复魔力”,声称糟糕的管理和票房失败导致了迪士尼股价的表现不佳。但首席执行官鲍勃·艾格展开了一场广泛的竞选活动,捍卫他的扭转策略,赢得了黑石集团、迪士尼家族和电影制片人乔治·卢卡斯的支持。据报道,佩尔兹先生声称获得只有31%的选票来获取一个董事席位。
Disney saw off an epic proxy challenge from Nelson Peltz at its annual general meeting. Through Trian, his hedge fund, Mr Peltz was seeking two seats on the company’s board to “restore the magic”, claiming that poor management and box-office failures have contributed to the underperformance of Disney’s share price. But Bob Iger, the chief executive, fought an extensive campaign defending his turnaround strategy, which won the support of BlackRock, the Disney family and George Lucas, a film producer. Mr Peltz reportedly received just 31% of the vote for his claim to a seat.
特斯拉在2024年第一季度全球交付了386,810辆汽车,同比下降了8.5%,这是自2020年以来首次在这一基础上出现季度下降。已经因电动汽车行业增长放缓而受挫的投资者惩罚了特斯拉的股票。其他汽车制造商的数据参差不齐。福特和现代报告美国电动汽车销量大幅增长,通用汽车宣布销量大幅下降。
Tesla delivered 386,810 vehicles worldwide in the first quarter of 2024, a decrease of 8.5% year on year and its first quarterly decline on that basis since 2020. Investors, already rattled by slowing growth in the electric-vehicle industry, punished Tesla’s stock. Figures from other carmakers were mixed. Ford and Hyundai reported a big rise in EV sales in America, and General Motors announced a sharp decline.
尽管交付量下降,但特斯拉重新夺回了世界最大的电动汽车销售商的头衔,因为比亚迪在2024年第一季度仅销售了30万辆纯电动汽车。这远低于比亚迪在2023年最后一个季度销售的超过52.6万辆的数量,在那时超过了特斯拉的销售。
Despite the fall in deliveries, Tesla reclaimed its crown as the world’s biggest seller of EVs, after BYD sold just 300,000 pure-electric vehicles in the first quarter. That is far below the more than 526,000 that BYD shifted in the last three months of 2023, when it overtook Tesla in sales.
小米进入了中国竞争激烈的电动汽车市场,开始销售其新款SU7四门轿车,其起步价格低于预期的3万美元。这家中国科技公司最为人所知的是其智能手机。该公司在24小时内获得了近9万份汽车订单,尽管客户可能需要等待长达七个月才能交付。
Xiaomi entered China’s fiercely competitive EV market when it started selling its new SU7 four-door sedan, which has a lower-than-expected starting price of $30,000. The Chinese tech company is better known for its smartphones. It took nearly 90,000 orders for the car over 24 hours, though customers may have to wait up to seven months for a delivery.
美国和英国签署了一项关于“确保人工智能安全的共同方法”的协议,这是世界上首个此类协议。尽管美国拥有更多的人工智能初创公司,英国是谷歌旗下的神经网络开发者DeepMind的所在地。英国去年11月成立了AI安全研究所。美国的类似研究所仍在组织中。
America and Britain signed an accord to “build a common approach” on ensuring the safety of artificial intelligence, the first agreement of its kind in the world. Although America has far more AI startups, Britain is home to DeepMind, a developer of neural networks that is owned by Google. Britain opened its AI Safety Institute last November. America’s parallel institute is still being organised.
微软决定在全球范围内将其Teams聊天应用与其Office 365套件分开销售。去年,为了避免欧洲委员会的反垄断罚款,该公司已经在欧洲解除了这些产品的捆绑销售。
Microsoft decided to sell its Teams chat application separately from its Office 365 suites around the world. It unbundled the products in Europe last year to avert an antitrust fine from the European Commission.
山姆·班克曼-弗里德 坚称“我从未认为自己的行为是非法的”,在他因在自己创立的加密货币交易所FTX上涣散的欺诈行为而被判入狱25年后如是说。判决法官称班克曼-弗里德先生在法庭证言时伪证,并对自己的行为没有任何悔意。
Sam Bankman-Fried insisted that “I never thought that what I was doing was illegal,” after he was sentenced to 25 years in prison for fraud at FTX, a cryptocurrency exchange he founded that collapsed in 2022. The sentencing judge said that Mr Bankman-Fried had committed perjury during his testimony to the court, and shown no remorse for his actions.
全球最大的油田服务提供商斯伦贝谢同意收购专业从事生产化学品和人工升油解决方案(如射流泵)的Champion X。这是自2016年以来斯伦贝谢(前身为施卢姆贝格)的最大收购。
SLB, the world’s biggest provider of oilfield services, agreed to buy Champion X, which specialises in production chemicals and artificial lift solutions, such as jet pumps. It is the biggest acquisition by SLB, formerly known as Schlumberger, since 2016.
欧洲天然气价格下跌,因为据报道欧盟的天然气储存量约为60%满,为年度同期的最高记录。随着天然气供应的补充,这一数字将在接下来的温暖月份上升。两年前,在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰和低储量的背景下,欧洲面临着天然气价格飙升的局面。如今,欧洲的基准天然气合约TFF的价格约为每兆瓦时25欧元(27美元),而一年前为56欧元。
The price of natural gas in Europe fell, after it was reported that gas-storage in the EU was around 60% full, a record high for this time of year. That will rise in the coming warmer months as gas supplies are replenished. Two years ago Europe faced soaring gas prices amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and low storage levels. The price of TFF, Europe’s benchmark gas contract, now trades around €25 ($27) per megawatt hour compared with €56 a year ago.
由于中东冲突和对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击引发担忧,原油价格达到五个月来的最高水平。布伦特原油价格接近每桶90美元。
Oil prices reached five-month highs, amid concerns about conflict in the Middle East and attacks on Russian refineries. Brent crude traded close to $90 a barrel.
欧元区通胀率在三月份降至2.4%,接近欧洲央行的2%目标。
The euro zone’s annual inflation rate fell to 2.4% in March, closer to the European Central Bank’s target of 2%.
“今天我们重新开始,” 通用电气表示,它已完成向三家独立公司的过渡,每家公司均在股票市场上单独上市。GE Aerospace 拥有喷气发动机和航空服务,GE Vernova 是专注于风力和燃气涡轮机的能源业务,而GE HealthCare 为医院提供影像、超声和IT系统。成立于1892年的通用电气不再以一个企业集团的形式存在。通用电气的老板拉里·卡普现在是GE Aerospace的首席执行官。
“Today we begin again,” said General Electric, as it completed its transition to three stand-alone companies, each listed separately on the stockmarket. GE Aerospace houses jet engines and aviation services, GE Vernova is the energy business, focusing on wind and gas turbines, and GE HealthCare supplies imaging, ultrasound and IT systems to hospitals. Founded in 1892, GE no longer exists as a conglomerate. Larry Culp, GE’s boss, is now CEO of GE Aerospace.
前美国总统特朗普的社交媒体平台特朗普媒体的股价暴跌,因其披露季度收入大幅下降并出现年度净亏损。特朗普媒体最近才在股票市场上市。该公司的审计师在一份监管文件中指出存在“对其作为持续经营实体的能力存在重大疑问”。与此同时,特朗普先生正与该公司的两位创始人陷入法律纠纷,声称他们不应该获得公司股份。
The share price of Trump Media, Donald Trump’s social-media platform, slumped after it revealed a huge drop in quarterly revenue and a yearly net loss. Trump Media only recently went public on the stockmarket. In a regulatory filing the company’s auditors noted that there is “substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern”. Meanwhile Mr Trump is embroiled in a legal fight with two founders of the business, claiming they shouldn’t receive shares in it.
本周世界大事 (The world this week)
KAL的漫画 (KAL’s cartoon)
2024年4月6日本周世界大事 (The world this week April 6th 2024)
深入探讨本周漫画的主题:
Dig deeper into the subject of this week’s cartoon:
法国揭露欧洲范围内大规模俄罗斯虚假信息活动你应该对人工智能干扰选举感到多么担忧?
France uncovers a vast Russian disinformation campaign in EuropeHow worried should you be about AI disrupting elections?By invitation: An AI-risk expert thinks governments should act to combat disinformation
本周世界 | 经济学人 (The world this week | The Economist)
本周封面 (This week’s cover)
我们如何看待世界 (How we saw the world)
本周我们只有一个全球封面。中国著名的勤劳劳动力正在减少,其房地产繁荣结束了,帮助它变得富有的自由贸易体系正在瓦解。
THIS WEEK we had one worldwide cover. China’s famously industrious workforce is shrinking, its property boom has ended and the system of free trade that helped it grow rich is disintegrating.
两种早期设计展示了习先生的狡计的不同方面。在最佳情况下,这是一个充满机器人、人工智能和先进材料的高科技未来愿景。这就是为什么我们有一双机器人手在创造取景器,就好像它们属于一个时髦的电影导演。不那么仁慈地说,中国的主席正在变魔术帽中掏出一只兔子,而在另一幅图片中,魔术师的帽子被堆叠起来,形成一个帽顶宝塔。
Two early designs illustrated different sides to Mr Xi’s cunning plan. At its best it’s a high-tech vision of the future, full of robots, AI and advanced materials. That’s why we had a pair of android hands creating a viewfinder, as if they belonged to a fancy film director. Less charitably, China’s president is pulling a rabbit out of a hat—and in the other image the magician’s hats were being stacked to make a millinery pagoda.
事实上,习先生的思想既是有远见的,也是神奇的,所以我们将机器人的手、兔子和帽子融合在一张图片中。
In reality, Mr Xi’s thinking is both visionary and magical, so we combined android hands, rabbit and hat in a single image.
习先生的计划绝非缺乏野心。新生产力的年度投资为1.6万亿美元,是五年前的两倍,相当于2023年美国所有商业投资的43%。到2030年,一些行业的工厂产能可能增加超过75%。其中一些将由渴望创造价值的世界一流公司制造,但更多的将是由补贴和国家规划所推动。
Mr Xi’s plan is hardly short of ambition. Annual investment in new productive forces is $1.6trn—double what it was five years ago and equivalent to 43% of all business investment in America in 2023. Factory capacity in some industries could rise by more than 75% by 2030. Some of this will be made by world-class firms keen to create value, but much will be prompted by subsidies and state direction.
我们中许多人喜欢这个结合设计,但其他人担心封面未解决的矛盾。新生产力是现实还是戏法?无论如何,我们的时间选择错了。我们将在复活节后的那周以兔子为主题。于是我们尝试了另一种方法。
Many of us liked this combined design, but others worried about the cover’s unresolved contradiction. Are new productive forces a reality or a conjuring trick? Anyway, our timing was out. We would be featuring a bunny in the week after Easter. We tried another tack.
这个总体计划的一个问题是,许多新的中国生产将不得不出口。然而,中国已经占全球制造业的31%。这个比例还能提高多少?美国肯定会阻止从中国进口先进产品,或者那些在其他地方由中国公司生产的产品。欧洲已经对中国车队摧毁其汽车制造商感到恐慌。新兴国家不希望自己的工业发展受到新的 “中国冲击” 的束缚。世界已经从2000年代的自由贸易时代走向了不同——部分原因是中国自身的重商主义。
A problem with the master plan is that much new Chinese production will have to be exported. However, China already accounts for 31% of global manufacturing. How much higher can that figure go? America will surely block advanced imports from China, or those made by Chinese firms elsewhere. Europe is already in a panic about fleets of Chinese vehicles wiping out its carmakers. Emerging countries will not want their own industrial development to be stymied by a new “China shock”. The world has moved on from the free-trading 2000s—partly because of China’s own mercantilism.
这些想法让我们想到了集装箱和运载它们的船只。展示起伏如长城的集装箱的图像唤起了这一战略不仅关乎经济增长,还关乎中国的安全。与美国的关系比一年前更为稳定,但仍然脆弱。中国官员深信,无论哪个政府在11月赢得美国总统大选,美国都将限制更多的中国进口并惩罚更多的中国公司。另一个设计,一艘装满赌筹的船,让我们回到了习主席战略的危险性。
Those thoughts led us to containers and the ships that carry them. An image showing the Great Wall of containers summoned up the idea that this strategy is not just about economic growth, but also about China’s security. Relations with America are steadier than they were a year ago, but they remain fragile. Chinese officials are convinced that America will restrict more Chinese imports and penalise more Chinese firms, whoever wins the White House in November. Another design, of a ship loaded up with gambling chips, took us back to the riskiness of Mr Xi’s strategy.
我们再次尝试将两种草图结合起来。从上方看,一支集装箱船队看起来像一支弹道导弹舰队。
Once more we tried to combine two sketches. An armada of container ships, seen from above, looked like a fleet of ballistic missiles.
这种侵略是恰当的。中国失衡的增长模式可能破坏国际贸易,进一步提高地缘政治紧张局势。如果失败,中国可能会停滞不前。这种想法可能会安慰美国及其盟友,他们担心中国货物的大量涌入。但事实并非如此:不满的中国可能比繁荣时更具有好斗性。
The aggression was apt. China’s lopsided growth model could wreck international trade, ratcheting geopolitical tensions even higher. If it failed, China could stagnate. That thought may comfort America and its allies, who fear an onrush of Chinese goods. It should not: discontented, China may be even more bellicose than if it were thriving.
我们中许多人喜欢这个封面,但也有人觉得集装箱是一种代表高科技革命的老式方式。此外,这个设计未能传达新生产力是习先生的创造这一点。
Many of us liked this cover, but some felt that containers were an old-tech way of representing a high-tech revolution. What’s more, this design failed to get across how the new productive forces are Mr Xi’s creation.
这些想法引出了我们的第三套想法。
Those thoughts led us to a third set of ideas.
习主席的总体计划摒弃了应对经济放缓的常规方法——通过一项大规模消费刺激来重新振兴经济。相反,他正在推动21世纪工业革命。中国不仅将摆脱对西方技术的依赖,而且将在新兴产业的关键知识产权中占主导地位,并相应地收取专利费。跨国公司将来到中国学习,而不是教导。
Mr Xi’s master plan rejects the conventional cure for a slowdown—a big consumer stimulus to reflate the economy. Instead he is going for a 21st-century industrial revolution. Not only will China escape dependence on Western technology, but it will control much of the key intellectual property in new industries and charge rents accordingly. Multinationals will come to China to learn, not teach.
因此,我们设计了一个图像,其中他在按下重置按钮——仿佛他正在全国人民代表大会中投票。我们还让他在共产党标志旁游行,该标志被修改成看起来像计算机的启动按钮。而且,我们再次将这两个想法结合在一起,这次是我们的最终封面设计。
Accordingly, we made up a design in which he was pressing the reset-button—as if he were voting in the National People’s Congress. We also had him parading in front of a Communist Party logo adapted to look like a computer’s on-switch. And once again, we combined these two ideas, this time into what was to be our final cover design.
我们希望把焦点放在习主席身上,因为新生产力不仅是经济上的,也是意识形态上的。近几十年来,中国的技术官员一直有学习全球最佳实践的授权。然而今天,他们已被边缘化。反馈已变成阿谀奉承。相比之下,中国已受制于习主席的集权统治。
We wanted the focus on Mr Xi because the new productive forces are ideological as well as economic. In recent decades China’s technocrats have had a mandate to study global best practice. Today, by contrast, they have been marginalised. Feedback has turned into flattery. Instead, China has come under Mr Xi’s centralising rule.
中国主席拒绝了纵容投机性地产企业或向公民施舍的想法,认为这是堕落西方诉诸的诡计。他去年表示,年轻人应少受宠,愿意“吃点苦头”。同样,国家安全现在凌驾于繁荣之上。中国必须为与美国未来的斗争做好准备,即使付出代价。这种负面影响将在中国和全球各地被感受到。
China’s president rejects the idea of bailing out speculative property firms or giving handouts to citizens as the kind of ruse the decadent West resorts to. Young people should be less pampered and willing to “eat bitterness”, he said last year. Equally, national security now takes precedence over prosperity. China must be prepared for the struggle ahead with America, even if there is a price to pay. The ill effects will be felt in China and around the world.
Leaders: Xi Jinping’s misguided plan to escape economic stagnationFinance and economics: How Xi Jinping plans to overtake AmericaBusiness: The mind-bending new rules for doing business in China
领导人 | 中国和世界经济 (Leaders | China and the world economy)
习近平错误的摆脱经济停滞计划 (Xi Jinping’s misguided plan to escape economic stagnation)
这将让中国人民失望,激怒世界其他国家 (It will disappoint China’s people and anger the rest of the world)
IT 是自1990年代邓小平最具影响力的改革以来,中国面临的最严峻经济考验。去年,该国实现了5%的增长,但其长达数十年的奇迹支柱正在动摇。中国以勤劳著称的劳动力人口正在减少,有史以来最疯狂的房地产繁荣已经崩溃,而使中国变得更富裕的全球自由贸易体系也正在瓦解。正如我们的报道所解释的那样,习近平主席的回应是全力以赴地实施一项大胆计划,重塑中国经济。Blending techno-utopianism、central planning和对安全的痴迷,这一计划阐明了中国主导未来产业的雄心壮志。然而,其内部矛盾将令中国人民失望,激怒世界其他国家。
IT is ChINA’S gravest economic test since the most far-reaching of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms began in the 1990s. Last year the country achieved growth of 5%, but the pillars of its decades-long miracle are wobbling. Its famously industrious workforce is shrinking, history’s wildest property boom has turned to bust and the global system of free trade that China used to get richer is disintegrating. As our reporting explains, President Xi Jinping’s response is to double down on an audacious plan to remake China’s economy. Blending techno-utopianism, central planning and an obsession with security, this sets out China’s ambition to dominate the industries of tomorrow. But its contradictions mean it will disappoint China’s people and anger the rest of the world.
与12个月前乃至繁荣时期相比,中国的mood(情绪)相当沮丧。尽管工业生产在3月份回升,消费者情绪低落,通缩潜在,许多企业家感到幻灭。在这种焦虑背后,隐藏着更深层次对中国脆弱性的担忧。到2050年,预计中国将失去20%的劳动力。房地产行业危机,这一行业占国内生产总值的五分之一,需要数年才能解决。这将伤害那些依赖土地销售获得财政收入和依靠繁荣的房地产行业实现增长的资金短缺的地方政府。与美国的关系已经较为稳定,正如习主席与乔•拜登总统本周的电话会谈所证实的那样。但双方关系仍然脆弱。中国官员确信,无论是谁赢得11月的白宫大选,美国都会限制更多的中国进口,对更多的中国企业进行惩罚。
Compared with 12 months ago, let alone the go-go years, the mood in China is dour. Although industrial production perked up in March, consumers are depressed, deflation lurks and many entrepreneurs are disillusioned. Behind the angst lie deeper fears about China’s vulnerabilities. It is forecast to lose 20% of its workforce by 2050. A crisis in the property industry, which drives a fifth of gdp, will take years to fix. It will hurt cash-strapped local governments that relied on land sales for revenues and flourishing real estate for growth. Relations with America are steadier, as a phone call between Mr Xi and President Joe Biden this week attested. But they remain fragile. Chinese officials are convinced that America will restrict more Chinese imports and penalise more Chinese firms, whoever wins the White House in November.
中国的应对措施是围绕官员所称的“new productive forces”(新生产力)制定的战略。这避开了通过巨大的消费刺激来刺激经济复苏的常规路径(这是腐朽西方有时采用的伎俩)。相反,习主席希望国家力量加速发展先进制造业,从而创造高生产率就业机会,使中国实现自给自足,并确保不受美国侵略。中国将跳跃式发展,从钢铁和摩天大楼跃升到电动汽车、电池、生物制造和基于无人机的“low-altitude economy”(低空经济)的大规模生产黄金时代。
China’s response is a strategy built around what officials call “new productive forces”. This eschews the conventional path of a big consumer stimulus to reflate the economy (that’s the kind of ruse the decadent West resorts to). Instead Mr Xi wants state power to accelerate advanced manufacturing industries, which will in turn create high-productivity jobs, make China self-sufficient and secure it against American aggression. China will leapfrog steel and skyscrapers to a golden era of mass production of electric cars, batteries, biomanufacturing and the drone-based “low-altitude economy”.
这项计划的规模令人惊叹。我们估计,“new productive forces”每年的投资已达到1.6万亿美元,占所有投资的五分之一,名义值是五年前的两倍。这相当于2023年美国所有商业投资的43%。到2030年,一些行业的工厂产能可能增加超过75%。一些投资将由渴望创造价值的世界一流企业推动,但更多的将受到补贴和明示或暗示的国家指导的推动。外国公司受欢迎,尽管许多公司之前在中国受到过伤害。习主席的最终目标是颠覆全球经济格局。中国不仅将escape dependence on Western technology(摆脱对西方技术的依赖),还将控制许多新行业的关键知识产权,并据此收取专利费。跨国公司会前往中国学习,而非教导。
The scope of this plan is breathtaking. We estimate annual investment in “new productive forces” has reached $1.6trn—a fifth of all investment and double what it was five years ago in nominal terms. This is equivalent to 43% of all business investment in America in 2023. Factory capacity in some industries could rise by over 75% by 2030. Some of this will be made by world-class firms keen to create value, but much will be prompted by subsidies and implicit or explicit state direction. Foreign companies are welcome, even though many have been burned in China before. Mr Xi’s ultimate aim is to invert the balance of power in the global economy. Not only will China escape dependence on Western technology, but it will control much of the key intellectual property in new industries and charge rents accordingly. Multinationals will come to China to learn, not teach.
然而,习主席的计划基本上是错误的。一个缺陷是忽略了消费者。尽管他们的支出远远超过房地产和新生产力,但只占国内生产总值的37%,远低于全球标准。要在房地产市场低迷的环境中恢复信心,从而提振消费支出,需要刺激措施。为了使消费者减少储蓄,需要提供更好的社会保障和医疗保健,以及开放公共服务给所有城市流动人口的改革。习主席不愿接受这点反映了他的严肃心态。他憎恶救助投机房地产企业或向市民发放补贴的想法。他去年表示,年轻人应少一些溺爱,愿意“eat bitterness”(忍受痛苦)。
However, Mr Xi’s plan is fundamentally misguided. One flaw is that it neglects consumers. Although their spending dwarfs property and the new productive forces, it accounts for just 37% of gdp, much lower than global norms. To restore confidence amid the property slump and thereby boost consumer spending requires stimulus. To induce consumers to save less requires better social security and health care, and reforms that open up public services to all urban migrants. Mr Xi’s reluctance to embrace this reflects his austere mindset. He detests the idea of bailing out speculative property firms or giving handouts to citizens. Young people should be less pampered and willing to “eat bitterness”, he said last year.
另一个缺陷是弱势国内需求意味着一些新产出将不得不出口。遗憾的是,世界已经摆脱了自由贸易的2000年代——部分是因为中国自身的重商主义。美国肯定会封锁来自中国的高级进口商品,或来自其他地方的中国企业生产的产品。欧洲担心中国车队将淹没其汽车制造商。中国官员表示他们可以将出口重新调向全球南方。但是,如果新“中国冲击”破坏了新兴国家的工业发展,他们也将变得谨慎。中国占全球制造业的31%。在保护主义盛行的时代,这个比例还能增长多少?
Another flaw is that weak domestic demand means some new production will have to be exported. The world has, regrettably, moved on from the free-trading 2000s—partly because of China’s own mercantilism. America will surely block advanced imports from China, or those made by Chinese firms elsewhere. Europe is in a panic about fleets of Chinese vehicles wiping out its carmakers. Chinese officials say they can redirect exports to the global south. But if emerging countries’ industrial development is undermined by a new “China shock”, they, too, will grow wary. China accounts for 31% of global manufacturing. In a protectionist age, how much higher can that figure go?
最后一个缺陷是习主席对企业家的不切实际看法,这些企业家是过去30年的动力源。在政治上受到青睐的产业投资激增,但资本主义风险承担的基础机制却受到了破坏。许多老板抱怨习主席不可预测的制定规则,并担心会发生清洗,甚至逮捕。相对于25年前,股市估值处于历史低位;外国公司谨慎;出现资本外逃和大亨移民的迹象。除非企业家得到解放,创新将受到损害,资源将被浪费。
The last flaw is Mr Xi’s unrealistic view of entrepreneurs, the dynamos of the past 30 years. Investment in politically favoured industries is soaring, but the underlying mechanism of capitalist risk-taking has been damaged. Many bosses complain of Mr Xi’s unpredictable rule-making and fear purges or even arrest. Relative stockmarket valuations are at a 25-year low; foreign firms are wary; there are signs of capital flight and tycoons emigrating. Unless entrepreneurs are unshackled, innovation will suffer and resources will be wasted.
中国可能会像上世纪90年代的日本那样,陷入通货紧缩和房地产崩溃的困境。更糟糕的是,其不平衡的增长模式可能会破坏国际贸易。如果是这样,可能会引发地缘政治局势的进一步升级。美国及其盟国不应对这种情况感到高兴。如果中国陷入停滞和不满,那么它可能比繁荣时更好斗。
China could become like Japan in the 1990s, trapped by deflation and a property crash. Worse, its lopsided growth model could wreck international trade. If so, that could ratchet geopolitical tensions even higher. America and its allies should not cheer that scenario. If China was stagnating and discontented, it could be even more bellicose than if it were thriving.
如果这些缺陷是显而易见的,为什么中国不改弦更张呢?一个原因是习先生没有在倾听。在过去的30年里,中国一直对经济改革的外部观点持开放态度。其技术官员研究了全球最佳实践,欢迎激烈的技术性辩论。在习的集权统治下,经济专家被边缘化,领导们曾经收到的反馈变成了阿谀奉承。习继续前行的另一个原因是国家安全现在优先于繁荣。尽管可能要付出代价,中国必须为与美国的前途挑战做好准备。这是与1990年代的深刻变化,其不良影响将在中国及全球范围内感受到。 ■
If these flaws are obvious, why doesn’t China change course? One reason is that Mr Xi is not listening. For much of the past 30 years, China has been open to outside views on economic reform. Its technocrats studied global best practice and welcomed vigorous technical debates. Under Mr Xi’s centralising rule, economic experts have been marginalised and the feedback leaders used to receive has turned into flattery. The other reason Mr Xi charges on is that national security now takes precedence over prosperity. China must be prepared for the struggle ahead with America, even if there is a price to pay. It is a profound change from the 1990s and its ill-effects will be felt in China and around the world.■
领导者 | 一朝被骗 (Leaders | Fool me once)
各国央行已消耗其信誉 (Central banks have spent down their credibility)
这将使未来的通胀处理变得更加棘手。 (That will make inflation trickier to handle in future)
不久之前,富裕世界曾为与通胀进行一场昂贵的战斗做好了准备。如今,似乎这场战争已经被无血却成功地打赢。在大多数富裕国家,年度核心通胀(不包括波动的食品和能源价格)已经从5-8%的高峰下降到了更可接受的3-5%。与悲观的经济学家相反,没有伴随的经济衰退。增长从繁荣(美国)到可观(澳大利亚、加拿大、日本)到温和(英国、欧元区)各有不同,但没有哪里经济崩溃了。与20世纪80年代的反通货膨胀相反,失业率一直保持低位。世界经济是在没有牺牲的情况下获得了拯救吗?遗憾的是,答案是否定的;高通胀留下了伤痕。
Not long ago the rich world was braced for a costly battle with inflation. Today it can seem as if the war has been won bloodlessly. In most rich countries annual core inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, has fallen from peaks of 5-8% to a more tolerable 3-5%. In defiance of pessimistic economists, there has been no accompanying economic slump. Growth varies from booming (America) to respectable (Australia, Canada, Japan) to tepid (Britain, the euro area), but nowhere has it collapsed. In contrast to the disinflation of the 1980s, unemployment has stayed low. Has the world economy enjoyed salvation without sacrifice? Sadly, the answer is no; high inflation has left scars.
在新冠疫情大流行之前,富裕世界享受了几十年没有任何严重通胀问题。在20世纪80年代残酷的货币紧缩和随后朝着独立央行以通胀为目标的方向发展之后,价格飙升似乎已经过时了。随着企业和工人认为通胀会保持低位,他们控制了价格和工资。他们的期望因此得到了实现。
Before the covid-19 pandemic, the rich world enjoyed decades without any serious inflation problems. After ruthless monetary tightening in the 1980s, followed by a movement towards independent central banks targeting inflation, price surges seemed as outdated as shoulder pads. As firms and workers came to assume that inflation would stay low, they kept prices and wages in check. Their expectations thereby proved self-fulfilling.
不幸的是,通胀已经死亡的想法也深植在央行行长的脑海中。当价格在2021年开始上升时,他们对作出反应的速度相当缓慢。最终,他们将利率调高到比最初预计的要高得多的水平。如今,预期外的反通货膨胀令他们松了一口气。上个月,美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔表示,降息将不会远了——尽管他在4月3日的讲话中似乎更加谨慎。英格兰银行行长安德鲁·贝利则庆祝了一个“越来越积极的故事”。
Unfortunately the idea that inflation was dead also lodged in the minds of central bankers. When prices started to rise in 2021 they were horribly slow to respond. Eventually they lifted interest rates much higher than they had initially thought necessary. Today faster-than-expected disinflation has allowed them a sigh of relief. Last month Jerome Powell, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, said that interest-rate cuts were not far away—although he seemed more guarded in a speech on April 3rd. Andrew Bailey, governor of the Bank of England, has celebrated an “increasingly positive story”.
但央行行长们的问题并没有结束。通胀仍然高于他们的目标。在欧洲,通胀可能会进一步下降,但这仅因为经济疲软。在美国,要实现美联储的2%目标可能无法以目前的经济增长速度实现,其中部分是由不可持续的政府赤字推动的。
But central bankers’ problems are not over. Inflation remains above their targets. In Europe it is likely to fall further, but only because the economy is weak. In America getting inflation down to the Fed’s 2% goal probably cannot be achieved at the current rate of economic growth, which is fuelled in part by an unsustainable government deficit.
最重要的是,公众对通胀危险的认识比疫情大流行之前更加敏感。一些调查表明,长期通胀预期有所上升。美国和英国的金融市场正在为长期通胀保护收费较高。对未来通胀的预测变得更加分散,这意味着更多人对是否会达到通胀目标表示怀疑。换句话说,现在,高通胀不再是一个遥远的记忆,央行的信誉看起来很脆弱。
Most important, the public is more attuned to the danger of inflation than it was before the pandemic. Some surveys show an uptick in long-run inflation expectations. Financial markets in America and Britain are charging a bit more for long-term inflation protection than they did. Predictions for future inflation have become more dispersed, meaning more people doubt whether inflation targets will be hit. In other words, now that high inflation is no longer a distant memory, the credibility of central banks looks fragile.
如果再次发生类似大流行的冲击,它将可能瓦解。预期通胀的明显上升将导致通胀持续,直到央行实施痛苦的减速措施。虽然这一次情况勉强避免了,但未来还可能出现更多测试性事件。地缘政治紧张局势、贸易战、气候变化和政府对财政刺激的偏好都将使通胀比20世纪80年代之后的寂静几十年更加不稳定。风险是双向的:特别是欧洲,由于经济疲弱,仍然面临通胀低于2%目标的危险。
It could shatter if another shock like the pandemic strikes. Inflation expectations rising definitively would cause inflation to persist until central banks brought about a painful slowdown. That was just about avoided this time, but further testing episodes are likely. Geopolitical tensions, trade wars, climate change and governments’ fondness for fiscal stimulus will all make inflation more volatile than it was in the sleepy decades after the 1980s. The risk is two-sided: Europe, especially, still faces the danger of inflation falling below the 2% target, owing to a weak economy.
波动的通胀和信誉受损的组合意味着富裕世界的决策者必须灵活。当通胀波动时,他们需要更快速地和更大幅度地调整利率,并容忍由此带来的经济波动。通过这样做,他们将会有一点像新兴市场的同事。没有像巴西、智利和波兰的央行那样长期低通胀记录的,所以它们在2021年急剧调高了利率;随着通胀下降,它们后来都进行了降息。迅速而有力地行动:这是鲍威尔和贝利先生等人将不得不遵循的规则书。 ■
The combination of volatile inflation and diminished credibility means that the rich world’s policymakers must be agile. They will need to adjust interest rates more quickly and to a greater extent when inflation fluctuates—and tolerate the resulting economic volatility. In so doing they will come to look a bit like their colleagues in emerging markets. Without as long a record of low inflation behind them, central banks in Brazil, Chile and Poland all raised interest rates sharply in 2021; all have since cut them as inflation has fallen. Move fast and forcefully: this is the rule book that the likes of Mr Powell and Mr Bailey will have to follow. ■
领导者 | 核威慑 (Leaders | Nuclear deterrence)
提防一个没有美国实力的世界 (Beware a world without American power)
唐纳德·特朗普威胁要放弃盟友,可能导致核武器自由竞争。 (Donald Trump’s threat to dump allies would risk a nuclear free-for-all)
核威慑是奏效的,或至少迄今为止是这样。要理解其原理,看看乌克兰的战争。美国和欧洲给予他们的盟友军备,却不敢派遣作战部队对抗俄罗斯。反过来,俄罗斯也不敢对西方发动攻击。相互的恐吓确保核大国不会公开互相攻击,正如它阻止冷战没有爆发成热战一样,尽管有许多代理冲突在激烈进行。成功的标志是只有九个国家拥有核武器,比人们曾经担心的要少,也比能制造核武器的国家数量要少。
Nuclear deterrence works—or at least it has so far. To understand how, look at the war in Ukraine. America and Europe arm their ally but dare not deploy combat troops against Russia. In turn, Russia dares not strike at the West. Mutual terror ensures that nuclear powers do not attack each other overtly, just as it stopped the cold war from turning hot, even though plenty of proxy conflicts raged. A sign of success is that only nine countries have nuclear arms—fewer than once feared, and fewer than the number of states able to make them.
随着北约纪念签署北大西洋公约75周年,感谢“延伸威慑”的慷慨,因此美国已经在其核保护伞下庇护了欧洲和亚洲盟友。部分原因是为了遏制敌人,另一部分是为了 dissuade 想要发展自己核武器的朋友,比如德国、日本和韩国。
As nato this week marks the 75th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, thank the generosity of“extended deterrence”, by which America has sheltered European and Asian allies under its nuclear umbrella. It has done so in part to contain foes and in part to dissuade friends like Germany, Japan and South Korea from going nuclear themselves.
随时了解我们的新每日更新,美国简报,以及我们的 总统竞选民调跟踪器。
Stay up to date with our new daily update, The US in brief, and our presidential poll tracker.
阅读更多有关2024年美国大选的报道:2024年美国大选。
Read more of our coverage of the US elections of 2024.
唐纳德·特朗普重返总统宝座可能在世界核武器平衡更加不稳定的时候制造混乱。他威胁要让俄罗斯“随便做他们想做的事”来攻击那些在防卫开支上投入不够的北约盟国,这个威胁可能破坏延伸威慑的信任基础。这可能导致美国一直试图避免的令人梦魇的核自由竞赛。
A return of Donald Trump as president threatens to sow chaos at a time when the world’s nuclear balance is more unstable. His threat to let Russia “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies that spend too little on defence risks destroying the trust that makes extended deterrence possible. That could produce the nightmarish nuclear free-for-all that America has always sought to avert.
作为世界上第一个拥有核力量的国家,美国长期以来一直试图阻止其他国家发展核武器。专家称之为“第 n 国问题”:拥有核武器的国家越多,其他国家就越想拥有,无法控制的危机风险就越高,美国的权力受到的约束也就越大,美国自己被核攻击的危险也就越高。在冷战期间与两个超级大国之间的威慑已经足够可怕了;而随着越来越多的核国家,问题可能变得无法应对。
As the world’s first atomic power, America has long tried to stop others from going nuclear. Wonks call it the “nth-country problem”: the more countries have nukes, the more others will want them, the likelier the risk of uncontrolled crises, the greater the constraints on American power and the higher the danger that America itself will be nuked. Deterrence with two superpowers during the cold war was scary enough; with ever more nuclear powers, it may become impossibly complex.
因此,美国试图通过往往是不宣而明确的”抑制战略”阻止核扩散,该战略基于三大支柱:如 1968 年的《核不扩散条约》等规范和条约;通过外交、制裁和军事威胁来对友邦和敌国施加压力;以及通过军事联盟和安全保证来提供保障和安慰。
America thus attempted to prevent nuclear proliferation by an often undeclared but far-reaching “strategy of inhibition” based on three pillars: norms and treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968; coercion of friends and foes by diplomacy, sanctions and threats of military action; and reassurance through military alliances and security guarantees.
延伸威慑是违反直觉的,因为美国为了盟友而冒险牺牲本土安全。这一许诺足以坚定地威慑克里姆林宫,但始终受到一些怀疑。为了加强这一点,美国在欧洲部署了部队和核武器,并让盟友参与核任务。据说温斯顿·丘吉尔曾经说过,他只需要一个美国士兵,最好是“已经牺牲了”。
Extended deterrence is counter-intuitive, in that America risks the homeland for the sake of allies. The promise, firm enough to deter the Kremlin, has always been plagued by some doubt. To strengthen it, America has deployed troops and nuclear weapons in Europe, and has given allies a role in nuclear missions. Winston Churchill is said to have quipped that all he needed to defend Europe was one American soldier, “preferably dead”.
根据我们的民调跟踪器,特朗普先生与现任总统乔·拜登齐头并进,他将在民意调查中。尽管他喜欢把这归功于自己,但在他的第一个任期中,世界却是平静的。现在美国深陷于乌克兰和加沙的战争之中,台湾的危机也在酝酿。随着俄罗斯发出威胁,中国正在扩大其核武库,核竞赛逐步加剧。
Mr Trump, neck-and-neck with President Joe Biden in the polls according to our tracker, sees allies as a burden, not an asset. His contempt mattered less in his first term, when the world was quiet (for which he likes to take credit). Now America is deeply involved in wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and clouds are gathering over Taiwan. A nuclear race looms as Russia issues threats and China builds up its nuclear arsenal.
没有人完全知道特朗普将会采取什么行动;即使是他自己也可能不太确定,尽管他大谈特别推行结束乌克兰战争的豪言壮语。但他的言论、前顾问对他希望退出北约的愿望的描述,以及未来潜在顾问的荒谬建议,都显示他有意减少或放弃美国对北约的安全保证,以及对盟友的保护。国会共和党几个月来拒绝通过向乌克兰、以色列和台湾提供援助的法案是一个不祥之兆。
Nobody knows quite what Mr Trump would do; even he may not be sure, despite his bluster about ending the war in Ukraine in a day. But his comments, former advisers’ accounts of his desire to leave nato and hare-brained proposals by putative future ones all point to a reduction or abandonment of American security guarantees to nato, and so to allies generally. Congressional Republicans’ months-long blocking of a bill to provide aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan is a bad omen.
盟国将希望,就像在特朗普的第一个任期中那样,他的政府中那些传统思维的成员会在某种程度上帮助限制损失。但一些特朗普团队的人士表示,那些没有将国内生产总值的2%用于国防开支的北约国家就不应该受到“攻击一个盟国就是攻击所有盟国”的承诺的保护。还有人提出一个“休眠的”北约,即美国从欧洲撤回地面部队,但保留核保护伞。这些想法是荒谬的。美国无法在没有保护欧洲滞后地区供应线的情况下保卫欧洲东部。特朗普会冒着让美国城市遭受核打击的风险来帮助他本不会在常规情况下保护的欧洲人吗?
Allies will hope that, as in Mr Trump’s first term, conventionally minded members of his administration will somehow help limit the damage. But some Trump-world figures say that nato countries which do not spend 2% of gdp on defence should not be protected by the pledge that an attack on one ally is an attack on all. Others propose a “dormant” nato, in which America withdraws ground forces from Europe while preserving the nuclear umbrella. Such ideas are nonsense. America cannot defend the martial east of Europe without protecting supply lines through the laggardly west. And would Mr Trump risk a nuclear attack on American cities to help Europeans whom he would not defend conventionally?
欧洲各国政府正在考虑不可思议的事情。波兰外交部长拉多斯瓦夫·希科尔斯基警告说,如果不继续为乌克兰提供军备援助,将会促使盟友启动“他们自己的核武器计划”。从德国到韩国的政治家也表达了类似观点。其他人则提出“欧洲化”北约,并用英国和法国的核武器代替美国的核武器,尽管二者的核储备总量不到俄罗斯的十分之一,它们保护欧洲其他地区的原则仍然在萌芽阶段。欧洲盟国正准备承担更多帮助乌克兰的负担,希望“规避特朗普风险”。
European governments are thinking the unthinkable. Poland’s foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, warns that a failure to keep arming Ukraine could push allies into “their own nuclear-weapons programmes”. Politicians from Germany to South Korea have said similar things. Others talk of “Europeanising” nato and substituting Britain’s and France’s nuclear weapons for American ones, though their combined stockpiles are less than a tenth of Russia’s and their doctrines for protecting the rest of Europe still embryonic. European allies are preparing to take up more of the burden of helping Ukraine, hoping to “Trump-proof” themselves.
所有这些都不能替代可信的美国威慑。美国权力的丧失对美国构成了两个威胁:一是俄罗斯和中国等敌人可能会变得更加胆大,二是朋友将不再对他们的老盟友抱有信心。“美国优先”的孤立主义,远非能让这个国家独善其身,只会加大美国面临的核风险。■
None of this can substitute for credible American deterrence. A world without American power endangers America for two reasons: because foes like Russia and China will feel emboldened, and because friends will lose faith in their old ally. “America First” isolationism, far from insulating the country, will only magnify the nuclear risks America faces. ■
领导者 | 谨防恶意软件 (Leaders | Beware malware)
一次令人不寒而栗的近失事表明当今数字基础设施的脆弱性 (A chilling near-miss shows how today’s digital infrastructure is vulnerable)
这就是如何保护互联网免受恶意攻击 (This is how to protect the internet from malicious attacks)
人类文明历史上很少有什么发明像互联网一样重要,但又被理解得如此不透彻。它并非作为一个中央计划的系统而发展,而是由一系列设备和网络以临时接口相连接的拼接而成。分权使得运行这样一个复杂系统成为可能。但每隔一段时间就会出现令人不安的提醒,整个建筑构架都是如此脆弱。
FeW INVENTIONS in history have been as important for human civilisation and as poorly understood as the internet. It developed not as a centrally planned system, but as a patchwork of devices and networks connected by makeshift interfaces. Decentralisation makes it possible to run such a complex system. But every so often comes a chilling reminder that the whole edifice is uncomfortably precarious.
3月29日,一位独立的安全研究人员宣布,他纯属偶然地发现了XZ Utils中的一个秘密后门。这个鲜为人知但非常关键的软件被整合到控制世界互联网服务器的Linux操作系统中。如果那个后门没有及时被发现,从关键的国家基础设施到托管你猫猫图片的网站都将会受到威胁。
On March 29th a lone security researcher announced that he had discovered, largely by chance, a secret backdoor in XZ Utils. This obscure but vital piece of software is incorporated into the Linux operating systems that control the world’s internet servers. Had the backdoor not been spotted in time, everything from critical national infrastructure to the website hosting your cat pictures would have been vulnerable.
那个后门是由一名匿名贡献者植入的,这名贡献者通过连续两年的帮助性贡献赢得了其他编码人员的信任。这种耐心和勤奋带有国家情报机构的痕迹。供应链攻击——针对的不是个别设备或网络,而是它们所依赖的底层软件和硬件——变得越来越频繁。在2019年至2020年间,俄罗斯外国情报机构SVR通过篡改名为SolarWinds Orion的网络管理平台渗透进美国政府网络。最近,中国国家黑客修改了思科路由器的固件,以便进入美国和日本的经济、商业和军事目标。
The backdoor was implanted by an anonymous contributor who had won the trust of other coders by making helpful contributions for over two years. That patience and diligence bears the fingerprints of a state intelligence agency. Such large-scale “supply chain” attacks—which target not individual devices or networks, but the underlying software and hardware that they rely on—are becoming more frequent. In 2019-20 the SVR, Russia’s foreign-intelligence agency, penetrated American-government networks by compromising a network-management platform called SolarWinds Orion. More recently Chinese state hackers modified the firmware of Cisco routers to gain access to economic, commercial and military targets in America and Japan.
互联网天生容易受到XZ Utils后门这类方案的攻击。像它依赖的很多东西一样,这个程序是开源的,这意味着其代码是公开的;就像维基百科一样,任何人都可以建议对其进行更改。维护开源代码的人员通常会在业余时间这么做。2014年一个标题,揭示了一个广泛用于安全通讯的名为OpenSSL的工具中灾难性漏洞被发现后只有2000美元的预算:“互联网由两个名叫史蒂夫的家伙保护”。
The internet is inherently vulnerable to schemes like the XZ Utils backdoor. Like so much else that it relies on, this program is open-source—which means that its code is publicly available; rather like Wikipedia, changes to it can be suggested by anyone. The people who maintain open-source code often do so in their spare time. A headline from 2014, after the uncovering of a catastrophic vulnerability in OpenSSL, a tool widely used for secure communication, and which had a budget of just $2,000, captured the absurdity of the situation: “The Internet Is Being Protected By Two Guys Named Steve.”
诱人的假设是解决方案在于建立起中央控制,无论是由国家还是公司。事实上,历史表明,与开源类型相比,专有软件并不更安全。就在这周,美国的网络安全审查委员会,一个联邦机构,谴责微软的低劣安全标准,使得俄罗斯能够窃取签名密钥——这相当于任何云服务提供商的王冠珠宝。这使其具有广泛的数据访问权限。相比之下,开源软件具有许多优势,因为它们允许集体审查和问责。
It is tempting to assume that the solution lies in establishing central control, either by states or companies. In fact, history suggests that closed-source software is no more secure than is the open-source type. Only this week America’s Cyber Safety Review Board, a federal body, rebuked Microsoft for woeful security standards that allowed Russia to steal a signing key—“the cryptographic equivalent of crown jewels for any cloud service provider”. This gave it sweeping access to data. By comparison, open-source software holds many advantages because it allows for collective scrutiny and accountability.
因此,前进的道路就在于充分利用开源的同时缓解它对少数无偿、经常令人疲倦的个人造成的巨大负担。技术也可以提供帮助。作为一个非营利机构,Let’s Encrypt过去十年来通过使用巧妙的软件使连接到网站的用户连接加密变得简单,从而让互联网更加安全。更先进的人工智能最终可以一举发现数百万行代码中的异常。其他修复方法是通过监管。去年发布的美国网络战略明确表示,责任不应该由开源开发人员承担,而应该由“最有能力采取行动以防止糟糕结果的利益相关者”承担。
The way forward therefore is to make the most of open-source, while easing the huge burden it places on a small number of unpaid, often harried individuals. Technology can help, too. Let’s Encrypt, a non-profit, has made the internet safer over the past decade by using clever software to make it simple to encrypt users’ connections to websites. More advanced artificial intelligence might eventually be able to spot anomalies in millions of lines of code at a stroke. Other fixes are regulatory. America’s cyber strategy, published last year, makes clear that the responsibility for failures should lie not with open-source developers but “the stakeholders most capable of taking action to prevent bad outcomes”.
实践上的意思是政府和科技巨头,两者都从免费软件库中受益良多,应该扩大资金投入,并与非营利机构合作,比如Open Source Initiative和Linux Foundation,它们支持开源生态系统。德国一个名为新责任基金会的智库建议,政府可以让员工在业余时间为开源软件做出贡献,并放宽将“白帽”或道德黑客非法化的法律。
In practice that means governments and tech giants, both of which benefit enormously from free software libraries. Both should expand funding for and co-operation with non-profit institutions, like the Open Source Initiative and the Linux Foundation, which support the open-source ecosystem. The New Responsibility Foundation, a German think-tank, suggests that governments might, for example, allow employees to contribute to open-source software in their spare time and ease laws that criminalise “white hat” or ethical hacking.
他们应该迅速采取行动。XZ Utils后门被认为是公开发现的针对重要开源软件的供应链攻击的首次。但这并不意味着这是第一次尝试。而且这很可能也不是最后一次。■
They should act quickly. The XZ Utils backdoor is thought to be the first publicly discovered supply-chain attack against a crucial piece of open-source software. But that does not mean it was the first attempt. Nor is it likely to be the last. ■
领导者 | Culp able (Leaders | Culp able)
波音、迪士尼等公司可以从通用电气中学到什么 (What Boeing, Disney and others can learn from General Electric)
拉里·卡普任期中的教训 (Lessons from the tenure of Larry Culp)
首席执行官很少被任命去执行分离计划。然而,当拉里·卡普尔于2018年10月担任通用电气(GE)的最高职务时,他被期待以比前任更快的速度出售这家有着130年历史的企业集团的部分业务,这个帝国建设的前任所组建的部分。2021年11月,他宣布了一项激进的终局:将公司分拆成三个部分。GE的医疗业务去年已成为一个独立公司。4月2日,该公司的能源部门也走上了同样的道路,留下了GE航空航天,即公司的发动机制造业务。
Only rarely are chief executives appointed with a mandate for dismemberment. Yet when Larry Culp assumed the top job at General Electric (GE) in October 2018, he was expected to sell parts of the 130-year-old conglomerate at a pace even faster than his empire-building predecessors had assembled them. In November 2021 he announced a radical finale: splitting the firm in three. GE’s health-care business became a separate company last year. On April 2nd its power division went the same way, leaving behind GE Aerospace, the firm’s engine-making operation.
投资者正在获得回报。在卡普尔先生任职的头四年摇摆不定之后,GE的股票一路狂飙。GE三个继任公司的累积股票市值为2370亿美元。尽管这远低于2000年的5940亿美元的最高点,但已经是卡普尔继承时的两倍多。商学院的学生们几十年来一直在剖析定义GE的生活的那些傲慢收购事件。现在他们必须吸取这个终局的教训。
Investors are reaping the rewards. After dithering during the first four years of Mr Culp’s tenure, GE’s shares have been on a jet-fuelled tear. The cumulative stockmarket value of GE’s three successor firms is $237bn. Although that is well below the firm’s peak of $594bn in 2000, it is more than double what Mr Culp inherited. Business-school students have spent decades dissecting the hubristic acquisitions that defined GE’s life. Now they must heed the lessons from its final act.
由于乘势而为,无疑对GE大有裨益。自新冠疫情结束以来,对喷气发动机的需求有所增加,而清洁能源项目也受益于美国政府的资助。美国股市的牛市情绪肯定也有助于分离过程。但卡普尔先生也值得赞扬。他的任期反映了不仅是专注战胜了扩张,还展现了在一个长期遭受过度金融工程影响的公司中的运营卓越。
The fact that the wind is at GE’s back has undoubtedly helped. Demand for jet engines has picked up since the covid-19 pandemic ended and clean-energy projects are benefiting from government handouts in America. The bullish mood of America’s stockmarket has surely eased the separation process, too. But Mr Culp also deserves praise. His tenure reflects not just a victory of focus over sprawl, but also of operational excellence at a firm that long suffered the effects of excessive financial engineering.
一个优势是卡普尔是一位局外人—是第一个担任GE最高职务的局外人。这种转变可能不可能由一位职业人士完成。GE内部人士已经僵化。没有任何东西取代六西格玛,这是由杰克·韦尔奇提倡的用于减少制造错误的系统,他是这家收购潮的老板,早在2001年就退休了。卡普尔带来了他自己的日本式管理哲学。对不断的运营改进的新鲜但狂热的思维方式有助于引进文化变革。让高管们走出办公室进入工厂也起到了作用。
One advantage was that Mr Culp was an outsider—the first ever to take the helm at ge. The turnaround probably could not have been pulled off by a lifer. GE insiders had ossified. Nothing had replaced Six Sigma, a system used to reduce manufacturing errors that was championed by Jack Welch, the firm’s acquisitive boss who retired as long ago as 2001. Mr Culp brought his own Japanese-style management philosophy. The fresh but fanatical approach to continuous operational improvement helped usher in cultural change. So did getting executives onto the factory floor.
新思维意味着GE的资产没有在售卖桌子上荒废,而是在卡普尔的领导下得到改善,并阻止了分拆变成抛售。这个计划在命名上有一种熟悉的味道——电力业务被命名为GE Vernova。但市场正在欢呼GE的继承者,这是引人注目的,鉴于拆分后市场通常让投资者失望。IBM的基础设施服务业务(Kyndryl)和强生的消费保健业务(Kenvue)都未能在公开市场上取得成功。
The new thinking meant that GE’s assets did not languish on the chopping block, but improved on Mr Culp’s watch and stopped the break-up becoming a fire sale. The programme has a familiar taste for fanciful names—the power business has been christened GE Vernova. But the markets are cheering on ge’s heirs, which is striking given that spin-offs often disappoint investors. IBM’s infrastructure-services business (Kyndryl) and Johnson & Johnson’s consumer health-care operation (Kenvue) have both failed to shine in the public markets.
因此,卡普尔的成功证明了平稳运作者的正确,而不是寻求摆脱问题资产或寻求企业集团折扣的激进对冲基金的公司。准备剥离自己公司分部的老板们,包括联合利华在内的公司,将密切研究他。但也有更广泛的教训。迪斯尼最近在针对尼尔森·佩尔兹的代理人斗争中取得了胜利,后者曾经向GE游说进行变革,只是美国一家蓝筹公司,可能会从新思维中受益。
Mr Culp’s success, then, is vindication for smooth operators, not firms looking to ditch problem assets or activist hedge funds in search of conglomerate discounts. Bosses preparing to lop off divisions of their own firms, including those at Unilever, will study him closely. But there are broader lessons, too. Disney, which recently prevailed in a proxy fight against Nelson Peltz, a noisy shareholder who once lobbied for change at gE, is just one American blue-chip firm that might benefit from fresh thinking.
这些教训对波音公司可能最为合适,它是腐朽企业文化的案例研究。今年三月,波音的老板辞职,之后两个月,其737 MAX飞机中的机身板爆裂。一些人建议卡普尔接任该职务,这将是对他运营技能的严峻考验。三月份,波音证实正在讨论收购Spirit AeroSystems,这是一家之前被剥离的不令人满意的供应商。卡普尔表示很高兴管理GE航空航天,这是波音的供应商之一。但如果他在成功管理一家公司的同时进行其拆分,也许他也能在重新组建一家公司时取得成功。■
The lessons may be most apt for Boeing, a case study for rotten corporate culture. In March its boss resigned, two months after the blowout of a fuselage panel from one of its 737 MAX planes. Some have suggested Mr Culp for the job, which would be a severe test of his operational prowess. In March Boeing confirmed that it was in discussions to acquire Spirit AeroSystems, an unsatisfactory supplier it had previously spun off. Mr Culp says he is happy running GE Aerospace, one of Boeing’s suppliers. But if he can manage a business well while pulling it apart, perhaps he could also thrive at putting one back together again. ■
美国 | 对我来说现在像一个梦 (United States | Like a dream to me now)
拜登在密歇根的竞选活动拥有巨大的地面优势 (The Biden campaign in Michigan has a tremendous ground-game advantage)
但民主党是否有足够统一的信息? (But does the Democratic Party have a sufficiently unified message?)
站在Ypsilanti镇安娜堡东南边的一家商店前,密歇根州的国会议员黛比·丁格尔向几十名民主党党员们传达了坏消息。“在2016年我说唐纳德·特朗普可能会赢得选举时,你们没有一个人相信我。”她说。“太多人不知道为什么我们必须选举乔·拜登。我们没有谈论他过去四年的成就。”然后,她列举了六个理由,说明拜登先生的连任至关重要,首当其中包括环境、妇女生殖权、经济、医疗保健,最后,唐纳德·特朗普如何以暴力言论“撕裂美国人”。她总结道:“现在比以往任何时候都更重要地投票了。”“地雷战场就在这里,就在此时。”
Standing in front of a few dozen Democratic Party members in a shopfront in Ypsilanti, a town just south-east of Ann Arbor, Debbie Dingell, a congresswoman from Michigan, delivers the bad news. “None of you believed me in 2016 when I said that Donald Trump could win,” she says. “Too many people don’t know why we gotta elect Joe Biden. We aren’t talking about what he’s gotten done the last four years.” She then goes on to list half a dozen reasons why Mr Biden’s re-election is crucial, starting with the environment, women’s reproductive rights, the economy, health care and then finally, how Donald Trump is “splitting Americans apart” with his violent rhetoric. “It’s more important now than it’s ever been to turn out the votes,” she concludes. “Ground Zero is right here right now.”
丁格尔女士是在拜登先生竞选办公室开幕式上讲话,这是拜登竞选团队即将在整个“狼獾之州”开设的30个竞选办公室之一,这个在过去两届总统选举中都扮演关键转折角色的州。2016年,特朗普仅以0.3%的优势赢得了密歇根州。2020年,拜登先生以2.8%的优势将其重新纳入民主党的阵营。州内的民主党官员们确信他们今年可以重拾这个技巧,并将2017年以来建立的显著竞选机器作为证据。“我们一直在组织并与选民交谈。”民主党主席拉沃拉·巴恩斯说道。不过,丁格尔女士的警告也是很有道理的。因此,密歇根是观察拜登先生竞选活动脉搏的好地方。总统正在按照传统模式竞选,而特朗普先生的选举方式则依然不拘一格。
Ms Dingell was speaking at the opening of one of 30 campaign offices that Mr Biden’s campaign will soon have operating across the Wolverine State, a decisive swing state during the past two presidential elections. In 2016 Mr Trump won Michigan with a margin of just 0.3%. In 2020 Mr Biden took it back for the Democrats by 2.8%. State Democratic officials are confident that they can repeat the trick this year, and they cite a remarkable campaigning machine built since 2017 as evidence. “We are organising and talking to voters all the time,” says Lavora Barnes, the Democratic chairwoman. But Ms Dingell’s warning rings true too. Michigan is thus a good place to take the pulse of Mr Biden’s campaign. The president is running a traditional playbook, while Mr Trump’s approach to electioneering is as unconventional as ever.
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Stay up to date with our new daily update, The US in brief, and our presidential poll tracker.
阅读更多我们对2024年美国选举的报道。
Read more of our coverage of the US elections of 2024.
巴恩斯女士指出,民主党在组织方面有明显优势。拜登先生的全国竞选委员会筹得1.29亿美元,而特朗普先生的筹款额为9600万美元,资金也在流入密歇根州。除了开设办公室外,民主党正在加紧招聘工作人员。充满活力的20多岁党员们纷纷从全国各地前来参加竞选工作。一大批拥有大量空闲时间的退休者已经准备好分发庭院标识和车贴给他们的邻居们。
Ms Barnes is right that Democrats have a significant organisational advantage over their opponents. Nationwide Mr Biden’s campaign committee has raised $129m to $96m raised by Mr Trump, and the cash is flowing into Michigan. As well as opening offices, the party is hiring staffers at pace. Phenomenally peppy 20-somethings are moving from all over the country to take up campaign jobs. An army of pensioners with lots of free time is already equipped with yard signs and bumper stickers to distribute to their neighbours.
相比之下,特朗普的竞选活动远不如此显眼。4月2日,前总统在大急流市举办了一次规模较小的集会,出席者主要是记者和当地共和党官员。但是竞选活动现在才刚“组建起构建组织的基石”,党主席皮特·胡克斯特拉说。“我们没有计算办公室数量。”当被问及是否已有开设办公室时,他回答说。在过去的大部分时间里,密歇根州的共和党一团糟。今年1月,成员们投票罢免了他们的主席克里斯蒂娜·卡拉摩,她是2020年选举被操纵论的坚定支持者,人们抱怨她管理党派及其财务出现问题。最终,一场诉讼才促使她下台。去年有一次,两位党派官员之间的争吵演变成了一场肢体冲突,一个县主席明显抱怨同僚“踢了我的裆”。
By contrast, Mr Trump’s campaign is far less visible. On April 2nd the former president held a modest rally in Grand Rapids, attended mostly by journalists and local Republican officials. But the campaign is only now “putting in place the building blocks” of its organisation, says Pete Hoekstra, the party chairman. “We are not counting offices,” he says, when asked if any have opened yet. For much of the past year, Michigan Republicans have been in disarray. In January members voted to oust their chair, Kristina Karamo, a vocal proponent of the theory that the 2020 election was rigged, over complaints that she was mismanaging the party and its finances. In the end it took a lawsuit to get her to step down. At one point last year a dispute between two party officials ended in a physical fight, with a county chairman apparently complaining that a fellow activist had “kicked me in my balls”.
然而,地面作战的优势并不能保证拜登会赢得这个州。大部分政治科学的证据表明,走访家门最多能起到一点边缘作用,一般是通过增加投票率。这当然无法替代有说服力的信息。初期的竞选活动表明,民主党可能存在过多要点,并且尚未形成统一的论据。
Yet a ground-game advantage does not guarantee that Mr Biden will win the state. Most evidence from political science suggests that door-knocking has at most a marginal effect, generally by boosting turnout. It certainly cannot replace a persuasive message. The early campaign suggests that Democrats may have too many points to make and have yet to craft a unified argument.
以密歇根州广受欢迎的民主党州长格雷琴·惠特默的讲话要点为例。在底特律西北部的共和党倾向区利文斯顿郡的另一个办公室开幕式上,有人问她预计选举信息将会是什么,一开始她坦率地回答:“一切都围绕经济展开。”但后来她补充道:“我们能够自主决定我们的身体,何时以及是否生育孩子,这是一个女性终身最重要的经济决策。”此外,她继续说,教育和气候变化也很重要,还有“供应链内地化”。她表示,这些事情“都将成为选民关注的核心”。
Take for example the talking points of Gretchen Whitmer, Michigan’s popular Democratic governor. Asked at another office opening, this one in Livingston County, a Republican-leaning suburb north-west of Detroit, what she expects the message of the election to be, at first she replies frankly: “Everything’s about the economy.” But then she adds: “Our ability to make our own decisions about our body, when and whether or not to bear a child, that is the most important economic decision a woman will make over the course of her lifetime.” In addition, she continues, education and climate change matter, as does “onshoring supply chains”. These things, she says, are “all going to be absolutely central to what’s on voters’ minds.”
信息的广泛性反映出民主党在密歇根州面临的挑战,特别是在总统级别。为了击败特朗普,该党需要确保忠诚的民主党人能大量出席,尤其是在底特律和安娜堡这个州的城市据点。这个基础已经相当分裂。其中包括大学生、黑人蓝领工人、白人专业人士、自由老年人和白人工人阶层中更加工会化的成员。利文斯顿的一些老年活动人士在没有被提示的情况下提到,他们对数字化竞选持鄙视态度,认为这不会说服任何新人。相比之下,年轻选民深谙网络使用。“我真的认为现在有更多的人基于Instagram和TikTok来形成自己的信念,”密歇根州学生民主党组织主席雅各布·韦尔奇说。他担心拜登对以色列在加沙的支持正在使年轻选民远离。
The breadth of the message reflects the challenge Democrats face in Michigan, particularly at presidential level. To beat Mr Trump, the party needs to make sure that committed Democrats turn out in large numbers, particularly in the state’s urban strongholds in Detroit and Ann Arbor. Already that base is rather divided. It includes college students, black blue-collar workers, white professionals, the liberal elderly and the more unionised of the white working class. A few older activists in Livingston mentioned unprompted their disdain for digital campaigning, arguing that it doesn’t persuade anyone new. By contrast, young voters are deeply online. “I really think that a lot more people now get their beliefs based off of, like, Instagram and TikTok,” says Jacob Welch, the president of Michigan’s College Democrats organisation. He worries that Mr Biden’s support for Israel in Gaza is putting young voters off.
联合群众最重要的是,正如韦尔奇先生所说,他们都“鄙视唐纳德·特朗普”。但是该党还需要争取至少一些可能被他所诱惑的人选。巴恩斯女士表示,希拉里·克林顿在2016年输掉该州的原因之一是她优先确保坚定的民主党人参加投票,而忽视了试图说服摇摆不定的人。她说:“当时有很多关注只是动员,”特别是在大城市。“现在他们正在试图触及民主党通常不接触的地区,”因此在利文斯顿等地开设办事处。“我认为过去曾投票支持共和党的很多正直、理性的人,”她说。
What unites the base most is, as Mr Welch puts it, that they all “despise Donald Trump”. But the party also needs to win over at least a few people who might be tempted to vote for him. Ms Barnes says that one of the reasons Hillary Clinton lost the state in 2016 was that she prioritised making sure solid Democrats turned out to vote, and neglected trying to persuade people on the fence. “There was a lot of focus on just turnout,” particularly in big cities, she says. Now they are trying to reach areas Democrats don’t usually touch—hence the opening of offices in places like Livingston. “I think that there are a lot of fair-minded, thoughtful folks who have voted Republican in the past,” she says.
复杂的是,这些选民可能需要不同的信息,有时候它们可能会相互冲突。拜登先生需要诱导的选民也是多元的。他们包括更富裕、更社会自由的郊区共和党人,但也包括蓝领工人。杰奎布·希利克,密歇根州的劳工国际北美分部代表,该工会代表主要是建筑行业的工人,已经支持了拜登先生,他表示,拜登先生对于他的工会成员的说词是,“他无非就是像从来没有人那样创造就业机会。” 当被问及文化战争议题的吸引力时,比如堕胎或试管受孕,他回避了。“我对堕胎权、枪支、密歇根州打猎权有我的个人看法,”他说,没有具体说明这些看法。“我们在这里是为了争取就业机会。”
The tricky thing is that those voters may require different messages, and sometimes they pull across each other. The voters Mr Biden needs to tempt away are also a diverse mix. They include wealthier, more socially liberal suburban Republicans but also blue-collar workers. Jacob Hilliker, the Michigan representative for LiUNA, a large trade union that represents mostly workers in the construction trade, and which has endorsed Mr Biden, says the case for Mr Biden for his union members is that “he’s done nothing but make it rain jobs like nobody has before”. When asked about the appeal of culture-war issues, such as abortion or IVF, he demurs. “I have my personal views on abortion rights, guns, the right to hunt in Michigan,” he says, without specifying what they are. “We are here to fight for jobs.”
相比之下,特朗普的信息简单却粗糙。“你正处于一次入侵之中,”他在大急流城的听众面前说。 在一群警长和两台电视屏幕旁边展示边境越境图的支持下,他辩称,乔·拜登正让“犯罪‘非法移民’”和无用的中国电动汽车淹没密歇根州。(他说委内瑞拉的犯罪率有所下降,这是事实,但他提出的原因是因为很多坏人被送往美国,这是虚假的。)为了解决这一问题,他建议向墨西哥征收巨额的贸易关税,阻止中国公司在那里生产汽车,并且“开始我国历史上最大规模的国内驱逐行动”。另外,他还表示,他会给被控违法的警官完全的免责权。
Mr Trump’s message, by contrast, is crude but simple. “You’re under an invasion,” he told his audience in Grand Rapids. Flanked by a gaggle of sheriffs, and two television screens showing a chart of border crossings, he argued that Joe Biden is letting criminal “illegal aliens” and useless Chinese electric cars flood into Michigan. (He said the crime rate in Venezuela has fallen, which is true, and suggested it is because so many wrong-uns have been sent to America, which is not.) To fix this, he proposes to whack monstrous trade tariffs on Mexico, to stop Chinese firms building cars there, and to “begin the largest domestic deportation operation in the history of our country”. For good measure he also added that he would give police officers accused of wrongdoing complete immunity from litigation.
联合汽车工人工会领袖肖恩·芬表示,特朗普“就像是争取班上同学会主席的三年级生,他想要给每个人一个免费的糖果机。” 他指出,当工会去年举行罢工时,拜登前来拜访了他们,而作为总统的特朗普在2019年则回避了罢工。但即使是芬先生也承认有时他不得不努力说服他的成员。“你可以宣称你支持特朗普或任何他想要的理由。如果你这么做,随你去吧。我为你感到难过。但归根结底,事实就是事实,”他说。“他就是一个彻头彻尾的骗子。”
Shawn Fain, the leader of the United Auto Workers union, says Mr Trump “is like the third-grader running for class president, you know, he wants to give a free candy machine to everybody in the class.” He points out that when the union went on strike last year, Mr Biden visited them, whereas Mr Trump, as president, shunned a strike in 2019. But even Mr Fain admits he sometimes has to work to persuade his members. “You can claim you love Trump or whatever the hell your reasoning is. And if you do that, so be it. I feel for you. But at the end of the day, facts are facts,” he says. “He’s just flat-out a con man.”
拜登先生的最大希望是在接下来的七个月内将所有这些因素结合起来。在利文斯顿县,该县党副主席丹·卢里亚提出了他自己的想法。他说,拜登先生应该“重新定义自由的概念”。自由,他说,将一切联系在一起 —— 从生殖权利到经济。此外,他补充道,你可以展示很多美国国旗。这是拜登竞选团队肯定会遵循的建议之一。 ■
Mr Biden’s best hope is to pull all these strands together over the next seven months. In Livingston County, Dan Luria, the county party vice-chairman, adds his own ideas. Mr Biden, he says, ought to “reappropriate the concept of freedom”. Freedom, he says, ties everything together—from reproductive rights to the economy. Also, he adds, you can put out a lot of American flags. That is one bit of advice the Biden campaign is sure to follow. ■
美国 | 佛罗里达妇女 (United States | Florida woman)
一项堕胎裁决让民主党希望佛罗里达成为竞争目标 (An abortion ruling has Democrats hoping Florida is in play)
但目前这将剥夺南部数百万妇女的进行该程序的权利。 (But for now it will end access to the procedure for millions of women in the South)
佛罗里达最高法院做出的两项决定在这周引发了“阳光之州”的震撼。第一项决定为明年5月1日开始实行的六周堕胎禁令铺平了道路,将立即对南方数百万妇女产生影响。第二项决定批准了一项修宪倡议,旨在保护堕胎,可能会更具有重要意义。11月的全民公投将让佛罗里达居民决定该州的堕胎政策。
Two decisions by Florida’s Supreme Court shook up the Sunshine State this week. The first, which paves the way for a six-week abortion ban to start on May 1st, will have immediate consequences for millions of women in the South. The second, which approved a ballot initiative that would amend Florida’s constitution to protect abortion, could prove even more significant. A referendum in November will allow Floridians to have a decisive say on the state’s abortion policy.
法院的第一项决定实际上维护了州议会通过并由佛罗里达共和党州长罗恩·德桑蒂斯签署的六周堕胎禁令。只允许在该期限之后有限的例外情况,使佛罗里达成为全国最为严格的州之一。允许堕胎进入选票的决定是基于一个积极的民间运动,收集了超过100万签名(据称其中15万为注册共和党人)。这两项裁决使得民主党人相信他们现在可能有机会在11月的总统选举中赢得该州。
The court’s first decision in effect upholds a six-week ban passed by the state legislature and signed by Florida’s Republican governor, Ron DeSantis, last year. Only limited exceptions beyond that period are allowed, making Florida one of the most restrictive states in the land. The decision to allow abortion onto the ballot follows an energetic grassroots campaign that collected over 1m signatures (reportedly 150,000 of them registered Republicans). The two rulings have left Democrats believing that they now may have a shot at winning the state in November’s presidential election.
就六周禁令的影响是严重的。2023年,佛罗里达贡献了美国堕胎总数的约1/12,超过86,000起。由于该州已经成为邻近州实行更严格规定的妇女的目的地,这一裁决也将伤害到她们。佛罗里达是在推翻Roe v Wade判决后Dobbs判决后堕胎增加最为显著的州之一。该州禁令将在南部几乎中断所有堕胎的途径。
The implications of the six-week ban are serious. Florida accounted for about one in 12 abortions in America in 2023—a total of more than 86,000. And because the state has become a destination for women from neighbouring states with stricter rules, the ruling will hurt them too. Florida was one of the states that saw the greatest increase in abortions following the Dobbs ruling that overturned Roe v Wade. The state’s ban will cut off nearly all access to abortion in the South.
那些妇女将需要去其他地方寻求超过六周的终止怀孕,而很多人在该时段甚至还不知道自己怀孕了。一些人将试图通过邮购获取堕胎药物。尽管在佛罗里达的禁令之下是违法的,这些药物却越来越容易获得。其他妇女将不得不远行寻找堕胎服务。没有一个州有足够大来弥补这一差距。
Those women will need to go elsewhere for terminations beyond six weeks, a point at which many do not even know they are pregnant. Some will try to get their hands on abortion pills by post. Although unlawful under Florida’s ban, such pills are increasingly available. Other women will have to travel long distances for an abortion. No single state is big enough to make up the difference.
然而从长远来看,禁令的极端可能会出人意料地有助于寻求堕胎的妇女。这是因为法院允许佛罗里达人对堕胎权利进行投票,直到胎儿能存活(通常在23-24周)。如果超过60%的选民支持这一修正案,六周禁令将被推翻。
Yet in the longer term, the extremity of the ban could, perversely, help women who are seeking abortions. This is because of the court’s decision to allow Floridians to vote on a constitutional right to abortion until viability (typically 23-24 weeks). If over 60% of voters support the amendment, the six-week ban would be overturned.
自Dobbs判决以来,全美各地都出现了这类选票倡议。在迄今为止举行的六次全民公投中,选民们都选择了保护堕胎权利。全国十几个州的堕胎权利倡导者现在正试图在11月份的选举中将这个问题放在选票上。全国各地的民主党人希望这些全民公投能够动员那些可能并没有感到激励要为乔·拜登投票的选民。
Such ballot initiatives have sprung up around America since the Dobbs decision. In all six referendums held so far, voters have chosen to protect abortion. Abortion-rights advocates in a dozen states are now trying to place the issue on the ballot in November. Democrats across the country hope these referendums will mobilise voters who otherwise may not have felt inspired to get out and vote for Joe Biden.
在佛罗里达,这看起来像是个不错的赌注。大多数佛罗里达人,包括60%的共和党人,反对六周堕胎禁令,并且现在将有机会阻止它。(第二项也被法院允许放在选票上的关于大麻娱乐使用的全民公投,也肯定会动员一些选民。)
In Florida, that looks like a decent bet. Most Floridians, including 60% of Republicans, oppose a six-week abortion ban, and will now have an opportunity to stop it. (A second referendum, also allowed on to the ballot by the state court, on the recreational use of marijuana, is also bound to mobilise some voters.)
无论该潜在的动员是否足以为拜登赢得该州是另一回事。佛罗里达民主党党主席妮基·弗里德认为该州重新成为有争议的地区。“一切都悬而未决,”她说。她预测“我们在佛罗里达州自奥巴马以来从未见过的基层活动”。
Whether this potential mobilisation of otherwise stay-at-home voters will prove sufficient to swing the state for Mr Biden is another matter. Nikki Fried, chair of the Florida Democratic Party, thinks that the state is back in play. “Everything is on the line,” she says. She predicts “a ground game that we really haven’t seen in the state of Florida since Obama.”
民调显然有利于民主党人:最近有81%的美国人告诉Ipsos/Axios的民调说,堕胎应该由妇女和她的医生管理,而非政府。然而,民调人员和政治学家警告说,民主党人可能需要做现实检查。近年来,该党在佛罗里达已经失去了很多注册选民,这种转变帮助德桑蒂斯在2022年以20个百分点的压倒性优势获胜。
The polls are certainly on Democrats’ side: 81% of Americans recently told an Ipsos/Axios poll that abortion should be managed between a woman and her doctor, not the government. And yet pollsters and political scientists warn that the Democrats may need a reality check. The party has haemorrhaged registered voters in Florida in recent years, a shift that helped Mr DeSantis win by a 20-point landslide in 2022.
“这不仅仅是拜登能否赢得佛罗里达的问题,”位于中佛罗里达大学的政治学家奥布雷·朱埃特说。即使有堕胎权利的全民公投,这仍然会非常困难,他认为。但比起一个星期前,比赛看起来更具竞争性一些。■
“This is not just about whether Biden can win Florida,” says Aubrey Jewett, a political scientist at the University of Central Florida. Even with the abortion-rights referendum, that will be very hard, he reckons. But the race looks more competitive than it was a week ago. ■
美国 | 婚姻 (United States | Marriage)
远程丈夫的崛起 (The rise of the remote husband)
她外出工作,他留在家里(并上网)。 (She goes out to work, he stays at home (and logs on))
在加州富裕且沙滩风情的橘郡城市科斯塔梅萨,她正在努力晋升成为一家大型律所当地办公室的合伙人;而他是一家总部位于湾区的科技初创公司的高管,距离有400多英里。在马萨诸塞州的剑桥,他在他们校园附近的公寓里写代码,而她则在哈佛法学院上课。她是一名产科医生,他远程为一家科技公司工作;她是一名常春藤名校的学者,而他则为一家加密公司工作。在全国各地,在富裕且受过良好教育的群体中,一种新趋势似乎正在兴起。当妻子早上出门去她们的办公室、教室或医院时,她们在向留在家里的丈夫挥手告别。
In costa mesa, a city in California’s wealthy, beachy Orange County, she is working her way up to becoming a partner in the local office of a major law firm; he is an executive at a tech startup based in the Bay Area, more than 400 miles away. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, he is writing code from their apartment just off-campus, while she attends her classes at Harvard Law School. She is an obstetrician, he works remotely for a tech company; she is an academic at an Ivy League university, he works for a crypto company. All over the country, among the well-heeled and well-educated, a new trend appears to be emerging. When the wives head out in the morning, to their offices, classrooms or hospitals, they are waving goodbye to their husbands, who remain at home.
这绝非上世纪五十年代性别颠倒的复活。毕竟,男性仍在工作,主要不是做饭、打扫和照顾孩子。但这确实反映出了远程工作兴起的一个被人忽视的影响:远程丈夫的兴起。
This is hardly a gender-swapped 1950s revival. The men are still working, after all, not predominantly cooking, cleaning and caring for children. But it does reflect an underappreciated effect of the rise of remote work: the rise of the remote husband.
男性和女性依然专注于不同类型的工作。计算机科学和工程等行业的工作主要由男性从事。而教学和护理工作则由女性主导。类似法律和医学等职业可能仍雇佣更多男性,但趋势逐渐改变:法学院和医学院的注册学生中,女性多于男性。因此,在年轻夫妇中,她可能更有可能成为律师或医生,而不是他。
Men and women still specialise in different kinds of work. Jobs in industries like computer science and engineering are disproportionately performed by men. Teaching and nursing jobs are dominated by women. Professions like law and medicine may still employ more men than women, but the scales are tipping: more women than men are enrolled in law school and medical school. As such, among young couples, she is probably more likely to be going to be a lawyer or a doctor than he is.
不同职业也不得不采取不同的远程工作方式。少数医疗保健专业人士可能能够通过接受远程医疗工作远程工作,但绝大多数必须当面诊治患者。律师可能会被执照和专业绑定到特定州或地区。与此同时,报告显示具有最高远程工作灵活性的行业是编程和技术、建筑、工程和商业工作。大约一半从事计算机或数学工作的人全职远程工作。
Different occupations have also had to take different approaches to remote working. A minority of medical professionals may be able to work remotely, by taking telehealth jobs, but the vast majority have to treat their patients in person. Lawyers may be tied to a specific state or area by their licence and speciality. Meanwhile, the industries which reported the highest level of remote-work flexibility are coding and technology, architecture, engineering and business jobs. About half of people working in computer or mathematical jobs work remotely full-time.
总的来说,男性更容易在任何地方工作。咨询公司麦肯锡进行的一项调查发现,38%的男性有全职远程工作的选择,而女性为30%。大约一半的女性报告称根本无法远程工作,而男性为39%。
The upshot is that, in aggregate, it is easier for men to work from wherever they please. A survey carried out by McKinsey, a consultancy, found that 38% of working men had the option to work remotely full-time, compared with 30% of women. Roughly half of women report being unable to work remotely at all, compared with 39% of men.
这也许听起来又是一种女性处于不利地位的方式。但这种观点是短视的。夫妻为了生活共同运转,在各个方面都做出妥协。如果她被提升的条件是搬到芝加哥,他如果工作与纽约有关可能会不得不放弃。其中任何一方的地理解放都能让另一方向职业阶梯攀登。科斯塔梅萨的夫妇选择了那个地区是因为对她的工作方便,也便于接触那里孩子的祖父母,他们现在经常招待这些小孩。
This may sound like yet another way in which women have ended up with the short end of the stick. But that view is myopic. Couples compromise in all kinds of ways for their lives to work together. If she is offered a big promotion, conditional on moving to Chicago, she may have to turn it down if his job is tied to New York. The geographical liberation of either partner makes it possible for the other to ascend the corporate ladder. The Costa Mesa couple picked that area because it was convenient for her job—and for access to their children’s grandparents, who now regularly entertain the little ones.
诺贝尔奖得主克劳迪娅·戈尔丁曾写过,远程工作可能对女性有利。在过去两个世纪,女性就业劳动力的参与率在能在家里进行有偿工作时最高。她还发现,在灵活工作是常规的领域,性别工资差距最小。但对女性有利的不仅仅是她们所从事工作的灵活性。■
Claudia Goldin, a Nobel laureate, has written about how remote work may be a boon for women. Over the past 200 years women’s participation in the labour force has been highest when it has been possible to perform paid work from home. She has also found that gender wage gaps are tightest in fields where flexible working is the norm. But it is not only flexibility in the work that women do that may be to their advantage. ■
美国 | 药物依赖 (United States | Drug-dependent)
乔·拜登对900美元抗儿童湿疹霜的攻击 (Joe Biden’s assault on the $900 child-eczema cream)
通胀缓解法案对医疗保健成本意味着什么 (What the Inflation Reduction Act means for the cost of health care)
在美国购买处方药有点像在街市讨价还价的游客。首先,会提到一个荒谬的“零售价格”(最近您的通讯记者花了$902买了一种治疗儿童湿疹的面霜)。然后会使用保险,然后再添加一层折扣券(药剂师通常会打印出来,然后递给他们自己)、折扣卡和退款要求。然而尽管这一切,根据国际标准来看,您自己掏钱支付的金额仍然相当高(这款面霜最终花了$273)。
BUYING PRESCRIPTION drugs in America can feel a bit like being a tourist haggling at a street market. First, a ludicrous “retail price” is mentioned (for your correspondent recently, $902 for eczema cream for a child). Then insurance is applied, followed by a layering-on of coupons (often printed by the pharmacist and then handed to themselves), discount cards and rebate claims. And yet even after all that, the amount of cash you pay out of pocket is still steep by international standards (the cream ended up costing $273).
美国人对很少几件事情能达成一致,但降低药品价格是美国政治中最受欢迎的政策立场之一,与支持社保齐名。九成美国人表示这应该是国会的重要或首要任务。乔·拜登在他的国情咨文中花了整整三分钟谈论这个话题。然而,只有四分之一的人表示他们知道他通过2022年的通胀削减法案(IRA)试图降低药品价格。这是他需要纠正的事情。
Americans agree on few things, but lowering the price they pay for medication is the most popular policy position in American politics, tied with support for Social Security. Nine in ten say this should be an important or top priority for Congress. In his state-of-the-union message Joe Biden spent a full three minutes on the topic. Yet only one in four say they are aware of his attempts through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 to reduce prices. This is something he needs to rectify.
至少与法律的直接影响同样有趣的是间接影响。据健康研究组织彼得森KFF称,美国人均处方药支出是相似国家的两倍。这种支出被没有竞争对手的品牌药物(所谓的非通用药)所扭曲。这些药物占处方药的10%,但占支出的80%。考虑通货膨胀,自1960年以来,处方药支出从每人$101增加到了2021年的$1,147。
At least as interesting as the direct impact of the law is the question of what the indirect ones might be. Americans spend twice as much on prescription medication per person as comparable countries, according to Peterson-KFF, a health-research group. This spending is skewed by branded drugs with no competitors, so-called non-generic drugs. These make up 10% of prescription drugs but 80% of spending. Adjusted for inflation, spending on prescription drugs has increased from $101 per person in 1960 to $1,147 in 2021.
IRA实际上主要是一项与气候变化和产业政策有关的法律,但确实包含了一些旨在降低价格的规定(尽管不是短期内)。其中一个在政治上很重要的规定涉及到了对老年人的公共医疗保险Medicare,覆盖了5000万人的处方药。IRA授权了Medicare管理员与制药商进行谈判(或者可能是命令),而他们长期以来一直被禁止这样做。
The IRA, which was mainly a climate-change and industrial-policy law, did actually have some provisions designed to bring down prices (although not in the short term). One politically important one relates to Medicare, the public-health insurer for the elderly which covers prescription drugs for 50m people. The IRA empowered Medicare administrators to negotiate with (or maybe dictate to) drugmakers, which they had long been forbidden to do.
这应该最终会降低消费者的支付价格。在短期内,IRA还设定了一些处方药支出上的上限。最先感受到这些措施影响的是那些需要胰岛素的糖尿病患者,而美国人支付的价格是欧洲人的好几倍。每个胰岛素处方药每月的国家自付上限为$35,这意味着自2023年1月以来,数百万名参与了Medicare计划的人现在支付更少。
This should eventually reduce the price consumers pay. In the near term, the IRA also capped some out-of-pocket drug costs. The first to feel the effects of these measures are people with diabetes who need insulin, a drug for which Americans pay several times what Europeans pay. A national out-of-pocket cap of $35 per insulin prescription per month has meant that, since January 2023, millions enrolled in Medicare now pay less.
另一个明显的结果是每年自付费用上的上限。来自亚利桑那州、患有心脏病的77岁的道格·哈特,之前每年大约花费$7000用于处方药。根据新的法律,即使这个限制正在逐渐实施,今年他只需要自付前$3300的费用,之后Medicare会负担剩下的费用。明年,这个上限将降至$2000。 “在我看来,拜登在帮我省下了$5000的药费,我可以去芝加哥看我的孙子们了,”他说。
Another tangible result is an annual cap on out-of-pocket spending. Doug Hart, a 77-year-old from Arizona with heart disease, previously spent about $7,000 per year on prescription medication. Under the new cap, which is being phased in, he will be on the hook for only the first $3,300 this year, before Medicare foots the rest of the bill. From next year, the cap will be lowered to $2,000. “The way I see it, Biden is saving me $5,000 in out-of-pocket drug costs [and] I can go and see my grandkids in Chicago instead,” he says.
这些措施相对较容易实施,因为无论如何,制药行业都对它们表示欢迎:它们降低了药物的价格,让消费者更便宜,而政府则承担差额。但是拜登的法律也授权了Medicare与制造商直接谈判药品价格,并对那些价格高于通货膨胀的公司进行处罚。然而,这部分遭到了更多行业的敌意,他们认为这会抑制创新。然而正是这部分将有助于纳税人:没有这一点,消费者的价格上限只会将高昂的药费转移到政府身上。拜登声称由于这些谈判,他已经帮助美国纳税人节省了1600亿美元,这是误导性的,因为它依赖于对未来政府节约的预测。
These measures have been relatively easy to implement because, if anything, the pharma industry welcomes them: they make drugs cheaper for consumers while the government picks up the difference. But Mr Biden’s law also gives Medicare a mandate to negotiate drug prices directly with manufacturers and penalises those that raise prices above inflation. This has met with more hostility from the industry, which argues that it will crimp innovation. Yet it is this part that will make a difference for taxpayers: without it, the price caps for consumers will just push high drug bills on to the government. Mr Biden’s claim that he has already saved American taxpayers $160bn thanks to these negotiations is misleading, because it relies on projections of future government savings.
政府和大型制药公司之间的谈判正在幕后进行。药品公司急于向股东保证,政府的提议并没有人们想象中的那么离谱。但与此同时,他们也提起了几起诉讼质疑该法规。无论如何,负责管理Medicare的联邦机构将在今年9月之前发布头十种经谈判达成的药品的“最大公平价格”清单,目的是在2026年之前引入这些折扣。在2018年至2022年间,Medicare对这十种药的支出翻了一番有余。
Negotiations between the government and Big Pharma are under way behind closed doors. Drug companies are keen to reassure shareholders that the government’s proposals are not as outlandish as feared. Yet at the same time they have filed several lawsuits challenging the legislation. One way or another, the federal agency that administers Medicare will publish a list of the “maximum fair price” for each of the first ten negotiated drugs by this September, with the intention of introducing these discounts by 2026. Medicare spending on these ten drugs more than doubled between 2018 and 2022.
还有一个问题是IRA的连锁效应。拜登表示他将努力扩大药品谈判的范围,并将$2000的自付上限扩展到拥有私人保险的人。一旦Medicare支付昂贵药品的价格被公布,这可能会增加私人保险公司的议价能力。“现在政府拥有了这些新工具,就有了超越[IRA]的巨大机遇,”智库布鲁金斯学会的理查德·弗兰克说。“如果突然可以在药品生命周期的早期达成更多药品价格的谈判,或者这些价格适用于整个私人市场,那么突然之间这就不再是渐进式变革 — 这就是一场革命性的变革,”智库AEI的贝内迪克·伊波利托说。
There is also the question of what the knock-on effects of the IRA will be. Mr Biden has said he will try both to increase the number of drugs subject to negotiation and expand the $2,000 out-of-pocket cap to people with private insurance. Once the prices that Medicare pays for expensive drugs are published, this might increase the bargaining power of private insurers too. “Now that the government has these new tools, there are huge opportunities to go beyond [the IRA],” says Richard Frank of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank. “If you can suddenly negotiate more drug prices, earlier in their life cycle, or these prices apply to the entire private market, then suddenly this is not an incremental change—this is a sea change,” says Benedic Ippolito at AEI, another think-tank.
总统竞选团队将希望在9月人们注意到新的降价Medicare药品价格 —— 正好是选举之际。但另一种情况也同样可能发生:特朗普先生获胜并声称要为拜登先生的成就负责,因为实际上价格的降低要到2026年才会生效。那将是最特朗普式的举动。不管怎样,患者都应该受益。 ■
The president’s campaign team will be hoping that enough people notice the new, reduced Medicare drug prices in September—just in time for the election. But another scenario is just as likely: Mr Trump wins and claims credit for Mr Biden’s achievement, because the price reductions would not actually come into force until 2026. That would be the Trumpiest move. Either way, patients should benefit. ■
美国 | 挣扎的州 (United States | The struggling state)
加利福尼亚深陷经济问题,没有简单的解决方案 (California is gripped by economic problems, with no easy fix)
不断上升的失业率、不断增长的赤字和持续的人口外流是一个痛苦的三重困境。 (Rising unemployment, a growing deficit and persistent outmigration are a painful trinity)
加州是许多美国最进步政策的发源地,从刑事司法到车辆排放,它在右翼政治家眼中扮演着一个独特的角色。每隔几年,宣称加州是一个失败的州,或者加州梦正在变成噩梦,成为潮流。这种言论往往言过其实:在经济实力方面,加州仍然是美国最强大的州。但尽管持续在创新方面表现出色(尤其是在人工智能领域),加州似乎再次进入了周期性的困境。
HOME TO MANY of America’s most progressive policies, from criminal justice to vehicle emissions, California serves a unique role as a punchbag for right-wing politicians. Every few years it becomes fashionable to declare that it is a failed state, or that the California dream is turning into a nightmare. This rhetoric is often overblown: in terms of pure economic heft California remains the most powerful American state. But for all its continuing prowess in innovation (not least in artificial intelligence), California again appears to be entering one of its periodic rough patches.
该州面临着三大重叠挑战:失业率上升、财政压力增加以及人口外流。这些问题随着时间的推移都将有所缓解,但目前它们标志着加州在本来强劲的美国经济中处于相对薄弱的地位。
The state faces three overlapping challenges: rising unemployment, growing fiscal strains and population outflows. All of these should abate over time, but for now they mark out California as a pocket of relative weakness in an otherwise robust American economy.
当联邦储备委员会在2022年上调利率以遏制通胀时,许多分析师和投资者担心这种货币紧缩会导致经济衰退。然而,整体经济表现出人们意想不到的韧性。全国失业率仍然低于4%,接近60年来的最低点。相比之下,加州的失业率已经飙升至5.3%,是任何州中最高的(见图表)。
When the Federal Reserve jacked up interest rates in 2022 in order to tame inflation, many analysts and investors fretted that this monetary tightening would lead to a recession. Instead, the broader economy has been surprisingly resilient. The national unemployment rate remains less than 4%, within spitting distance of a six-decade low. In California, by contrast, the unemployment rate has shot up to 5.3%, the highest of any state (see chart).
表面上,加州失业率上升的原因并不是坏事:随着新冠大流行的余波逐渐消散,更多人积极寻找工作。在他们找到工作之前,他们会在官方数据中被归为失业者。更深层次的问题在于,加州没有足够的工作岗位。在加州,每个失业者大约有0.8个工作机会,是全国最低的,而在美国其他49个州整体比例为1.6。在招聘网站Indeed上,自新冠大流行前夕以来,加州是仅有几个州之一在工作岗位上出现下降的州。在利率长期偏低的情况下大举招聘的科技公司目前正在裁员。硅谷的规模调整已经渗透到加州经济的其他部分,包括交通、金融和制造公司都在裁减员工。
On its surface the reason for the rise in joblessness in California is no bad thing: as the aftershocks of the covid pandemic fade away, more people are actively seeking jobs. Until they find work, they show up in official data as unemployed. The deeper problem is that the state does not have enough work for them. In California there are roughly 0.8 job openings per unemployed person—the lowest in the country—whereas in America’s other 49 states the overall ratio is 1.6. On Indeed, a recruitment website, California is one of only a handful of states to have suffered a decline in job postings since the eve of the pandemic. Tech firms, which had hired aggressively during the long period of low interest rates, are now retrenching. Silicon Valley’s downsizing has seeped into other parts of the Californian economy, with transport, financial and manufacturing companies all shedding workers.
加州立法分析办公室(LAO),加州议会的一个无党派财政顾问,在去年秋天指出失业率上升可能是州内衰退信号。LAO的判断很重要,因为它关注的是州的财政状况,这一状况看起来非常糟糕。去年,加州的所得税收入下降了25%,类似于2007-09年全球金融危机和2000年代初的互联网泡沫破裂期间的下降。
The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), a nonpartisan fiscal adviser for California’s legislature, last autumn pointed to the rise in unemployment as a potential signal of a recession in the state. The LAO’s judgment matters because it focuses on the state’s fiscal picture, which appears to be badly frayed. Last year California’s income-tax collection tumbled by 25%, similar to falls during the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the dotcom bust of the early 2000s.
财政困难仍在持续。加州州长加文·纽森在新财政年度预算中预计,加州的赤字将达到380亿美元。但LAO估计实际上它的赤字可能达到730亿美元。其中约一半的差异来自稍微不同的计算方法,但无论如何,加州宪法要求平衡预算,它必须找到一种方法来弥补其财政漏洞。
Weakness has persisted. In his budget for the new fiscal year, which begins on July 1st, Gavin Newsom, California’s governor, projected that the state’s deficit would hit $38bn. But the LAO estimates that it is instead on track to hit $73bn. A slightly different methodology accounts for roughly half of that discrepancy, but however the numbers are sliced, California’s constitution requires a balanced budget and it must find a way to close its fiscal hole.
过去十年间加州已经建立了一个紧急储备基金,但纽森提出的预算方案将动用其中约一半金额。其他解决方案包括推迟承诺的资金支持,例如大学、无家可归者和残障人士。然而,这只会导致未来短缺加剧,而LAO预测赤字将继续存在。“告诉各方利益相关者资金只是被推迟可能更容易,但事实上许多资金需要被削减,”LAO主管加布里埃尔·佩特克说。
The state has built up a rainy-day fund over the past decade, but Mr Newsom’s proposed budget will draw down roughly half of it. Other solutions have involved deferring promised funding—for universities, the homeless and the disabled. That, however, will only add to shortfalls in the near future, when the LAO projects continued deficits. “It might be easier to tell various stakeholders that the money has just been delayed, but the reality is much of it needs to be eliminated,” says Gabriel Petek, head of the LAO.
至于加州人口外流——第三个担忧——这并不是什么新鲜事。自1990年代初以来,离开加州的加州人通常多于其他美国人。但这种外流的影响变得更加严重。在过去,海外移民多数弥补了国内外流的人口,使得加州的人口继续增长。新冠大流行期间国际来客的减少改变了这种情况。加州连续三年录得人口绝对下降,这是自1850年成为州以来的首次持续下降。
As for the outflow of Californians—the third worry—it is not new. Since the early 1990s Californians moving out have usually outnumbered other Americans moving in. But the impact of this out-migration has become more serious. In the past immigrants from abroad more than made up for the domestic outflows, such that California’s population continued to grow. The slowdown in international arrivals during the covid pandemic changed that dynamic. California has recorded an outright decline in its population for three straight years, the first sustained drop since 1850, the year it became a state.
从财政角度看,这种损害也受到了离开者的财富影响。加州已经失去了越来越多的高收入居民,这一趋势在新冠疫情高峰时加速。2021年,加州净纳税人收入流失了近300亿美元到其他州,大约占其税基的2%。鉴于其对资本利得税作为一个重要但不稳定的税收来源的依赖,富人的离开可能会损害其未来的财政状况。总结这些外流,限制了该州在解决预算问题上的灵活性。提高税收可能是一个可能的解决方案,但这样做可能只会导致更多富有的加州人离开。**
From a fiscal standpoint, the damage has been compounded by the wealth of those leaving. California has lost a steadily growing number of high-earning residents, with the trend accelerating at the height of covid. In 2021 California lost nearly $30bn in net taxpayer income to other states, amounting to about 2% of its tax base. And given its reliance on capital-gains taxes as a big, if volatile, source of revenue, departures of the wealthy may hurt its future fiscal position. Taken together these outflows limit the state’s flexibility in fixing its budget mess. Raising taxes would be one possible solution but doing so may just drive more rich Californians to leave.
根据智囊团Tax Foundation的数据,目前加州居民的总税收负担在全国排名第五。该州税收收入较低的唯一领域——财产,却是如此之低,这是因为1978年通过的一项法律导致房产评估远低于市场价值。这反过来导致加州房屋价格虚高,进一步推动更多人离开该州。
As it stands, the overall tax burden on Californians is the fifth-highest in the country, according to the Tax Foundation, a think-tank. The one area where the state’s tax revenues are low—absurdly so—is on property because of a law, passed by popular vote in 1978, which has led to homes being assessed well below their market value. That in turn contributes to inflated housing prices in California, pushing yet more people away from the state.
值得记住的是,加州曾经历过更严重的问题。在90年代初,受严重衰退影响,100多万加州人移居他州。2000-01年,一个管理严重失误的电力市场(再加上安然公司的腐败)导致了停电。2009年,加州开始向企业、学生和纳税人支付应得款项的借据。加州的失业率往往略高于美国其他地区。这在一定程度上反映了其技术行业的变动,公司迅速扩张,但在艰难时期也会急剧收缩。在加州与经济困境多次擦肩而过的过程中,其以创新为主导的增长模式表现出了惊人的韧性。去年,该州的总产出约占美国总产出的14%,而上世纪90年代末只占12.5%(见图表)。
It is salutary to remember that California has experienced worse. In the early 1990s, reeling from a deep recession, more than 1m Californians left for other states. In 2000-01 a grossly mismanaged electricity market (plus Enron’s corruption) led to blackouts. In 2009 California began paying IOUs to businesses, students and taxpayers to whom it owed money. California’s unemployment rate tends to run a little higher than the rest of America’s. This partly reflects the churn of its tech sector, with firms expanding rapidly but also, when times are tough, pulling back sharply. Throughout California’s many brushes with economic trouble, its innovation-led growth model has been remarkably resilient. The state accounted for about 14% of America’s total output last year, up from 12.5% in the late 1990s (see chart).
“人们总是根据过去的指标来评判我们。因此,他们更多地关注正在减退的方面,而忽视了新兴的方面。”加州州长的高级顾问迪迪·迈尔斯如是说。她指出,加州各地正出现新兴领域的明星:人工智能、量子计算、太空技术、免疫疗法、电动车等。加州根深蒂固的实力包括全国规模最大的高等教育体系、比其他州更多的国家实验室、得益于地理位置成为美国三分之一外贸进出口的门户,还有一个传言中拥有一些非常美丽的海滩和山脉。“我还认为这是加州的文化,经常受到诋毁。所有这些新点子发生在这里并非偶然。”迈尔斯女士说。
“People are always judging us on past metrics. So they’re looking at what’s receding, and not enough at what is emerging,” says Dee Dee Myers, a senior adviser to the governor. She points to rising stars across different parts of the state: AI, quantum computing, space tech, immunotherapy, electric vehicles and more. California’s entrenched strengths include the largest higher-education system in the country, more national laboratories than any other state, a location that makes it the gateway for a third of America’s foreign trade and—rumour has it—some pretty nice beaches and mountains. “I also think it’s the culture of California, which often gets maligned. It’s not an accident that all these new ideas are happening here,” says Ms Myers.
另一个转变正在进行中,更多的加州人口,从而间接影响经济,正向内陆转移。根据研究公司牛津经济学的数据,2016年至2020年间从旧金山和圣何塞这两个最大的湾区城市搬离的人中,前六大热门目的地中有五个在加州内陆,而非其他州。其中两个赢家是萨克拉门托和斯托克顿,距离旧金山不到三小时车程。这使得科技专业知识更广泛传播。“如果你在别处有人才,又不需要在旧金山,为什么要在那里建厂呢?你可以在更廉价的大旧金山地区建厂。”加州大学洛杉矶分校的杰里·尼克尔斯伯格说。
Another transition is under way, with more of California’s population and, by extension, economy shifting inland. Among people who left the two biggest Bay Area cities (San Jose and San Francisco) between 2016 and 2020, five of their six most popular destinations were within California, not to other states, according to Oxford Economics, a research firm. Two of the winners were Sacramento and Stockton in the Central Valley, both less than three hours by car from San Francisco. That is spreading tech expertise more widely. “If you’ve got the talent elsewhere and you don’t need to be in San Francisco, why would you build a factory there? You can build in the greater San Francisco area, where land is much cheaper,” says Jerry Nickelsburg of UCLA.
然而,仅靠内陆移民还不足以解决加州的问题。保守智囊团胡佛研究所最近一篇研究论文计算,仅在截至2021年底的四年间,已有352家公司将总部迁往其他州。报告作者之一李·奥哈纳认为,加州经济将会继续呈现更多相同的情况——稳定的下滑,而非崩溃。“当这种阴险的下降越来越多时,对州政府变得越来越艰难。”他说。“我们已经触碰了无法再通过损害经济来获得更多税收收入的底线。”
Yet the inland migration by itself is not enough to solve California’s problems. A recent research paper by the Hoover Institution, a conservative think-tank, counted 352 firms that had moved their headquarters to other states in the four years to the end of 2021. A bevy of cost factors were, it argued, pushing them out: high taxes, high energy prices and high wages. Lee Ohanian, one of the report’s authors, thinks more of the same—a steady decay, not a crash—is in store for California’s economy. “The more you have this insidious drop, the tougher it becomes for the state government,” he says. “We have hit the wall where we really can’t get any more tax revenue without significantly damaging the economy.”
一个可能彻底改变加州命运的关键点是房产市场。在过去十年中,住房价格在全美范围内变得更加难以负担,但加州仍然以购买力最弱的大州的可耻头衔著称。根据哈佛大学的研究人员,圣何塞的住房购买价格收入比为12,旧金山为11.3,是全国中位数的两倍。根本原因在于缺乏新住房。纽森先生心知肚明,并试图刺激建设。自2017年以来,立法者已通过了100多项相关立法,以便更容易建造住宅。但到目前为止,成效并不理想。建筑许可证数量稳定在每年约11万套住房单位左右,远远不足加州的需求。
One fulcrum that could dramatically alter California’s fortunes is the property market. Housing has become more unaffordable throughout America over the past decade but California continues to claim the dubious crown as the least affordable big state. The price-to-income ratio for buying homes is 12 in San Jose and 11.3 in San Francisco, double the national median, according to researchers at Harvard University. The root cause is a lack of new housing. Mr Newsom is well aware of this and has sought to kick-start construction. Since 2017 lawmakers have passed more than 100 separate pieces of legislation to make it easier to build homes. But the results have been dismal so far. Construction permits have plateaued at about 110,000 housing units per year, far short of what California needs.
相反,房地产行业成为了加州常常因监管问题束手束脚的一个例子。该州已经加快了其众所周知的繁琐的住房环境评估过程,尤其是针对经济实惠的项目。然而,要想从这项条款中受益,企业必须证明他们雇用了薪酬较高的技术工人——这一要求实际上迫使他们聘用工会承包商。开发商亚历克西斯·杰沃尔基安估计,这可能导致成本增加多达40%,将经济适用房变成一个必然亏损的项目。“加速审核本身是没用的,除非你从政府那里获得补贴。”杰沃尔基安先生说。在寻求解决预算赤字的同时,加州可以裁减的项目之一是约10亿美元的经济适用住房资金,包括开发商的补贴。加州不是一个失败的州。但它确实是一个挣扎中的州。 ■
Instead, the property sector stands as an example of how California often ties itself in regulatory knots. The state has sped up its notoriously cumbersome environmental reviews for housing, especially for affordable projects. Yet to benefit from this provision, companies must demonstrate that they are using highly skilled workers at prevailing wages—a requirement that in practice compels them to hire union contractors. Alexis Gevorgian, a developer, calculates that this can increase costs by as much as 40%, turning affordable housing into a guaranteed loss-making venture. “The expedited reviews themselves are useless unless you get a subsidy from the government,” Mr Gevorgian says. One of the things on the chopping block as California looks to close its budget deficit? About $1bn of funding for affordable housing, including subsidies for developers. California is no failed state. But it certainly is a struggling one. ■
美国 | 莱克星顿 (United States | Lexington)
美国进步派让自己变得悲伤吗? (Are American progressives making themselves sad?)
保守派似乎更兴奋于变革 (Conservatives seem more excited about change)
毫无疑问,美国最近在全球快乐排名中下滑的消息几乎没有什么比这更令人意外的了。盖洛普在三月中旬报告称,美国自从2012年开始进行调查以来,首次跌出前20名,一年间从第15位跌至第23位。(是的,让人恼火的是,芬兰连续第七年蝉联榜首)。
Surely few developments could be less surprising than the recent news that America has slipped down the global happiness rankings. Gallup reported in mid-March that America had dropped out of the top 20 for the first time since it started taking its survey in 2012, falling in a year from 15th place to 23rd. (Yes, annoyingly, Finland came out on top, for the seventh straight year.)
虽然美国的经济和技术可能是全球羡慕的对象,但美国人正在变得易怒不高兴,对未来感到焦虑,对从军队到媒体再到有组织宗教等基础性机构感到不安。然而,并非所有人都同样忧伤。众多研究和调查表明,一些群体在追求快乐方面落后于其他群体:银行家比伐木工人更悲伤,未婚者比已婚者更忧郁,十几岁的女孩比少年男孩更伤感。
Their economy and technology may be the envy of the world, but Americans are becoming a dyspeptic bunch, anxious about the future and uneasy about foundational institutions, from the armed forces to the press to organised religion. Yet all are not equally sad. Numerous studies and surveys—Americans are obsessed with this subject—show that some groups tend to lag behind others in the pursuit of happiness: bankers are said to be sadder than lumberjacks, the unmarried sadder than the married, teenage girls sadder than teenage boys.
今天仍然成立的一个区别持续了数十年:自由派比保守派更悲伤。这是政治差异的一种全球性症状,但在美国尤为明显。无论是哪个年龄组或哪个性别,自由派报告被诊断患有心理疾病的可能性也远远高于保守派。
One distinction that holds true today has persisted for decades: liberals are sadder than conservatives. This is a global symptom of political difference, but it is particularly strong in America. Of whatever age group or whichever sex, liberals are also far more likely than conservatives to report having been diagnosed with a mental illness.
在新的盖洛普调查中,自报快乐感在所有年龄组中下降,但对于30岁及以下的人群下降最为剧烈。老年美国人在全球快乐排名中列第十,而年轻美国人排名第62位。这是与十年前不同的,当时这两个群体报告的快乐水平相似。这个趋势与美国疾病控制与预防中心的数据一致,该中心每两年对1.7万名中学生进行一次调查。自从2011年以来,心理健康问题的比率在每一次调查中都在增加,去年,中心报告称十年来发现的悲伤比率最高,尤其是在女孩中。
In the new Gallup survey self-reported happiness fell for every age group, but most precipitously for those 30 and younger. Older Americans ranked tenth globally in happiness, whereas younger Americans ranked 62nd. That is a change from a decade ago, when the two groups reported similar levels of happiness. The trend is consistent with data from the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which surveys 17,000 high-school students every two years. Rates of mental-health problems have increased with every survey since 2011, and last year the CDC reported the highest rates of sadness found in a decade, particularly among girls.
在2021年一项名为“抑郁政治”的研究中,一组学者重点关注了青少年中政治意识形态与不快乐之间的可能联系。他们发现从2012年开始,青少年中抑郁情况出现了惊人的上升,并且与疾病控制与预防中心一样,女孩中的增长尤其显著。但思想差异比性别差异更为重要。自由派男孩报告的抑郁率比保守派男孩或女孩更高,自由派女孩的抑郁率最高。
In a study in 2021 called “The Politics of Depression”, a group of scholars zeroed in on the possible link between political ideology and unhappiness among teenagers. They found an alarming rise in depression among young people starting in 2012, and, like the cDC, a particular increase among girls. But ideological difference mattered more than gender difference. Liberal boys reported higher rates of depression than conservative boys or girls, and liberal girls reported the highest rates of all.
澄清保守派和自由派之间快乐差距的相关性和原因一直是社会心理学家和政治评论家长期以来的困扰。毫无疑问,将自己的政治观点与假设区分开也是一项艰巨的任务。这项研究的作者将抑郁的增加与社交媒体的传播联系起来。他们还提出保守意识形态可能有助于保护心理健康,但理由并不讨喜:“这一群体可能受益于美国文化中关于透明竞争场的神话,即特殊的社会地位被认为是通过努力和才能赢得的,而不是通过法定特权继承的。”他们写道,与在其权势盛行的保守派同行相比,“自由派青少年”可能会感到疏远”。
Disentangling correlation from cause to explain the happiness gap between conservatives and liberals has long vexed social psychologists and political commentators. So, no doubt, has the task of disentangling one’s own politics from one’s hypotheses. The authors of the study connected the rise of depression with the spread of social media. They also argued that conservative ideology may help protect mental health, for reasons that did not flatter conservatives: “This group presumably benefits from the American cultural myth of an equal playing field in which exceptional social positions are thought to be earned through hard work and talent rather than inherited through codified privilege.” Liberal adolescents, they wrote, may feel alienated in contrast to conservative peers “whose hegemonic views were flourishing”.
这一理论的一个可能缺陷是,在年轻自由派的心理健康下降的前四年里,巴拉克·奥巴马是总统,而保守派观点并没有那么成功地占主导地位。甚至早在2012年之前,当青少年报告心理健康相对稳定时,年轻自由派就像年长自由派一样,报告了更高的抑郁率。对于这项假设的怀疑者指出,做保守派可能会给予心理上的好处,由于并非出于悲观的原因。保守派倾向于更健康,更爱国和更虔诚,以及报告在他们的生活中找到更高程度的意义。这些特点与快乐呈相关。
A possible flaw in this theory is that, in the first four years that young liberals’ mental health declined, Barack Obama was president and conservative views were not so successfully hegemonic. Even before 2012, when teenagers reported relatively stable mental health, young liberals, like older liberals, reported higher rates of depression. Sceptics of the authors’ hypothesis have noted that being conservative could confer psychological benefits for less cynical reasons. Conservatives tend to be healthier, more patriotic and more religious, and to report finding higher levels of meaning in their lives. These characteristics correlate with happiness.
自由派不仅可能与悲伤相关,而且可能加剧悲伤。斯托尼布鲁克大学的社会学家穆萨·阿尔加尔比指出,受过教育和富裕的白人自由派开始赞同美国存在系统性种族主义的观点,导致他们比对其他种族和民族群体更友好。他在《American Affairs》杂志中写道,“这种紧张情绪——成为一个自己憎恶的群体的一部分——在许多白人自由派中造成了强烈的分裂压力”。社会心理学家乔纳森·海德特和律师格雷格·卢基亚诺夫提出的另一个假设是,自由派正在对自己进行一种逆向认知行为疗法:不是促进对逐渐改善世界的韧性和乐观,而是对问题进行灾难性的思考,例如气候变化以及甚至对大学校园上的分歧感到恐惧。这种思维习惯可能加深抑郁。
It is possible that liberalism does not just correlate with sadness but may exacerbate it. Musa al-Gharbi, a sociologist at Stony Brook University, has noted that educated, affluent white liberals have come to endorse the idea that America is systemically racist, leading them to view other racial and ethnic groups more warmly than their own. “This tension—being part of a group that one hates—creates strong dissociative pressures on many white liberals,” he wrote in the journal American Affairs. Another hypothesis, advanced by Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist, and Greg Lukianoff, a lawyer, is that liberals are performing a reverse cognitive behavioural therapy on themselves: promoting not resilience and optimism about incrementally improving the world but catastrophic rumination about problems such as climate change and fearfulness of disagreement even on university campuses. Such habits of mind can deepen depression.
研究发现自由派比保守派更具有移情能力,因此在一个困扰世界中,人们可能会预期他们更加悲伤。但在对于改变的兴奋感方面,似乎正在发生深刻的转变。1960年,弗里德里希·哈耶克在《自由宪法》中写道:“保守性态的一个基本特征就是对改变的恐惧,对新事物的怯懦不信任,而自由派的立场则建立在勇气和信心之上,愿意让改变自然而然地发生”。
Research has found liberals to be more empathetic than conservatives, so in a troubled world one might expect them to be sadder. But a profound shift appears to be under way when it comes to excitement about change. “One of the fundamental traits of the conservative attitude is a fear of change, a timid distrust of the new as such,” wrote Friedrich Hayek in “The Constitution of Liberty” in 1960, “while the liberal position is based on courage and confidence, on a preparedness to let change run its course.”
奥巴马总统曾号召“希望与改变”,与他自身的传记相呼应,或许标志着美国自由主义这一理念的鼎盛时刻,不同于今天的进步主义。乔·拜登总统已经谈判出潜在的变革性立法,但他把自己塑造成对激进变革持谨慎态度的形象。唐纳德·特朗普剥夺了自由主义的颠覆性魅力,使保守主义成为其对立面:破坏、颠覆、挑战**老古板和现状——所有那些酷炫的东西。这有点令人沮丧。■
Mr Obama, whose summons to “hope and change” rhymed with his own biography, may have marked high water for this idea of American liberalism, as opposed to today’s progressivism. President Joe Biden has negotiated potentially transformative legislation, but he presents himself as guarding against radical change. Donald Trump has robbed liberalism of its transgressive glamour and made conservatism mean its opposite: disruption, subversion, challenge to fuddy-duddies and the status quo—all that cool stuff. It’s kind of depressing. ■
阅读更多有关美国政治的专栏文章,请浏览我们的列克星敦专栏:
- Daniels风波是历史丑闻的翻版(3月27日)
- 内塔尼亚胡正在疏远以色列最好的朋友(3月18日)
- 《沙丘》是对政治英雄及其部落的警示(3月14日)
Read more from Lexington, our columnist on American politics:The case of Stormy Daniels echoes past scandals (Mar 27th)Binyamin Netanyahu is alienating Israel’s best friends (Mar 18th)“Dune” is a warning about political heroes and their tribes (Mar 14th)
亚洲 | 莫迪悖论 (Asia | The Modi paradox)
为何印度精英喜爱纳伦德拉·莫迪 (Why India’s elite loves Narendra Modi)
通常受过教育的选民鄙视民粹主义者。三个因素解释了为什么印度领导人与众不同。 (Educated voters usually disdain populists. Three factors explain why India’s leader is different)
纳伦德拉·莫迪是印度总理,他经常被归类为特朗普或欧尔班等右翼民粹主义者。从表面上看,这种比较是合理的。在2019年,莫迪告诉《印度快报》一家报纸,他的选举成功不是由于“汗市场帮派或卢特延斯德里”(这是印度旧体制的代称)。莫迪表示,他是通过“45年的辛勤劳动”取得成功的。预计在印度本月晚些时候举行选举后,这位总理将赢得第三个任期,但他并非普通的强人。
Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, is often lumped together with right-wing populists such as Donald Trump or Viktor Orban. On the surface, the comparison is plausible. In 2019 Mr Modi told the Indian Express, a newspaper, that his electoral success was not due to “the Khan Market gang or Lutyens Delhi”, monikers for India’s old establishment. Rather, said Mr Modi, he pulled himself up through “45 years of toil”. But the prime minister, who is expected to win a third term after India goes to the polls later this month, is no ordinary strongman.
在大多数地方,支持特朗普等反建制的民粹主义者和脱欧政策通常与大学教育呈负相关。但在印度,却有着莫迪悖论。这有助于解释为什么他是当今任何主要民主国家中最受欢迎的领袖。
In most places support for anti-establishment populists, such as Mr Trump, and policies such as Brexit tends to be inversely correlated with university education. Not in India. Call it the Modi paradox. It helps explain why he is the most popular leader of any major democracy today.
由政治学家Cristóbal Rovira和Steven van Hauwaert在2020年对英国、土耳其、欧盟八个国家以及拉丁美洲五个国家进行的研究证实了高等教育与对民粹主义领导者支持之间的负相关关系。这并不普遍存在:2019年至2022年间担任巴西总统的贾希尔·博尔索纳罗得到了一些受过良好教育的精英的支持。但在美国,这种现象很明显。2023年12月,民意调查机构盖洛普发现,仅有26%受过大学教育的受访者赞同特朗普,而未受过大学教育者中有50%对他表示赞同。
A study in 2020 of Britain, Turkey, eight countries in the European Union and five in Latin America by Cristóbal Rovira and Steven van Hauwaert, two political scientists, confirmed the inverse relationship between higher education and support for populist leaders. It is not universal: Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s president from 2019 to 2022, was backed by some of the best-educated elites. But in America it is strong. In December 2023 Gallup, a pollster, found that just 26% of respondents with a university education approved of Mr Trump, compared with 50% of those without.
莫迪完全颠覆了这种趋势(见图表)。2017年,在接受皮尤研究调查时,66%仅有小学文化程度的印度人表示对莫迪“非常有利正面的”看法。而接受过一定高等教育的印度人中这一比例升至80%。在2019年的上次大选之后,民意调查机构洛克尼蒂-印度社会科学数据调查中心发现,大约42%持有学位的印度人支持莫迪的人民党(印度人民党),而仅有小学文化程度的人中这一比例约为35%。2023年卡纳塔克邦等邦选举之后进行的民意调查也证实了这一趋势。同样,皮尤去年的最新调查显示,60%接受过大学教育的印度人对莫迪持非常有利的看法,而未受过大学教育者中这一比例为55%。
Read more of our coverage of the Indian election
莫迪在受过良好教育的群体中的成功并不是以牺牲其他群体的支持为代价。正如政治科学家尼兰简·西尔卡所言,与其他民粹主义领袖一样,他在较低阶层选民中取得了最大进展。2020年,研究发现在农村、低种姓、年轻和贫穷选民中,对人民党的支持在2014年至2019年间增加。其中,“其他中下阶层”特别迅速增长,占印度人口的近一半。他们对人民党的支持从34%增至44%,而所有选民中的增长从31%增至38%。
Mr Modi bucks this trend altogether (see chart). In 2017, 66% of Indians who had no more than a primary-school education told Pew Research that they had a “very favourable” view of Mr Modi. The number rose to 80% among Indians with at least some higher education. After the previous general election, in 2019, Lokniti-CSDS, a pollster, found that around 42% of Indians with a degree supported Mr Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), while around 35% of those with only a primary-school education did. Polls conducted after state elections in 2023, such as in Karnataka, confirm the trend. Similarly Pew’s latest survey, from last year, shows that 60% of university-educated Indians have a very favourable opinion of Mr Modi, compared with 55% of those who do not have a degree.
对于人民党的这种支持模式与其他国家类似,即受教育程度较低或生活在农村地区的人向右倾斜。但与国外许多同行不同的是,莫迪还成功地增加了受过教育者的支持。社会阶级、经济以及精英对强人统治的崇拜等三个因素有助于解释这一现象。
Mr Modi’s success among the well-educated does not come at the expense of support among other groups. Indeed, like other populist leaders, his biggest inroads have been made among lower-class voters, says Neelanjan Sircar, a political scientist at the Centre for Policy Research, a think-tank in Delhi. In 2020 Sanjay Kumar of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies found that between 2014 and 2019 support for the BJP increased among rural, lower-caste, young and poor voters. It grew especially quickly among “other backward classes”, which make up nearly half of the population. Among them, the BJP’s support rose from 34% to 44%, compared with an increase of 31% to 38% among all voters.
在印度,社会阶级与种姓制度相互交织。人民党像许多保守党派一样,以对商界友好而著称。其核心选民包括很多“班尼亚”交易群体,这是一群传统上以商业为导向的群体,主要集中在古吉拉特邦和拉贾斯坦邦等邦。印度最富有的人,如穆克什·安巴尼和高坦·阿达尼,都属于这一群体。包括武士和婆罗门在内的上流印度教徒也是其核心支持群体。一些地区政党,如泰米尔纳德邦的DMK党,定位为反对这些上层种姓群体。国大党,主要的全国反对党,提倡为低种姓提供前往教育以及政府职位的优先途径。
This pattern of support for the BJP is comparable to other countries in which less-educated or rural people have shifted right. But unlike many of his counterparts abroad, Mr Modi has also been able to increase his support among the educated. Three factors—class politics, economics, and elite admiration for strongman rule—help explain why.
莫迪本人来自一个相对低种姓的家庭,他把人民党定位为不考虑种姓的“泛印度教”政党。这意味着他保留着高种姓群体的支持,同时扩大了该党对其他人的影响。西尔卡指出,印度各地受过良好教育的专业阶层普遍不认同德里的官僚和媒体人员。因此,莫迪**对首都精英的敌意并没有导致他在其他地方失去支持。
In India, class is intertwined with the caste system. The BJP, like many conservative parties, is known to be business-friendly. A core constituency includes much of the “Bania” trader community, a traditionally business-oriented group concentrated in states such as Gujarat and Rajasthan. Tycoons such as Mukesh Ambani and Gautam Adani, India’s richest men, fall into this group. Upper-caste Hindus, including Kshatriyas and Brahmins, are also part of the core support base. Some regional parties, such as the DMK in Tamil Nadu, have positioned themselves against such upper-caste groups. Congress, the main national opposition party, has championed preferential access to education and government jobs for lower castes.
第二个因素是经济。2023年第四季度的年GDP增长率为8.4%(尽管由于印度衡量GDP的方式存在一些怪异之处,实际增长率接近6.5%)。尽管增长不平衡,但这推动了印度中上阶层规模和财富的迅速增加。一家银行高盛称这一现象为“富裕印度”的崛起。它计算出,2011年年收入超过1万美元的印度人数从2000万增至2023年的6000万,并将在2027年达到1亿。
Mr Modi, himself from a relatively low caste, has marketed the BJP as a caste-agnostic “pan-Hindu” party. This means he retains support from high-caste groups while extending the party’s reach to others. Mr Sircar notes that the well-educated professional class across India broadly does not identify with the bureaucrats and media types in Delhi. So Mr Modi’s antipathy to the capital’s elite has not cost him support among others elsewhere.
不奇怪的是,莫迪保持了那些变得更富裕的人的支持。在增长迅速的2000年代后期,国大党在中上阶层中受到了强烈支持。直到2010年代出现经济放缓和一系列腐败丑闻才改变了形势。
The second factor is economic. Annual GDP growth was 8.4% in the last quarter of 2023 (though because of quirks in how India measures its GDP, the underlying figure is closer to 6.5%). That growth, albeit unequally distributed, is driving a rapid increase in the size and wealth of the Indian upper-middle class. Goldman Sachs, a bank, has called this phenomenon the rise of “affluent India”. It calculates that the number of Indians with an annual income of $10,000 or more grew from 20m in 2011 to 60m in 2023, and will hit 100m by 2027.
但莫迪的任期也提升了印度在世界经济和地缘政治中的地位。孟买的一位基金经理表示,她的朋友们在莫迪当选总理时担心印度形象。2002年他在古吉拉特邦担任首席部长时,发生了一起针对穆斯林的血腥骚乱,这一事件导致他被美国拒绝签证长达九年。她认为莫迪可能会成为全球的社会负累。实际上,相反的情况发生了。由于印度在经济上的影响力,以及作为中国的制衡力量的重要性,莫迪受到了全球领导人的拥护。
It is not surprising that Mr Modi has retained the support of those who have become richer. The Congress party enjoyed strong support among the upper-middle class during the fast-growing late 2000s. It took a slowdown and a series of corruption scandals in the 2010s to change things.
许多受过大学教育的印度人表示,他们不喜欢莫迪将执法用于打击反对党,以及政府对待穆斯林的方式,将他们视为二等公民。3月21日逮捕德里首席部长阿尔温德·凯杰里瓦尔加剧了这些担忧。不过,正如一位孟买银行家所指出的,普遍认为莫迪的优点大于缺点。事实上,一些人认为印度正需要一定程度的强人统治。
But Mr Modi’s tenure has increased India’s economic and geopolitical standing in the world, too. One fund manager in Mumbai says that her friends worried about perceptions of India when Mr Modi was elected prime minister. He was chief minister of Gujarat during a bloody riot against Muslims there in 2002, an incident that saw him denied a visa to America for nine years. She thought Mr Modi might become a global pariah. In fact, the opposite happened. Because of India’s economic heft, and its importance as a counterweight to China, Mr Modi has been embraced by leaders worldwide.
这是促使总理在精英中受欢迎的第三个原因。他们指出中国和东亚的几个“老虎”展示了强有力的治理可以消除经济增长的障碍。南印度的一位工业家表示,鉴于印度的收入水平,这个国家“可能过于民主”。他补充道,莫迪**能够“做成一些事情”。
Many university-educated Indians say they dislike Mr Modi’s weaponisation of law enforcement against opposition parties and his government’s treatment of Muslims as second-class citizens. The arrest on March 21st of Arvind Kejriwal, the chief minister of Delhi, amplified these concerns. Still, as a banker in Mumbai notes, there is a widespread sense that the good parts of Mr Modi outweigh the bad. Indeed, some think a dose of strongman rule is exactly what India needs.
印度的精英视莫迪的外交政策为民族主义但务实。他们喜欢他嘲弄自由主义西方机构和媒体的方式,以及他促进印度利益的做法,类似于其他反全球化的强人。自2021年以来,莫迪已经谈判达成四项新的贸易协议,最近一项是于3月10日与一个包括四个非欧盟欧洲国家的集团达成。在2月份的德里莱西纳对话会上——印度的慕尼黑安全会议——他的部长们哀叹联合国过时的结构,同时将印度定位为全球南方的领导者。
This is the third reason for the prime minister’s popularity among elites. They point to China and the East Asian tigers, which they believe show that muscular governance can tear down barriers to economic growth. One industrialist in south India says that the country is “probably too democratic”, given its level of income. Mr Modi, he adds, can “get shit done”.
欣赏被认为果断的领导者并非印度精英的新现象。据说上世纪七十年代,这个国家最著名的实业家之一塔塔集团的主席塔塔欣赏英迪拉·甘地实施了为期两年的“紧急状态”,暂停正常的民主程序以应对对她权力的威胁。皮尤研究机构2月发布的一项调查发现,67%的印度人认为“一个强有力的领导人可以在没有议会或法院干预的情况下做决定的体系将是一个治理国家的良好方式”。这一比例比2017年的55%有所上升,是调查的24个国家中最高的。许多具有国际视野的印度人表示,特朗普对美国来说太独裁了,但莫迪是他们国家的合适人选。
India’s elites see Mr Modi’s foreign policy as nationalist yet pragmatic. They like the way he thumbs his nose at liberal Western institutions and the media, in a similar fashion to other anti-globalist strongmen, while promoting Indian interests. Mr Modi has negotiated four new trade deals since 2021, most recently with a grouping of four non-EU European countries on March 10th. In February, at the Raisina Dialogue in Delhi—India’s version of the Munich Security Conference—his ministers lamented the UN’s antiquated structure, while also positioning India as the leader of the global south.
那么是什么因素可能动摇莫迪的精英粉丝群?继续政府机构的武器化,如在凯杰里瓦尔案件中所见,可能会适得其反;大多数精英仍表示他们相信民主。许多称赞总理的人也害怕他,包括那些了解他们的生存取决于保持他的恩宠的商界人士。一些人已经减弱了对他的支持。皮尤在2023年的调查中发现,17%上过大学的受访者对莫迪持不利看法,而2017年这一比例为5%。
Admiration for leaders perceived as decisive is not new among India’s elite. In the 1970s J.R.D. Tata, one of the country’s most prominent industrialists, is said to have appreciated Indira Gandhi’s imposition of “the Emergency”, a two-year-long suspension of normal democratic processes in response to a perceived threat to her power. A survey by Pew published in February found that 67% of Indians thought that “a system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from parliament or courts would be a good way of governing their country”. That figure, up from 55% in 2017, was the highest among the 24 countries surveyed. Many internationally minded Indians say Mr Trump is too autocratic for America, but that Mr Modi is the right man for their country.
其他人则通过行动做出选择:根据咨询公司亨利与伙伴的数据,2022年和2023年,印度拥有的百万富翁净流出达到1.4万人,超过了除中国外的其他国家,包括俄罗斯。相比之下,澳大利亚、新加坡、阿联酋和其他八个国家的净流入分别吸引了1000名以上的百万富翁——这或许反映了他们更可预测的法治环境。
So what could shake Mr Modi’s elite fan base? Continued weaponisation of the state, as in the case of Mr Kejriwal, could come back to bite him; most elites still say they believe in democracy. And many of the people who say they like the prime minister also fear him, including those in business who know their survival depends on remaining in his good graces. Some have tempered their support. Pew’s survey in 2023 found that 17% of college-educated respondents had an unfavourable view of Mr Modi, up from 5% in 2017.
但是对于那些选择留在印度的人来说,即使强化的独裁也可能不足以让莫迪失去很多选票。2019年,由于小型金融危机的影响,印度经济增速放缓至4%。尽管这种疲软并非完全是莫迪的错,但他在2016年急躁决定迅速废除大额银行票据,并没有帮助。精英们抱怨,但显然他们觉得莫迪对他们的钱包更有利,因此投了他的票。
Others are voting with their feet: according to Henley and Partners, a consultancy, India had a net outflow of 14,000 millionaires in 2022 and 2023, more than any country among those measured bar China, including Russia. By contrast Australia, Singapore and the UAE, and eight other countries, attracted over 1,000 millionaires each in net inflows—reflecting, perhaps, their more predictable rule of law.
这就是为什么许多人认为,对莫迪的支持将持续,直到出现可信的替代方案。大多数精英已经失去了对国大党及其领袖拉胡尔·甘地的信任,后者被视为世袭和脱离实际。甚至有一位国大党高级官员承认,莫迪“拿走了我们最好的想法”,比如通过数字化发放福利支付,“比我们党能够做得更好”。“更强大的反对派可能是唯一让印度精英放弃莫迪的事情。然而,目前,这在眼前难以实现。■
But for those who stay, even intensified autocracy may not be enough to lose Mr Modi many votes. In 2019 India’s economy, reeling from a mini-financial crisis, slowed to a growth rate of 4%. While this weakness was not entirely Mr Modi’s fault, his impulsive decision to swiftly demonetise large banknotes in 2016 had not helped. Elites complained, but apparently felt that Mr Modi was better for their wallets than the opposition, and voted for him.
This is why many say that support for Mr Modi will continue until a credible alternative appears. Most elites have lost faith in Congress and its leader, Rahul Gandhi, who is seen as dynastic and out of touch. One senior Congress official even admits that Mr Modi “has taken our best ideas”, such as distributing welfare payments digitally, and “executed them better” than his party could have done. A stronger opposition is probably the only thing that will cause India’s elites to abandon Mr Modi. For now, however, that is nowhere in sight. ■
亚洲 (Asia | Building back stronger)
日本在能登地震后100天仍然震惊不已 (Japan is still reeling 100 days after the Noto earthquake)
恢复将需要数年时间,并为未来灾难提供了教训 (The recovery will take years, and holds lessons for future disasters)
捕鱼靴。 这就是浜塚宏之和千秋最希望在他们的车库废墟下找到的东西。浜塚一家人位于日本能登半岛北端的珠洲,也是受到了 1月1日发生的一场大地震 的近10万栋建筑物中的一座。截至三月底,死亡人数已达244人。浜塚一家人和他们的孩子幸存了,但和大多数邻居一样,地震发生近100天后,这个家庭才刚刚开始重建生活。
Fishing boots. Their son’s beloved fishing boots—that is what Hamazuka Hiroyuki and Chiaki most hope to find under the rubble of their garage. The Hamazukas’ place in Suzu, on the northern tip of Japan’s Noto peninsula, is one of nearly 100,000 buildings that were damaged or destroyed when a massive earthquake struck on January 1st. As of late March the death toll had reached 244 people. The Hamazukas and their children survived, but like most of their neighbours, nearly 100 days after the tremor, the family is only beginning to piece its life back together.
灾后援助志愿者藤野辰雄表示,要让半岛恢复正常还需要数年时间。它提供的教训对太平洋周围“火环”这一以地震频发而闻名的地区也很相关——正如3月3日台湾发生7.4级地震所显示的,那是台湾两十多年来最强的地震。
The peninsula will take years to recover, says Fujino Tatsuo, a disaster-relief volunteer. The lessons it offers are pertinent for the earthquake-prone area around the Pacific Ocean known as the “ring of fire”—as seen on March 3rd, when Taiwan was hit by an earthquake of magnitude 7.4, its strongest in over two decades.
能登的震动始于元旦下午4点左右。”大海看起来是黑色的,还在旋涡,”浜塚先生回忆道。这场7.6级的地震是自2011年发生的“东日本大地震”以来日本最强烈的一次,当时那场地震引发了一场巨大海啸,并导致了福岛核泄漏。能登地区的地震活动引发了一种被称为“液化”的过程,即通常坚固的地面变成类似液体的物质。在能登半岛主要城市輪島,一场市场火灾爆发,留下了一片废墟。
In Noto, the shaking began around 4pm on New Year’s Day. “The sea looked black, and it was swirling,” Mr Hamazuka recalls. With a magnitude of 7.6 the quake was the strongest to hit the country since the Great East Japan earthquake of 2011, which triggered a massive tsunami and precipitated the nuclear meltdown at Fukushima. The seismic activity in Noto initiated a process known as “liquefaction”, wherein normally solid ground turns into a liquid-like substance. In Wajima, the peninsula’s main city, a fire broke out at a market, leaving a wasteland behind.
在整个能登,破坏非常严重。尽管一些新的建筑幸存下来,许多传统木质房屋被夷为平地。近1万人仍然无家可归。居民们努力保持尊严。在輪島的一个避难所,一群妇女搅拌绿茶,摆放点心在漆盘上,这是该镇的标志性手工艺。但悲痛和震惊总是掩盖在表面之下。
Across Noto, the wreckage is widespread. Although newer structures survived, many traditional wooden houses were flattened. Nearly 10,000 people are still displaced. Residents strive to maintain their dignity. At one evacuation centre in Wajima a group of women whisk green tea and arrange sweets on lacquer trays, the town’s signature craft. Yet grief and shock are never far below the surface.
如果不是日本对灾害风险的重视和一点好运的话,能登地区的受损可能会更严重。这场地震袭击了一个人口占比很小、国内生产总值只占较小份额的半岛。政府估计损失将达到约2.6万亿日元(约合170亿美元),这个金额相对较少,甚至与2016年熊本发生的另一次大地震造成的5万亿日元损失相比也是可以控制的。(东京担心的地震或中部日本的话将会造成更大的影响。) 尽管政府发出了一次大规模海啸警报,但海啸的规模不如预期大。居民们大多听从了疏散的号召。
The damage in Noto might have been worse, had it not been for Japan’s attention to disaster risk and a bit of good luck. The quake struck a peninsula that is home to a small fraction of the country’s population and accounts for a minor share of its GDP. The government estimates that the damage will amount to around ¥2.6trn ($17bn), a manageable amount compared even with the cost of another big quake in 2016 in Kumamoto, a mid-sized southern city, which did ¥5trn worth of damage. (Feared tremors in Tokyo or central Japan would cause far more.) Though the government issued a major tsunami warning, the waves turned out to be smaller than expected. Residents largely heeded calls to evacuate.
然而,日本每次地震都是未来灾害的一堂课。能登半岛的偏远地理位置给救援和恢复工作带来了困难。通往地区首府金泽的道路被摧毁,地震后数周,通常两小时的车程需要九小时。港口受到破坏,严寒的冬季气候使直升机无法起飞。
Yet each earthquake in Japan is a lesson for future disasters. The remoteness of the Noto peninsula has complicated rescue and recovery efforts. Roads leading to Kanazawa, the regional capital, were destroyed, and for weeks after the quake a drive that had normally taken two hours took up to nine. Ports were damaged, while bad winter weather grounded helicopters.
能登半岛也处于日本人口结构转变的前沿。该地区是人口最老龄化的地区之一,近一半的人口年龄超过65岁,而全国平均比例约为30%。老年居民在灾害发生时特别脆弱。但不仅是日本的人口在老龄化,它的基础设施也是如此。日本战后建造的水管正逐渐接近寿命终点,但公用事业缺乏资金进行升级。人口减少正侵蚀着它们的利润。在能登,多达13.5万户人家断水。冲洗厕所仍然困难。志愿者们建立了临时设施。“人们第一次洗澡时哭了,”非营利组织VNet的神川哲也回忆道。
The Noto peninsula is also at the edge of Japan’s demographic transition. The region is one of the oldest, with nearly half of the population older than 65, compared with around 30% nationally. Elderly residents are especially vulnerable during disasters. But it is not only Japan’s population that is ageing—its infrastructure is, too. Water pipes laid during Japan’s post-war boom are reaching the end of their useful lives, but utilities lack funds to invest in upgrades. Depopulation is eating into their profits. In Noto as many as 135,000 households were left without water. Flush toilets are still hard to come by. Volunteers set up makeshift facilities. “People cried when they took baths for the first time,” recalls Kamikawa Tetsuya of VNet, a non-profit.
新技术可能有所帮助。在全半岛各处的避难所,居民可以使用特殊的水槽和浴室单位洗澡,这些水槽和单位可以自行回收水,这得益于日本初创公司Wota生产的分散式水处理基础设施。无人机被部署用于帮助向难以到达的沿海社区运送物资。数字身份证使跟踪有需要的人变得更加容易—官员们希望这场灾难能促进它们的使用。“我们希望使该地区更具弹性,而不仅仅是兼具更多混凝土,”包括能登半岛在内的石川县副知事西垣温子说。
New technology may be able to help. At evacuation centres across the peninsula residents can wash using special sink and bath units that self-recycle water, courtesy of Wota, a Japanese startup that produces decentralised water-treatment infrastructure. Drones were deployed to help ferry supplies to hard-to-reach coastal communities. Digital ID cards have made it easier to track those in need—officials hope the disaster will encourage their use. “We want to make the region more resilient, not just lay more concrete,” says Nishigaki Atsuko, vice-governor of Ishikawa prefecture, which includes the Noto peninsula.
然而,恢复过程肯定会漫长。“感觉几乎没有尽头,”輪島一名官员说。仅仅清理废墟预计要到2026年初才能完成;灾难垃圾的数量预计将达到约240万吨,相当于该县大约七年的垃圾量。官员们希望在四年内让流离失所的人们回家,但实际上可能需要更长时间,甚至根本无法实现。
Yet the recovery is sure to be protracted. “It feels almost endless,” one official in Wajima says. Merely clearing away debris is projected to take until early 2026; the disaster waste is expected to amount to some 2.4m tonnes, equivalent to roughly seven years of the prefecture’s rubbish. Officials hope to have displaced people back at home within four years, but in reality it may take much longer, or not happen at all.
最主要的长期风险是加剧的人口下降,非营利组织Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Centre的辛船由加里分析道:“实际上有多少人会回来?”正如日本深知的那样,灾难继续发生的时间远比震动停止要长。■
The main long-term risk is accelerated population decline, reckons Karashima Yukari of the Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Centre, a non-profit: “How many people will actually come back?” As Japan knows all too well, disasters continue long after the shaking stops. ■
亚洲 | 不同凡响 (Asia | In a different league)
板球印度垄断的终结 (The end of cricket’s Indian monopoly)
印度板球超级联赛为其他赛事树立了榜样。 (The Indian Premier League is a model for other tournaments)
走进印度的任何一个房间,从现在直到五月底,你将发现自己在观看印度超级联赛(IPL),这是一项极其受欢迎的板球比赛,据某些指标显示,它是继美国的国家橄榄球联盟之后全球最赚钱的体育联赛。直到上个月末比赛开始前的几天,同样的屏幕可能正在播放女子超级联赛(WPL),也就是IPL的女子对应赛。三月初还见证了印度街头超级联赛的首个赛季——该赛事使用黄色网球进行板球比赛。
WALK INTO any room in India with a screen from now until the end of May and you will find yourself watching the Indian Premier League (IPL), a wildly popular cricket tournament that is by some measures the world’s most lucrative sports league after America’s National Football League. Until a few days before it started, late last month, the same screens would have been showing the Women’s Premier League (WPL), IPL’s women’s counterpart. Early March also saw the inaugural season of the Indian Street Premier League—cricket played with a yellow tennis ball.
印度人痴迷于板球是一个老生常谈。然而,IPL的成功不可思议地促使其他体育项目的国内联赛蓬勃发展。过去十年间,以IPL为蓝本的联赛在曲棍球、网球、羽毛球、足球和手球等运动中出现,同时还有像被围捉和卡巴迪这样的本土游戏。一些联赛,尤其是卡巴迪联赛,甚至取得了商业成功。这个疯狂的板球之国正在多样化发展。
It is a truism that Indians are obsessed with cricket. Yet the success of IPL has had the unlikely effect of spurring an efflorescence of domestic leagues in other sports, too. Over the past decade leagues modelled on IPL have emerged in hockey, tennis, badminton, football and handball, along with indigenous games such as kho kho and kabaddi. Some, notably kabaddi, have even been commercially successful. A cricket-mad country is diversifying.
板球占据了去年在体育广告、赞助和代言方面花费的每一卢比的87%,据营销机构GroupM ESP称。但这个比例下降了一点点,从2021年的88%下降至现在(见图表)。JSW Sports的迪延舒•辛格表示:“非板球运动的蛋糕将会变大”,该公司拥有IPL、WPL、职业卡巴迪联赛和印度超级联赛(足球比赛)的球队。
Cricket took 87% of every rupee spent on sports advertising, sponsorship and endorsements last year, according to GroupM ESP, a marketing agency. But that was down—a smidge—from 88% in 2021 (see chart). “The pie for non-cricket sport is going to grow,” says Divyanshu Singh of JSW Sports, which owns teams in IPL, WPL, Pro Kabaddi League and the Indian Super League, a football tournament.
就像任何其他繁荣时期一样,不是所有的尝试都会成功。一些联赛已经停止运营。然而,罪魁祸首不是板球的支配地位,而是一系列内部因素。印度管理学院的山杰夫•特里帕蒂表示,为了吸引观众,新联赛必须提供特定运动中最优秀的人才。随着全球体育赛事在电视和网络上的普及,例如,印度和美国的篮球联赛之间的质量差异显而易见。卡巴迪的成功在一定程度上归功于该联赛提供了该运动中最高水平的比赛。
As in any other boom, not all ventures will succeed. Some leagues have already folded. Yet the culprit is not the dominance of cricket but a range of internal factors. For a new league to attract viewers it must offer the very best talent in that particular sport, says Sanjeev Tripathi of the Indian Institute of Management in Indore. With global sports available on television and streaming, the difference in quality between, for example, Indian and American basketball leagues is apparent. Kabaddi’s success can in part be attributed to the league offering the highest quality of play available in that sport.
此外,联赛往往只在团队运动中成功。在以球员为中心的运动,如网球和羽毛球中,很难为人工球队建立忠诚度。任何新联赛还必须治理得当,并为支持者提供回本的机会。印度职业卡巴迪联赛的专员Anupam Goswami表示,这意味着要对球员薪水设定合理的上限,控制成本,投资高水准的制作标准。与比赛水准一样,习惯全球体育的观众对业余制作感到厌烦。辛格先生表示,印度非板球运动成功的另一个关键原因是成功本身:“作为电视观众,我们并不是运动的狂热者,我们是超级明星的粉丝”。
Moreover, leagues tend to succeed only in team sports. It is hard to build up loyalty for artificial teams in player-driven sports such as tennis and badminton. Any new league must also be well governed and offer its backers a decent chance of recouping their investment. That means setting sensible caps on player salaries, keeping costs down and investing in high production standards, says Anupam Goswami, commissioner of the Pro Kabaddi League. As with the quality of play, viewers accustomed to global sports are turned off by amateurish production. Another crucial reason for non-cricket sports to succeed in India, says Mr Singh, is success itself: “As a TV-viewing audience, we are not such fans of sport. We are fans of superstars.”
然而,维持体育繁荣最重要的因素之一是进展依然缓慢的地方。尽管印度观众乐于观看体育比赛,但实际的体育活动率较低。民意调查机构YouGov最近的调查发现,有57%的受访者自称是板球的粉丝,但仅有31%在过去一年里真正玩过这项运动。其他体育项目的比例甚至更低。根据联合国世界卫生组织的数据,印度四分之三的青少年缺乏体育锻炼。Capri Sports的Jinisha Sharma表示:“年轻一代从未接触这些运动,如何不断发现新的人才呢?” ■
Yet the most important factor in sustaining the sports boom is one where progress remains slow. Though Indian viewers are happy to watch sports, rates of physical activity are low. A recent survey by YouGov, a pollster, found that while 57% of respondents described themselves as fans of cricket, only 31% had actually played the game in the previous year. Rates for other sports are even lower. Three-quarters of Indian adolescents are physically inactive, according to the UN’s World Health Organisation. “The younger generation has never played these sports,” says Jinisha Sharma of Capri Sports, which owns cricket, kabaddi and kho kho teams. “How do you keep finding newer talent?”■
亚洲 | 有害的王朝 (Asia | Damaging dynasties)
亚洲“政治二代”正在主导政治 (Asian “nepo babies” are dominating its politics)
他们也在阻碍增长 (They are stunting growth, too)
亚洲的政治展示了一个事实,那就是家庭关系至关重要。在菲律宾,最近的四位总统中有三位都是前总统的子女。在柬埔寨,自1985年起掌权的强人洪森最近将总理职位传给了他的儿子洪曼尼。朝鲜唯一认识的是同一统治家族的三代人。大多数家族都渴望保持权力。
If politics in Asia shows anything, it is that family matters. In the Philippines three of the four most recent presidents were the children of past ones. In Cambodia Hun Sen, the strongman who has ruled since 1985, recently passed on the prime ministership to his son, Hun Manet. North Korea has only ever known three generations of the same ruling family. Most families are bent on staying in power.
政治世袭并不是什么新鲜事。亚洲也不是唯一存在政治世袭现象的地区。这种现象几乎影响了每一片大陆。然而很难想象有一个亚洲国家是不受此类现象影响的。在这里,由家族传承权力是社会和繁荣共享的最佳保证者,这一看法显然错得离谱。这种错误观点对该地区的经济和增长能力产生了极坏的影响。
Political dynasties are not new. Nor can Asia claim a monopoly on them. They have shaped nearly every continent. Yet it is hard to think of an Asian country unsullied by them. Nowhere else is the case so assiduously cultivated by dynasts and their fans that power passed down by families is the best guarantor of social peace and spreading prosperity. This profoundly mistaken claim has egregious effects on the region’s economies and their ability to grow.
事实上,“政治世襲”正在巩固权力。今年1月,孟加拉国建国功臣谢赫·穆吉布尔·拉赫曼的女儿谢赫·哈西娜在一定程度上通过围堵持续多年的敌对派——叶海亚·吉亚家族的领袖卡莉达·吉亚,在选举中获得连任总理的职位(她坚称选举是自由和公正的)。今年2月,巴基斯坦的夏里夫家族和布托-扎尔达里家族,这两个历史上交替执政的政治世家,事实上在强大的军队的支持下,联合起来排除了非世袭的伊姆兰·汗在选举中取得胜利。
Indeed, “nepo babies” are consolidating power. In January Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Bangladesh’s founding father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, secured her re-election as prime minister, in part by hounding the opposition—her long-time enemy, Khaleda Zia, head of a rival clan, languishes under house arrest. (She insists the vote was free and fair.) In Pakistan in February the Sharifs and the Bhutto-Zardaris, two rival political dynasties who have historically alternated in power, in effect joined forces, with the powerful army’s backing, to keep out a non-dynast, Imran Khan, in the election.
印度尼西亚的总统选举,也发生在2月,一个家族联盟获胜。斯哈托时代的将军普拉博沃·苏比安托赢得了总统选举,他曾是斯哈托之前的丈夫,后者选择了深受欢迎的即将卸任总统佐科的儿子作为自己的竞选伙伴。(2014年,佐科曾坚称成为总统“并不意味着将权力传给我的孩子们”)。
Indonesia’s presidential election, also in February, saw a family alliance triumph. Prabowo Subianto, a general under the late Suharto’s dictatorship and the former husband of Suharto’s daughter, won the presidency. He chose the son of Jokowi, the popular outgoing president, as his running-mate. (In 2014 Jokowi insisted that becoming president “does not mean channelling power to my own children”.)
当然,联盟也可能破裂。总统费迪南德“邦邦”马科斯是前总统费迪南德的儿子,后者在成为独裁者前夕在1986年的一场民众革命中被废黜。他的副总统萨拉·杜特尔特则是前一任总统的女儿。将他们带上政治舞台的不稳定联盟已经发展成了公开的争斗。
Alliances, of course, can also fracture. President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos is the son of a former president, also Ferdinand, who turned dictator before being deposed in a popular revolution in 1986. His vice-president, Sara Duterte, is the daughter of the previous president. The uneasy alliance that brought them to power in 2022 has since turned to open feuding.
历史造就了亚洲易于产生政治世袭的特点。在菲律宾,许多政治家族可以追溯到殖民统治时期。在独立后,富裕家族买下了穷菲律宾人买不起的土地。其中的马科斯家族等家族发展了庞大的庄园。自2001年以来,有四位菲律宾总统来自这些土地拥有阶级。马尼拉雅典耀大学的罗纳德·门多萨计算称,该国78%的省长、73%的国会议员和57%的市长来自家庭中拥有多名担任公职成员的家庭。
History plays its part in making Asia prone to dynastic rule. In the Philippines many political families date back to colonialism. Upon independence rich families snapped up land that poor Filipinos could not afford. Clans, the Marcoses among them, developed vast haciendas. Four presidents since 2001 have come from these landowning classes. Ronald Mendoza of Ateneo de Manila University calculates that 78% of the country’s governors, 73% of congressmen and 57% of mayors are from families boasting more than one member holding an elected position.
土地所有权也在巴基斯坦和孟加拉国政治家族的突出地位中扮演着角色。相比之下,在印度,世袭家族是独立后的民主精英的产物。尤其是尼赫鲁-甘地家族,该家族产生了三位总理,始于第一任总理贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁。他的曾孙拉胡尔·甘地领导着主要反对党国大党(尽管他看起来可能在即将到来的印度选举中遭受重创)。
Land ownership also plays a part in the prominence of political families in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In India, by contrast, dynasties are products of post-independence democratic elites. This is especially the case with the Nehru-Gandhi family, which has produced three prime ministers, starting with the first, Jawaharlal Nehru. His great-grandson, Rahul Gandhi, runs Congress, the main opposition party (though he looks likely to be thrashed in India’s upcoming election).
正如在陷入极度贫穷的朝鲜所见,裙带关系的影响可能是深远的。在菲律宾,门多萨先生和其他人的研究显示,在该国更繁荣的地区,例如北部的吕宋岛,政治家族促进了经济发展,但也扩大了他们的财富和影响力。当他们的利益及其亲信的利益受到威胁时,改革的极限就会到来。门多萨的论文称这些世袭政客为“固定强盗”。
The effects of nepotism can be profound, as seen in crushingly poor North Korea. In the Philippines work by Mr Mendoza and others shows that in the country’s more prosperous regions, such as Luzon in the north, political families encourage economic development, but also expand their wealth and clout. The limits of reform are reached when their interests and those of their cronies are at risk. Mr Mendoza’s paper calls these dynastic politicians “stationary bandits”.
至于巴基斯坦,拉合尔管理科学大学的阿伊莎·阿里的一篇论文指出,2010年国家遭到灾难性洪水袭击后,在由政治世家管理的选区里,发展支出比平均水平低出十分之一。根据西达特·伊平·乔治和多米尼克·波纳图的一篇论文,在印度,世袭统治每年会使夜间可见光的增长率降低6.6个百分点,后者是经济活动的一种替代指标。为了发光,亚洲需要摒弃世袭家族。■
As for Pakistan, a paper by Ayesha Ali of the Lahore University of Management Sciences highlights how, after disastrous national floods in 2010, development spending was over a tenth lower than the average in those constituencies run by political dynasts. In India, dynastic rule lowers the growth in light visible at night—a proxy for economic activity—by 6.6 percentage points per year, according to a paper by Siddhart Eapen George and Dominic Ponattu. In order to shine, Asia needs to dump its dynasts. ■
亚洲 | 榕树 (Asia | Banyan)
要一窥日本的未来,请看看它的便利店 (For a glimpse at Japan’s future, look at its convenience stores)
这些7-Eleven店展示了移民的重要性。 (The country’s 7-Eleven shops show the importance of immigration)
要了解日本正在发生的变化,可以考虑位于东京市中心南麻布1丁目的7-Eleven便利店。乍一看,它似乎和其他konbini一样,这种商店在当地被称为,是日本无可挑剔服务文化的典范。店员们每次门开都喊“Irasshaimase”欢迎顾客。整齐排列的季节性零食摆满货架,空气中飘着新鲜炸鸡的香味。然而,所有员工都是来自缅甸的,包括店主May Zin Chit,她是第一位拥有日本7-Eleven特许经营权的缅甸人。
TO UNDERSTAND how Japan is changing, consider the 7-Eleven convenience store in Minami-Azabu 1-chome, in central Tokyo. At first glance, it appears to be like any other konbini, as such shops are known locally—a paragon of impeccable Japanese service culture. Clerks shout “Irasshaimase”, a greeting to customers, each time the doors open. Rows of neatly arranged seasonal snacks fill the shelves and the scent of freshly fried chicken wafts through the air. Yet all the staff are Burmese, including the owner, May Zin Chit, the first person from Myanmar to own a Japanese 7-Eleven franchise.
Konbini(便利店)是现代日本的生命线。自1969年问世以来,它们已经超过了美国的前身,成为这个国家社会基础设施的重要组成部分——一个每年770亿美元的产业。四大主要连锁店——7-Eleven, FamilyMart, Lawson和MiniStop——共拥有55,700家分店,遍布每个城市和城镇;去年它们为合计16亿顾客提供服务。日本人依赖它们购买新鲜食物、支付账单、购买相扑门票、寄包裹等等,实现24小时无休。外国游客对它们的商品范围感到惊讶;知名国际厨师赞扬它们的蛋三明治。
Konbini are the lifeblood of modern Japan. Since emerging in 1969, they have outgrown their American antecedents, becoming an essential part of the country’s social infrastructure—and a $77bn-a-year industry. The four main chains—7-Eleven, FamilyMart, Lawson and MiniStop—boast a total of 55,700 branches, dotted across every city and town; last year they served a combined 16bn customers. Japanese rely on them as places to buy fresh food, pay bills, pick up sumo tickets, send parcels, and much more, 24 hours a day. Foreign tourists marvel at the range of their offerings; famous international chefs praise their egg sandwiches.
然而,让konbini这种魔力运转的日本人越来越少。日本的劳动年龄人口在1995年达到了8700万的峰值,预计到2050年将下降至5500万。吸引更多女性和老年日本人参加工作可以在一定程度上抵消这一趋势,但效果有限。日本政治人士不愿明说,但移民也是其中的一部分答案——正如May女士升职至konbini梯队的过程所展示的。
Yet there are ever fewer Japanese to make the konbini magic happen. Japan’s working-age population peaked at 87m in 1995 and is projected to fall to 55m by 2050. Bringing more women and elderly Japanese into the workforce can help counteract the trend, but only to a limited extent. Japanese politicians are loth to say it out loud, but immigration is also part of the answer—as Ms May’s journey up the konbini ladder demonstrates.
May最初作为交换学生来到日本。2008年开始在7-Eleven工作时,日本仅有50万外国工人。人们会盯着她看。顾客经常要求和日本员工交谈。
Ms May first came to Japan as an exchange student. When she began working at 7-Eleven in 2008, there were just 500,000 foreign workers in Japan. People would stare at her. Customers often asked to speak with Japanese staff.
虽然避免谈论官方“移民政策”,但日本政府近年来已悄然为更多外国人进入该国打开了大门。自2008年以来,外国工人数量翻了四倍,去年首次达到了200万人的里程碑(另外还有120万外国人在日本居住,但没有正式工作)。3月29日,政府扩大了符合技术工人签证条件的领域。
While avoiding talk of an official “immigration policy”, the Japanese government has quietly opened the door for more foreigners to enter the country in recent years. The number of foreign workers has quadrupled since 2008, reaching the 2m mark for the first time last year. (Another 1.2m foreigners live in Japan, but do not officially work.) On March 29th the government expanded the list of fields eligible for skilled-worker visas.
外国工人数量将不得不更快增长。到2030年,日本需要420万外国工人才能实现即使是其较为温和的GDP增长目标。虽然对大规模移民持谨慎态度仍然普遍,但劳动力短缺已经说服许多商界领袖和官员,让日本成为一个多元文化的必要性。外国人目前约占日本人口的2.5%,但根据政府自身的预测,到2070年,这一比例将超过10%,类似于法国的目前水平。正如在7-Eleven负责多元文化共存工作的Yasui Makoto指出的那样,这个时代处于今天孩子们的一生之中。
The number will have to rise faster. Japan needs 4.2m foreign workers by 2030 to sustain even its modest GDP growth targets. Though wariness about large-scale immigration is still widespread, the labour crunch has convinced many business leaders and officials of the necessity of a more multicultural Japan. Foreigners make up roughly 2.5% of Japan’s population today, but according to the government’s own projections, the ratio will exceed 10% by 2070, similar to current levels in France. As Yasui Makoto, who leads efforts on multicultural coexistence at 7-Eleven, notes, that era falls within the lifetime of today’s children.
在日本的konbini里,这个时代已经到来。大约有8万外国人在该行业工作,占据了劳动力的9%;在许多大城市,有一半的7-Eleven员工是外国人(许多是学生)。在May女士的店里,她力求“提供日本水准的服务”,强调向员工介绍“小细节”的重要性,比如如何包装产品而不挤压。
Inside Japan’s konbini that era has already arrived. Some 80,000 foreigners work in the industry, accounting for 9% of the workforce; in many big cities, half of 7-Eleven staff are foreigners. (Many of them are students.) At Ms May’s shop, she seeks to “provide a Japanese level of service”, stressing to staff the importance of the “little details”, such as how to bag products and not squish them.
在7-Eleven,May被视为公司希望效仿的典范。然而,仍存在太多障碍,让其他人无法走上她的道路。许多在konbini工作的学生们在毕业后努力获得继续在那里工作的签证。相对较少的人能晋升到店长甚至店主的水平。May不得不努力获得永久居留权,一个艰难的过程,并且需要信用额度才能实现拥有店铺的梦想。尽管政府不断调整移民规定,但对于潜在移民在日本扎根仍然非常困难。
At 7-Eleven, Ms May is held up as a model the company hopes to replicate. Yet too many roadblocks remain for others to follow in her path. Many of the students who work at konbini struggle to get visas to continue working there after graduation. Relatively few rise to the level of store manager, much less an owner. Ms May had to secure permanent residence, an arduous process, and a line of credit in order to achieve her dream of owning a shop. For all the government’s tweaks to the migration rules, it is still far too difficult for prospective migrants to put down roots in Japan.
May则希望能够在日本永久居留。她正在抚养两个年幼的孩子,他们在家说缅甸语,在学校说日语。“现在我在这里有了家庭,日本感觉像家一样,”她说。和许多土生土长的日本人一样,她喜欢去温泉,也有着自己最喜欢的konbini小吃:牛肉饭。成为店长让她充满自信。“这让我想到,只要努力工作,我是外国人并不重要,”她说。慢慢地,日本也可能在学到同样的教训。■
Ms May, for her part, hopes to stay in the country for good. She is raising two young children, who speak Burmese at home and Japanese at school. “Now that I have a family here, Japan feels like home,” she says. Like many native-born Japanese, she enjoys travelling to onsen (hot springs) and has a favourite konbini snack of her own: gyu meshi, a rice bowl topped with stewed beef. Becoming a store manager gave her confidence. “It made me think that it doesn’t matter if I’m a foreigner, as long as I work hard,” she says. Japan, slowly but surely, may be learning the same lesson. ■
Read more from Banyan, our columnist on Asia:Vietnam’s head of state leaves under a cloud (Mar 27th)A string of setbacks for the junta in Myanmar presents an opportunity (Mar 21st)Pakistan’s generals look increasingly desperate (Mar 14th)
中国 | 红二代的权力 (China | The power of princelings)
中国政治家族如何决定其未来 (How China’s political clans might determine its future)
那些与毛泽东共事的后代将帮助选择该国的下一任统治者。 (The descendants of those who fought with Mao will help choose the country’s next ruler)
中国的宣传首脑渴望展示国家领导人习近平属于红色贵族阶层。他们大量出版关于习仲勋的书籍和纪录片(左图),习仲勋是毛泽东的战友。每年一次,当国家电视台播出习先生在据称为其办公桌的地方发表新年祝辞时,他父亲的照片清晰可见地放在他身后的书架上。信息显而易见:习先生的血统是无可置疑的。
China’s propaganda chiefs are eager to show that Xi Jinping, the country’s leader, belongs to the red aristocracy. They pump out books and documentaries about his late father, Xi Zhongxun (pictured, left), who was a comrade-in-arms of Mao Zedong. Once a year, when state television shows Mr Xi delivering new year’s greetings from what purports to be his desk, his father’s picture is clearly visible on a bookshelf behind him. The message is clear: Mr Xi’s bloodline is impeccable.
2012年习近平上台执政时,许多观察家将此描述为“太子党”崛起的象征,这个术语经常用来指代与毛泽东一起奋斗的最高级别革命者的后代,以及那些1949年共产党掌权后担任北京高级官员的子女(以及他们的配偶)。习近平成为党最强大机构、七人政治局常委会的四名太子党成员之一。此前从未有如此众多太子党出现在这个机构中。
When Mr Xi came to power in 2012, many observers described it as a symbol of the rise of “princelings”, a term often applied to descendants of the most senior revolutionaries who fought with Mao, as well as the offspring (and their spouses) of those who served as senior officials in Beijing after the Communists came to power in 1949. Mr Xi became one of four members of the party’s most powerful body, the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, who could be described as princelings. Never had it been so stacked with them.
在政治的最高层,如今情况看起来完全不同。经过2022年的一次重组,习近平成为政治局常委中唯一的太子党。他似乎不愿与其他可能挑战他自身血统的人分享权力。
At the highest levels of politics, things look very different today. After a reshuffle in 2022, Mr Xi became the only princeling in the Standing Committee. He appears not to want to share power with others whose pedigrees could challenge his own.
但太子党们可能决定中国未来的走向。他们仍然渗透到国有企业和金融公司的管理层,以及军队的军官阶层。在这些机构中,家族关系很重要。权力通过正式机制传递,然而其起源往往更加模糊,涉及与血统相关联的网络。这具有重大意义。当习近平离开政坛后,红色家族将拥有财富、声望和军事关系,这可能使他们能够塑造未来的走向。下一位统治者可能不是太子党,但这些宗族可能成为决策者。
But princelings might yet determine China’s future. They still permeate the management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial firms, as well as the armed forces’ officer class. In these institutions, family connections matter. Power is transmitted through formal mechanisms, yet its origins are often hazier, involving networks tied to bloodlines. This has big implications. When Mr Xi leaves the political scene, red families will have the wealth, prestige and military ties that could enable them to shape what comes after. The next ruler may not be a princeling, but the clans may be kingmakers.
要理解这一切,必须看看毛泽东1976年去世后政治演变的方式。邓小平在上世纪70年代晚期引入市场改革后,许多太子党进入了商界。由于经历了毛时代的残酷政治,他们将其视为一个更安全的选择。但邓及其同事希望将党的控制权留在诸如他们自己这样的人手中,因此他们选拔了其中几位子女培养为潜在领导人。习近平就是其中之一。他开始了在省级的一段漫长而平凡的职业生涯。
To understand all this, one must look at the way politics evolved following Mao’s death in 1976. After Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms in the late 1970s, many princelings went into business. Having experienced the vicious politics of the Mao era, they saw this as a safer option. But Deng and his colleagues wanted to keep the party in the hands of people like themselves, so they picked a few of their offspring to groom as potential leaders. Mr Xi was one of them. He began a long and unremarkable career in the provinces.
当最终到来的权力交接机会面对太子党时,习近平在他同辈中几乎没有竞争者。最显著的例外是薄熙来,这位风度翩翩、富有魅力的重庆地区党首,他是薄一波之子,后者是数位革命老前辈之一,在上世纪70年代末随邓一起 wielding 了巨大影响,其家族今天仍是红色家族中的佼佼者之一。在重庆,薄熙来背离了省级领导低调的常规,他发起了一场针对腐败的大规模运动,激起了对平等的毛时代的怀旧情绪。他的民粹主义风格吸引了许多支持者。
When the opportunity eventually came for a handover of power to princelings, Mr Xi faced little competition from others of his pedigree. The most notable exception was Bo Xilai, the suave and charismatic party chief of the south-western region of Chongqing. Mr Bo is the son of Bo Yibo, one of several revolutionary veterans who, along with Deng, wielded enormous influence from the late 1970s and whose clans today are foremost among the red families. (Most, including Deng, had died by the late 1990s, though Mr Xi’s father lived until 2002 and Mr Bo’s until 2007.) In Chongqing Mr Bo deviated from the low-profile norm of provincial leaders by waging a sweeping campaign against corruption and whipping up nostalgia for the egalitarian Mao years. His populist style attracted many supporters.
但薄熙来的政治抱负被他的警察局长潜逃到美国领事馆的行为击败,警察局长透露薄熙来的妻子杀害了一名英国商人。薄熙来在习近平接管之前几个月被逮捕。习迷最终让他因受贿和其他不端行为被判处无期徒刑。后来,习近平指控薄熙来计划“夺取权力”。据香港报纸《南华早报》报道,薄熙来现在被认为被关押在北京北郊钦程监狱,这是高层斗争的牺牲品惯常关押地。他在那里受到特殊待遇,据报道,他被允许穿西装。
But Mr Bo’s political ambitions were scuppered by the flight of his police chief to an American consulate, where he revealed that Mr Bo’s wife had murdered a British businessman. Mr Bo was arrested a few months before Mr Xi took over. Mr Xi eventually had him jailed for life for bribe-taking and other misdeeds. He later accused Mr Bo of planning to “seize power”. Mr Bo is now thought to be in Qincheng prison on Beijing’s northern outskirts, the usual place of incarceration for casualties of high-level struggles. He enjoys special treatment there. According to the South China Morning Post, a newspaper in Hong Kong, he is allowed to wear a Western suit.
为巩固自己的权力,习近平在政治局委员会的另一名太子党王岐山身上施加了重压,王岐山是姚依林的女婿(姚在邓的统治时期曾是政治局常委)。王岐山代表习近平策划了一场反腐运动,推翻了数百名高级官员和军事指挥官,从而粉碎了对新统治者的任何潜在反对。
To consolidate his power, Mr Xi leant heavily on one of his fellow princelings on the Standing Committee: Wang Qishan, the son-in-law of Yao Yilin (Yao was on the Standing Committee during Deng’s rule). On Mr Xi’s behalf, Mr Wang masterminded a war on corruption that toppled hundreds of senior officials and military commanders, thereby crushing any potential opposition to the new ruler.
2017年,王岐山从政治局常委会退下,但清洗继续进行。去年被降职的一个是红色贵族:李尚福将军在担任国防部长数月后被解职。李将军的父亲是一名革命者,在毛时代成为一名高级军官。他的涉嫌犯罪行为尚未被披露。
Mr Wang stepped down from the Standing Committee in 2017, but the purges continue. One of those felled last year was a red aristocrat: General Li Shangfu was sacked as defence minister a few months after taking up the job. General Li’s father was a revolutionary who became a high-ranking officer under Mao. His alleged offences have not been revealed.
目前,李将军仍然是中央委员会的一员,该委员会由大约370名党的精英组成,包括部长、省级领导人、国有企业老板和军方高官。但当它下次开会时,很可能被清除出去,预计这将在今年内发生。根据香港大学的程李的估计,这将只剩下九名太子党成员。习近平成为党首时,中央委员会中有41名太子党成员。
For now, General Li remains on the Central Committee, a body comprising about 370 members of the party elite, from ministers and provincial leaders to SOE bosses and military brass. But he is likely to be booted out when it next meets, probably this year. That would leave only nine members of the group who are princelings, reckons Cheng Li of the University of Hong Kong. When Mr Xi became the party’s boss the Central Committee had 41 of them (see chart).
在商业领域情况并不相同。在习近平执掌前,西方媒体揭露了一些中国权贵家庭成员积累的巨额财富的轰动性细节。《纽约时报》的调查揭示,现任和前任高级官员的亲属“积累了巨额财富,他们往往在与国家密切相连的企业中发挥核心作用,包括金融、能源、国内安全、电信和娱乐行业”。美国新闻服务机构彭博聚焦于习近平的亲属,将他们与数亿美元的资产联系起来(据报道,这些资产没有追溯到习近平,也没有找到任何有关习近平或其家人违法行为的迹象)。
In business it is a different story. In the build-up to Mr Xi’s accession, Western media uncovered sensational details of the riches accumulated by family members of some of China’s most powerful people. Investigations by the New York Times revealed that relatives of current and former senior officials had “amassed vast wealth, often playing central roles in businesses closely entwined with the state, including those involved in finance, energy, domestic security, telecommunications and entertainment”. Bloomberg, an American news service, focused on Mr Xi’s relatives, linking them to hundreds of millions of dollars in assets (it said none was traced to Mr Xi, adding that it had found no indication of any wrongdoing by Mr Xi or his family).
官员对这些报道作出了愤怒的回应。他们以阻止这些新闻机构的签证申请作为报复。2019年,中国外交部拒绝延长《华尔街日报》新加坡记者黄津汉的新闻记者证件,迫使他离开了中国。黄先生曾报道澳大利亚当局进行的一项有关有一名生意人、习大大的堂兄、也是澳大利亚入籍公民的活动的有组织犯罪调查(文章指出习先生并不知道这个人的商业和赌博事务)。据该报报道,外交部官员敦促不要发表这篇文章,警告未指明的后果。
Officials reacted furiously to the reports. They retaliated by blocking visa applications from these news organisations. In 2019 the Chinese foreign ministry refused to renew the press credentials of a Singaporean reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Chun Han Wong, forcing him to leave the country. Mr Wong had written about an organised-crime investigation by Australia’s authorities that touched on the activities of a businessman who is a cousin of Mr Xi and has become a naturalised Australian citizen. (The article said there was no evidence that Mr Xi knew about the man’s business and gambling affairs.) According to the paper, ministry officials urged it not to publish the article, warning of unspecified consequences.
2014年,《纽约时报》报道称习大大曾逼迫家人出售数亿美元的投资。其中包括他姐姐齐巧巧和姐夫邓家贵持有的矿业和房地产公司的股份。但中国企业家顿巴士,2015年移居英国,表示习的反腐行动对政治家族的交易几乎没有影响。他说:“或许现在比以前更加微妙,不那么张扬。”但他称借用家族名声为“太子党”生活中的一个天然特征。
In 2014 the New York Times reported that Mr Xi had been pushing family members to sell hundreds of millions of dollars in investments. They included stakes in mining and property firms held by his sister, Qi Qiaoqiao, and brother-in-law, Deng Jiagui. But Mr Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has had little impact on the dealings of political families, says Desmond Shum, a Chinese businessman who moved to Britain in 2015. “Maybe it’s more subtle than it used to be. It’s not so in-your-face,” he says. But he calls cashing in on the family name “a baked-in feature” of princeling life.
顿巴士是罕见的人,他既是这些交易如何运作的亲身见证者,同时也愿意公开谈论。他是杜安惠(也称为段卫红)的前夫,她曾成为张蓓莉的密友,后者是文矫堡的妻子、商业女商人和珠宝专家。他和段女士帮助安排了一些张女士的交易。(在一篇名为“红色轮盘”的爆料文章中,顿巴士写道,他们一直“小心翼翼地遵守法律的边界”)。
Mr Shum is rare as someone who is both a close-up witness of how these dealings work and who is willing to talk openly about them. He is the ex-husband of Whitney Duan, also known as Duan Weihong, who became a close friend of Zhang Beili, a businesswoman and jewellery expert who is the wife of Wen Jiabao, the former prime minister. Mr Shum and Ms Duan helped to arrange some of Ms Zhang’s deals. (In an exposé of this, “Red Roulette”, published in 2021, Mr Shum wrote that they had always been careful “to stay within the boundaries of the law”.)
在反腐败行动中,几乎没有太子党被逮捕。顿巴士表示其中一个原因是习对他们的亲近感:“这是一个网络,”他说。“他们是你父亲的合作伙伴,是你父亲同事的子女,是你父亲的手下。他们和你一起长大。” 顿巴士认为,习几乎不会将太子党送入监狱,除非他们构成政治威胁。“这几乎违背了他的成长经历,”顿巴士认为。习的崛起“实际上是在这个群体的支持下实现的。”
Few princelings have been arrested in the anti-corruption drive. Mr Shum says one reason is Mr Xi’s feeling of kinship with them: “It’s a web,” he says. “They are people who worked with your father, they are the children of your father’s colleagues, your father’s underlings. They grew up with you.” For Mr Xi to send princelings to prison, other than those who pose a political threat, would “almost go against his upbringing”, Mr Shum believes. Mr Xi’s rise “was really with the support of that group”.
习让追踪太子党的商业联系变得更加困难。作为《纽约时报》2004年至2015年的上海记者,大卫·巴博扎在曝光这些网络中扮演了重要角色。后来他共同创立了总部位于纽约的面向中国的新闻和数据平台The Wire Digital。巴博扎认为任何记者都无法获得他在中国工作时所能获取的详细公司记录,这些记录包括所有人签名、地址、身份证详细信息和电话号码。这些记录是纸质的,当局已经对获取它们的途径加强管控。“即使公司也很难获得纸质记录,”巴博扎说。
Mr Xi has made it much harder to trace the princelings’ business connections. As Shanghai correspondent of the New York Times between 2004 and 2015, David Barboza played a big role in exposing these networks. He later co-founded The Wire Digital, a China-focused news and data platform based in New York. Mr Barboza doesn’t think any journalist could obtain the kind of detailed company records that he could get access to when working in China, with owners’ signatures, addresses, ID-card details and phone numbers. These records were on paper, and the authorities have clamped down on access to them. “Even companies have a hard time getting the paper records,” Mr Barboza says.
中国公司所有权的细节仍然可在在线数据库中获取(巴博扎的公司维护着一个名为WireScreen的数据库,可以标记已知与政治有关的人员)。但中国公司提供的信息比巴博扎从记录中获取的线索要少得多。然而,他认为太子党仍在进行重大交易。“我认为情况并没有发生很大变化,除了这个方面:每个人都害怕习近平。人们要么想办法更好地隐藏资金,要么将其转移境外。”
Details of Chinese company ownership are still available from online databases (Mr Barboza’s firm maintains one, called WireScreen, that flags people known to be politically connected). But those provided by Chinese firms contain far fewer of the clues that Mr Barboza was able to glean from the records he used. He believes that the princelings are still doing big deals, however. “I don’t think it’s changed dramatically, except in this sense: everyone is afraid of Xi Jinping. And people are either trying to figure out how to hide their money better, or move it offshore.”
习并不否认血统的重要性。相反,他致力于振兴共产党,重振其“革命精神”。这包括夸大其创始人的英雄主义和理想主义。在2019年庆祝共产主义统治70周年的党庆典上,一些后代参加了天安门广场的大规模阅兵式,乘坐着喷漆成红金色的顶篷巴士,挥舞着他们显赫祖先的画像(见图片)。其中尤为显眼的是毛泽东的孙子毛新宇少将。
Mr Xi does not reject the idea that bloodlines matter. Far from it. He has dedicated his rule to revitalising the party and reviving its “revolutionary spirit”. This has involved playing up the heroism and idealism of its founding fathers. At the party’s celebrations in 2019 of 70 years of Communist rule, some of their descendants joined a massive parade through Tiananmen Square, sitting on open-top buses painted red and gold, waving portraits of their powerful ancestors (see picture). Prominent among them was Mao’s grandson, Major General Mao Xinyu.
但习的高压方式至少已经激怒了曾经支持他的一些太子党。正在撰写有关习父亲的书籍的约瑟夫·陶里基安认为,许多太子党对他非常不满。“他们认为他完全把他们排除在外,”他说。伦敦东方与非洲研究学院的奥利维亚·张认为,习可能认识到威权政权的崩溃通常是由精英内部的斗争造成的,而非公众抗议。她说:“我认为习近平对此非常警觉。因此,控制太子党必须是政治优先事项。”
But Mr Xi’s high-handed ways have angered at least some of the princelings who once backed him. Joseph Torigian, who is writing a book about Mr Xi’s father, believes that many princelings are extremely dissatisfied with him. “They think that he has just completely shut them out,” he says. Olivia Cheung of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London believes Mr Xi is mindful that the collapse of authoritarian regimes is often caused by fighting within the elite, rather than public protests. “I think Xi Jinping is quite alert to that. So keeping the princelings under control has to be a political priority.”
对于习来说,这显然是如此。薄熙来的判决就是一个鲜明的例子。但习也试图扼杀更自由派的人士。这些太子党曾是《炎黄春秋》的支持者,这本杂志探讨了毛时代的黑暗面并提出了更大的政治自由。该杂志的副总编辑是胡德华(右图),他是前党首胡耀邦的儿子,胡耀邦于1989年去世,导致全国范围内爆发争取民主的动荡。在该杂志组织的闭门会议上,太子党对政治改革的需求提出了看法,直到2016年官员清洗了该杂志的领导层(包括胡氏),并用符合习思想的新团队取而代之。
To Mr Xi, it clearly is. The sentencing of Mr Bo was a dramatic example. But Mr Xi has also tried to stifle more liberal types. Such princelings were among backers of Yanhuang Chunqiu, a journal that explored the dark side of the Mao era and suggested greater political freedom. Its deputy publisher was Hu Dehua (pictured, right), a son of the former party chief, Hu Yaobang, whose death in 1989 triggered nationwide pro-democracy upheaval. At closed-door meetings organised by the publication, the princelings aired their views on the need for political reform—until officials purged the journal’s leadership in 2016 (including Mr Hu) and replaced it with a new team in tune with Mr Xi’s thinking.
在公开违抗习近平先生的人中,少数人中有一位是一家国有房地产公司的退休主席任志强(左图)。任志强是任泉生的儿子,后者曾在毛泽东时期任职。2020年,他因腐败和滥用职权被判处18年监禁。真正的、未明言的原因是他对习近平的抨击。在称他为“一个赤身裸体的小丑,仍然决心扮演皇帝”后,他被拘留。
Among the few to have defied Mr Xi openly is the retired chairman of a state-owned property company, Ren Zhiqiang (pictured, left). Mr Ren is the son of Ren Quansheng, who served under Mao. In 2020 he was sentenced to 18 years in prison for corruption and abuse of power. The real, unstated, reason was his tirades against Mr Xi. He was detained after calling him “a clown with no clothes on who is still determined to play emperor”.
其他太子党支持习近平加强党的力量,但他们指出毛时代是中国看似更加公平、更加符合工人阶级需要的时代(他们否认了毛主义的恐怖行为)。一批新毛主义网站兴高采烈地报道支持他们事业的太子党的活动,比如他们去年举办活动以纪念毛诞辰130周年。出席者包括他的一些后裔(在政治家族中,毛的派系相对边缘)。
Other princelings support Mr Xi’s efforts to stiffen the party’s sinews, but they point to Mao’s days as a time when China was supposedly fairer and more in tune with the needs of the working class (they are denialists of Maoist horrors). A clutch of neo-Maoist websites fawningly report on the activities of princelings sympathetic to their cause, such as their staging of events last year to mark the 130th anniversary of Mao’s birth. Attendees included several of his descendants (among the political clans, Mao’s is relatively marginal).
虽然习近平已经把他们排挤出局,但宣称太子党没有政治前途将是一个错误。有三个理由让人们密切关注他们。首先,革命家族自共产党执政开始以来就一直很重要。毛泽东和邓小平都是革命时代的巨人。邓的直接继承者江泽民和胡锦涛则不是,但是他们是由邓选定的。太子党视习的统治为一种规范的恢复:在经过几年的看守行政后,由红色贵族们统治。如果习下台,他的继任者很可能会是一个傀儡。当他去世时,贵族们将期望在设计中国下一个政治阶段时有发言权。
Just because Mr Xi has sidelined them, it would be a mistake to declare that princelings have no political future. There are three good reasons for keeping an eye on them. First, revolutionary families have been important since the beginning of Communist rule. Mao and Deng were both giants of the revolutionary era. Deng’s immediate successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, were not, but they were selected by him. Mr Xi’s rule is seen by princelings as a resumption of the norm: rule by the red aristocracy after years of caretaker administration. If Mr Xi steps down, his successor is likely to be a puppet. When he dies, the aristocracy will expect a say in designing China’s next political phase.
第二个原因是,与个别竞争对手不同,家族是不可能被消灭的。太子党可能已经被习近平撇到一边,但他们的财富使他们具有很大的潜在影响力。
The second reason is that clans, unlike individual rivals, are impossible to wipe out. The princelings may have been pushed aside by Mr Xi, but their wealth gives them much potential influence.
当然,每一代新人都与长辈看世界的方式有所不同:三代革命后代中,包括一些接受西方生活方式的人,这会让他们的祖辈大感震惊。查看@baobaowan的Instagram账户。其所有者是已故的革命老人万里的孙女。“非常高兴收到中国第一辆阿斯顿·马丁DBX,以我一直喜爱的独特缎面太阳青铜色为特色,”她在2020年发布了一篇帖子。但加州大学圣地亚哥分校的史伟刚认为,这些家族的观点仍可能影响接班斗争的结果。“他们可以发挥非常关键的作用,”他说。
To be sure, each new generation sees the world differently from their elders: the hongsandai, or third-generation reds, include some whose embrace of Western lifestyles would appal their ancestors. Check the Instagram account of @baobaowan. Its owner is a grand-daughter of the late Wan Li, a veteran of the revolution. “Delighted to receive the first Aston Martin DBX in China, in the very unique satin solar bronze color that I always loved,” went a post in 2020. But Victor Shih of the University of California, San Diego, believes these families’ views may still affect the outcome of a succession struggle. “They can play a very pivotal role,” he says.
第三个太子党可能变得重要的原因就是数量。尚宁甲称,整个系统“被他们侵蚀了”。在接班逼近时,党内结构将参与决定结果。但如果历史可以作为参考,新的领导班子将由更广泛的精英组成,退休官员,尤其是那些革命好基因的官员,会发言。为了维护他们的利益,这些前领导者可能会觉得让一个拥有相同血统的人掌控权力更安全。
The third reason why princelings may prove important is simply their numbers. The system is “infested” with them, says Mr Shum. When succession looms, party structures will be involved in deciding the outcome. But, if the past is a guide, the new line-up will be decided by a broader swathe of the elite, with retired officials, especially those of good revolutionary genes, having a say. To protect their interests, these ex-leaders may feel safer with someone of their own blood in charge.
事实上,这就是2012年的情况,当时他们更喜欢习近平(尽管许多人后来开始怨恨他)。中国领导人自那时起一直致力于防止可能威胁他权力的联盟的出现。官员轮换更为频繁。努力让他们在离家乡省份更远的地方工作。但家族关系更难打破。目前,一个太子党在其他太子党中高居其上。他可能不是他们中的最后一个。 ■
Indeed, that was the case in 2012, when they preferred Mr Xi (even if many came to resent him). China’s leader has since worked hard to prevent the emergence of coalitions that might threaten his power. Officials are rotated more frequently. Efforts are made to keep them employed away from their home provinces. But clan links are harder to smash. One princeling currently towers above the others. He may not be the last of his kind. ■
中国 | 茶馆 (China | Chaguan)
中国对世界的生硬态度 (China’s tin-eared approach to the world)
它希望国家关注利益,而不是价值。小心你所期望的。 (It wanted countries to focus on interests, not values. Careful what you wish for)
中国最优秀的蛮族处理者—— 一支由外交官、技术专家、贸易使节和外交政策学者组成的精英队伍,这是一个“我早就告诉过你们”的时刻。这样的中国声音已经花费多年敦促外国政府,特别是那些与美国深度联系的政府,少去烦恼民主价值观等模糊概念,转而专注于冷酷无情的国家利益。现在,他们辩解道,时代证明了他们是正确的。
FOR CHINA’s finest barbarian-handlers—an elite corps of diplomats, technocrats, trade envoys and foreign-policy scholars—this is a told-you-so moment. Such Chinese voices have spent years urging foreign governments, especially those with deep ties to America, to fuss less about democratic values and other fuzzy notions, and to focus on cold, hard national interests. Now, they argue, the times are proving them right.
中国认为,美国暴露出自己是个伪君子,很快便指责中国或俄罗斯违反国际法、滥用人权,同时提供了用于击杀加沙平民的炸弹。在北京,人们说俄罗斯入侵乌克兰团结了西方,但以色列与哈马斯的冲突再次分裂了西方。有人预测,如果唐纳德·特朗普再次当选,他的盟友们将再次了解到这是一个无朋友的世界,“美国优先”是言出必行。在这样的时刻,明智的外国政府将停止指责其他政治体系或政权的缺陷,而是专注于让本国公民安全和繁荣。这一建议尤其适用于与中国的关系。根据中国官员和学者的说法,精明的外国领导人应该拒绝美国要求加入意识形态集团或旨在遏制中国崛起的防御联盟。相反,各国应该集中精力与中国的经济合作伙伴达成双边“互利共赢”协议。
In China’s telling, America stands exposed as a hypocrite, quick to accuse China or Russia of breaking international law and abusing human rights, while supplying bombs used to kill civilians in Gaza. In Beijing it is said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine united the West, but Israel’s conflict with Hamas is dividing it again. It is predicted that if Donald Trump is re-elected his allies will learn, once again, that this is a friendless world and that “America First” means what it says. In such a moment, wise foreign governments will stop pointing fingers at the flaws of other political systems or regimes, and concentrate on making their own citizens safe and prosperous. This advice is applied most particularly to relations with China. According to Chinese officials and scholars, shrewd foreign leaders should spurn American calls to join ideological blocs or defence alliances that are meant to contain China’s rise. Instead, states should concentrate on striking bilateral, “win-win” deals with Chinese economic partners.
中国外交政策领域的许多聚会都充斥着一种严峻的伸张正义的情绪。今天,人们说国际关系是由利益指导的逻辑。有证据表明,其他人也有这种看法,这对中国有利。新加坡智库伊斯哈克研究所进行的一项针对东南亚政治、商业和学术要人的最新在线调查令美国外交官沮丧不已。自一年前进行该调查以来,东盟国家的受访者更不认为美国是一个可靠的伙伴,并对基于国际规则的秩序更持怀疑态度。加沙冲突发挥了一定作用:尤其是在印度尼西亚或马来西亚等多数穆斯林国家,它是最被提及的地缘政治关切。排在“南海的侵略行为”之前(指中国欺凌菲律宾和其他邻国)。如果该地区必须在美国和中国之间做出选择,61%的受访者在2023年选择了美国。现在他们一刀平分。今年的调查显示,人们对中国的政治和军事影响力持越来越谨慎的态度,但其经济实力被视为无与伦比。
A mood of grim vindication suffuses many gatherings of China’s foreign-policy establishment. Today, the logic of power guides international relations, it is said. There is evidence that others share that outlook, to China’s benefit. A newly published poll of South-East Asian political, business and academic bigwigs, conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think-tank in Singapore, makes gloomy reading for American diplomats. Since the poll was last taken a year ago, respondents from ASEAN countries are less confident that America is a reliable partner and more sceptical of the international rules-based order. The conflict in Gaza plays a role: it is the most-cited geopolitical concern, especially in such majority-Muslim countries as Indonesia or Malaysia. It comes ahead of “aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea” (meaning, Chinese bullying of the Philippines and other neighbours). When asked to choose between America and China, should the region have to pick one of those rivals, 61% of respondents chose America in 2023. Now they are divided 50-50. This year’s survey shows growing wariness of China’s political and military clout. But its economic power is seen as unrivalled.
在北京的使馆区,一种务实的氛围占据主导地位。西方政府在遥远的联合国会议上挑战中国的人权记录,对新疆或西藏的镇压,或是对香港政治权利的摧毁提出关切。但外交使节们承认他们主要关注利益。世界变得太混乱,难以因价值观而对中国大声喧哗。然后还有美国的总统选举,一位外交官称之为“最后的审判”。
In Beijing’s tree-lined embassy districts, a mood of pragmatism prevails. Western governments challenge China’s human-rights record at faraway UN meetings, raising concerns about repression in Xinjiang or Tibet, or the crushing of political rights in Hong Kong. But foreign envoys admit to an overwhelming focus on interests. The world is too messy for noisily confronting China over values. Then there is America’s presidential contest, which a diplomat calls “the Armageddon election”.
简言之,中国已经获得了它一直声称想要的:一个由利益而非价值观和意识形态引导的世界。不幸的是,它的回应显得笨拙。在某些情况下,中国对他人的动机过于愤世嫉俗。中国有一个恶习,告诉其他国家他们是美国的爪牙。中国官员指责荷兰和日本政府在控制半导体等高科技工具的出口时向美国低头,并敦促他们考虑自己的利益,摒弃美国的“冷战集团思维”。事实上,这样的盟友遵循的是一个压倒性的利益:与他们最强大的安全伙伴保持关系。在一个强权为尊的世界中,中国**感到自在。但对这种世界的恐惧推动日本、韩国、澳大利亚和其他邻国加强武装力量和联盟。
In short, China has what it all along said it wanted: a world guided by interests, not values and ideology. Alas, it is responding clumsily. In some cases, it is too cynical about the motives of others. China has a bad habit of telling countries that they are America’s pawns. Chinese officials accuse the Dutch and Japanese governments of bowing to America when they control exports of semiconductors and other high-tech tools, urging them to think of their interests and shun America’s “cold war bloc mentality”. In truth, such allies are following an overwhelming interest: maintaining relations with their strongest security partner. China is comfortable in a might-makes-right world. But fears of such a world are pushing Japan, South Korea, Australia and other neighbours to upgrade their armed forces and alliances.
法国外交部长斯蒂芬·塞略尼本月访问北京显露出情况。中国总理李强告诉他的访客:“我们两国有着悠久的历史和灿烂的文明”,有着共同的“独立精神”—这是一种暗示,呼吁共同抵制美国。就在去年,法国总统埃马纽尔·马克龙称欧洲在台湾战争中不应成为美国的“跟风者”,令中国感到高兴。尽管如此,法国和其他欧洲大国基于各自国家利益做出了严肃的争端。有些是涉及地缘政治的。塞略尼呼吁中国向俄罗斯发出“明确信息”,不能强加和平于乌克兰,补充说“如果没有按照国际法达成和平,欧洲将无法安全”。
A visit to Beijing this month by France’s foreign minister, Stéphane Séjourné, was revealing. China’s prime minister, Li Qiang, told his visitor that “our two countries have a long history and splendid civilisations” and a shared “spirit of independence”—a coded appeal to resist America together. Only last year France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, pleased China by saying that Europe should not be a “follower” of America in the event of war over Taiwan. For all that, France and other European powers have serious disputes with China, based on calculations of their national interests. Some involve geopolitics. Mr Séjourné called on China to pass “clear messages” to Russia that peace cannot be imposed on Ukraine, adding that “there will be no security for Europeans if there is no peace in accordance with international law.”
最激烈的争吵涉及经济。随着国内需求疲弱和房地产市场低迷,中国押注于出口导向的制造业繁荣。随着美国将自身封锁,欧洲担心成为一波中国商品涌入的最后一个大市场。塞略尼告诉他的中方同行王毅,欧洲与中国之间日益扩大的贸易逆差“不具持续性”。
The sharpest rows involve economics. With domestic demand weak and the property sector slumping, China is betting on an export-led manufacturing boom. As America walls itself off, Europe fears being the last large market open to a wave of Chinese goods. Mr Séjourné told his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, that Europe’s growing trade deficit with China is “not sustainable”.
中国对欧盟对中国电动汽车制造商补贴进行的贸易调查感到愤怒。在北京,人们称这是一种威胁,试图勒索中国公司在欧洲开设电动汽车工厂,这或许是事实。然而,中国的论点常常听起来漫不经心或听不进去。官方新华社抨击认为中国过剩产能威胁他国的观念,称这是“基本的经济知识,过剩产品一旦满足了国内需求,自然会寻找别处的市场。”这忽略了一些基本的政治:中国选择寻求海外增长,而非刺激国内需求。中国渴望拥有一个由利益主导的与世界关系。现在它得到了。是时候开始更尊重外国人的利益了。 ■
China is indignant about an EU trade probe into subsidies for electric-vehicle makers in China. In Beijing this is called a bid to blackmail Chinese firms into opening EV factories in Europe, and perhaps it is. Often, though, Chinese arguments sound dismissive or tin-eared. The official Xinhua news agency attacked the notion that Chinese overcapacity threatens other countries, calling it “basic economics that surplus products naturally seek out markets elsewhere once domestic demand is met”. That ignores some basic politics: China has chosen to seek growth overseas, rather than stimulate demand at home. It yearned for interests-dominated relations with the world. Now it has them. Time to start treating foreigners’ interests with more respect. ■
从本栏目的专栏作家查观了解更多中国相关内容:中国的低生育率困境(3月21日)为何中国的信心危机没有解决(3月7日)中国敦促银行家更加爱国(2月29日)*
Read more from Chaguan, our columnist on China:China’s low-fertility trap (Mar 21st)Why China’s confidence crisis goes unfixed (Mar 7th)China tells bankers to be more patriotic (Feb 29th)
国际 | 大规模屠杀 (International | Mass killings)
卢旺达30年后,种族灭绝仍是魔鬼问题 (Thirty years after Rwanda, genocide is still a problem from hell)
大规模屠杀达到20年来的最高水平 (Mass killings are at their highest level in two decades)
种族大屠杀始于1994年4月7日,当时总统卫队成员开始暗杀反对派领导人和政府中的温和分子。在几个小时之内,卢旺达少数图西人的种族大屠杀就开始了。 这是历史上最快的大规模屠杀之一:100天后,卢旺达四分之三的图西人,大约50万人,丧生。 大多数人被杀害的不是军队,而是多数群体——胡图族普通民众。 “邻居砍死邻居,“美国记者菲利普·古瑞维奇写道。“医生杀死他们的病人,学校老师杀死他们的学生。”
The killing started on April 7th 1994, as members of the presidential guard began assassinating opposition leaders and moderates in the government. Within hours the genocide of Rwanda’s minority Tutsis was under way. It was among the fastest mass killings in history: 100 days later three-quarters of Rwanda’s Tutsis, about 500,000 people, were dead. Most were killed not by the army but by ordinary Hutus, the majority group. “Neighbours hacked neighbours to death,” wrote Philip Gourevitch, an American journalist. “Doctors killed their patients, and schoolteachers killed their pupils.”
大约2500名联合国驻卢旺达维和部队几乎没有采取任何行动。 温和派胡图族总理阿加特·乌伊林吉玛纳是首批遇害者之一。 她曾受到15名联合国维和人员的保护,但他们投降了。 自由党图西族领袖兰多·恩达辛瓦打电话给维和人员,称士兵正在准备袭击他的家。 一名军官答应派遣一个小分队,但当他听到枪声时仍在通话中。“为时已晚,”兰多说。
The roughly 2,500 United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda did almost nothing. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the moderate Hutu prime minister, was among the first to die. She had been guarded by 15 UN peacekeepers, but they surrendered. Lando Ndasingwa, the Tutsi leader of the Liberal party, called the peacekeepers, saying that soldiers were preparing to attack his home. An officer promised to send a detachment, but was still on the phone when he heard gunfire. “It’s too late,” Lando said.
全世界袖手旁观。 罗密欧·达莱尔,指挥维和部队的加拿大将军,事先得到了灭绝计划的警告。 他在给当时的联合国维和主管科菲·安南的电报中说,他计划突袭武器库,预防种族大屠杀。 安南拒绝了许可,命令他不要采取任何“可能导致使用武力”的行动。 在种族灭绝发生后的三周内,安理会投票决定撤回所有维和部队,只留下大约270名。
The world stood by and watched. Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian general commanding the peacekeepers, was warned beforehand of the extermination plan. In a cable to Kofi Annan, then the UN’s peacekeeping chief, he said he planned to raid arms caches and pre-empt the genocide. Annan refused permission and ordered him to do nothing that “might lead to the use of force”. Three weeks into the genocide, the Security Council voted to withdraw all but about 270 peacekeeping troops. “This world body aided and abetted genocide,” the general later wrote.
30年过去了,卢旺达种族灭绝被铭记为1990年代导致全球良心受到责备,誓言再也不会袖手旁观,允许大规模暴行发生的两个事件之一。另一个是波斯尼亚塞族分子在接下来的一年里在斯雷布雷尼察屠杀成千上万穆斯林男子和男孩。 2005年,联合国大会一致通过了所有国家都有义务通过武力阻止种族灭绝和战争罪行的原则。梦想是从卢旺达的恐怖中诞生一个得到有效监督的世界。
Thirty years later, the Rwandan genocide is remembered as one of two events in the 1990s that prodded a guilt-ridden world to pledge never again to stand aside and allow mass atrocities. The other was the massacre by Bosnian Serbs of thousands of Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica the following year. In 2005 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the principle that all countries have a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) people from genocide and war crimes, by force if necessary. The dream was that from Rwanda’s horrors would emerge a well-policed world.
然而,噩梦继续。 在埃塞俄比亚、缅甸、苏丹、叙利亚、也门和其他地方,全球强国几乎什么都没做,数百万人被炸死、毒气轰炸和饿死。 加沙战争也带来了原则与地缘政治之间的紧张关系,在媒体、外交和国际法庭中,哈马斯的暴行和以色列长达六个月的破坏性军事行动的合法性的争议和反驳引发了激烈的说法。
Instead the nightmare has continued. In Ethiopia, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere, global powers have done almost nothing as millions have been bombed, gassed and starved. The war in Gaza, too, has brought tensions between principles and geopolitics to a head, with bitter claims and counterclaims about Hamas’s atrocities and the legality of Israel’s destructive six-month-long military campaign, which have played out in the media, diplomacy and international courts.
要理解全球阻止大规模屠杀的努力是如何崩溃的(以及它是否可以复兴),最好从卢旺达开始,这强化了全球人权倡导者的案例,然后再考虑到怎样愤世嫉俗的现实政治力量卷土重来。
To understand how the global push to prevent mass killings collapsed (and whether it can be revived), it helps to start with Rwanda, which strengthened the case of global human-rights advocates, and then to examine how cynical realpolitik made a comeback.
早在1990年代初是充满希望的。 冷战的结束促使东欧和非洲的民主蓬勃发展。第一次海湾战争将萨达姆·侯赛因的军队赶出了科威特,表明不会容忍扩张战争。由美国领导的西方国家在饥荒肆虐的索马里派遣部队保护人道主义任务,这显示了他们不仅关心石油,还关心挨饿者的福祉。 自由民主的传播似乎势不可挡。
The early 1990s were hopeful years. The end of the cold war allowed democracy to blossom in eastern Europe and in Africa. The first Gulf war ejected Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait and signalled that wars of expansion would not be tolerated. Western powers led by America sent troops into famine-struck Somalia to guard a humanitarian mission under attack by warlords, showing that they cared not just about oil but about the welfare of the starving. The spread of liberal democracy seemed unstoppable.
然而,现实也有一票。 在卢旺达发生种族灭绝的六个月前,美国在摩加迪沙的18名突击队员被杀后撤出了索马里。 这场战斗投下了一道长长的阴影:波斯尼亚的联合国维和部队被告知不要对被击打时做出强有力反应,因为担心 “越过摩加迪沙线”并卷入战斗。 美国总统比尔·克林顿反对除非涉及到美国国家利益的维和行动。
Yet reality had a vote. Six months before the genocide in Rwanda, America pulled out of Somalia after 18 of its commandos were killed in Mogadishu, the capital. The battle cast a long shadow: UN peacekeepers in Bosnia were instructed not to respond forcefully when fired on, for fear that they “cross the Mogadishu line” and become embroiled in the fighting. Bill Clinton, America’s president, turned against peacekeeping operations unless they involved America’s national interests.
而卢旺达不涉及美国的国家利益。 国务院的律师警告官员不要称那里的暴行为种族灭绝,以免政府承担“实际行动”。 英国驻联合国大使警告不要在保护平民方面“承诺我们无法实现的事情”。
Rwanda did not. State Department lawyers warned officials not to call the atrocities there a genocide, lest it commit the government to “actually do something”. Britain’s ambassador to the UN warned against “promising what we could not deliver” in terms of protecting civilians.
然而,当种族灭绝的恐怖变得显而易见时,西方选民和政治精英对这种冷酷的计算感到愤慨。塞曼莎·帕尔(Samantha Power)是一名前记者,现在负责美国援助机构,她在自传中讲述,乔治·W·布什总统在一篇她撰写的关于美国未能在卢旺达采取行动的文章总结备忘录上匆匆写下了“不能让这种事情在我的任期内发生”。国际危机组织(ICG)驻纽约的联合国资深观察员理查德·高温(Richard Gowan)称:“托尼·布莱尔、大卫·卡梅伦、法国的尼古拉·萨科齐等一代政治家见证了他们前任的失误,这影响了他们对后来危机的回应。” 在2000年,英国首相布莱尔派军队进入塞拉利昂,制止了正在砍掉人们手臂的叛军。
Still, when the horror of the genocide became clear, Western voters and political elites were revolted by this cold-hearted calculus. Samantha Power, a former journalist who now heads America’s aid agency, recounts in her memoir that President George W. Bush scribbled “not on my watch” on a memo summarising an article she had written about America’s failure to act in Rwanda. “You had a generation of politicians like Tony Blair, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy in France, who had seen their predecessors’ failings, and that shaped their responses to later crises,” says Richard Gowan, a veteran UN-watcher in New York with the International Crisis Group (ICG), a think-tank. In 2000 Mr Blair, Britain’s prime minister, sent troops into Sierra Leone, stopping rebels who were chopping off people’s hands.
这种干预的障碍在于国家不应该干涉彼此的内部事务的信条。 联合国于1945年签署的宪章禁止干涉“基本上属于任何国家内部管辖范围的事务”。 尽管其安理会可以授权使用武力,但这仅仅是对侵略的回应,而非为了防止暴行。 新独立的非洲国家已经受够了殖民大国践踏其主权。 1963年,他们组建了非洲统一组织(OAU),成员国承诺“不干涉”。
Standing in the way of such interventions was the doctrine that countries should not interfere in each other’s internal affairs. The UN’s charter, signed in 1945, forbade meddling in “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. Though its Security Council could authorise force, this was intended as a response to aggression, not to prevent atrocities. Newly independent African countries had had their fill of colonial powers trampling on their sovereignty. In 1963, when they formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the members committed themselves to “non-interference”.
卢旺达动摇了这种信念。 2003年,非洲联盟(AU),OAU的继任者,赋予自己干预以防止严重罪行的权力。 其他国家更进一步:美国、英国和其他几个西方国家开始声称拥有单方面使用武力的权利,无须安理会授权,他们认为,由于其五个常任理事国——美国、英国、中国、法国和苏联(现为俄罗斯)都拥有否决权,安理会已陷于瘫痪。 布莱尔在1999年芝加哥的一次演讲中概述了一种基于价值观而非任何领土野心的正义战争理论。 他坚称世界不能将屠杀置之不理。这一理论此后成为政策。 2018年,英国政府保留了在未经安理会授权的情况下防止暴行的权利,因为其瘫痪将导致平民人口遭受“严重后果”。
Rwanda shook that belief. In 2003 the African Union (AU), the OAU’s successor, gave itself the power to intervene to prevent grave crimes. Others went further: America, Britain and several other Western countries began claiming the right to use force unilaterally without the authority of the Security Council, which they argued had become paralysed because each of its five permanent members—America, Britain, China, France and the Soviet Union (now Russia)—has veto power. In a speech in Chicago in 1999, Mr Blair outlined a doctrine of just wars “based not on any territorial ambitions but on values”. He insisted the world could not simply allow mass murder. That doctrine has since become policy. In 2018 the British government reserved the right to prevent atrocities without the Security Council’s authorisation, if its paralysis would lead to “grave consequences” for civilian populations.
所有这些融合成一种被称为“自由干预主义” 的思潮。 1999年科索沃,北约轰炸了当时的塞尔维亚一部分,无需安理会授权,以制止对阿尔巴尼亚族群的种族灭绝。 一家国际委员会随后判定这场轰炸行动是“非法”的,但仍“合法”,因为没有其他方法能停止对平民的杀戮。 然而,许多人对强大国家以人权名义自行轰炸其他国家的权力感到不安。 较弱的国家担心这将为“新殖民主义”干预开脱责任。
All this converged into a current of thought known as “liberal interventionism”. In Kosovo in 1999 NATO bombed what was then part of Serbia, without Security Council authorisation, to stop a genocide against ethnic Albanians. An international commission subsequently judged the bombing campaign “illegal” but nonetheless “legitimate” because there was no other way to stop the killing of civilians. Yet many were unsettled that powerful countries were arrogating the authority to bomb others in the name of human rights. Weaker states worried it would excuse “neocolonial” interference.
安南,当时是联合国秘书长,试图调和主权和对平民的保护。 在2000年,他提出了一个问题:“如果人道主义干预确实是对主权不可接受的侵犯,我们应该如何回应卢旺达、斯雷布尼察?” 答案是R2P,试图协调自由干预主义者的愿望和弱国家的担忧。 2005年,联合国一致通过了R2P决议,该决议规定国家有责任干预,但仅在安理会授权时。 一位英国历史学家马丁·吉尔伯特爵士称其为“360年来对国家主权最重大的调整”。 澳大利亚前外交部长之一、R2P的创始人之一加雷思·埃文斯认为这种说法太过了。 尽管如此,他称之为“一个非常成功的事业”。
Annan, by then the UN’s secretary general, tried to reconcile sovereignty and protection of civilians. In 2000 he asked: “If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica?” The answer was R2P, which tried to reconcile the aspirations of liberal interventionists with the worries of weak states. The R2P resolution, passed unanimously by the UN in 2005, held that countries had a responsibility to intervene, but only when authorised by the Security Council. A British historian, Sir Martin Gilbert, called it “the most significant adjustment to national sovereignty in 360 years”. That goes too far, thinks Gareth Evans, a former foreign minister of Australia and one of the founders of R2P. Nonetheless, he calls it “a wildly successful enterprise”.
埃文斯先生认为,R2P建立了一种新的规范:今天没有官员可以公开出于国家原因对种族灭绝置之不理,就像亨利·基辛格(当时是美国国务卿)在1975年与柬埔寨红色高棉合作时所做的那样。 与此同时,自卢旺达事件以来,几乎所有联合国部队都被指示保护平民——然而,阿兰·多斯在利比里亚和刚果运行此类任务时表示,他们很少得到足够的部队。 批评者反驳说,R2P对国家没有产生约束力的义务。 威斯敏斯特大学的艾丹·黑尔表示,这一理论是“一个只有口号、被国家热情支持但缺乏实质内容的口号”。
Mr Evans argues that R2P created a new norm: no official today can openly shrug off genocide for reasons of state, as Henry Kissinger, then America’s secretary of state, did while cosying up to Cambodia’s Khmers Rouges in 1975. Meanwhile, since Rwanda almost all UN forces have been ordered to protect civilians—though they are seldom given enough troops to do so, says Alan Doss, who ran such missions in Liberia and Congo. Critics counter that R2P creates no binding obligations on countries. The doctrine is a “slogan…enthusiastically avowed by states but one devoid of substance”, says Aidan Hehir of the University of Westminster.
在2011年初,R2P 的首次现实考验中,安理会批准北约使用武力保护利比亚平民。(两周后,他们在科特迪瓦再次这样做。)“我拒绝等到屠杀和大规模坟墓的图像出现才采取行动”,巴拉克·奥巴马总统说道。至关重要的是,安理会三个轮值非洲成员国(加蓬,尼日利亚和南非)背离了非洲联盟的立场,并支持了相关决议。然而,并非所有人都持积极态度。共和党前外交官约翰·博尔顿称R2P 是一个“模糊而无限的信条”,它最大的危险不在于可能失败,而在于可能成功并导致越来越多的外国卷入。
In early 2011, in the first real-world test of R2P, the Security Council approved the use of force by NATO to protect civilians in Libya. (It did so again two weeks later in Ivory Coast.) “I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action,” President Barack Obama said. Crucially, the council’s three rotating African members (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) broke with the AU and supported the resolution. But not everyone was enthusiastic. John Bolton, a Republican former diplomat, had called R2P “a gauzy, limitless doctrine” whose greatest danger was not that it might fail, but that it might succeed and lead to ever more foreign entanglements.
事实上,原本应该是R2P 辩护的事实证明却导致了它的覆灭。最初,利比亚的轰炸效果很好,阻止了利比亚东部城市班加西的平民大屠杀。然而,英国和法国随后超出了安理会授予的权限,推翻了利比亚独裁者穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲。随之而来的内战使整个地区陷入动荡。这削弱了西方干预的热情。莱顿大学前联合国R2P特别顾问卡伦·史密斯提到:“‘西方干预非洲动机长期存疑’的长期怀疑是因为这一事件而重新活跃起来。”R2P 的非洲支持者,如南非,变成了怀疑派。联合国前官员、R2P的设计者之一拉梅什·萨库尔在利比亚事件后写道:“良好的意图并不能自动形成良好的结果。相反,没有这样严重的人道主义危机,外部的军事干预也可能让情况变得更糟。”
In the event, what was to have been R2P’s vindication proved its undoing. At first the bombing in Libya worked, preventing a massacre of civilians in Benghazi, a city in the country’s east. Yet Britain and France then stretched the authority granted by the Security Council and toppled Muammar Qaddafi, Libya’s dictator. The subsequent civil war destabilised the entire region. That dampened the West’s enthusiasm for intervention. It also revived “long-held suspicions of the motivations behind Western interventions in Africa”, argues Karen Smith of Leiden University, a former UN special adviser on R2P. African supporters of the doctrine, such as South Africa, turned into sceptics. “Good intentions do not automatically shape good outcomes,” Ramesh Thakur, a former UN official and an architect of R2P, wrote after the effort in Libya went sour. “On the contrary, there is no humanitarian crisis so grave that an outside military intervention cannot make it worse.”
对许多人来说,利比亚的任务蔓延是破坏R2P 的原罪。“一切开始走下坡路的时刻,”埃文斯先生叹息道。然而,即使利比亚的行动取得成功,这项信条很可能也会遭受挫折。西方公众已经厌倦了长达十年的“反恐战争”,以及在那些似乎不想要自由民主制度的国家建立失败的努力。“我们现在有一批由于伊拉克和阿富汗干预失败而塑造的一代政治家,”国际危机组织的戈文表示。
For many, mission creep in Libya was the original sin that undermined R2P. “It’s when things started to fall apart,” laments Mr Evans. Yet even had the Libyan campaign succeeded, the doctrine would probably have stumbled. Western publics were tiring of the decade-long “war on terror” and unsuccessful efforts at building liberal democracies in countries that did not seem to want them. “We now have a generation of politicians who have been shaped by the failure of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan,” says the ICG’s Mr Gowan.
这一点在2013年变得明显,叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德向平民投掷了神经气体。那时,奥巴马对使用武力变得怀疑;他提到红线,但当红线被跨越时却几乎无所作为。其他西方国家也不愿意采取行动。结果表明,不作为也是有代价的。到2023年,叙利亚内战可能已造成35万人丧生,约一半人口流离失所,将成千上万难民涌入周边国家和欧洲。
That became clear in 2013 when Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, dropped nerve gas on civilians. By then Mr Obama had grown sceptical about using force; he spoke of red lines but did little when they were crossed. Other Western powers were no more eager to act. Inaction, it turned out, has costs too. By 2023 Syria’s civil war had claimed perhaps 350,000 lives and displaced roughly half of the population, sending waves of refugees into neighbouring countries and Europe.
安理会被地缘政治的对抗所束缚。一些人指出“大国加害行为”的问题,即安理会常任理事国本身犯下暴行。俄罗斯在2008年入侵格鲁吉亚,在2014年和2022年以更大规模入侵乌克兰;其主要兴趣在于破坏安理会。在2011年至2022年期间,俄罗斯否决了有关叙利亚的17项决议,还阻止了对乌克兰的任何行动。中国一直不愿批准采取行动来防止暴行,或许是因为它保留了虐待本国公民的权利。在叙利亚问题上,中国与俄罗斯一道投票,坚称制裁将侵犯该国主权。
The Security Council was hamstrung by geopolitical rivalry. Some point to the problem of the “great-power perpetrator”, in which a permanent member of the council itself commits atrocities. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014 and on a bigger scale in 2022; it has been mainly interested in undermining the council. Between 2011 and 2022 it vetoed 17 resolutions on Syria, and it has blocked any action on Ukraine. China has been reluctant to approve actions to prevent atrocities, perhaps because it reserves the right to abuse its own citizens. On Syria it voted with Russia, insisting that sanctions would abridge the country’s sovereignty.
在叙利亚不作为之后,面对其他地方的暴行却表现出被动。2017年,缅甸政府军开始屠杀和强奸罗兴亚人,这是一支长期受迫害的穆斯林少数族裔群体,联合国和美国将此称为种族灭绝。但安理会却无能为力,因为中国和俄罗斯阻止其发布甚至是轻微的关切声明。
The failure to act in Syria has been followed by passivity in the face of atrocities elsewhere. In 2017 government forces in Myanmar began killing and raping Rohingyas, a long-persecuted Muslim minority group, in what the UN and America have branded genocide. Again the Security Council was powerless, as China and Russia prevented it from issuing even mild statements of concern.
2020年,埃塞俄比亚爆发内战。政府军封锁了北部地区提格雷,并故意使其约600万人陷于饥饿。两年后,战争结束时,据信大约有60万人死亡,几乎全是平民。安理会几乎完全保持缄默。俄罗斯和中国并非唯一的障碍:非洲联盟放弃了对战争罪行的“不中立”政策,支持埃塞俄比亚政府,阻止了将冲突提请安理会的努力。因此,“非洲的防暴机制可能会保持关闭状态,其工具悄然生锈”,塔夫茨大学的亚历克斯·德瓦尔写道。
In 2020 civil war broke out in Ethiopia. Government forces sealed off Tigray, a northern region, and deliberately starved its roughly 6m people. By the war’s end two years later some 600,000 are thought to have died, nearly all of them civilians. The Security Council stayed almost completely silent. Russia and China were not the only obstacles: the AU dropped its policy of “non-indifference” to war crimes and sided with the Ethiopian government, blocking efforts to raise the conflict before the council. As a result, “the atrocity-prevention toolbox for Africa is likely to remain shut, its tools quietly rusting away,” wrote Alex de Waal of Tufts University.
The situation is being repeated today in Sudan, where civil war risks causing the world’s biggest famine, with at least 25m people in need of food. Much of the blame lies with the Sudanese Armed Forces, which have blocked the flow of aid into areas controlled by their enemy, the Rapid Support Forces, a group of rebellious paramilitaries. They, in turn, are accused of genocidal killings. For almost a year Russia and China blocked even calls for a ceasefire. The wider world has been indifferent. “We seem to be rapidly unlearning the lessons of Rwanda,” says Mr Gowan.
在苏丹,如今的情况重演,内战可能导致全球最大规模的饥荒,至少有 2500 万人急需粮食。苏丹军队承担了很大的责任,他们堵塞了援助物资流入由叛军武装力量“快速支援部队”控制的地区。叛军武装力量被指控实施种族灭绝式的屠杀。俄罗斯和中国近一年来一直甚至阻止呼吁停火。国际社会似乎漠不关心。“我们似乎正迅速地忘记卢旺达的教训。”Gowan 先生说。
This is the backdrop for the claims and counterclaims in the Middle East. After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th, killing and abducting 1,400 people, mainly civilians, the West affirmed Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence. Yet worldwide protests erupted almost immediately against Israel, and have spread as its military campaign has killed around 33,000 civilians and fighters in Gaza, according to the Hamas-run health authority.
这是中东地区索赔与反驳的背景。哈马斯在 10 月 7 日袭击以色列,造成 1400 人死亡和被绑架,主要是平民,西方肯定了以色列自卫的合法权利。然而,对以色列的全球抗议几乎立即爆发,并随着以色列的军事行动在加沙造成大约 33000 名平民和战士死亡,这一抗议活动蔓延开来,根据哈马斯管理的卫生部门的数据。
From one perspective the conflict has triggered a renaissance in the use of international law to curtail violence. The Security Council has proved ineffective, with America, China and Russia blocking each other’s resolutions (although on March 25th America allowed one to pass, calling for a ceasefire and the release of Hamas’s hostages). But several countries have turned to international courts. South Africa asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to order Israel to halt its military operations, invoking the Genocide Convention, which Israel has signed. It also filed complaints at the International Criminal Court (ICC), a different court in The Hague that can arraign individuals. (This was quite a turnabout: South Africa had flirted with quitting the ICC to avoid honouring its arrest warrants.) While the trial at the icj continues, it has ordered Israel to take steps including providing humanitarian aid, on the basis that it is “plausible” that it is breaching the Genocide Convention. Israel says it is complying with the order; many dispute that.
从某种角度看,这场冲突引发了国际法用于限制暴力的复兴。联合国安理会证明失效,美国、中国和俄罗斯相互阻挠彼此的决议(尽管美国在 3 月 25 日允许通过一项决议,呼吁停火和释放哈马斯的人质)。但是,一些国家已转向国际法院。南非要求驻哈格国际法院(ICJ)命令以色列停止军事行动,援引以色列已签署的种族灭绝公约。南非还在驻哈格的另一家国际刑事法院(ICC)提出了投诉,这家法院可以起诉个人。(这是一个相当大的转变:南非曾考虑退出 icc 以避免履行其逮捕令。)尽管 icj 的审判还在继续,但已经要求以色列采取一些措施,包括提供人道主义援助,理由是“看似”违反了种族灭绝公约。以色列表示正在遵守这一命令;很多人对此表示怀疑。
Yet from another viewpoint the icj case illuminates the shortcomings of international law in an age of bitter geopolitical divides. The ICJ has no jurisdiction over war crimes other than genocide, which encourages complainants to allege genocide even when the facts do not support it. That cheapens the taboo against genocide and discredits the court. The icj case has disillusioned some Western countries. America says the allegation of genocide is “meritless”, and Britain says South Africa’s decision to bring the case was “wrong and provocative” and that Israel’s actions cannot be described as genocide. For its part, China, usually a foe of international courts’ ordering countries around, has opportunistically decided it likes the claims against Israel. The case will take years to resolve and the icj cannot compel compliance with its orders without the help of the Security Council, which is split.
然而,从另一个角度看,icj 一案揭示了在充满激烈地缘政治分歧的时代国际法的不足之处。ICJ 对除种族灭绝之外的战争罪行没有司法管辖权,这助长了投诉方即使事实不支持也要声称种族灭绝的倾向。这降低了对种族灭绝的禁忌,并使法庭声誉扫地。icj 一案使一些西方国家感到幻灭。美国表示种族灭绝的指控“毫无价值”,英国表示南非提出此案是“错误和挑衅性的”,以色列的行为不能被描述为种族灭绝。至于中国,通常是国际法院命令国家行事的敌人,却机会主义地决定支持针对以色列的指控。该案将需要多年时间解决,icj 无法强制执行其命令,除非安理会协助,而安理会目前存在分歧。
Is there still hope for a credible and universal doctrine to prevent mass killings? Mr Evans thinks so, and that current conflicts may alert the midsize powers of the new multipolar world to the need to prevent atrocities. That seems more a wish than a prediction: his memoir, published in 2017, is titled “Incorrigible Optimist”. But it is hard to disagree with his aspiration. “We can’t afford to let the flame die,” he says. ■
在阻止大规模屠杀的可信且普世的信条中还有希望吗?Evans 先生认为有,当前的冲突可能会使中小型大国警觉到防止暴行的必要性,这似乎更像是一个愿望而不是一个预测:他于 2017 年出版的回忆录名为“难以改正的乐观主义者”。但很难不同意他的愿景。“我们不能让火焰熄灭,”他说。■
商业 | 一个新的开端? (Business | A new opening?)
在中国做生意的全新颠覆性规则 (The mind-bending new rules for doing business in China)
习近平向西方老板和投资者传递混杂信息。 (Xi Jinping is sending mixed messages to Western bosses and investors)
多年来,外国公司急于进入中国,但他们面临着相当可观的官僚障碍。如今,许多公司却在撤退。过去的12个月中,几家外国律师事务所关闭了它们在中国的一部分或全部办事处。美国的奥睿科、赫林顿与萨利夫律师事务所于3月22日宣布将关闭他们20年前在上海开设的办事处。另一家名为阿金·甘普·斯特劳斯·豪尔和费尔德的公司计划今年完全退出中国。一些全球性投资银行正在裁减他们在中国的员工。一些大型会计事务所和尽职调查机构也在进行裁员。2023年,中国的外商直接投资下降至30年来的最低水平。
FOR YEARS foreign companies were desperate to get into China, and faced formidable bureaucratic obstacles in their way. Now many are getting out. Over the past 12 months several foreign law firms have closed some or all of their Chinese offices. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, an American one, said on March 22nd it would shut the Shanghai office it opened 20 years ago. Another, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, plans to exit China altogether this year. Some global investment banks are pruning their Chinese staff. So are a few large accountancies and due-diligence groups. In 2023 foreign direct investment in China fell to its lowest level in 30 years.
外国公司改变心意的原因之一是中国经济的糟糕状态。在那些报告其中国收入的18家最大跨国公司中,有13家在2023年的年度收入下降。两家科技巨头高通和三星的销售额下降超过20%。苹果在2024年前六周销售的iPhone几乎比前一年同期减少四分之一。二月份,特斯拉的电动车销量减少了19%。中国市场疲软是法国Gucci品牌所有者开云集团预计第一季度亚洲销售量将减少五分之一的主要原因。
One reason for foreigners’ change of heart is the sorry state of the Chinese economy. Of the 18 largest multinational companies that report their earnings from China, 13 saw annual revenues there fall in 2023. Qualcomm and Samsung, two technology giants, recorded sales drops of more than 20%. Apple sold nearly a quarter fewer iPhones in the first six weeks of 2024 than it did in the same period the year before. In February Tesla shifted 19% fewer electric cars. Weak Chinese sales are the main reason why Kering, the French owner of Gucci, expected to flog a fifth less of its bling in Asia in the first quarter.
习近平主席和共产党对这些问题了如指掌。他们关心。这至少是3月24日至25日在北京举行的中国发展论坛(CDF)上高调宣传的信息,几天后在博鳌论坛也有所呼应,这是中国对达沃斯论坛(没那么多雪)的回应。在这两个盛会上的氛围明显好于去年,那时一架疑似中国间谍气球飘过美国空域,最终在乔·拜登总统的命令下被击落,破坏了气氛。许多西方公司高管重新出现;超过80位外国首席执行官前往北京,其中包括许多美国人。在博鳌,一位高级官员发誓,中国将简化资本进出国的程序。就在两天前的一个独立活动中,习先生向一些美国首席执行官承诺,中国将继续进行改革开放。
President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party are keenly aware of these problems. And they care. At least that was the message broadcast loudly at the China Development Forum (CDF) in Beijing on March 24th-25th, and echoed a few days later at the Boao Forum, China’s (less snowy) answer to Davos. The mood at both jamborees was decidedly better than last year, when it was spoiled by a suspected Chinese spy balloon floating above America before being shot down on the orders of President Joe Biden. Many Western corporate bigwigs who stayed away were back; more than 80 foreign chief executives turned up in Beijing, including lots of Americans. In Boao a senior official vowed that China would make it easier to move capital in and out of the country. Two days earlier, at a separate event, Mr Xi assured a handful of American CEOs that China would continue to reform and open up.
与会者报告称,习近平和党内官员现在比过去四年更积极强调中国仍然向外国开放市场——这是一种改变,这是疫情期间,中国领导人极力使自己与外界隔离的阶段。曾参加了今年和去年CDF的一位老板表示:“这些会议至少表明了双方有强烈的沟通意愿。”三月初,中国国务院推出了一份有关吸引外资的24点“行动计划”。其中包括保护知识产权、促进贸易协议等熟悉的想法,以及促进跨境数据流动等受欢迎的新增内容。几周后,主要的互联网监管机构放宽了一些令外国商人过去两年对常规事务感到紧张的繁琐数据规定,比如给海外同事发送电子邮件等事项。
Participants report that Mr Xi and party officials are doing more now than in the past four years to stress that China is still open for business—a nice change after the pandemic years, when its leaders assiduously quarantined themselves from the outside world. “At the very least the meetings showed there is a strong desire to communicate,” says a boss who attended the CDF both this year and last. Earlier in March the State Council, China’s cabinet, launched a 24-point “action plan” for attracting foreign investment. It included familiar ideas such as protecting intellectual property and promoting trade agreements, and welcome additions such as fostering cross-border data flows. A few weeks later the main internet regulator eased some onerous data rules that in the past two years have made foreign businesspeople nervous about routine things such as sending emails to colleagues abroad.
问题在于,习近平重新吸引外国企业回国的愿望与他的其他目标相冲突。观察人士形容他的领导模式为“想要这个、那个和其他的”。外国公司可以在中国做生意,但不得触及中国数据。跨国公司应在中国加大投资,而国内品牌也应该为他们挑战提供竞争。中国的技术产业应脱离西方,同时吸引西方投资。全球企业应该喜欢这一切,不管这与他们的商业利益相违背。
The trouble is that Mr Xi’s desire to lure back foreign business runs up against his other objectives. Observers describe his leadership model as “wanting this, that and the other”. Foreign companies are to do business in China but keep their hands off Chinese data. Multinationals are to double down on China and homegrown brands are meant to give them a run for their money. China’s technology industry is to decouple from the West while attracting Western investment. And global businesses are to like all this, never mind that it works against their commercial interests.
习近平所推崇的马克思主义理论或许能够解决这些矛盾。但资本家看到的是权衡和选择。商业逻辑越来越倾向于更加审慎对待中国。
Marxist theories of the sort Mr Xi likes to elevate may be able to resolve these contradictions. But capitalists see trade-offs and choices. And business logic increasingly argues in favour of greater circumspection about China.
以数据流动为例。监管机构可能放宽了一些限制,但几周前他们却加强了其他限制,更新了自2010年以来首次修改的国家秘密法。该法现在包括“工作秘密”,即“非国家秘密但泄露会造成一定不良影响的信息”。这种模糊措辞赋予了安全部门广泛的权力,使其认为外国人和中国员工之间的任何通讯可能构成潜在违规行为。就在3月28日,当外国首席执行官在博鳌与党内领导人交往时,国家安全部发布了一部时长六分钟的指导视频。视频中,一家中国工程公司被说服允许外国投资者由外资尽职调查机构进行调查。公司高管穿越时光,拜访了他未来被监禁的自己,后者警告他不要将公司机密交给调查人员。当现实中他们向他要求分享敏感信息时,被启蒙的高管选择向有关部门举报他们。
Consider data flows. Regulators may have loosened some restrictions but weeks earlier they tightened others, by updating a state-secrets law for the first time since 2010. The law now covers “work secrets”, or information that is “not state secrets but will cause certain adverse effects if leaked”. The vague wording gives security agencies broad powers to consider any communication between foreigners and Chinese employees as a potential violation. On March 28th, as foreign CEOs mingled with party bosses in Boao, the Ministry of State Security released a six-minute instructional video. In it a Chinese engineering company is convinced by foreign investors to allow a foreign due-diligence firm to investigate it. An executive at the company travels in time to visit an incarcerated version of his future self, who warns him not to hand over company secrets to the investigators. When, back in reality, they ask him to share sensitive information, the enlightened executive reports them to the authorities instead.
这部影片的教训就像演技一样不加掩饰。对中国观众来说,外国投资者和顾问可能效忠敌对外国政府,不能信任他们。对外国人来说,不要过于关注明显的物质关注点,比如公司的供应链漏洞或与国家的联系,这可能使企业易受西方制裁。
The lessons of the film are as unsubtle as the acting. For Chinese viewers, it is that foreign investors and consultants could be working for hostile foreign governments and must not be trusted. For foreigners, it is not to look too hard into obvious material concerns such as a company’s supply-chain vulnerabilities or its links to the state, which could make a business susceptible to Western sanctions.
任何对中国芯片产业的调查,这是美国限制的主要目标之一,长期以来都招致了党的愤怒。现在,电动汽车(EVs)、电池、可再生能源和生物技术等不那么敏感的领域,也越来越成为禁区。最近,一家气候咨询公司北京分部的中国高管被安全人员询问其收集有关本地公司信息以及向哪些外国实体透露了这些信息。这次询问令人吃惊,因为这家机构似乎一直得到了中国环境监管部门的强力支持。此事件导致该机构削减在中国的运营,并试图消除中国和其他国家员工之间的报告渠道。
Any such investigation of China’s chip industry, a big target of American restrictions, has long incurred the party’s wrath. Now less sensitive sectors, such as electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, renewables and biotechnology, are increasingly out of bounds, too. Chinese executives at the Beijing branch of a climate consultancy were recently questioned by security agents about the information it collects on local firms and to what foreign entities it has divulged it. The interrogation came as a surprise, because the outfit had enjoyed seemingly strong support from China’s environmental regulators. The incident led it to slim down its Chinese operations and try to eliminate reporting lines between staff based in China and in other countries.
外国人对中国犹豫不决的另一个原因是越发激烈的本地竞争,其中许多得到了或大或小的国家支持。政府对电动汽车、电池、太阳能电池板和风力涡轮机制造商的支持造成了供应过剩并拉低了价格。这对进口中国制造零部件的外国进口商来说是个福音。但对于试图在中国竞争的跨国公司来说,却是一种诅咒。据说,最近几个月,用于生产氢气的体积庞大的电解器的销售利润已经几乎消失。2023年3月,长期享受国家资助的中国电动汽车巨头比亚迪将其紧凑型电动汽车的价格降至仅为9700美元,这一举动延续了一场迫使特斯拉降价销售其电动汽车的价格战。外国工业企业面临着数百家似乎在亏损经营的本地竞争对手。2023年,中国22%的工业企业亏损,创下历史新高。
A further reason foreigners are having second thoughts about China is stiffening local competition, a lot of it given a leg-up by the state, one way or another. Government support for makers of EVs, batteries, solar panels and wind turbines has created oversupply and pushed down prices. This has been a blessing for foreign importers of Chinese-made components. For multinationals trying to compete in China it has been a curse. Margins on sales of electrolysers, bulky machines used to produce hydrogen, are said to have dropped to almost nothing in recent months. In March BYD, a Chinese EV giant and longtime recipient of state largesse, dropped the price of its compact electric car to just $9,700, perpetuating a price war that has forced Tesla to sell its EVs for less. Foreign industrial firms face hundreds of local rivals that appear to operate in the red. In 2023, 22% of industrial companies in China lost money, an all-time high.
官员们还以国家安全和民族自豪感为由,选择中国产品而非西方产品。苹果不仅要应对消费者的沮丧情绪,还要面对华为推出的新一系列智能手机,华为是一家受到美国制裁的中国科技巨头——以及公务员和国有企业员工被告知不要购买iPhone,以免其含有美国政府可以窃取信息的后门。特斯拉由于其车辆会拍摄周围环境而被禁止进入一些政府机构和机场。国有企业和政府机构被指示在2026年前用中国制造的芯片取代美国半导体公司英特尔和AMD的产品。他们还将在未来几年逐步淘汰微软的Office软件。
Officials also invoke a mix of national security and national pride as a reason to choose Chinese products over Western ones. Apple must contend not just with downbeat consumers but also with a new line of smartphones from Huawei, a Chinese tech champion targeted by American sanctions—and with public servants and employees of state-run firms being told not to buy iPhones, lest they contain backdoors through which the American government can steal information. Teslas have been banned from some government facilities and airports on the grounds that they film their surroundings. State-owned enterprises and government agencies have been instructed to replace chips from Intel and AMD, two American semiconductor firms, with Chinese-made ones by 2026. They are also to phase out Microsoft’s Office software over the next few years.
对许多外国人来说,克服这些障碍可能是值得付出代价的。根据摩根士丹利银行进行的一项对354家跨国公司的调查,在2023年第四季度,三分之二外国企业对中国持乐观态度,比前两年高出一倍,远高于2022年第一季度46%的低谷。对一些公司来说,中国是磨练竞争优势的地方:如果能在中国成功,就能在任何地方成功。许多公司希望保持对中国庞大市场和制造基地的准入。3月21日,苹果的首席执行官蒂姆·库克在上海开设一家新旗舰店,引起了极大反响,并重申“世界上没有比中国更重要的供应链了”。为了强调这一点,几天后他在北京的CDF对观众说:“我热爱中国和中国人民。”
For many foreigners, overcoming these obstacles may be a price worth paying. In a survey of 354 multinationals conducted by Morgan Stanley, a bank, two-thirds of foreign firms were optimistic about China in the last quarter of 2023, the most in two years and up from a trough of 46% in the first quarter of 2022. For some companies China is a place to sharpen their competitive edge: if they can make it there, they can make it anywhere. Plenty want to preserve access to China’s vast market and manufacturing base. On March 21st, to much fanfare, Tim Cook, Apple’s boos, opened a new flagship store in Shanghai and reiterated that “There’s no supply chain in the world that’s more critical to us than China.” To ram the point home, days later he told an audience at the CDF in Beijing, “I love China and the people.”
然而,许多西方人认为,习近平对开放的承诺越来越空洞。一家跨国公司在中国部门的疲惫老板说,他的政权只能重复这些陈词滥调几次,你就会变得愈加愤世嫉俗。从长远来看,外国的愤世嫉俗可能对中国经济造成的损害甚至超过电动汽车和氢气电解器的过剩。 ■
Yet to many Western ears, Mr Xi’s commitment to openness rings increasingly hollow. His regime can repeat such bromides only so many times before you grow cynical, says a weary boss of a multinational’s Chinese branch. In the long run a surfeit of foreign cynicism may end up being even more damaging to China’s economy than a glut of EVs and electrolysers. ■
商业 | 城堡之王 (Business | King of the castle)
鲍勃·艾格在迪士尼击败了纳尔逊·佩尔兹。现在怎么办? (Bob Iger has defeated Nelson Peltz at Disney. Now what?)
神奇王国的转变远未结束。 (The Magic Kingdom’s transformation is far from over)
BOB IGER 于2022年11月重返迪士尼的最高职位时,一些人期待这家娱乐巨头的烦恼将有一个童话般的结局。然而,去年2月,被人们敬畏的激进投资者纳尔逊·佩尔兹(Nelson Peltz)及其对冲基金特里安伙伴公司(Trian Partners)在BOB IGER宣布采取措施削减成本和其他方面改善迪士尼运势后,取消了一场改革运动。
WHEN BOB IGER returned to the top job at Disney in November 2022, some anticipated a fairytale ending to the entertainment giant’s troubles. In February last year Nelson Peltz, a feared activist investor, called off a campaign by his hedge fund, Trian Partners, for a shake-up after Mr Iger announced measures to slash costs and otherwise improve Disney’s fortunes.
然而,由于公司股价低迷,佩尔兹先生于10月重新展开攻势。另一位激进投资者Blackwells也发起了自己的运动。两者都试图获得迪士尼董事会席位,并认为公司与BOB IGER关系过于亲密,没有在“线性”电视衰退中找到可行的策略。
With the company’s share price languishing, however, Mr Peltz returned to the warpath in October. Blackwells, another activist investor, launched a campaign of its own. Both sought seats on Disney’s board, arguing it had grown too chummy with Mr Iger and failed to find a viable strategy amid the decline of “linear” TV.
在4月3日的迪士尼年度股东大会上,公司称BOB IGER的两位激进投资者候选人“以实质性多数”被股东拒绝。这给了BOB IGER一个他肯定希望得到的决定性胜利。投资者们在二月的财报电话会议后开始重新对迪士尼老板恢复信心,在那次会议上,他宣布公司在2023年第四季度流媒体业务的亏损(包括Disney+)大幅缩减,并宣布鼓舞人心的新举措,包括与视频游戏开发商史诗游戏(Epic Games)合作,将迪士尼角色整合到其热门游戏《堡垒之夜》中。迪士尼将增加50%的股息并回购30亿美元股份的公告也受到好评。当天,其股价上涨了11%,自此以来持续攀升(见图表)。
On April 3rd both activists’ candidates were rejected by shareholders at Disney’s annual general meeting (AGM), by what the company said was “a substantial margin”. This has handed Mr Iger what he surely hopes is a decisive victory. Investors began to regain faith in Disney’s boss after an earnings call in February, when he reported that losses in its streaming business, including Disney+, had narrowed sharply in the final quarter of 2023, and trumpeted splashy new initiatives including a partnership with Epic Games, a video-game developer, to incorporate Disney characters into its popular “Fortnite” franchise. The announcement that Disney would increase its dividend by 50% and repurchase $3bn of shares also went down a treat. Its share price jumped by 11% the following day, and has kept climbing since (see chart).
在股东大会上,BOB IGER宣布迪士尼已经“翻开新的一页,进入一个新的积极时代”。然而,这种意气风发还为时过早,因为BOB IGER在三个特别领域仍有许多工作要做。首先是在迪士尼的流媒体业务中创造他向投资者承诺的“两位数”营运利润率。这将需要更多订户,以提供规模经济,这可能会让BOB IGER陷入困境。为了遏制业务中的亏损,他已提高了价格,削弱了增长。去年第三季度和第四季度之间,Disney+(在印度以外地区)的订户数量减少了130万。
At the AGM Mr Iger declared that Disney has “turned a corner and entered a new, positive era”. Yet such triumphalism is premature, for Mr Iger still has much work to do, in three areas especially. The first is to generate the “double-digit” operating margins in Disney’s streaming business that he has promised investors. That will require a lot more subscribers, to provide economies of scale, which may put Mr Iger in a bind. To stem losses in the business he has jacked up prices, undermining growth. Between the third and fourth quarters of last year the number of subscribers to Disney+ (outside India) shrank by 1.3m.
此外,BOB IGER承诺削减的75亿美元成本中,超过一半将来自迪士尼的内容预算。这几乎不会帮助公司增长,可能会破坏BOB IGER的另一个承诺,即恢复迪士尼的创意魅力。在他1966年致股东的信中,最后一封写于他去世前的信中,沃尔特·迪士尼宣称他鄙视续集。相比之下,BOB IGER是一个狂热的粉丝。在二月的演讲中,他提到的15部即将上映的电影中,除了一部外,全部都是续集、前传、衍生作品或翻拍作品。BOB IGER称赞更多地依赖系列作品是一种“明智的做法”。然而,票房表现却令人失望。去年,迪士尼首次自2015年以来失去了全球电影票房销售冠军头衔,被环球影业取代。据报道,3月31日,去年的《印第安纳·琼斯》电影,是一部迪士尼翻拍作品,由一位80岁的哈里森·福特主演,票房收入比制作成本少了1.34亿美元。
What is more, over half of the $7.5bn in costs Mr Iger has pledged to slash are to come from Disney’s content budget. That will hardly help the company grow, and could undermine a second of Mr Iger’s promises—to restore Disney’s creative magic. In his letter to shareholders from 1966, the last before he died, Walt Disney declared a disdain for sequels. Mr Iger, by contrast, is an avid fan. Of the 15 forthcoming films he mentioned in his presentation in February, all bar one were sequels, prequels, spin-offs or remakes. Mr Iger applauded a greater reliance on franchises as a “smart thing”. Results at the box office, however, have been disappointing. Last year Disney lost the top spot for global cinema-ticket sales, to Universal, for the first time since 2015. On March 31st it was reported that last year’s Indiana Jones film, a Disney reboot featuring an 80-year-old Harrison Ford, took in $134m less at the box office than it cost to produce.
BOB IGER必须实现的第三个承诺是找到一个比他上一任继任者更持久的接班人,对他的上一个选择感到担忧,然后接手。令人担忧的是,迪士尼继任计划委员会的四位董事中有三人参与了那场搞砸的过程。BOB IGER的两年合同已经延长至2026年底。
The third promise Mr Iger must still fulfil is to find a more durable successor than his last pick, whom he then supplanted. Worryingly, three of the four directors on Disney’s succession-planning committee were involved in that bungled process. Already Mr Iger’s two-year contract has been extended until the end of 2026.
如果BOB IGER犯错,这些闯入者可能会卷土重来。在股东大会上,佩尔兹先生在谈话中指出,无论投票结果如何,他将“关注公司的业绩”。这位资深激进投资者也许也是续集的粉丝。■
If Mr Iger trips up, the interlopers may return. In his remarks at the AGM, Mr Peltz noted that, regardless of the outcome of the vote, he would be “watching the company’s performance”. The veteran activist, too, may be a fan of sequels. ■
商业 | 世界上最大的初创企业 (Business | The world’s largest startup)
印度最大的企业集团开始涉足芯片制造 (India’s biggest conglomerate takes on chipmaking)
塔塔集团步入增长模式 (Tata Group goes into growth mode)
印度尼西亚两个邦联的大型建筑工地的挖掘机于4月1日动工,开始兴建一对半导体工厂。在古吉拉特邦的工厂将耗资110亿美元,预计将雇佣2万人,并每月生产5万块硅晶圆。在阿萨姆邦的30亿美元工厂中,预计将有2.7万名工人将芯片打包成处理单元。
ON APRIL 1ST diggers at large construction sites in two Indian states broke ground on a pair of semiconductor factories. The plant in Gujarat, which will cost $11bn, is to employ 20,000 people and produce 50,000 silicon wafers a month. At the $3bn facility in Assam, 27,000 workers will package chips into processing units.
这两个项目的策划者是塔塔集团,印度最大的企业集团。在古吉拉特邦,它与台湾的力晶半导体制造公司合作。在阿萨姆邦,塔塔独自掌控。这是一个庞大的赌注,赌注是印度政府将国家打造成高科技制造强国的梦想会成真。这也展示了塔塔及其主席纳塔拉真·钱德拉塞卡兰的雄心,他们计划从长达数年的重组中坚定地回到增长模式。“我们计划实现一个远大的愿景,”钱德拉塞卡兰先生说。
The two projects are masterminded by Tata Group, India’s biggest conglomerate. In Gujarat it has teamed up with Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation of Taiwan. In Assam Tata is going it alone. It is all a giant bet that the Indian government’s dream of turning the country into a high-tech manufacturing powerhouse will materialise. And it illustrates the ambitions of Tata and its chairman, Natarajan Chandrasekaran, to move from a years-long restructuring firmly back into growth mode. “We have a big vision to play,” says Mr Chandrasekaran.
2017年,钱德拉塞卡兰接管塔塔公司控股公司塔塔集团时,这样的愿景看上去是荒谬的。这个起源自1868年的集团处于混乱之中。对外购置钢铁和汽车业务的时机失误,每年造成数十亿美元的亏损。为大众打造的1300美元汽车是个失败品。在其数百个附属公司中,只有当时正在经营的IT服务巨头塔塔咨询服务公司是一家真正的赢家。
In 2017, when Mr Chandrasekaran was handed the reins of Tata Sons, the group’s holding company, such a vision would have seemed preposterous. The group, which dates back to 1868, was in disarray. Mistimed acquisitions of foreign steel and car businesses were losing billions of dollars a year. A homegrown $1,300 car for the masses was a flop. Of its hundreds of affiliated firms only Tata Consultancy Services, the IT-services giant Mr Chandrasekaran ran at the time, was a real winner.
在担任最高职位的头三年里,他将企业零散的业务整合到30多家上市公司中,并且重点重新关注他们。2020年,Nexon车型改为电动汽车,并取得巨大成功。如今,集团汽车部门塔塔汽车公司在印度的乘用车中占比从四年前的1/20上升至1/7。集团一些业绩低迷的欧洲钢铁厂正在关闭,而国内钢铁业正骑着印度的经济繁荣。印度度假热潮使酒店子公司从一家金钱坑变成了一个摇钱树。塔塔于2022年从印度政府手中购买的国营航空公司“印度航空”也吹来同样的顺风。塔塔上市子公司的市值从2017年的约1400亿美元飙升至约4000亿美元。集团的净债务收入比已从2020年的8降至仅2.4。
In his first three years in the top job he consolidated the corporate sprawl into 30-odd listed businesses and, importantly, gave them a new focus. In 2020 a car model, the Nexon, was reconfigured into an electric vehicle and became a smash hit. Today Tata Motors, the group’s car unit, sells one in seven passenger cars in India, up from one in 20 four years ago. Some of the group’s underperforming European steel mills are being shut and the domestic steel business is riding India’s economic boom. An upsurge in Indian holidaymaking has transformed the hotels subsidiary from a money pit into a cash machine. Air India, bought from the government in 2022, is enjoying a similar tailwind. The combined market value of Tata’s listed affiliates has shot up from around $140bn in 2017 to roughly $400bn (see chart). The group’s ratio of net debt to income has plummeted from eight in 2020 to just 2.4.
这一成功让钱德拉塞卡兰有了信心和财务实力去追求新的事业,尤其是在芯片制造领域。以往在实现国内半导体产业的努力都失败了。在上世纪70年代,政府主导的努力没有走远。2007年,印度与英特尔之间的有望谈判破裂,因为当时德里政府拖拖拉拉,这位美国芯片制造商的老板当时抱怨道。投资流向了中国和越南。
This success has given Mr Chandrasekaran the confidence—and the financial muscle—to pursue new ventures, most notably in chipmaking. Past efforts to create a domestic semiconductor industry have failed. A government-led effort in the 1970s went nowhere. Promising talks between India and Intel broke down in 2007 because the government in Delhi was dragging its feet, the American chipmaker’s boss grumbled at the time. Investment went to China and Vietnam instead.
在现任总理纳伦德拉·莫迪的领导下,事情进展得要快得多。他希望吸引来自中国的生产,首先从在汽车和家电中使用的较不先进的芯片开始,然后逐渐向尖端技术迈进。据信,他的政府将支付大约一半的新芯片工厂的资本成本,包括在古吉拉特邦和阿萨姆邦的这些工厂,而邦级政府也将出资20%。即便如此,这些项目对私营部门,尤其是对塔塔来说,都代表着一个巨大的赌注。2023年1月,钱德拉塞卡兰表示,集团的资本支出将在未来五年达到惊人的900亿美元。其中一部分将由塔塔控股公司直接在半导体领域投入,公司希望在一切从设计到打包的地方都要参与。
Under the current prime minister, Narendra Modi, things are moving considerably faster. He hopes to lure production from China, starting with less advanced chips of the sort used in cars and appliances and then gradually moving towards the cutting edge. His government is believed to be footing around half of the capital costs of new chip factories, including the ones in Gujarat and Assam, with states chipping in another 20%. Even so, the projects represent a big wager by the private sector, and by Tata in particular. In January 2023 Mr Chandrasekaran said that the group’s capital expenditure would amount to a staggering $90bn over five years. A slug of that would be spent directly by Tata Sons on semiconductors, where the company wants to be present in everything from design to packaging.
印度有望成为一个芯片制造的冠军这个观点让一些观察家觉得太疯狂了。印度央行前行长、现任芝加哥大学的拉古拉姆·拉詹认为为大宗芯片提供庞大补贴,尤其是在像美国和欧洲这样的富裕地区正投入数十亿资金用于尖端生产时,是不明智的做法。他认为印度最好是为现金紧张的工程学院提供资金,并专注于需要较少投资的领域,如芯片设计。
The idea that India can become a chipmaking champion strikes some observers as bonkers. Raghuram Rajan, a former governor of India’s central bank now at the University of Chicago, decries all the vast subsidies for commoditised chips, especially at a time when richer places like America and Europe are pouring billions into production at the cutting edge. India would be better off, he thinks, funding its cash-strapped engineering schools and focusing on areas that require less investment, such as chip design.
钱德拉塞卡兰不同意。他认为仅国内购买者到2030年就将每年在芯片上支出1千亿美元,相比之下今天只有400亿美元。他的公司是印度为数不多能够迅速实现大型项目的公司之一。他们从国外招募了75名在芯片行业具有专业知识的高管。预计2025年开始生产的阿萨姆工厂的产能70%已经被全球客户预订。即使对于印度而言,这个看似异想天开的项目也仍可能是一个好生意。 ■
Mr Chandrasekaran disagrees. He reckons domestic buyers alone will be spending $100bn a year on chips by 2030, up from $40bn today. His firm is one of the few in India that can carry out big projects fast. It has recruited 75 executives from abroad with expertise in the chip business. Some 70% of capacity in the Assam factory, due to start production in 2025, has already been contracted for by global customers. What is a fanciful initiative for India may still be good business. ■
商业 | 更具体,更电气化 (Business | Less general, more electric)
通用电气分为三家公司会比单一公司表现更好吗? (Will GE do better as three companies than as one?)
如何拆解一个产业标志 (How to dismantle an industrial icon)
“这样一次重组中存在的困难很多而且严重。”1893年,这是当时通用电气(GE)首席执行官查尔斯·科芬描述将三家企业合并成为传奇美国企业集团的方式。130多年后,科芬的最新继任者拉里·卡尔普对于进行反向操作可能有相似的感受。4月2日,通用电气分拆为两家上市公司:GE航空航天公司,一家喷气发动机制造商,以及GE Vernova,一家发电设备制造商。第三家公司GE医疗保健公司,一家医疗设备公司,于2023年1月进行了分拆。
“THE DIFFICULTIES inherent in such a reorganisation were many and serious.” In 1893 that was how Charles Coffin, the first chief executive of General Electric (GE), described merging three businesses into what became the legendary American conglomerate. More than 130 years later Coffin’s latest successor, Larry Culp, must have similar feelings about doing the reverse. On April 2nd GE split into two public companies: GE Aerospace, a maker of jet engines, and GE Vernova, a manufacturer of power-generation equipment. A third, GE HealthCare, a medical-devices firm, was spun off in January 2023.
投资者并不为GE终结而感到悲伤,因为他们,他们的父亲,祖父和曾祖父知道的GE已不复存在。在分拆前夕,公司的市值稳定在约1900亿美元左右。次日,这两家新公司的市值几乎达到了2000亿美元,如果加上GE HealthCare,则为2400亿美元(见图表)。2018年11月,卡尔普夺任总裁后不久,整个集团价值为650亿美元,是自上世纪90年代初以来最低。到了次年6月,公司无颜的被踢出了道琼斯工业平均指数,即美国蓝筹股指数。过去一年,GE和GE HealthCare的股价表现均超过了道琼斯指数。他表示,公司无法继续作为“全能的通用电气”。相反,GE的公司后代将变得更加专业化,在能源转型中变得更加电气化。
Investors are not mourning the end of GE as they, their fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers knew it. On the eve of the split the company’s market value hovered at around $190bn. The next day the two new firms were worth nearly $200bn—and some $240bn if you add GE HealthCare (see chart). In November 2018, shortly after Mr Culp took over as boss, the whole group was worth $65bn, the least since the early 1990s. That June it had been ignominiously kicked out of the Dow Jones industrial average, an index of American blue-chip firms. In the past year both GE and GE HealthCare have handily outperformed the Dow. Their shares have also done better than those of most American spin-offs. Mr Culp says that the group could not continue as an “all-singing, all-dancing GE”. Instead, GE’s corporate progeny will become less general and, amid the energy transition, more electric.
在其历史中的大部分时间里,GE都是与规模相提并论的。在杰克·韦尔奇领导公司从1981年到2001年期间,这家爱收购的首席执行官的带领下,GE成为了世界上最有价值的公司。随后GE资本,其庞大的金融部门的亏损,以及其核心工业业务的问题使这家巨头陷入困境。韦尔奇的继任者杰夫·伊梅尔特出售了GE的媒体、家电业务,最后才出售金融资产,但又斥资110亿美元收购了法国集团阿尔斯通的电力和电网业务,以及斥资70亿美元购买了石油行业设备供应商贝克休斯的股份。2017年接替伊梅尔特的约翰·弗拉纳里主张将GE的医疗保健部门剥离,并专注于GE的核心业务:航空与发电。但他在任不到一年就被革职,因为GE的股价暴跌。
For much of its history GE was synonymous with size. Under Jack Welch, the acquisitive CEO who ran it from 1981 to 2001, it became the world’s most valuable company. Subsequent losses at GE Capital, its bloated finance arm, and troubles in its core industrial businesses laid the giant low. Jeff Immelt, Welch’s successor, sold off GE’s media, home-appliance and, belatedly, finance assets but spent $11bn on the ill-timed takeover of a power-and-grid business of Alstom, a French conglomerate, and $7bn on a stake in Baker Hughes, a purveyor of oil-industry gear. John Flannery, who replaced Mr Immelt in 2017, had the idea of spinning off the health-care division and focusing on GE’s core businesses: aviation and power generation. But he was dumped barely a year into the job, as GE’s share price cratered.
因此,第一位外部人士接管GE的卡尔普继承了一场混乱。2018年底,GE因功率部门(主要由于阿尔斯通交易)进行了230亿美元的减记,尾部再保险业务有150亿美元的资本缺口,净年亏损220亿美元,负债逾1.3万亿美元。从纸面上看,他的救援计划与弗拉纳里的相似:剥离医疗,加大飞机发动机与发电业务的投入。然而,他的操作方式却不同。
As a result, Mr Culp, the first outsider to run GE, inherited a mess. GE ended 2018 with a $23bn write-down of its power business (largely due to the Alstom deal), a $15bn capital shortfall in a rump reinsurance business, a net annual loss of $22bn and more than $130bn in debt. On paper his rescue plan looked similar to Mr Flannery’s: hive off health, double down on aircraft engines and power. The way he went about it, though, was different.
他停止了前任提出的医疗部门剥离计划,意识到在短期内,GE将无法在成功部门的收入支持下生存。相反,他将GE的生物技术业务以210亿美元售予自己的老雇主、另一家工业集团达纳赫;加快了向更清洁能源的转变,剥离了在贝克休斯的股份;并以超过300亿美元的价格出售了GE的飞机融资部门。他还将每股季度股利从12美分降至1美分。综合起来,这些举措减少了GE约1千亿美元的债务。
He halted his predecessor’s proposed spin-off of the health-care division, realising that GE would be too weak in the short run to survive without the successful unit’s income. Instead he sold GE’s biotechnology business to his old employer, Danaher, another industrial group, for $21bn; accelerated the move towards cleaner energy by divesting the stake in Baker Hughes; and flogged GE’s aircraft-financing unit for more than $30bn. He also cut the quarterly dividend from 12 cents a share to a cent. Taken together, these moves reduced GE’s debt by some $100bn.
关键是,卡尔普意识到,改革GE不仅需要对其结构进行调整,还需要对其运营进行改变。杰克·韦尔奇曾大力倡导的一系列技术“六西格玛”,旨在确保生产缺陷低于每百万零件3.4个,已成为创新的障碍,因此被舍弃。卡尔普引入了“精益管理”概念,该概念寻找随着时间积累起来导致巨大改进的小变化。这种由日本丰田公司首创的方法,涉及管理者解决问题时亲自到工厂车间或客户现场,而非坐在办公桌上。
Critically, Mr Culp understood that reforming GE required not just changes to its structure but also to its operations. Six Sigma, a series of techniques championed by Welch that aimed to keep manufacturing defects below 3.4 per million parts, had become a barrier to innovation and was dropped. Instead Mr Culp introduced GE to “lean management”, which looks for small changes that add up to big improvements over time. This approach, pioneered by Toyota in Japan, involves managers solving problems by visiting the factory floor or their customers, rather than from the comfort of their desks.
如今,GE高管在演讲中频繁使用日本术语,如改善的过程、现场(行动发生的地方)和方针管理(将员工的工作与公司目标对齐)。更重要的是,卡尔普及他的下属们经常和工人一起在工厂里度过一周。公司认为这一制度已为改进做出贡献,比如将其一款燃气涡轮机钢叶片在制造过程中的总运输距离从3英里(5公里)减少到165英尺(50米),并将直升机发动机的制造时间从75小时缩短到11小时。
Today GE executives pepper their disquisitions with Japanese terms such as kaizen (a process of continuous improvement), gemba (the place where the action happens) and hoshin kanri (aligning employees’ work with the company’s goals). More important, Mr Culp and his underlings routinely spend a week on the factory floor alongside workers. The company credits this system for improvements such as reducing the total distance a steel blade for one of its gas turbines travels during the manufacturing process from three miles (5km) to 165 feet (50 metres), and slashing the time to build a helicopter engine from 75 to 11 hours.
所有这些使得这两家子公司有了富有活力的健康基础,可以像姊妹公司GE HealthCare那样蓬勃发展。2023年,GE航空航天和GE Vernova的联合收入达到650亿美元,比前一年的550亿美元有所增长。GE航空航天制造的发动机是集团最赚钱的部门,卡尔普选择在分拆后负责该部门,这些发动机装备了四分之三的商用航班。GE Vernova的燃气和风力涡轮机生产了世界三分之一的电力。
All this puts the two daughter firms in fighting shape to thrive as their sister, GE HealthCare, has done. In 2023 GE Aerospace and GE Vernova generated combined revenues of $65bn, up from $55bn the year before. Engines made by GE Aerospace, the group’s most profitable division, which Mr Culp has chosen to run after the break-up, power three-quarters of all commercial flights. GE Vernova’s gas and wind turbines generate a third of the world’s electrical power.
像许多成功的经理一样,卡尔普也有运气之助。客机的需求——因此保持空中飞行的引擎——从大流行的低谷迅速反弹。GE航空航天直到2020年代末之前的订单积压,预计调整后的经营利润将从2023年的56亿美元激增至2028年的100亿美元。;向波音供应引擎,后者供应波音备受困扰的737 MAX飞机,意味着面临这些窄体最重要客机的延期交付的航空公司需要保持现有机队。正如投资银行杰费里斯的她伊拉·卡哈约格卢指出的那样,去年,服务业务占该部门收入的近70%。
Like many successful managers, Mr Culp also has luck on his side. Demand for passenger jets—and thus the engines that keep them aloft—is rebounding sharply from a pandemic slump. With a backlog of orders until the end of the decade, GE Aerospace expects adjusted operating profit to surge from $5.6bn in 2023 to $10bn by 2028. The turbulence at Boeing, which GE supplies with engines for the planemaker’s troubled 737 MAX planes, means that airlines facing delayed deliveries of these narrowbody workhorses will need to stretch their exisiting fleet. That, points out Sheila Kahyaoglu of Jefferies, an investment bank, increases demand for GE Aerospace to keep older engines going. Last year the services business accounted for almost 70% of the division’s revenues.
GE Vernova 的前景看起来也是乐观的。该业务的运营利润率从2019年的个位数上升到2023年的近8%。国际能源署,一家官方的预测机构,认为到2040年,由于数据中心和电动汽车消耗更多电力,对电力的需求将增长一半以上。美国正在对可再生能源项目慷慨地提供补贴和税收优惠。将领导GE Vernova 的GE 老将Scott Strazik相信,这将帮助公司获得扩大规模所需的条件,以分摊仍在亏损的风力涡轮机制造成本。
The winds look favourable for GE Vernova, too. Operating margins in the business rose from low single digits in 2019 to almost 8% in 2023. The International Energy Agency, an official forecaster, reckons that demand for electricity will grow by more than half by 2040 as power-hungry data centres and electric cars guzzle more of it. America is lavishing subsidies and tax breaks on renewable-energy projects. Scott Strazik, a GE veteran who will run GE Vernova, believes that this will help the company attain the scale necessary to spread the high costs of wind-turbine manufacturing, which is still lossmaking.
GE 的好运可能不会持久。在循环性极强的航空业,对交通量的预测可能过于乐观。如果波音 不能摆脱低迷,GE 航空航天业务的订单簿可能会受到打击。在GE Vernova 的最大市场――美国,即使在其亲环保的总统乔·拜登的治下,美国向清洁能源的转型也一直进展缓慢。如果碳友好的唐纳德·特朗普明年重新入主白宫,他誓言要削减绿色补贴。换句话说,GE 的业务将面临许多严峻的困难。但至少,重组不是其中之一。■
GE’s run of good fortune may not last. Projections for traffic in the notoriously cyclical airline business may turn out to be too rosy. If Boeing doesn’t pull out of its nosedive, GE Aerospace’s order books could take a hit. The transition to clean energy in America, GE Vernova’s largest market, has been fitful even under Joe Biden, its climate-friendly president. Should the carbon-cuddling Donald Trump return to the White House next year, he has vowed to gut green subsidies. GE’s businesses, in other words, face many and serious difficulties ahead. But at least reorganisation is not one of them. ■
更正:对于燃气轮机叶片的制造时间进行了改进,而不是风力涡轮机。
Correction: Improvements were made to the manufacturing time for blades for gas turbines, not wind turbines
商业 | 系统工程 (Business | System engineering)
看看这家平衡增长和绿色的法国石油巨头 (Meet the French oil major that balances growth and greenery)
道达尔能源做到了竞争对手无法做到的事情。 (TotalEnergies has pulled off something its rivals haven’t)
“德克萨斯对我们来说是一个黄金国,一个能源黄金国,”上个月,法国石油巨头TotalEnergies的老板Patrick Pouyanné在休斯顿举办的能源行业年度盛会CERAWeek上宣称。他宣布了该公司在该州南部页岩资源的扩张计划,旨在巩固其作为美国液化天然气领先出口商的地位。该公司此前收购了三座德克萨斯州的燃气电厂,并在休斯顿开设了新的电力交易部门。与此同时,在布拉佐利亚,距离市区一个小时车程的一个多风的县,该公司建成了一个太阳能场,可生产380兆瓦的清洁能源,并利用其能源存储部门Saft生产的锂离子电池存储部分能源。数百只羊和零星的羚羊在它的2300英亩(930公顷)上的70万光伏板中吃草,没有一个摇头井出现。“你们在这里热爱各种形式的能源,从天然气到可再生能源,”Pouyanné先生在休斯顿的狂欢会上告诉石油工人们。
“TEXAS IS AN El Dorado for us, an energy El Dorado,” declared Patrick Pouyanné, boss of TotalEnergies, last month at CERAWeek, the energy industry’s annual shindig in Houston. He unveiled an expansion of the French supermajor’s shale holdings in the south of the state, a deal intended to bolster its position as the leading exporter of American liquefied natural gas. It had earlier bought three Texan gas-fired power plants and opened a new electricity-trading desk in Houston. Meanwhile in Brazoria, a windswept county an hour’s drive from the city, it has built a solar park capable of producing 380 megawatts (MW) of clean power, and of stashing some of the resulting joules in a bank of lithium-ion batteries made by Saft, its energy-storage arm. Hundreds of sheep and the odd gazelle graze among 700,000 photovoltaic panels on its 2,300 acres (930 hectares), with not a nodding donkey in sight. “You love energy here in all forms, from gas to renewables,” Mr Pouyanné told the oilmen at the Houston gabfest.
这种普遍性的策略是TotalEnergies尝试弥合行业在能源转型问题上的跨大西洋差距。法国公司的主要欧洲竞争对手BP和Shell在类似风能和太阳能等“电子”业务上进行了大量投资,直到较低的回报和股价下跌迫使它们尴尬地改变方向。而美国公司ExxonMobil和Chevron则继续加大石油和天然气的投资,同时支持“清洁分子”业务,如氢能和碳捕捉,并因此获得了更高的估值。
This ecumenical strategy is TotalEnergies’ attempt to bridge its industry’s transatlantic divide when it comes to the energy transition. The French firm’s big European rivals, BP and Shell, invested heavily in “electrons” businesses like wind and solar energy—until weak returns and sagging share prices forced them into embarrassing U-turns. Its American counterparts, ExxonMobil and Chevron, have instead doubled down on oil and gas, while backing “clean-molecule” businesses like hydrogen and carbon capture—and have been rewarded with higher valuations.
Pouyanné先生认为他可以兼顾两个世界。他的公司将继续投资于他所称的“A体系”,即世界依然需要的石油和天然气。例如,最近在巴西、苏里南、纳米比亚和阿拉伯联合酋长国的烃项目。在这些项目中,Pouyanné先生的首要任务是降低在提取原油过程中释放的碳量,并且关键地,削减生产成本,使之降至“每桶低于20美元”,他表示。如果每桶交易价格保持在大约90美元左右,这应该会产生大量现金,以投资于“B体系”,即需要快速增长以实现全球气候目标的低碳业务。TotalEnergies在德克萨斯州专门拥有或正在建设约5000兆瓦的清洁能源容量,使其成为美国最大的支持者之一。该公司计划将其大约5年全球资本支出的30%,约50亿美元,用于低碳电力,是同类公司的两倍。到2030年,该公司希望每年生产超过100太瓦时的电力,足以照亮亚利桑那州。而这些太瓦时中可能有大约四分之一将在美国产生。
Mr Pouyanné thinks he can straddle both worlds. His firm will continue to invest in “System A”, as he calls the oil and gas that the world still needs. Examples include its recent hydrocarbon projects in Brazil, Suriname, Namibia and the United Arab Emirates. Here Mr Pouyanné’s imperatives are reducing the amount of carbon released in extracting the crude and, critically, slashing production costs, down to “less than $20 a barrel”, he says. If barrels keep trading for around $90, this should spin out plenty of cash to invest in “System B”, the low-carbon business that needs to grow fast if global climate goals are to be met. TotalEnergies has or is building some 5,000MW of clean-power capacity in Texas alone, making it one of America’s biggest backers of such ventures. It plans to devote 30% of its capital spending, or around $5bn a year globally, to low-carbon electricity, twice as much as a typical major. By 2030 it wants to produce over 100 terawatt-hours annually, enough to light up Arizona. Perhaps a quarter of those terawatt-hours would be generated in America.
TotalEnergies的绿色计划之所以独具特色在于它找到了一种从中获利的方法。去年,其资本回报率接近20%,高于所有其大型竞争对手(见图表1)。因此,自2019年以来,其股东们获得了几乎80%的股市回报,包括股息,大致与Chevron持平,并且是BP和Shell的两倍左右(见图表2)。
What makes TotalEnergies’ green plans distinctive is that it has found a way to make good money from them. Last year its return on capital was nearly 20%, higher than all its big rivals (see chart 1). As a result, since 2019 its shareholders have enjoyed a total stockmarket return, including dividends, of nearly 80%, roughly in line with Chevron’s and around twice those of BP and Shell (see chart 2).
可再生能源在市场上遭受的一个重要原因是不稳定性。随着像布拉佐利亚安装的大规模电池等更多发电站,将会清洁地补充其风能和太阳能。在那之前,TotalEnergies将使用燃气轮机作为“灵活”备用,以应对无风天和无阳夜。其去年的低碳电力业务的大部分利润来自这些天然气“灵活发电”资产。
One big reason renewable energy suffers in the marketplace is intermittency. In time lots more grid-scale batteries like those installed in Brazoria will cleanly complement its wind and solar. Until then TotalEnergies will use gas turbines as “flexible” backup to manage windless days and sunless nights. A big chunk of the profits from its low-carbon-electricity business last year came courtesy of those gassy “flexible-generation” assets.
这一双重策略是TotalEnergies历史的副产品。CFP以其原始的法语缩写成立于一百年前,是为了确保法国的能源独立。最初,这涉及在伊拉克进行烃类开采。这项有利可图的业务于1972年伊拉克石油工业被国有化时结束。而在2021年,该公司以令人瞩目的方式重回伊拉克,获得了一个价值270亿美元的能源项目的主导地位。Pouyanné先生认为公司击败竞争对手的原因是其提供了资金和技术支持,以帮助伊拉克利用本来会被焚烧的天然气发电,并且建造了1000兆瓦的太阳能发电厂。相似的方法在利比亚、莫桑比克等拥有丰富烃类资源但电力行业薄弱的国家获得了好评。现在,在能源转型之际,即使是在美国等地方也在取得进展。
The dual strategy is a byproduct of TotalEnergies’ history. CFP, in its original French acronym, was founded 100 years ago to ensure France’s energy independence. Initially that involved drilling for hydrocarbons in Iraq. This profitable business ended when the Iraqi oil industry was nationalised in 1972. In 2021 the company returned to Iraq in a spectacular way by securing the lead role in a $27bn energy project. Mr Pouyanné thinks it edged out competitors because it offered financial and technical assistance to help Iraq generate electricity using gas that would otherwise be flared, as well as building 1,000MW of solar power. A similar approach has found favour in Libya, Mozambique and other countries with plentiful hydrocarbons and pitiful power sectors. Now, amid the energy transition, it is gaining ground even in places like America.
一些气候活动人士对这一策略提出了质疑。他们认为天然气燃烧比石油或煤炭更清洁,但并非通往更清洁未来的桥梁,而是一个化石的死胡同。TotalEnergies的资本支出计划表明这种观点过于愤世嫉俗。其每年50亿美元的低碳能源投资中,93%将投向可再生能源,仅有7%投向燃气。到2028年,灵活发电在利润中的份额预计将下降到四分之一,因为蓬勃发展的B体系将开始匹敌,并超过,不断萎缩的A体系。根据公司的气候计划,到2050年,TotalEnergies销售额中只有25%将来自石油和天然气,从今天的90%下降。该公司设想到那时,电力生产和可再生能源将占其营收的一半,氢能和可再生生物燃料占据其余部分。在那之前,它将努力证明利润和地球并非水火不相容,即使是对于一个石油巨头也是如此。■
Some climate campaigners question this strategy. They see gas, which burns more cleanly than oil or coal, not as a bridge to a greener future but a fossil cul-de-sac. TotalEnergies’ capital-spending plans suggest that view is too cynical. Of its $5bn in annual investments in low-carbon energy, 93% is going to renewables and just 7% to gas. By 2028 flexible generation’s share of profits is expected to fall to a quarter, as a surging System B begins to match, and then surpass, a shrinking System A. By 2050 only 25% of TotalEnergies’ sales will derive from oil and gas, according to the company’s climate plan, down from 90% today. The firm envisages that electricity generation and renewables will make up half its revenues, with hydrogen and renewable biofuels making up the rest. Between now and then it will try to prove that profits and the planet need not be at odds—even for an oil major. ■
商业 | 巴托比 (Business | Bartleby)
火灾演习的六条规定 (The six rules of fire drills)
请把这些规定展示在办公室的一个地方,没人会看到。谢谢 (Please display this somewhere in your office where no one will read it. Thank you)
规则 1. 消防演练绝对不能让人觉得有用。尽管这可能是一种帮助拯救生命的有效方式,更不用说在许多工作场所是法定要求。但重要的是,人们只能将这种演习看作是一种麻烦。应该在人们面临最后期限时进行演练。绝对不能计时与漫长的会议重叠,那样反而可能会让人们有些松口气。理想情况下,最好是倾盆大雨。只有足够多的人翻白眼并嘟囔自言自语,演练才能算得上成功。(第六条规则对于实现这一结果也是至关重要的。)
Rule 1. The fire drill must never feel useful. It may be a proven way to help save people’s lives, to say nothing of being a legal requirement in many workplaces. But it is important that people experience the exercise only as an inconvenience. The drill should take place when people are up against a deadline. It must not be timed to coincide with a long meeting, when it might come as a bit of a relief. Ideally, it should be pouring with rain. The drill can be counted a success only if enough people are rolling their eyes and muttering to themselves. (The sixth rule is essential to achieving this outcome, too.)
规则 2. 记住,这次演练实际上并不是为了演练,而是为了勉强达成共识。当警报响起时,人们绝对不能立即起身离去。他们必须首先确信这不是错误。可能有人按错了按钮;而那个声音可能还会单调地说“这只是一个测试”,这一次人们会感激起来。
Rule 2. Remember that the drill is not really a drill but an exercise in begrudging consensus. When the alarm sounds, people must never just get up and leave. They must first satisfy themselves that this is not a mistake. Someone might have pressed the wrong button; that voice might yet drone “This is a test” and for once people will feel grateful.
然后,他们必须看到其他员工正在准备离开。这一阶段涉及到人们像疯狂的獴一样在办公桌旁上下蹦跶,以看看同事们在做什么。当明确这的确是一次演练时,人们必须花费大量时间决定带什么东西。天气如何?应该带上笔记本电脑吗?他们把可重复使用的咖啡杯放在哪里了?是否该带一个手提箱?他们在离开的时候不能有任何紧急感。
They must then see other employees getting ready to leave. This stage involves people bobbing up and down at their desks like demented meerkats to see what their colleagues are doing. When it is clear that this is indeed a drill, people must then spend inordinate amounts of time deciding what things to take with them. What’s the weather like? Should they take the laptop? Where did they put their reusable coffee flask? Should they pack a suitcase? The one thing they must not have as they leave is any sense of urgency.
规则 3. 演练的这个阶段是消防警卫必须展现自己的时候。只有警卫可以加速从建筑物撤离的速度。这个秘密小组是办公室的主教团,但缺少一点狂热或威胁感。消防警卫经常担任这个角色已经多年了;没有人知道他们是如何得到这份工作或如何申请的。他们就藏在人们的视线中:办公室墙壁上很可能有他们年轻时的褐色照片,旁边还有一个更加隐秘的组织,只有一个被称为“急救员”的小众团体。在演练中,警卫们会穿上高能见度背心,这些背心立刻赋予他们一种神秘的权威。在其他时候永远看不到这个团伙一起出现。
Rule 3. This stage of the drill is when the fire wardens must show themselves. Only the wardens can accelerate the speed of departure from the building. This secretive group is the Opus Dei of the office but with a bit less of the fervour or sense of menace. The fire wardens have often been in the role for years; no one knows how they got the job or how to apply. They hide in plain sight: there may well be sepia photos of their younger selves on the office wall, next to an even more obscure sect known only as the “first-aiders”. The wardens reveal themselves during a drill by putting on high-visibility jackets, which instantly confer on them a mysterious authority. The cabal is never seen together at other times.
规则 4. 消防演练会产生一种归属感。这是因为演练突然让你接触到在你所在建筑物工作的每一个人。在正常情况下,你可能会和其他公司或部门的人一起乘电梯。当电梯门打开和关闭时,你可能会瞥见他们的办公室,觉得它们是多么没有灵魂。(他们也会对你的办公室持相同看法。)但你从未意识到你是多么少数。
Rule 4. The fire drill will produce a sense of belonging. That is because a drill will suddenly expose you to everyone who works in your building. In the normal course of events, you might briefly share a lift with people from other companies or other departments. You might glimpse their offices as the doors open and close and think how soulless they look. (They will think the same of yours.) But you never realise how outnumbered you are.
然而,在演练中,陌生人围绕着你。楼梯间挤满人,大部分人也背着外套、笔记本电脑和可重复使用的咖啡杯。他们在撤离途中在你下方蜿蜒前行,然后在电梯门口排起长队。你突然会为任何熟悉的面孔的安慰而感到感激。你注意到一个法律部门的人,你认为他可能叫基思,然后打个招呼。之前你从未考虑过他;在这严肃但不危险的时刻,他就像家人一样。
In a drill, however, strangers surround you. Stairwells fill with people, most of them also weighed down by coats, laptops and reusable coffee flasks. They spiral down below you on the way out and form long queues by the lifts on the way back. You will suddenly feel grateful for the comfort of any recognisable face. You spot someone from legal you think may be called Keith and say hello. You have never given him any thought before; in this moment of grave non-peril he is like family.
规则 5. 集合区域不只是一个指定的地点,而是在离你所在建筑物十分钟步行范围内,人们自行选择的地方。“你的雇主可能指定了员工集合地点。他们可能给了它们军事化的名称,如“主要集结点”或“三级疏散区”。其他人根本不知道它在哪里。一群人会聚集在尽可能靠近所谓火灾场地的地方。另一群人会四处散开寻找咖啡或提早吃午餐。如果他们走得有目的,其他人会以为他们知道集合区域在哪里并跟随他们。因此,办公室的大部分人可能会意外地最终来到星巴克。
Rule 5. The assembly area is not so much a designated spot as a place of people’s choosing within a ten-minute walk of your building. Your employer might have specified a place for employees to gather. They may have given it militaristic names like the “primary muster point” or the “tertiary evacuation zone”. No one else will have the faintest idea where it is. A clump of people will mill about as close to the site of the notional blaze as possible. Another group will scatter in various directions in search of a coffee or an early lunch. If they walk purposefully enough, other people will assume they know where the assembly area is and follow them. As a result most of the office may accidentally end up at Starbucks.
规则6. 令人困惑,也被称为消防演练的第一和第二条规则,你绝对不能谈论消防演练。在某个时刻,有传言称演练已经结束,人们开始回到办公室。一旦他们回到办公桌,每个人都必须表现得好像整个事情从未发生过一样。绝对不能提及演练的效果如何或是否学到了任何安全教训。消防警卫必须将他们的高能见度背心收起,重新回到阴影中。你所做的工作必须简单地从离开的地方继续。你不会再跟法律部门的基思说话。但你知道如果发生真正的紧急情况不能使用电梯。 ■
Rule 6. Confusingly also known as the first and second rules of fire drill, you must never talk about fire drill. At some point word will spread that the drill is over and people will start to drift back to the office. Once they have returned to their desks, everyone must act as though the whole thing never happened. There must never be any reference to how it went or whether any safety lessons were learned. The fire wardens must fold away their high-viz jackets and settle back into the shadows. The work you were doing must simply be picked up where it was left. You will not speak to Keith from legal again. But you do know not to use the lifts if there is a real emergency.■
Read more from Bartleby, our columnist on management and work:The pros and cons of corporate uniforms (Mar 27th)The secret to career success may well be off to the side (Mar 21st)Every location has got worse for getting actual work done (Mar 13th)
商业 | 熊彼特 (Business | Schumpeter)
为什么日本公司不再受制于美国 (Why Japan Inc is no longer in thrall to America)
作为资本主义之邦转向保护主义,日本正在开放。 (As the home of capitalism turns protectionist, Japan is opening up)
经济学人中最令人不安的时刻之一发生在1982年的底特律,两名美国汽车工人殴打一名华裔美国人致死,他们误以为他是一名被指控偷走美国工作岗位的日本公民。一位心怀同情的法官对他们处以3000美元的罚款,没有监禁。这一离谱宽容的判决反映了一种情绪,后来一直延伸至政府的最高层。由于惧怕日本超越成为全球经济超级大国,美国握起了撬棍。它实施贸易限制,试图打开日本的国内市场,并领导国际努力以减少美元对日元的价值。直到日本在1990年代的资产价格泡沫破裂后,美国才将其撇在一旁。
One of the most chilling moments in America’s post-war relationship with Japan occurred in Detroit in 1982. Two American car workers clubbed a Chinese-American man to death, mistaking him for a Japanese citizen they accused of stealing American jobs. A sympathetic judge fined them $3,000, with no jail time. This outrageously lenient verdict reflected a mood that later extended to the highest level of government. Fearful of being overtaken by Japan as the world’s economic superpower, America wielded the crowbar. It imposed trade restrictions, sought to pry open Japan’s domestic markets and led international efforts to reduce the value of the dollar against the yen. Only after Japan’s asset-price bubble burst in the 1990s did America leave it alone.
你会认为美国最近一轮贸易保护主义措施,尤其是试图以保护美国就业为由阻止日本制铁公司以150亿美元收购美国制钢公司的双方尝试,会在日本引发一种的既视感。但情况比这更复杂。近年来,世界上最重要的战略伙伴关系之一发生了180度转变。日本正在接纳以股东为友、支持市场的改革,而这长期以来一直是美国的专长。而美国正采取着曾经定义日本的产业政策和保护主义措施。这揭示了美国在试图建立全球联盟以对抗中国的同时,在国内追求商业自给自足时所面临的矛盾。日本的方法更为合理。
You would think a new bout of protectionism in America, most recently the bipartisan attempt to block Nippon Steel’s $15bn acquisition of US Steel under the guise of safeguarding American jobs, would elicit a sense of déjà vu in Japan. But it is more complicated than that. In recent years one of the most important strategic partnerships in the world has done a switcheroo. Japan is embracing shareholder-friendly, pro-market reforms that have long been America’s thing. America is adopting the sort of industrial policies and protectionism that once defined Japan. This reveals a lot about the contradictions America faces as it attempts to build global alliances to counter China while pursuing business autarky at home. Japan’s approach makes more sense.
日本在2010年代初让熊彼特生活的十年里发生的转变令人瞩目,这不仅限于大局观的事情如利率上升和股票市场飙升。随着日本努力抵消人口减少带来的经济逆风,地面上的情况也在发生变化。问问乐观主义者,日本失落十年的若干方面正在逐渐淡出视野。
Japan’s transition in just the ten years since Schumpeter lived there in the early 2010s is remarkable—and not merely big-picture stuff such as rising interest rates and the surging stockmarket. As Japan struggles to offset the economic headwinds of depopulation, things are changing on the ground, too. Ask an optimist, and several aspects of Japan’s lost decades are fading from view.
再见通货紧缩:价格上涨,日本大型企业最近同意实现33年来最大规模的工资增长。再见仇外:移民就业虽然仍远远不及西方标准,但正在上升。再见舒适资本主义:企业虽然仍然现金充裕,但正追求更高的回报,进行更多的收购,收获股东激进主义带来的好处。“这是内在的。这是日本精英说如果我们不充分利用资产,我们将无法生存。”资深日本观察员Jesper Koll表示。像沃伦·巴菲特一样,他在2020年大举买进了日本贸易公司的大部分股权,进行了明智的投资。
Sayonara deflation: prices are rising and Japan’s large firms recently agreed to the biggest wage increase in 33 years. Sayonara xenophobia: immigrant employment, though still small by Western standards, is going up. Sayonara cosy capitalism: firms, though still awash with cash, are targeting higher returns, conducting more takeovers and reaping the benefits of shareholder activism. “It’s endogenous. This is the elite of Japan saying if we don’t sweat our assets, we won’t be around,” says Jesper Koll, a veteran Japan-watcher. As usual Warren Buffett, who bought big stakes in Japan’s trading houses in 2020, invested shrewdly.
同时还有久违之久的几件事。日本是一个更强大的贸易大国,出口在过去三年里激增(部分得益于日元贬值)。其最有价值的公司丰田的销售今年在美国大幅增长;许多汽车买家更青睐该公司的混合动力车型,而非竞争对手的纯电动车(EVs)。日本正在享受工业复兴,尤其是在半导体等高科技产品领域。今年二月,全球最大芯片制造商台积电在日本开设了其在美国建厂不到两年之后的第一家工厂。该公司在尝试在美国开设工厂时遇到了巨大延误。
There are several hisashiburis, or “long time no sees”, too. Japan is a stronger trading power, with exports surging for the past three years (thanks in part to a cheap yen). Sales by its most valuable company, Toyota, have risen sharply in America this year; many car buyers favour the firm’s hybrid models over rivals’ electric vehicles (EVs). Japan is enjoying an industrial renaissance, especially in high-tech products such as semiconductors. In February TSMC, the world’s biggest chip manufacturer, opened its first factory in Japan less than two years after construction started. It has suffered big delays trying to do the same in America.
那么,日本对美国逐渐走向老牌的“日本化”持何看法?对信任的第一次打击发生在2017年,当唐纳德·特朗普让美国退出了一项由美、日和其他十个国家费尽心机打造的贸易条约——跨太平洋合作协定,部分目的是为了制衡中国。而特朗普的继任者乔·拜登则进一步推行了“美国优先”的产业政策。他的减轻通货膨胀法案(IRA)对缺乏与美国自由贸易条约的公司(包括日本在内)进行了歧视性处理(日本后来签署了一项关键的矿业协议,为其EVs提供了一些被剥夺的税收激励)。拜登对跨太平洋钢铁合并的反对成为了一记耳光。他的保护主义论点不仅站不住脚,还恰逢立法者提议将日本列入可以绕过美国严格外国投资规则的战略盟友白名单。
So what does Japan make of America turning Japanese, in the bad old sense? The first blow to trust came in 2017 when Donald Trump withdrew America from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade treaty that America, Japan and ten other countries had painstakingly crafted partly to counterbalance China. Mr Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, doubled down on an America-first industrial policy. His Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) discriminated against firms from Japan and other places that lacked a free-trade treaty with America (Japan later signed a critical-minerals deal that provides its EVs with some of the tax incentives they had been denied.) Mr Biden’s opposition to the trans-Pacific steel merger has been a slap in the face. Not only were his protectionist arguments spurious. They came just as lawmakers were proposing to add Japan to a whitelist of strategic allies permitted to bypass America’s strict foreign-investment rules.
日本经济部不会像上世纪80年代美国商务部对日本那样对抗美国。尽管在支持市场方面取得进展,但日本并非资本主义的典范,使用产业政策促进清洁能源和芯片制造。美国的庞大经济正在快速增长,因此日本不能太蹩脚。日本企业承诺向美国投资数十亿美元,以利用IRA的优势。至于日本制铁公司,预计它会低调处理,并希望合并风波在11月的总统选举后平息。如果拜登先生的亲就业立场帮助他击败身怀保护主义基因的特朗普,那么日本将会松口气。
Japan’s economy ministry will not go on the warpath against America as the Commerce Department did against Japan in the 1980s. For all its pro-market progress it is no paragon of capitalist virtue, deploying industrial policy to promote clean energy and chipmaking. America’s giant economy is growing fast, so Japan cannot afford to be too huffy. Its firms have pledged to invest billions in America to take advantage of the IRA. As for Nippon Steel, expect it to keep its head down and hope the merger brouhaha blows over after the presidential election in November. If Mr Biden’s pro-jobs stance helps him defeat Mr Trump, a protectionist to the marrow of his bones, Japan will sigh with relief.
然而这种关系不再是单向的。过去,美国不仅是日本最重要的出口市场,也是美日安全联盟的保证者,这是一项防务条约。这种保护仍然至关重要。然而,近年来,随着来自中国和朝鲜的威胁加剧,日本已经开始承担更多自身防卫责任。它决定在强力新武器,比如巡航导弹上投入更多资金。日本科技产业希望在西方军事供应链中扮演更重要的角色。据报道,4月10日拜登总统和日本首相岸田文雄在白宫会面时将公布数十年来最大规模的安全协定升级计划。
Yet the relationship is no longer one-sided. In the past America was not just Japan’s most important export market but also a guarantor of its safety under the US-Japan Security Alliance, a defence treaty. That protection remains vital. In recent years, though, as threats from China and North Korea have grown, Japan has taken more of its defence into its own hands. It has decided to spend vastly more on powerful new weapons, such as cruise missiles. Its tech industry is hoping to play a bigger role in the West’s military supply chains. On April 10th Mr Biden and Japan’s prime minister, Kishida Fumio, will reportedly unveil the biggest upgrade to the security pact in decades when they meet at the White House.
美国则需要日本,不仅作为亚洲的军事合作伙伴。正如另一位长期关注日本事务的彼得·塔斯克所言,日本日益被视为该地区的“非中”领导者,美国依赖它作为对抗中国的经济对标。随着更多亚洲国家进入日本的轨道,借着幸运之际,它们将模仿日本新发现的贸易务实主义。毕竟,这才是真正的美国方式。■
America, for its part, needs Japan not just as a military partner in Asia. As Peter Tasker, another long-time Japan-watcher, puts it, Japan is increasingly seen as the “non-China” leader in the region, and America relies on it as an economic counterweight to China. As more Asian countries move into Japan’s orbit, with luck they will emulate its new-found pro-trade pragmatism. That, after all, is the true American way. ■
*阅读更多关于全球商业的专栏文章,请查看 Schumpeter:Meet the digital David taking on the Google Goliath (3月27日)Can anything stop Nvidia’s Jensen Huang? (3月20日)Elon Musk is not alone in having Delaware in his sights (3月14日)*
Read more from Schumpeter, our columnist on global business:Meet the digital David taking on the Google Goliath (Mar 27th)Can anything stop Nvidia’s Jensen Huang? (Mar 20th)Elon Musk is not alone in having Delaware in his sights (Mar 14th)
金融与经济 | 炒作与远视眼 (Finance and economics | Hype and hyperopia)
习近平如何计划超越美国 (How Xi Jinping plans to overtake America)
数字孪生体、核聚变以及解决中国经济的重大问题 (Digital twins, nuclear fusion and the small matter of fixing China’s economy)
去年,中国国家主席习近平访问了位于中国东北部的黑龙江。这个作为工业霞带一部分的省份典型地展示了困扰中国经济的问题。其出生率是全国最低的。在其最大城市,房价正在下跌。该省2023年的GDP仅增长了2.6%。更糟糕的是,未调整通胀的名义GDP几乎没有增长,这表明其正陷入深度通缩之中。
Last year Xi Jinping, China’s president, paid a visit to Heilongjiang in the country’s north-east. This province, part of the industrial rustbelt, exemplifies the problems besetting China’s economy. Its birth rate is the lowest in the country. House prices in its biggest city are falling. The province’s GDP grew by only 2.6% in 2023. Worse, its nominal GDP, before adjusting for inflation, barely grew at all, suggesting it is in the grip of deep deflation.
不要担心:习近平有一个计划。在访问中,他敦促当地听众培育“新生产力”。这个短语此后在国有报纸和官方聚会上出现了数十次。它在上个月“两会”中被突出,即中国的“橡皮图章”议会和咨询机构的年度会议。北京大学的王贤青在一本新书的序言中将这个术语比作“改革开放”,这个公式概括了中国在1978年之后对市场力量的拥抱。他写道,那些词如今依然“闪烁”,暗示“新生产力”将具有类似的持久力。
Never fear: Mr Xi has a plan. On his visit, he urged his provincial audience to cultivate “new productive forces”. That phrase has since appeared scores of times in state newspapers and at official gatherings. It was highlighted in last month’s “two sessions”, annual meetings of China’s rubber-stamp parliament and its advisory body. In the preface of a new book on the subject, Wang Xianqing of Peking University likens the term to “reform and opening up”, the formula that encapsulated China’s embrace of market forces after 1978. Those words “shine” even today, he wrote, implying that “new productive forces” will have similar staying power.
这个短语意味着什么?中国官员正在寻找推动国家经济的方式。多年来,其生产力依赖于劳动动员和资本积累。从1996年到2015年,中国的劳动力增加了1亿人。根据亚洲生产力组织的数据,在2001年资本存量占GDP的比例从258%增至20年后的349%。2007年至2009年的全球金融危机过后,资本积累通常表现为新的房地产或基础设施。
What does the phrase mean? Chinese officials are hunting for ways to power the country’s economy. For years its productive forces drew on the mobilisation of labour and accumulation of capital. Its workforce grew by 100m people from 1996 to 2015. Its stock of capital rose from 258% of GDP in 2001 to 349% two decades later, according to the Asia Productivity Organisation. After the global financial crisis of 2007-09, capital accumulation often took the form of new property or infrastructure.
但是中国的劳动力现在正在减少,对房地产的需求也下降了:越来越少的人搬到中国的城市,房地产的投机收益不再被保证,潜在的购房者不愿提前购买尚未完工的公寓,以防止困境中的开发商在建设完成前资金耗尽。房地产市场的低迷损害了消费者信心,并使地方政府丧失了土地出让的关键收入。即使中国放松其严格的新冠肺炎控制措施后,经济复苏也乏力而不均衡。支出不够强劲,无法充分利用中国现有的生产力。据一项指标显示,通缩已经连续三个季度持续存在。
But China’s workforce is now shrinking and demand for property has slumped: fewer people are moving to China’s cities, speculative gains on real estate are no longer assured and potential homebuyers are reluctant to buy flats in advance in case distressed developers run out of cash before building is complete. The property downturn has hurt consumer confidence and deprived local governments of crucial revenues from land sales. Even after China abandoned its strict covid-19 controls, the economic recovery has been muted and uneven. Spending has not been strong enough to fully employ China’s existing productive forces. As a consequence, according to one measure, deflation has persisted for three quarters in a row.
在中国发展的阶段,经济体通常会转向服务业。然而,政府的关注点在别处。疫情增加了对中国制造业产品的需求,从外科口罩到健身车等各种产品。美国对“关键技术”出口的限制创造了对国产替代品的需求,从半导体制造机器到航空级不锈钢。中国的第十四个五年计划涵盖了2021年至2025年,承诺维持制造业在国内生产总值中的份额,这一份额从2006年的近三分之一下降到2020年的四分之一。
At China’s stage of development, economies typically pivot towards services. Yet the government’s heart lies elsewhere. The pandemic boosted demand for China’s manufactured goods, from surgical masks to exercise bikes. America’s export controls on “chokepoint technologies” have created a need for homegrown alternatives, from lithography machines to aviation-grade stainless steel. China’s 14th five-year plan, which spans 2021-25, promised to maintain manufacturing’s share of GDP, which had declined from almost a third in 2006 to just over a quarter in 2020.
在寻求复杂而自给自足的制造系统的过程中,中国采用了各种有益的政策。例如,其教育部最近批准了新的本科专业,涉及高端半导体科学和工程。根据智库战略与国际问题研究中心的数据,2019年用于更明确的工业政策,包括补贴、减税和廉价信贷的支出占国内生产总值的1.7%,是美国支出比例的三倍多。
In its quest for a sophisticated, but self-contained, manufacturing system, China employs a variety of helpful policies. Its Ministry of Education, for example, recently approved a new undergraduate concentration in high-end semiconductor science and engineering. Spending on more explicit industrial policies, including subsidies, tax breaks and cheap credit, amounted to 1.7% of GDP in 2019, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank—more than three times the percentage spent by America.
“中国真正希望做的是成为下一次工业革命的领导者,”顾问公司嘉卫龙洲经济研究的Tilly Zhang说。这需要它升级传统产业,打破外国对现有技术的束缚,并在未来的产业领域开创新道路。尽管中央政府的雄心令人印象深刻,甚至令人不安,但没有地方政府的帮助(他们缺钱),也没有私营企业家的支持(他们信心不足),这个计划无法成功。因此,新的口号可能暴露出一种有害的“远视症”,这种远大远瞩的目光让领导层忽视了更直接的经济问题。
“What China really wants to be is the leader of the next industrial revolution,” says Tilly Zhang of Gavekal Dragonomics, a consultancy. That will require it to upgrade traditional industries, break foreign strangleholds on existing technologies and forge a new path in industries of tomorrow. Although the central government’s ambition is impressive, even unsettling, it cannot succeed without the help of local governments, which are short of cash, and private entrepreneurs, who are short of confidence. As such, the new slogan may betray a damaging hyperopia—long-sightedness that is blinding the leadership to more immediate economic concerns.
对于加州大学圣地亚哥分校的Barry Naughton来说,他承认在年轻时阅读过一些黑格尔,短语“新生产力”唤起了一个“辩证”观念,即定量变化的积累可能导致质的突破或突然的飞跃,正如黑格尔所说的,就像温度的逐渐升高使水变成蒸汽。与此同时,马克思指出,当新生产力在经济中获得足够的权重时,它们有能力重塑社会秩序,“手工磨盘带给你领主社会,蒸气磨盘带给你资本家社会。”因此,新生产力可能会带来重大影响。
To Barry Naughton of the University of California, San Diego, who confesses to reading some Hegel in his younger days, the phrase “new productive forces” evokes the “dialectical” idea that an accumulation of quantitative changes can result in a qualitative break or sudden leap, as Hegel put it, much like when an incremental increase in temperature turns water into steam. Marx, meanwhile, noted that when new productive forces achieve sufficient weight in the economy, they have the capacity to remake the social order: “The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord,” he wrote, “the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.” New productive forces, then, can be a big deal.
在介绍这个概念时,习近平表示,对于新生产力的检验将体现在“全要素生产率”的提高上,这个术语并非出自马克思之手,而是源自主流经济学。它指的是产出的增加不能归因于可衡量的输入增加,比如实物和人力资本。根据Naughton的说法,新生产力是一个“奇怪的混合兽”。
In presenting the concept, Mr Xi has said that the test for new productive forces will be improvements in “total factor productivity”, a term lifted not from Marx, but from mainstream economics. It refers to increases in output that cannot be attributed to increases in measurable inputs, such as physical and human capital. In mixing Marxist and neoclassical concepts, new productive forces are a “strange hybrid beast”, says Mr Naughton.
根据习先生,新生产力将源自对科学技术在生产中的应用。这句话表明中国的科技推动应该比当今更加雄心勃勃,更加紧密地融入经济生产之中。中国领导人承诺实施“全民”努力推动技术自力更生。中央政府三月公布的预算中,将科学技术年度支出增加了10%,是各部门中最大的百分比增长。这可不是节俭的创新。
According to Mr Xi, the new productive forces will flow from the application of science and technology to production. The phrase is a signal that China’s technology push should be even more ambitious than it is today, and more tightly integrated into economic production. China’s leaders have promised a “whole of nation” effort to boost technological self-reliance. The central government’s budget, unveiled in March, increased annual spending on science and technology by 10%, the largest percentage increase of any division. Frugal innovation, this is not.
这也不是中国首次对该问题采取行动。2006年,一个为时15年的计划制定了国家目标,提高研发支出,减少对外国技术的依赖,增加技术对经济增长的贡献。它还确定了16个“大项目”,比如建造中国自己的大型客机和让探测器着陆月球。这些主要是为了复制现有技术。2010年,在全球金融危机后,中国改变了策略,将一些重刺激投入到各种“战略新兴产业”,包括新型信息技术、可再生能源和电动汽车(EVs)-其中许多仍处于初级阶段。
Nor is it China’s first assault on the problem. In 2006 a 15-year plan set national targets to raise research-and-development (R&D) spending, reduce dependence on foreign technology and increase technology’s contribution to growth. It also identified 16 “megaprojects”, such as building China’s own large passenger aircraft and landing a probe on the moon. These were largely attempts to replicate existing technologies. In 2010, after the global financial crisis, China changed tack, lavishing some of its heavy stimulus on a variety of “strategic emerging industries”, including new kinds of information technology, renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs)—many of which were still embryonic.
六年后,中国再次转变重点。其“创新驱动发展战略”表达了对世界正处在工业革命中的信心。数字技术、物联网、绿色技术和人工智能(AI)的进步承诺着经济各个领域的突破。中国的新战略强调这一互相强化技术集群,而不是挑选各种新兴产业。中国旨在到本世纪中叶成为“世界强国”的创新者。据咨询公司Rhodium Group称,截至2020年,中国在科学技术上的支出几乎达到了2.9万亿人民币(4200亿美元,占GDP的2.8%)。如果包括慷慨的税收减免在内,政府的贡献超过60%。受益者中,六分之一最终是大学或研究机构。大约60%流向了公司。
Six years later, China shifted emphasis again. Its “innovation-driven development strategy” expressed faith that the world was in the midst of an industrial revolution. Advances in digital technologies, the internet of things, green tech and artificial intelligence (AI) promised breakthroughs across the economy. Rather than pick a miscellany of emerging industries, China’s new strategy emphasised this cluster of mutually reinforcing technologies. China aimed to become a “world power” in innovation by the middle of this century. By 2020 it was spending almost 2.9trn yuan ($420bn, or 2.8% of GDP) on science and technology, according to Rhodium Group, a consultancy. The government’s contribution exceeded 60% if generous tax breaks are included. Of the recipients, a sixth ended up with universities or research institutes. Roughly 60% flowed to companies.
诺顿先生称中国的创新战略为“史上政府资源对工业政策目标的最大单一承诺”。这个国家为此付出了什么?到目前为止,结果比任何中等收入国家都要好,但并不像中国领导人所希望的那样令人印象深刻。
Mr Naughton has called China’s innovation strategy “the greatest single commitment of government resources to an industrial-policy objective in history”. What does the country have to show for it? The results have so far been better than any middle-income country could expect. But they are not quite as impressive as China’s leaders might have hoped.
在电子商务、金融科技、高铁和可再生能源方面,中国处于或接近前沿。同样显而易见的是在电动汽车领域,成功帮助去年中国成为世界最大汽车出口国。据智囊团澳大利亚政策研究所确定的64项“关键”技术榜单上,中国在所有领域中的最具影响力论文中的份额上领先于全球,除了11项之外。在5G和6G通信、生物制造、纳米制造和增材制造方面,中国也处于领先地位。此外,中国也在无人机、雷达、机器人和声纳,以及后量子密码等领域占领先地位。
In e-commerce, fintech, high-speed trains and renewable energy, China is at or near the frontier. The same is strikingly apparent in EVs, where success helped China last year to become the world’s biggest exporter of cars. In a list of 64 “critical” technologies identified by the Australian Policy Research Institute, a think-tank, China leads the world in all but 11, based on its share of the most influential papers in the fields. The country is number one in 5G and 6G communications, as well as biomanufacturing, nanomanufacturing and additive manufacturing. It is also out in front in drones, radar, robotics and sonar, as well as post-quantum cryptography.
此外,中国在衡量国家创新“生态系统”的各项指标上取得了良好的进展。由世界知识产权组织发布的全球创新指数结合了大约80个指标,涵盖基础设施、法规和市场环境,以及研究投入、专利授予和引用次数。有中国人均GDP水平的中等收入国家预计排在60名左右,而中国排在第12位。
In addition, China has made good progress in measures of a country’s innovation “ecosystem”. The Global Innovation Index, published by the World Intellectual Property Organisation, combines about 80 indicators, spanning infrastructure, regulations and market conditions, as well as research effort, patent awards and citation counts. A middle-income country with China’s GDP per person would expect to rank in the 60s. China ranks 12th.
这些成就的经济影响很难衡量。自2010年引入以来,中国的“战略性新兴产业”名单一直在不断演变,这使得跟踪进展变得困难。中国国家统计局的两名成员曾经抱怨说,特别是在产品层面上,包括的标准“模糊”。该如何确定锅炉是否属于“节能”范畴,或复合材料是否算作“高性能”?尽管如此,中国的统计员估计,截至2021年,战略性新兴产业对GDP的贡献率为13.4%,高于2014年的7.6%,但低于2020年15%的最初目标。相比之下,房地产建筑和服务(忽略对钢铁、铁矿石等行业的上游环节)的附加值约为12%。
The economic impact of these achievements is harder to measure. China’s list of “strategic emerging industries” has kept evolving since its introduction in 2010, making it tough to track progress. Two members of China’s National Bureau of Statistics once lamented that the criteria for inclusion, especially at the level of products, are “vague”. How to know if a boiler counts as “energy saving” or a composite material counts as “high performing”? Nonetheless, China’s statisticians estimate that strategic emerging industries accounted for 13.4% of GDP in 2021, up from 7.6% in 2014 but below the original target for 2020 of 15%. By comparison, the value added by property building and services (ignoring upstream links to steel, iron-ore and other such industries) was about 12%.
尽管这些收益令人印象深刻,但中国的领导人并不满足。他们对美国的技术禁运和最近的技术胜利感到担忧。对芯片销售和芯片制造设备的大规模出口管制揭示了中国对外国零部件、软件和设备的依赖性。美国在AI方面的进步也引发了反思。AI是一个中国认为自己具有优势的领域。中国领导人对2022年OpenAI开发的大型语言模型ChatGPT的到来感到震惊。
Although these gains are impressive, China’s leaders are not content. They have been alarmed both by America’s technological embargoes and its recent technological triumphs. Sweeping export controls on the sale of chips and chipmaking equipment have revealed China’s dependence on foreign components, software and equipment. America’s advances in AI have also prompted reflection. AI was an industry in which China thought it had an edge. The country’s leaders were shocked by the arrival in 2022 of ChatGPT, a large language model developed by OpenAI.
中国的进展也受到了自己领导人的伤害。他们在2021年打击了许多该国最先进的科技公司,指责它们处理数据不当、阻挠竞争和剥削零工人员。这场监管风暴针对的是面向消费者的“平台”公司,如阿里巴巴和美团,而不是“硬科技”中的先进制造商或其他公司。然而,对投资者信心的损害难以遏制。这些备受冷落的平台公司拥有大量数据,并且也是许多前沿技术(如人工智能)的重要投资者,而中国领导人正努力培育这些技术。据Rhodium称,2023年上半年,中国大型互联网公司的研发支出同比减少了近7%。
China’s progress has also been hurt by its own leaders. They cracked down on many of the country’s most advanced tech firms in 2021, accusing them of mishandling data, thwarting competition and exploiting gig workers. This regulatory storm targeted consumer-facing “platform” companies, such as Alibaba and Meituan, rather than advanced manufacturers or other firms in “hard tech”. However, the damage to investor confidence was hard to contain. The disfavoured platform companies, with their huge troves of data, are also big investors in many frontier technologies, such as AI, which China’s leaders are keen to foster. The country’s large internet firms cut their R&D spending by almost 7% in the first half of 2023, compared with a year earlier, according to Rhodium.
总体要素生产率增长——习先生偏爱新生产力的检验——也有所减缓。中国在2006年推出的科技计划意味着其对经济增长的贡献应当升至60%。但实际上,根据信用评级机构标普全球评级的路易斯·高音显示,这一比例已经下降到不到三分之一。因此,中国正在遭受自己版本的“索洛维谬论”困境:尽管你可以在各处看到新的技术时代,但在生产率统计数据中却无法找到它们的身影。这些挫折和缺陷或许可以解释为何需要一个新口号来搞刺激。
Total-factor productivity growth—Mr Xi’s preferred test of new productive force—has also slowed. The tech programme China introduced in 2006 implied that its contribution to growth should rise to 60%. Instead, it has fallen to less than a third, according to Louis Kuijs of S&P Global Ratings, a credit-rating agency. China is thus suffering from its own version of the “Solow paradox”: you can see a new technological age everywhere but in the productivity statistics. These setbacks and shortcomings may explain the perceived need for a fresh slogan to shake things up.
中国的创新推动目前似乎分为三个方向。首先,它试图复制“垄断”技术。第二个目标是发明全球尚未创造的技术。今年一月,政府部门发布了一个“未来产业”名单,其中许多产业甚至比过去的战略新兴产业更具开创性。这些产业包括光子计算、脑机接口、核聚变和数字孪生——这是医生可以监测的患者的仿真,以便发现可能在他们真实人体中出现的疾病。政府鼓励实验室和研究机构将超过半数的基础资金用于35岁以下的科学家,因为他们更有可能做出国家需要的突破。
The country’s innovation push now seems split into three. First, it seeks to replicate “chokehold” technologies. A second goal is to invent technologies the rest of the world is yet to create. In January government ministries issued a list of “future industries”, many of which are even more pathbreaking than the strategic emerging industries of the past. They include photonic computing, brain-computer interfaces, nuclear fusion and digital twins—simulacra of patients that doctors can monitor for illnesses that might arise in their real-life counterparts. The government is encouraging laboratories and research institutes to spend more than half of their basic funding on scientists under 35 years of age, in the belief they are more likely to make the breakthroughs the country needs.
这些激进尝试可能被视为中国无法承受且不切实际的行为——分散了对自力更生的顽强追求,这需要中国自行研发那些不再可以依赖进口的技术。但据——格思佳的张女士表示,中国领导人希望未来产业通过在未来科技战斗中给予中国“讨价还价的筹码”,间接有助于国家的技术主权。如果美国威胁要切断中国获取重要输入的途径,中国可以以牙还牙。
These moonshots could be seen as a folly China can ill afford—a distraction from the dogged pursuit of self-reliance, which requires homegrown versions of technologies that China can no longer count on importing from abroad. But according to Ms Zhang of Gavekal, China’s leaders hope that futuristic industries will contribute indirectly to the country’s technological sovereignty by giving it “bargaining chips” in the tech battles ahead. If America threatens to cut off China’s access to a vital input, China can retaliate in kind.
中国评论人士经常谈论“在弯道超车”。中国在长期未能取代传统车辆制造商之后,在电动车领域取得成功,这表明在那些尚未被牢固的老牌企业占据的领域取得进展有时会更容易。据北京对外经济贸易大学的毛洁及其合著者表示,中国从2000年到2012年的科技政策最大程度上提高了搅动中的行业的生产率,而不是在国内或国外已成熟的行业。正如毛泽东在打游击战争中著名地相信先占领农村再进攻城市一样,中国可能正在向技术探索更加狂野和复杂的领域迈进,那里它长期的对手优势更小。
Chinese commentators often talk about “overtaking at the curve”. China’s success in EVs, after its longstanding failure to displace incumbent makers of traditional vehicles, demonstrates that it can sometimes be easier to make advances in fields that are not already occupied by well-entrenched incumbents. According to Jie Mao of the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing and his co-authors, China’s science-and-technology policies from 2000 to 2012 boosted productivity most in industries in ferment, rather than in those that had reached maturity either at home or abroad. In fighting a guerrilla war, Mao Zedong famously believed in occupying the countryside before advancing on the cities. In the same way, China may be marching into wilder and woollier areas of technological discovery, where its long-entrenched adversaries have a smaller advantage.
第三个目标是升级现有行业。北京大学的王勇认为,“即使是最传统的农业也可以形成新的生产力”,只要采用革命性技术。他提到自动种植或利用大数据进行选择育种。在中国的两会上,一位知名国有酿酒厂的代表甚至主张新的生产力可以在烈酒中找到。
A third objective is to upgrade existing industries. “Even the most traditional agriculture can form new productive forces,” Wang Yong of Peking University has argued, so long as it employs revolutionary technologies. He cites automated planting or selective breeding using big data. At the two sessions, the annual meetings of China’s parliament and its advisory body, a delegate from a prominent state-owned distillery even argued that the new productive forces can be found in hard spirits.
追求这些目标将会成本巨大。过去十年的一个教训是,再多的资金也不能保证生产转型为黑格尔所说的变革。但缺乏支出必然也会阻碍变革。
The pursuit of these goals will be expensive. One lesson of the past decade is that lots of money cannot guarantee a Hegelian transformation of production. But a lack of spending will surely preclude one.
因此,中国领导人应该担心地方政府的预算紧张而民心涣散。在过去,为了推动科技进步,中国多数资金都来源于地方政府基金,通过土地出售和“专项债券”筹集资金。这些收入从2020年到2023年下降了超过五分之一。
It must therefore worry China’s leaders that local governments’ budgets are stretched and animal spirits are low. In the past, much of the money for China’s tech push has come from local-government funds that raise money from land sales and “special bonds”. Their revenues fell by more than a fifth from 2020 to 2023.
国际和平协会卡内基说,繁荣经济和地方政府资金富裕时,它们有权进行可能在五到十年内不见回报的投资。例如,2010年,经济增长在反弹,刺激资金可以投入到电动车、太阳能电池板和其他不断发展的技术中。但在如今艰难的时代,当地政府很可能不得不应对短期内所付不起的税费。为了帮助省或市平衡财政收支,他们可能会被催促和骚扰。
When the economy is booming and local authorities are flush, they are at liberty to invest in ventures that may not pay off for five or ten years, points out Matt Sheehan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank. In 2010, for example, growth was rebounding and stimulus money could flood into EVs, solar panels and other evolving technologies. But for local governments in today’s more straitened times, “firefighting is going to end up overwhelming attempts to think long term”, he says. Firms will be urged to invest in projects with short-term payoffs. They may also be pestered and harassed for taxes and fees to help their provincial or municipal patron balance its books.
在今年的两会上,中国总理李强列出了本年度的“重点任务”。李总理列得第一位的是“推动工业体系现代化”和培育“新的优质生产力”。扩大国内需求,这对于消除通货紧缩是必要的,排在第三位。如果形势和市场无法重振,地方政府将太难重新填满财政,私人投资可能也会不足。习近平正决心重新塑造中国经济。为此,他首先需要重新刺激经济。 ■
At this year’s two sessions, Li Qiang, China’s prime minister, set out the country’s “major tasks” for the year ahead. First on Mr Li’s list was “to modernise the industrial system” and develop “new quality productive forces”. Expanding domestic demand, which is necessary to dispel deflation, ranked only third. If the mood and markets do not revive, local governments will struggle to refill their coffers and private investment may fall short. Mr Xi is determined to reinvent China’s economy. To do so, he needs to reinflate it first. ■
金融与经济 | 美丽的墙 (Finance and economics | A lovely wall)
美联储清理其印钞混乱 (The Federal Reserve cleans up its money-printing mess)
它希望避免扰乱市场,并到目前为止取得成功。 (It wants to avoid upsetting markets, and is so far succeeding)
在 当前阶段,全球市场中几乎每个人都熟悉更高长期利率这一概念。很快,他们可能会了解另一个同样重要的概念,这对于理解央行政策至关重要:更少长期的量化紧缩(QT)。这个短语描述了美联储打算继续减少其资产规模,以撤销其在covid-19大流行期间的巨额债券购买。它希望通过更少并且更长的方式最终使其资产负债表规模比原先会更小一些。
At this point, almost everyone in global markets is familiar with the notion of higher-for-longer interest rates. Soon, they are likely to meet another concept as important for understanding central-bank policy: less-for-longer quantitative tightening (QT). This phrase describes how the Federal Reserve intends to continue reducing its assets to undo its huge bond purchases during the covid-19 pandemic. It hopes that a less-for-longer approach will ultimately leave it with a smaller balance-sheet than would otherwise be the case.
这一切可能看起来很技术性。事实上,在所谓的美联储官员所喜欢的一个比喻中,追踪QT应该像看油漆干燥那样无聊。但是,如果这种乏味持续下去的话,就具有关键的意义,因为这将有助于使资产负债表的扩张和收缩成为央行应对金融危机的工具包中的一部分。尽管其他货币当局也正在实施QT,但美联储作为全球最大经济体的中央银行在这次实验中扮演着占主导地位的角色。
This may all seem quite technical. Indeed, in one metaphor much liked by Fed officials, tracking QT should be as interesting as watching paint dry. But the very dullness—if it remains that way—has crucial implications, because it would help to make balance-sheet expansion and contraction a staple in central banks’ tool kits for staving off financial crises. Although other monetary authorities are also in the midst of QT, the Fed plays a dominant role in this experiment as the central bank for the world’s biggest economy.
美联储已经在自2022年中期开始这一轮QT以来,将资产规模减少了约16%,降至7.5万亿美元左右,略高于在2007-2009年全球金融危机之后的QT尝试中减少的规模(详见图表)。然而,其资产负债表仍比2020年初大约增长了80%左右。 进一步缩减将使美联储有更多的余地在下一次金融风暴来临时通过购买债券(通常被描述为印钞)来扩大资产规模。成功做到这一切而不引发市场崩溃也将有助于回应那些认为量化宽松(QE)是高通胀和资产价格泡沫的原因的批评者。
The Fed has already reduced its assets by about 16% to $7.5trn since the start of this round of QT in mid-2022—a slightly bigger reduction than its previous attempt at QT from 2017 to 2019 in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (see chart). Yet its balance-sheet remains about 80% larger than in early 2020. Shrinking it further would give the Fed more scope to expand it again by purchasing bonds (often described as printing money) when the next financial maelstrom arrives. Managing to do so without crashing markets would also help answer critics who view quantitative easing (QE) as a cause of high inflation and bubbly asset prices.
没有人,包括美联储官员,在中央银行持有的资产的确切规模上知道什么才是正确的大小。关键的衡量标准不是其资产负债表上的资产,而是其负债,具体地说,是商业银行持有的储备金,这些储备金随央行在QE过程中购买债券而增加。美联储的目标是将银行的储备金从如今的“充裕”水平降至“丰富”水平。在疫情爆发前,这样的储备金约占其资产的10%左右。如今,它们占约15%。考虑到对流动性需求的增加,部分原因是因为更严格的金融监管,高盛集团的经济学家认为合理水平会大约在12%左右。这意味着美联储可能希望通过减少其资产规模约5000亿美元来达到这个水平。
No one, including Fed officials, knows precisely the right size for the central bank’s holdings. The crucial measure is not the assets on its balance-sheet but its liabilities—specifically, the reserves held by commercial banks, which rise as a counterpart to the central bank’s bond purchases during QE. The Fed’s goal is to return banks to “ample” reserves, down from their “abundant” level today. Before the pandemic, such reserves came to about 10% of their assets. Now, they are about 15%. Given increased needs for liquidity, in part owing to stricter financial regulation, economists at Goldman Sachs, a bank, think a good level would be about 12%. This would imply that the Fed may want to shrink its balance-sheet by another $500bn.
没有任何固定的目标,美联储让市场信号来指导自己。特别是,它正在关注银行隔夜融资利率是否高于其对储备金支付的利率。这将表明流动性条件已经变得更加紧张。 2019年秋季的货币市场动荡,包括短期融资成本激增,导致美联储将其上一轮QT紧缩开始的速度急剧放缓。这一次,它避免了这种不稳定。
Without any fixed target, the Fed is allowing itself to be guided by market signals. In particular, it is watching whether overnight financing rates for banks trade above the rate that it pays on their reserve balances. This would be an indication that liquidity conditions have become much tighter. Money-market ructions in the autumn of 2019, including surging short-term financing costs, led the Fed to bring its previous round of QT to a screeching halt. This time, it has avoided such instability.
到目前为止,官员们现在希望放缓资产减少的速度,押注这样做将最大程度地减少市场扰动的风险,从而在一个较长时期内最大化其资产负债表的缩减。随着美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔在上个月承诺“很快”开始,可以合理猜测美联储将在5月1日的下次会议之后制定缩减政策。目前,美联储并没有出售证券,而是让每个月高达950亿美元的证券到期从其资产负债表中清除。逐步减少QT可能会使其旨在清除约一半规模的资产。
Having got this far, officials now want to slow their asset reduction, betting that doing so will minimise the risk of market disruption and thus, over a longer period, maximise their balance-sheet shrinkage. With Jerome Powell, the Fed’s chairman, promising last month to start “fairly soon”, a fair conjecture is that the Fed will lay out plans for tapering QT after its next meeting on May 1st and begin to do so in June. Currently, the Fed is not selling securities but letting up to $95bn roll off its balance-sheet each month. A tapered QT may see it aim for a roll-off of roughly half as much.
更少而更长的QT的推论是,美联储可能会继续在今年晚些时候减少其资产,这意味着它可能会在缩减其资产负债表的同时(即货币紧缩)也会降低利率(即货币宽松)。虽然这听起来似乎矛盾,但理论上投资者应该在美联储宣布这一政策后就大部分地反映出逐步缩减的影响。
The corollary of less-for-longer QT is that the Fed will probably continue to reduce its assets for the rest of this year, which means it may be shrinking its balance-sheet (ie, monetary tightening) at the same time as it cuts interest rates (ie, monetary loosening). Although that may sound contradictory, investors should in theory price in much of the impact of tapered QT as soon as the Fed announces it.
无论如何,总体来说,目前中央银行资产负债表的缩减带来的波动很少——与2019年的动荡以及2013年“缩减恐慌”形成对比,当时美联储首次讨论了缩减资产购买计划。前美联储经济学家威廉·英格利什表示:“人们对资产负债表工具的思考越来越熟练,而美联储对沟通这些工具也更加熟练。”观察油漆干燥是无聊的。但是粉刷好的墙壁是可爱的。■
In any case, the big picture is just how few ripples the central bank’s balance-sheet reduction has caused so far—a contrast with both the turbulence of 2019 and the “taper tantrum” of 2013, when the Fed first discussed plans for trimming asset purchases. “People are getting more used to thinking about balance-sheet tools, and the Fed is more used to communicating them,” says William English, a former Fed economist. Watching paint dry is boring. But a well-painted wall can be lovely. ■
金融与经济 | 106亿美元的问题 (Finance and economics | The $10.6bn question)
FTX的客户将被偿还吗? (Will FTX’s customers be repaid?)
随着Sam Bankman-Fried被关押,他的往期存款人等待着他们的命运 (As Sam Bankman-Fried is locked up, his erstwhile depositors await their fate)
在加密货币交易所倒闭后的几天里,山姆·班克曼-弗里德(Sam Bankman-Fried)打开了一个谷歌文档,并开始打字。在标题为“可能不好的主意”下,他列出了一些潜在的策略,其中包括公开承认自己是共和党人并辩称“SBF为我们的罪而死”。班克曼-弗里德最终决定放弃这两种做法,但有一种说法他从未放弃。他一直声称FTX实际上是偿债的,可以偿还10.6亿美元欠客户的债务。
In the days after the fall of his crypto exchange, Sam Bankman-Fried opened a Google Doc and began to type. Beneath the title “probably bad ideas” he listed potential strategies, which included coming out as a Republican and arguing that “SBF died for our sins”. Mr Bankman-Fried ultimately decided against both, but there is one fiction he never let die. He has always claimed FTX was, in fact, solvent and could repay the $10.6bn it owed customers.
班克曼-弗里德在2022年11月失去了自己的帝国,但直到3月28日才得知自己的命运:25年监禁。FTX的客户转变为债权人仍在等待。破产案变得混乱,涉及100多家实体,律师表示资产“无可救药地”混合在一起。因此,当FTX在一月告诉法院应能够全额偿还36,000名客户时,除了班克曼-弗里德自己之外,这对可能所有人来说都是令人惊讶的。
Mr Bankman-Fried lost his empire in November 2022, but it was not until March 28th that he learned his fate: 25 years in prison. FTX’s customers-turned-creditors are still waiting. The bankruptcy is messy, extending to over 100 entities with assets lawyers say are “hopelessly” mingled. So it was surprising to possibly everybody except Mr Bankman-Fried himself when FTX told a court in January that it should be able to repay its 36,000 customers in full.
FTX之所以现金充裕,并不是因为它一直是偿债的,而是因为管理者们收回了上一任首席执行官挥霍掉的资产,FTX当前老板约翰·雷三世(John Ray III)辩解说。不断上涨的加密货币价格也有所帮助。雷先生的团队已经找到了70亿美元的资产,包括奢华住宅和私人飞机。他们估计在公司破产之前流出了另外166亿美元,其中三分之一流向了内部人员和关联方,其中一部分可能被收回。
FTX is good for the cash not because it was always solvent, but because administrators have clawed back assets that its last chief executive frittered away, argues John Ray III, the firm’s current boss. Rising crypto prices have also helped. Mr Ray’s team has located $7bn in assets, including luxury homes and private jets. They reckon that another $16.6bn flowed out of the company before its collapse—a third of which went to insiders and affiliates—and some of which may be clawed back.
雷先生成功地追踪到FTX的现金使得对其资产的索赔成为热门商品。伪造者已经夸大了他们的总价值达到了23.6qn美元(quintillion即百万的五次方)。尽管FTX债务的合法索赔最初交易价格低至面值的十分之一,反映出人们认为这些债务不会被偿还,但这些债券几乎完全恢复了它们的价值。一名客户正试图在法庭上寻求恢复1.66亿美元的债权,他们已经以三分之一的面值出售了这些债权。
Mr Ray’s success in tracking down FTX’s cash has made claims on its estate a hot commodity. Imposters have pumped up their total value to $23.6qn (quintillion, that is). Although legitimate claims on FTX’s debt first traded at as low as one-tenth of their face value, reflecting expectations they would not be repaid, these certificates have almost entirely recovered their value. One customer is trying to regain $166m of claims in court, having sold them for a third of their face value.
雷先生只需要在FTX于2022年11月11日申请破产保护时的账户里,以无息方式偿还客户加密货币账户的美元价值。那时,比特币代币已经损失了自班克曼-弗里德三天前禁止提款以来价值的五分之一。自那时以来,加密货币一直呈猛增态势。FTX最大的持有令牌solana的价格增长了十一倍;比特币的价值也增长了三倍多。这导致一些债权人提出要求以代币而不是美元支付。他们声称这些代币是根据FTX的条款属于他们的财产。
Mr Ray only has to repay, without interest, the dollar value of customers’ crypto accounts at the time FTX filed for Chapter 11 protection on November 11th 2022. By then, bitcoin tokens had lost a fifth of their value since Mr Bankman-Fried had barred withdrawals three days earlier. And crypto has since been on a tear. The price of solana tokens, FTX’s largest holding, has increased eleven-fold; bitcoin has more than tripled in value. This has led some creditors to sue for payment in tokens, rather than dollars. They claim the tokens are their property under FTX’s terms.
然而,FTX并没有他们寻求的代币。雷先生表示,当他接管时,交易所只剩下105枚比特币,相比之下客户有近100,000枚的权益。事实上,客户们似乎幸运地侥幸避开了风险。他们的偿还依赖于FTX的所有者放弃他们120亿美元的索赔权、联邦政府放弃435亿美元的罚款和税款,以及允许雷先生出售剩下的资产。如果FTX真的一直是偿债的,这一切都不会发生。 ■
Yet FTX does not have the tokens they seek. Mr Ray says there were only 105 bitcoins left on the exchange when he took over, against customer entitlements to nearly 100,000. In truth, customers seem to have made a lucky escape. Their repayment relies on FTX’s owners losing out on their $12bn claim, the federal government forgoing $43.5bn in fines and taxes, and Mr Ray being allowed to sell what remains. None of this would have happened if FTX really had been solvent. ■
金融和经济 | Buttonwood (Finance and economics | Buttonwood)
如何打造全球货币 (How to build a global currency)
印度是最新尝试的国家。需要进行痛苦的改革。 (India is the latest country to try. Painful reforms are required)
七十年前,印度卢比常常在离家很远的地方被找到。在印度从英国独立之后,这种货币仍然在阿拉伯海对岸的酋长国中使用。直到1970年,一些地方依然使用海湾卢比,这是由印度央行发行的一种货币。
Seventy years ago the Indian rupee was often found a long way from home. After India gained independence from Britain, the currency remained in use in sheikhdoms across the Arabian Sea. Until as late as 1970, some employed the Gulf rupee, a currency issued by India’s central bank.
如今,情况大不相同。尽管印度经济是世界第五大经济体,卢比在国际货币交易中所占比例不到2%。印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪希望看到该货币再次遍布全球。在印度储备银行成立90周年纪念活动上,在4月1日,莫迪告诉中央银行的决策者们要专注于使卢比更具可及性。然而,从历史上看,国家领导人更有可能对让本国货币成为全球货币的想法表示热情,而不是实施所需的改革。
Today the picture is rather different. The rupee accounts for less than 2% of international-currency transactions, even though the Indian economy is the world’s fifth-largest. Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, would like to see the currency span the globe once again. Speaking at the 90th anniversary of the Reserve Bank of India on April 1st, Mr Modi told the central bank’s policymakers to focus on making the rupee more accessible. Historically, however, national leaders have been a lot more likely to express enthusiasm for the idea of making their currency a global one than to enact the reforms required to do so.
尽管美元是无可争议的货币之王,但仍有许多货币在国际上发挥着自己的作用。欧元、英镑、瑞士法郎,以及澳大利亚、加拿大、香港和新加坡的元,都是例子。这些货币在世界范围内的外汇储备和私人投资组合中被发现,并用于贸易和金融交易。理论上,卢比无需加入这个尊贵的行列。
Although the American dollar is the undisputed king of currencies, there are many with a global role of their own. The euro, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the dollars of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore are all examples. These currencies are found in foreign reserves and private portfolios worldwide, and used for both trade and financial transactions. In theory, there is no reason why the rupee should not join the illustrious group.
拥有一种被广泛使用的货币会带来可观的好处。海外投资者的需求降低了国内企业的融资成本,这些企业不再被迫以外币借贷。这种需求还减少了出口商和进口商的汇率风险,他们在进行贸易时不需要经常兑换货币,还使政府能够减少外汇储备的规模。
Having a widely used currency brings sizeable benefits. Demand from overseas investors lowers financing costs for domestic companies, which are no longer compelled to borrow in foreign currencies. Such demand also reduces exchange-rate risks for exporters and importers, who do not need to convert currencies so often when trading, and enables the government to reduce the size of its foreign-exchange reserves.
印度正在奠定国际货币的基石。该国现在拥有外国人想购买的资产,使卢比成为海外可能的储值方式。九月份,摩根大通银行宣布将纳入印度政府债券到其新兴市场指数中。数据提供商彭博上个月也做出了同样的决定。印度股市的爆炸性表现引起了全球投资者的兴趣,过去一年以美元计价上涨了37%。
Some of the foundation stones of an international currency are being laid in India. The country now has assets that foreigners want to buy, making the rupee a potential store of value overseas. In September JPMorgan Chase, a bank, announced that it would include Indian government bonds in its emerging-market index. Bloomberg, a data provider, took the same decision last month. The explosive performance of the country’s stocks, which are up by 37% in dollar terms over the past year, has piqued global interest.
卢比也越来越多地成为外国人的计价单位和交换媒介。来自22个国家的银行被允许开立特殊的卢比账户,没有通常的兑换限制。今年八月,印度向阿布扎比国家石油公司进行了首笔卢比支付。
The rupee is also increasingly a unit of account and a medium of exchange for foreigners. Banks from 22 countries have been permitted to open special rupee-denominated accounts, without the usual exchange limits. In August India made its first rupee payment for oil, to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
然而,中国展示了印度还有多远的路要走。尽管中国决策者十多年来一直试图使人民币成为全球货币,但在“SWIFT”这一支付网络外地区进行的国际交易中,人民币仍只占不到3%,尽管中国占全球GDP的17%。此外,80%的国际人民币交易发生在香港。中国相对封闭的资本账户,阻碍了其货币的更广泛使用。印度的资本账户比以前开放多了,但仍远比任何一个拥有全球货币的国家更受保护。
Yet China shows how far India has to go. Although Chinese policymakers have been trying to make the yuan a global currency for more than a decade, it still accounts for less than 3% of international trades made via SWIFT, a payments network, outside the euro zone, despite the fact that China accounts for 17% of global GDP. Moreover, 80% of such international yuan transactions occur in Hong Kong. China’s relatively closed capital account, which prevents investments from flowing freely across its borders, is the main obstacle to wider use of its currency. India’s capital account is less closed than it once was, but is still far more sheltered than that of any of the countries with a global currency.
日本提供了更好的例子。在1970年,日本占全球GDP的7%,高于现在的4%,其公司也开始在国外崭露头角。但日元却无人问津。在随后的十年里,这种情况发生了改变:1970年,日本出口中用日元结算的比例为1%;到了80年代初,这一比例为40%。到1989年,日元占外汇交易总额的28%。如今仍有16%。
Japan provides a better example. In 1970 it accounted for 7% of global GDP—more than the 4% it does now—and its companies were beginning to make a mark abroad. But the yen was a nonentity. That changed over the following decade: in 1970, 1% of Japan’s exports were invoiced in yen; by the early 1980s, 40% were. In 1989 the yen made up 28% of all foreign-exchange transactions. It still accounts for 16% today.
要实现全球货币地位的飞跃,日本领导人必须改革该国经济。他们允许外国人持有各种资产,对大型金融机构进行了解除管制,取消了对资本流动和利率的控制。这些变化打乱了日本的出口导向型经济模式,瓦解了该国官僚体系的权力。
To make the leap to global-currency status, Japan’s leaders had to transform the country’s economy. They allowed foreigners to hold a wide range of assets, deregulated big financial institutions, and peeled back controls on capital flows and interest rates. These changes disrupted Japan’s export-oriented economic model, and undermined the power of the country’s bureaucrats.
任何现在希望加入金字塔尖端的国家,都需要进行同样彻底且令人不安的改变。目前似乎很少有国家有这样的决心。实际上,如果没有美国的压力和对关税的威胁,日本本身可能不会进行这样的改革。美国不会以同样的方式对印度施加压力。改变的愿望必须源自内部。■
Changes just as far-reaching—and uncomfortable—will be required for any country that now wants to join the top table. Few seem to have the stomach for them at present. Indeed, without American pressure and the threat of tariffs, Japan itself might not have made such reforms. America is not about to lean on India in the same way. The desire for change will have to come from within. ■
Read more from Buttonwood, our columnist on financial markets:How the “Magnificent Seven” misleads (Mar 27th)How to trade an election (Mar 21st)The private-equity industry has a cash problem (Mar 14th)
金融与经济 | 自由交易 (Finance and economics | Free exchange)
丹尼尔•卡尼曼是一个善于提出戏弄性问题的大师 (Daniel Kahneman was a master of teasing questions)
一位心理学家如何改变了经济学 (How a psychologist transformed economics)
诺贝尔经济学奖的得主们倾向于在论文中点缀方程式。Daniel Kahneman,于3月27日去世,用人物和难题点缀着他最著名的作品。早期读者遇到了一个IQ为150的学童,生活在市均IQ为100的城市中。稍后,他们思考起不幸的Tees先生,他在飞机原定离港30分钟后到达了机场,当他发现飞机晚点起飞25分钟时,恐怕感觉更糟糕。在70年代,读者们不得不评估如何对抗一种威胁要杀死600人的疾病。1983年,他们被问及要猜测拉琳达的职业,一个言辞直率、31岁的单身哲学毕业生。
Winners of the Nobel prize in economics tend to sprinkle their papers with equations. Daniel Kahneman, who died on March 27th, populated his best-known work with characters and conundrums. Early readers encountered a schoolchild with an IQ of 150 in a city where the average was 100. Later they pondered the unfortunate Mr Tees, who arrived at the airport 30 minutes after his flight’s scheduled departure, and must have felt even worse when he discovered the plane had left 25 minutes late. In the 1970s readers had to evaluate ways to fight a disease that threatened to kill 600 people. In 1983 they were asked to guess the job of Linda, an outspoken, single 31-year-old philosophy graduate.
Kahneman利用这样的片段来揭示那些可能扭曲人们思维和决策的迷人心理快捷方式。例如,很多人认为Linda更可能是一个女权主义的银行职员而不是银行职员的任何一种。在面对对抗疾病的两种选择时,大多数人选择保证救200人的方案,而不是一个有三分之一的几率挽救每个人和三分之二的几率无人能救的更具风险的替代方案。但如果选择被重新构思,决定往往会不同。毕竟,选择第一个选项,就会有400个人确保死去。而选择第二个,没有人会死,只有三分之一的概率。
Kahneman used such vignettes to expose the seductive mental shortcuts that can warp people’s thoughts and decisions. Many people, for example, think it more likely that Linda is a feminist bank-teller than a bank-teller of any kind. Presented with two responses to the disease, most choose one that saves 200 people for certain, over a chancier alternative that has a one-third chance of saving everyone and a two-thirds chance of saving no one. But if the choice is reframed, the decision is often different. Choose the first option, after all, and 400 people die for sure. Choose the second and nobody dies with a one-third probability.
挑逗性的问题对Kahneman来说很容易,甚至在他梦中都有,根据迈克尔·刘易斯的《逆转项目》一书。一些问题源自他的教学,这种教学不仅限于象牙塔。他曾向以色列空军飞行教官解释“均值回归”的概念。飞行员之所以在粗糙的飞行动作后表现更加出色,不是因为教官朝他们大喊大叫,而是因为在先前表现异常糟糕的情况下,改善的机会更大。
Teasing questions came easily to Kahneman, even in his sleep, according to “The Undoing Project”, a book by Michael Lewis. Some sprang from his teaching, which was not confined to ivory towers. He once explained the idea of “regression to the mean” to flight instructors in Israel’s air force. The reason pilots tended to improve after a sloppy manoeuvre was not because the instructor screamed at them, but because the chances of an improvement are higher if the prior performance was unusually bad.
Kahneman是自己顽固自我不宽容的严格评分者,关注自己的过失。他早期的一篇论文揭示了他本人容易陷入的方法论混乱,比如错误地坚信,像一个IQ为150的孩子,即使是一个小样本,也不会使结果产生偏差。
Kahneman was a harsh grader of his own incorrigible self, attentive to his own lapses. One of his early hit papers exposed the kind of methodological muddles to which he himself was vulnerable, such as the misplaced confidence that an outlier, like a child with an IQ of 150, would not skew even a small sample.
Kahneman还有一个终生并且有生命意义的对八卦的兴趣。他曾写道,他的童年是作为立陶宛犹太人的儿子,在巴黎过着舒适但琐屑的战前生活,充满了有关他人的闲谈。他的一位朋友告诉刘易斯先生,“欧洲的犹太人必须‘持续评估别人’。谁是危险的?谁不是危险的?…人们基本上依赖于他们的心理判断。”
Kahneman also had a lifelong—and life-preserving—interest in gossip. His childhood, as the son of Lithuanian Jews living a comfortable but edgy pre-war existence in Paris, was full of talk about other people, he once wrote. Jews in Europe had to “assess others, all the time,” a friend of his told Mr Lewis. “Who is dangerous? Who is not dangerous?…People were basically dependent on their psychological judgment.”
对于心理洞察的传播,Kahneman曾试图将关于判断的课程加入以色列的学校教学大纲。他原以为该项目会花一两年的时间。而实际花了八年,到那时教育部已经失去了热情;这是他和常合作的阿莫斯·特沃斯基所称的“计划幻觉”的一个令人羞愧的例子。他更成功地将心理智慧融入经济学这个受到保护的领域,后者始终坚持着有限但整洁的人类决策模型。
Gossip was both a source of his work and an intended target. His bestselling book, “Thinking Fast and Slow”, was written not for decision-makers, but for “critics and gossipers”. Decision-makers were often too “cognitively busy” to notice their own biases. Pilots could be corrected by observant co-pilots and overconfident bosses might be chastened by whispers around the water-cooler, especially if the whisperers had read Kahneman’s book.
他是如何做到的呢?一个答案是,他与特沃斯基合作,他优雅的头脑像他的办公桌一样残酷整洁。他们将发现的认知偏差整合到了所谓的“前景理论”模型中。根据这个理论,人们的幸福感对财富的变化更为敏感,而不是对财富水平。这些变化是相对于中性参考点来判断的。这个点并不总是显而易见,可以重新构思:如果奖金比预期小,可能会让人失望。在追求利益时,人们是厌恶风险的。他们会选择一定赢取450美元的胜利,而不是50%的机会赢取1000美元。但人们赌博是为了避免损失,而损失比相同大小的收益更为重要。
To spread psychological insight, Kahneman once tried to add a course on judgment to Israel’s school curriculum. He expected the project would take a year or two. It took eight, by which time the ministry of education had lost enthusiasm; a humbling example of what he and Amos Tversky, his frequent co-author, called the “planning fallacy”. He had more success inveigling psychological wisdom into the well-guarded realm of economics, which had clung to a thin but tidy model of human decision-making.
前景理论将这种决策模型从片段翻译成代数和几何语言。这使经济学家们觉得很可接受。实际上,这门学科开始将这类东西视为自己的产物。Kahneman感叹道,心理学的应用“竟然被称为行为经济学”,“许多心理学家发现,尽管其内容没有改变,但他们的行业名称已经改变。”
How did he do it? One answer is that he teamed up with Tversky, whose elegant mind was as ruthlessly tidy as his desk. They incorporated the cognitive illusions they had discovered into a model called “prospect theory”. According to this theory, people’s well-being responds to changes in wealth, more than levels. The changes are judged relative to a neutral reference point. That point is not always obvious and can be recast: a bonus can disappoint if it is smaller than expected. In pursuit of gains, people are risk averse. They will take a sure win of $450 over a 50% chance of winning $1,000. But people gamble to avoid losses, which loom larger than gains of an equivalent size.
在经济学重新打造心理学的同时,Kahneman使一个更古老的经济学传统重焕生机:“快乐计量器”,即弗朗西斯·埃奇沃斯斯思所想象的快乐和痛苦的衡量器。Kahneman的快乐计量器简单地要求人们在一个尺度上即时评价自己的感受。他发现人们的评分经常与他们之后回忆的不一致。他们的“回忆自我”过于重视一个经历的结束和最好或最坏的时刻,忽略了其持续时间。人们宁愿把手放在痛苦地冷水中90秒,也不愿放置一分钟,如果最后30秒比前面的60秒要暖和一点。同样,人们报名参加紧张的旅游行程是因为他们期待回顾,而不是因为他们在那个时候享受得很多。
Prospect theory translated this model of decision-making from vignettes into the language of algebra and geometry. That made it palatable to economists. Indeed, the discipline began to claim this sort of thing as its own. Applications of psychology “came to be called behavioural economics”, lamented Kahneman, “and many psychologists discovered that the name of their trade had changed even if its content had not.”
这一发现的影响延伸至哲学领域。哪一种自我更重要?尽管有明显的缺陷,精心安排非典型记忆以构建生活故事的策展自我对人们来说是珍贵的。Kahneman写道,“我是我的回忆自我,而经历自我,也就是我实际的生活者,对我来说就像一个陌生人。”现在,他的经历自我已经度过了它的生活。接下来就是他触及的许多人来为他留下回忆。■
Even as economics was rebranding psychology, Kahneman revived an older economic tradition: “hedonimeters”, gauges of pleasure and pain that Francis Edgeworth, a 19th-century economist, had imagined. Kahneman’s hedonimeter simply asked people to rate their feelings moment-to-moment on a scale. He found that people’s ratings were often at odds with what they later recalled. Their “remembering” selves put undue weight on the end of an experience and its best or worst moment, neglecting its duration. People would rather keep their hand in painfully cold water for 90 seconds than for a minute, if the final 30 seconds were a little less cold than the preceding 60. Likewise, people sign up for hectic tourist itineraries because they look forward to looking back on them, not because they much enjoy them at the time.
阅读更多关于《自由交换》的专栏文章:印度如何成为亚洲老虎(3月27日)为什么《司空见惯的经济学》未能改变经济学(3月21日)当邻居不欢迎新设施会增加碳排放(3月14日)*
The implications of this discovery extend into philosophy. Which self counts? Despite its manifest flaws, the curatorial self, artfully arranging unrepresentative memories into a life story, is dear to people. “I am my remembering self,” Kahneman wrote, “and the experiencing self, who does my living, is like a stranger to me.” Now his experiencing self has done its living. And it is up to the many people he touched to do the remembering for him. ■
Read more from Free exchange, our column on economics:How India could become an Asian tiger (Mar 27th)Why “Freakonomics” failed to transform economics (Mar 21st)How NIMBYs increase carbon emissions (Mar 14th)
科学技术 | 药理学 (Science and technology | Pharmacology)
减肥药物可能会吞噬世界吗? (Could weight-loss drugs eat the world?)
科学家发现抗肥胖药物也可以帮助治疗许多其他疾病。 (Scientists are finding that anti-obesity medicines can also help many other diseases)
基拉怪兽是一种北美有毒蜥蜴,体长约50厘米,身披黑色和橙色鳞片的特殊外衣。这种缓慢的爬行动物大多生活在地下,一年仅进食三到四次,这种情况出乎意料地成为制药业的最畅销药物之一的灵感来源:新一代减肥药物,让患者和投资者兴奋异常。最初是为糖尿病而研制的药物,越来越多的证据表明它们对心脏、肾脏、肝脏以及其他疾病也有益处。
The Gila monster is a poisonous North American lizard that measures around 50 centimetres and sports a distinctive coat of black and orange scales. This lethargic reptile, which mostly dwells underground and eats just three to four times a year, is the unlikely inspiration for one of pharma’s biggest blockbusters: a new generation of weight-loss drugs that has patients—and investors—in a frenzy. Originally made for diabetes, evidence is growing that they also have benefits in diseases of the heart, kidney, liver and beyond.
自20世纪80年代末,科学家们就相信一种叫做胰高血糖素样肽-1(GLP-1)的肠道激素,在餐后由肠道分泌,有助于治疗糖尿病。GLP-1可增加胰岛素的分泌(一种降低血糖水平的激素)并减少葡萄糖生成素的分泌(增加血糖水平)。但是GLP-1在体内会很快被酶分解,因此只能维持几分钟。因此,如果要将其作为药物使用,患者将面临每小时需要注射GLP-1的不愉快前景。
Since the late 1980s scientists believed that a gut hormone called glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1), which is secreted by the intestines after a meal, could help treat diabetes. GLP-1 increases the production of insulin (a hormone that lowers blood-sugar levels) and reduces the production of glucagon (which increases blood-sugar levels). But GLP-1 is broken down by enzymes in the body very quickly, so it sticks around for only a few minutes. If it were to be used as a drug, therefore, patients would have faced the unwelcome prospect of needing GLP-1 injections every hour.
1990年,纽约布朗克斯退伍军人事务医疗中心的研究员约翰·恩格发现,称为exendin-4的激素,在基拉怪兽的毒液中发现,类似于人类的GLP-1。至关重要的是,在这种怪兽饮食后释放的exendin-4比GLP-1更难降解,可以在其体内停留数小时。经过十多年的努力,一种合成基拉怪兽激素的荷尔蒙exenatide,由美国制药业巨头礼来公司和生物技术公司艾米琳制药开发,获批在美国治疗糖尿病。这一突破刺激了其他公司开发更有效、持续时间更长的GLP-1药物作为糖尿病治疗的选择,超越注射胰岛素。
In 1990 John Eng, a researcher at the Veterans Affairs Medical Centre in The Bronx, discovered that exendin-4, a hormone found in the venom of the Gila monster, was similar to human GLP-1. Crucially, the exendin-4 released after one of the monster’s rare meals is more resistant to enzymatic breakdown than GLP-1, staying in its body for hours. It took more than a decade before exenatide, a synthetic version of the lizard hormone, created by Eli Lilly, an American pharma giant, and Amylin Pharmaceuticals, a biotech firm, was approved to treat diabetes in America. This breakthrough spurred other firms to develop more effective and longer-lasting GLP-1 medications as a treatment option for diabetes, beyond injections of insulin.
科学家们还意识到GLP-1有另一个副作用:它减慢了“胃排空”的速度,让食物在胃中停留更长时间,并抑制了食欲。但是最初并没有认真探索潜在的减肥益处。直到2021年,丹麦一家公司挪威制药公司展示了一项临床试验数据,超重或肥胖患者接受了该公司基于GLP-1的糖尿病药sema-glutide,产品名称为Ozempic,每周一次,历时68周。结果令人瞩目,参与者平均减掉了15%的体重。
Scientists had also been aware that GLP-1 had another side-effect: it slowed the rate of “gastric emptying”, which allows food to stay in the stomach for longer and suppresses appetite. But the potential weight-loss benefits were not seriously pursued at first. It was only in 2021 that Novo Nordisk, a Danish firm, showed data from a clinical trial where overweight or obese patients were put on a weekly dose of its GLP-1-based diabetic drug, semaglutide, which was then being marketed under the name Ozempic, for 68 weeks. The results were dramatic—participants had lost 15% of their body weight, on average.
模拟GLP-1激素的药物后来成为了最畅销品。根据世界肥胖联盟的数据,预计到2030 年,接近一半的世界人口会处于超重或肥胖状态,需求大增—Bloomberg,一家数据提供商,估计到那时这些药物的销售额将达到每年800亿美元。市场预计在接下来的五年中每年增长26%,而肿瘤药物以及免疫学药物,这两个最大领域的年增长率分别为16%和4%。
The medicines that mimic the GLP-1 hormone then became blockbusters. With close to half of the world’s population expected to be obese or overweight by 2030, according to the World Obesity Federation, demand for these drugs is surging—Bloomberg, a data provider, estimates that these medications will hit $80bn in yearly sales by then. The market is projected to grow by 26% per year in the next five years, compared with 16% per year for oncology drugs and 4% per year for immunology medicines, the two other biggest areas.
迄今为止,已经有三种GLP-1药物获批用于治疗超重或肥胖人群:由Novo制造的利拉谷肽和赛马谷肽,以及由礼来制造的地塞帕肽。但市场已经吸引了一大批竞争对手。Bloomberg追踪了近100种正在研发中的候选药物。大多数新疗法希望通过设计更易于使用、引起更少副作用或实现更有效减肥的药物,从而超越赛马谷肽和地塞帕肽。
So far only three GLP-1 drugs have been approved to treat obese or overweight individuals: liraglutide and semaglutide, developed by Novo; and tirzepatide, made by Lilly. But the market has already attracted a wave of competitors (see chart 1). Bloomberg tracks close to 100 wannabe drugs in the development pipeline. Most new therapies hope to outdo semaglutide and tirzepatide by crafting drugs that are easier to take, cause fewer side-effects or result in more effective weight loss (see chart 2).
一个问题是便利性。赛马谷肽和地塞帕肽都是需要一周注射一次的药物。停药后,大部分体重在一年内会恢复。美国大型生物技术公司安进正在研发一种基于每月一次的抗肥胖药物,并希望减肥效果将持续甚至在治疗结束后继续。AMG133激活GLP-1受体,同时阻断胰岛素糖依赖性促胰岛素多肽(GIP)的受体,GIP是小肠对食物摄入的反应中分泌的一种激素,刺激胰岛素和葡萄糖生成素的产生。该公司目前正在进行临床试验,以了解患者是否可以逐渐减少剂量。
One issue is convenience. Both semaglutide and tirzepatide are injections that need to be taken weekly. Stop the dose and most of the weight returns within a year. Amgen, a large American biotech firm, is developing an anti-obesity drug that relies on doses once a month, and hopes the weight-loss effects will last even after treatment ends. AMG133 activates receptors for GLP-1 while blocking receptors of glucose-dependent insulinotropic polypeptide (GIP), a hormone secreted in the small intestine in response to food intake that stimulates the production of both insulin and glucagon. The company is now conducting clinical trials to find out if patients can, over time, be gradually weaned towards smaller doses.
从注射转为口服药也将使那些不喜欢注射的人更容易接受这些药物。Novo正在研发一种口服版本的赛马谷肽,其效果与注射剂一样好。但是这种药片需要比注射剂多20倍的有效成分,并且必须每天服用。由于赛马谷肽供应短缺,Novo不得不推迟口服版本的推出。礼来还有一种名为orforglipron的针对GLP-1受体的每日药丸正在进行晚期临床试验。
Switching from injections to pills would also make the drugs a lot more tolerable for those who dislike needles. Novo is working on an oral version of semaglutide that works just as well as its jabs. But the pill requires 20 times the amount of the active ingredient as the injection, and must be taken daily. With semaglutide in short supply, Novo has had to push back the oral version’s launch. Lilly also has a daily pill that targets GLP-1 receptors called orforglipron in late-stage clinical trials.
GLP-1药物的另一个缺点是使用时经常伴随恶心和呕吐。丹麦生物技术公司ZeaLand Pharma正在研发一种基于胰岛素在胰腺与进食反应中产生的一种叫做淀粉样激素的荷尔蒙的药物。但与抑制食欲的GLP-1不同,淀粉样激素诱发饱腹感,即在饭后的饱腹感。
Another drawback of GLP-1-based medicines is the nausea and vomiting that frequently accompanies their use. Zealand Pharma, a Danish biotech firm, is developing a drug that is based on a different hormone called amylin, produced in the pancreas along with insulin in response to food intake. But unlike GLP-1, which suppresses appetite, amylin induces satiety, or the feeling of fullness after a meal.
亚当·斯滕贝格,Zealand 的老板称,在大多数人身上,激素 leptin 会从脂肪组织中释放,向大脑发出信号,告诉身体已经饱。肥胖者对该激素不敏感。临床研究表明,amylin 的类似物可使人重新对leptin 敏感,帮助他们更早停止进食。感觉饱腹,而不是降低食欲,也可能减轻恶心感。斯滕贝格先生表示,早期试验结果表明,其药物可实现与 GLP-1 药物相似的减重效果,但恶心和呕吐现象较少。
Adam Steensberg, boss of Zealand, says that in most people a hormone, leptin, is released from fat tissue that signals to the brain that the body is full. Obese individuals are insensitive to that hormone. Clinical studies have shown that analogues of amylin can make people sensitive to leptin again, helping them to stop eating earlier. Feeling full, rather than lowering appetite, may also reduce the feeling of nausea. Mr Steensberg says that results from early-stage trials suggest that its drug could achieve similar weight loss as GLP-1 drugs, but with less nausea and vomiting.
除了烦人的注射和恶心外,一个更大的担忧是,使用这些药物的患者不仅仅脱脂,还会失去瘦肌肉。一些患者的瘦肌肉体重减少了近40%,这对老年患者来说是一个严重问题。为了解决这个问题,一些公司正在尝试在 GLP-1 药物之外,配合原本设计用于治疗肌肉萎缩的药物。
Besides pesky injections and nausea, a bigger concern is that patients on these drugs do not just shed fat, they also lose lean muscle mass. Some patients drop almost 40% of their body weight in lean mass, a serious concern for older patients. To counter this, companies are trying out, alongside GLP-1 drugs, medicines originally designed to treat muscle atrophy.
美国制药公司Regeneron 正在测试可阻断myostatin 和activin 的药物,这些蛋白质会在体内抑制肌肉生长。与semaglutide 一起服用,这种组合可以通过保留瘦肌肉来提高减重质量。同样,总部位于加州的生物技术公司BioAge 正在测试一种可以与Lilly 的tirzepatide 配合使用的药物。这种药物被称为azelaprag,模拟了一种称为apelin 的激素,这种激素在运动后分泌,在骨骼肌、心脏和中枢神经系统发挥作用,以调节新陈代谢,促进肌肉再生。在肥胖小鼠中,这种组合导致了与单独使用tirzepatide 相比更多的减重,同时保留了瘦体组织。
Regeneron, an American pharma company, is testing drugs that block myostatin and activin, proteins that inhibit muscle growth in the body. Taken with semaglutide, the combination could boost the quality of weight loss by preserving lean muscle. Similarly, BioAge, a California-based biotech, is testing a drug that can be taken alongside Lilly’s tirzepatide. The drug, called azelaprag, mimics apelin, a hormone secreted after exercise that acts on skeletal muscle, the heart and the central nervous system to regulate metabolism and promote muscle regeneration. In obese mice, the combination led to greater weight loss compared with tirzepatide alone, while preserving lean body tissue.
减肥药物不仅仅是为了减轻体重。由于肥胖与200多种健康问题有关,包括中风、肾问题和脂肪肝,因此 GLP-1 药物在许多其他医学领域也被证明是有用的。
The slimming drugs aren’t just for shedding pounds. Because obesity is linked to over 200 health issues, including strokes, kidney problems and fatty liver, GLP-1 drugs are proving useful in many other areas of medicine.
Novo 进行了为期五年、招募了超过17,500名参与者的一项最近的临床试验发现,semaglutide 将心脏病发作、中风或心脏疾病致死的风险降低了20%。Novo 认为治疗的心脏益处不仅仅是由于减重,因为心血管问题的风险降低发生在患者减重之前。在3月,semaglutide 获得了美国食品和药物管理局的批准,用于减小肥胖或超重患者心脏病的风险,这是减重药物首次因此目的而获批准。另一项临床试验的结果显示,semaglutide 降低了患有糖尿病的患者肾脏疾病相关事件的风险24%。
A recent clinical trial by Novo that ran for five years and enrolled more than 17,500 participants found that semaglutide cut the risk of serious heart issues like heart attacks, strokes, or death from heart disease by 20%. Novo believes that the heart benefits of the treatment are not due to weight loss alone, because the reduction in the risk of cardiovascular problems occurred early, before patients lost weight. In March semaglutide was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration for reducing the risk of heart disease in obese or overweight people, the first time a weight-loss medication has been approved for this purpose. Results from another clinical trial have shown that semaglutide reduced the risk of kidney-disease-related events by 24% in patients with type-2 diabetes.
另一种减重药物 survodutide 由德国制药公司Boehringer Ingelheim 和Zealand 开发,已经显示出治疗一种严重的肝脏疾病—代谢性功能障碍性肝脂肪肝(MASH)的有效结果。这是由于肝脏内多余脂肪积聚而引起的,可能导致肝癌或肝功能衰竭。
Another weight-loss drug, survodutide, being developed by Boehringer Ingelheim, a German drug company, and Zealand, has shown promising results in being able to treat a serious liver condition called metabolic dysfunction-associated steatohepatitis (MASH). This is caused by the build-up of excess fat in the liver and can lead to liver cancer or liver failure.
在最近对295名患者进行的试验中,83%的人在接受survodutide 治疗时看到了病情的显著改善,而安慰剂组中只有18%的人有改善。survodutide 的作用靶点是 GLP-1 和胰高血糖素的受体。Boehringer Ingelheim 的Waheed Jamal 表示,有证据表明胰高血糖素与GLP-1 相比在肝脏中分解更多脂肪,并减少纤维化(肝脏中过多疤痕组织的积累)。
In a recent trial of 295 patients, 83% of them saw a significant improvement in their condition when treated with survodutide, compared with 18% of those on a placebo. Survodutide targets receptors for GLP-1 and glucagon. Waheed Jamal from Boehringer Ingelheim says that there is evidence that glucagon breaks down more fat in the liver compared with GLP-1 and reduces fibrosis (build-up of excessive scar tissue in the liver).
尽管这些药物在改善代谢健康方面受到了很多关注,科学家们现在发现这些药物也与大脑和免疫系统发生作用,通过与大脑中的 GLP-1 受体相互作用。多伦多圣山医院的糖尿病研究员Daniel Drucker 发现,在整个身体都存在广泛炎症的小鼠身上,GLP-1 药物可以减轻炎症,但只有当小鼠的大脑受体没有被阻断时才能发挥作用。当小鼠的大脑受体被阻断或基因上被删除时,这些药物的抗炎作用就会消失。这表明 GLP-1 药物通过对大脑细胞的作用来抑制炎症。
Though a lot of focus has been on the action of these medicines on improving metabolic health, scientists are now uncovering that these drugs also engage with the brain and immune system, by interacting with GLP-1 receptors in the brain. Daniel Drucker, a diabetes researcher at Mount Sinai Hospital in Toronto, found that in mice suffering from extensive inflammation throughout the body, GLP-1 drugs reduced the condition, but only when the receptors in the brain were not blocked. When the brain receptors in mice were blocked or genetically deleted, the anti-inflammatory properties of the drugs were lost. This suggests that GLP-1 drugs tame inflammation by acting on the brain cells.
对于一些人来说,这说明这些药物可能对治疗以炎症为特征的脑部疾病,如阿尔茨海默病和帕金森病,可能有用。自2021年以来,Novo 一直在进行一项涉及1800多名患者的临床试验,以测试semaglutide 是否有助于早期阶段阿尔茨海默病患者。这项研究预计将于2026年完成。
For some this suggests that these drugs might be useful for treating brain disorders that are characterised by inflammation, such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease. Since 2021, Novo has been conducting a clinical trial involving more than 1,800 patients to test whether semaglutide helps patients with early stages of Alzheimer’s. This study is expected to be completed by 2026.
Dr.Drucker认为GLP-1 药物的抗炎特性是它们多功能性的关键。他指出,除了阿尔茨海默病和帕金森病外,慢性炎症也是由于糖尿病和肥胖引发的许多并发症的因素,并影响到肾脏、心脏、血管和肝脏等器官。如果这些药物最终有助于治疗这些疾病,Dr.Drucker 认为它们减轻炎症的特性可能解释了部分其成功的原因。
Dr Drucker sees the anti-inflammatory qualities of GLP-1 medications as key to their versatility. He notes that, besides Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, chronic inflammation is a factor in many complications for people with type-2 diabetes and obesity, and affects organs like the kidneys, heart, blood vessels, and liver. If these drugs eventually help in treating these conditions, Dr Drucker believes that their inflammation-reducing properties could explain part of their success.
这些药物的压抑食欲效果也引起了人们对它们在一般抑制欲望方面的能力的兴趣。丹麦的研究人员调查了GLP-1 药物对130名酒精使用障碍患者的影响。他们发现在使用这些药物的患者(辅以治疗)和接受安慰剂的患者之间,随后的饮酒量没有明显差异。但是,一部分使用这些药物的肥胖患者最终酒精摄入量减少。研究人员还观察了患者在看到酒精饮料图片时的大脑活动情况-对于接受安慰剂的患者,他们的大脑奖赏中心活跃了; 对于使用GLP-1 药物的患者,大脑与奖赏和成瘾有关的区域的活动减弱,表明这种药物具有直接的大脑作用。研究人员现在正在探索这些药物是否会影响人们使用其他成瘾物质,如烟草或大麻。
The appetite-suppressing effects of these drugs has also raised interest in their ability to curb cravings more generally. Researchers in Denmark investigated the effect of GLP-1 drugs on 130 people with alcohol-use disorder. They found no overall difference in subsequent alcohol consumption between patients who used the drugs (alongside therapy) compared with those given a placebo. However, a subset of obese patients taking the drugs did end up drinking less alcohol. The researchers also looked at brain activity in the patients when they were shown pictures of alcoholic drinks—for those in the placebo groups the reward centres of their brains lit up; for patients on GLP-1 drugs, activity in the areas of the brain associated with reward and addiction was attenuated, indicating a direct brain effect. Researchers are now exploring if the drugs might have an impact on how people use other addictive substances such as tobacco or marijuana.
所有这些发现仍处于初期阶段。开发新药物的成本高昂且耗时。失败率很高。实验室中的成功可能在人体中无效,小群体的结果可能不能在更大群体中得到复制。但随着有望治疗远超肥胖和糖尿病等许多病症的潜力,新药物引发的希望只会增长。 ■
All these findings are still early. Developing new drugs is costly and time-consuming. There are steep failure rates. Successes in the lab may not work in people, and results in small groups may not replicate in larger ones. But with the potential to treat many conditions well beyond obesity and diabetes, hope around the new drugs will only grow. ■
科学技术 | 机器人技术 (Science and technology | Robotics)
为什么机器人应该更多地从植物中获取灵感 (Why robots should take more inspiration from plants)
它们将能够以更有用的方式生长、抓握和移动。 (They would be able to grow, grip and move in more useful ways)
变形金刚宇宙中庞大的标题机器人,一个横跨玩具、电视系列、视频游戏和电影的热门系列,以一种两种方式在地面上移动。当它们呈车辆形状时,它们会在轮子上移动;而当它们不呈此形状时,则会站在巨大的类人脚上。数十年来,大多数现实世界中的机器人也都整齐地分为这两种虚构的范例。
The enormous titular robots of the “Transformers” universe, a popular franchise spanning toys, TV series, video games and films, move along the ground in one of two ways. On wheels, when they are shaped like vehicles; on giant humanoid feet when they are not. For decades, most real-world robots also fell neatly into these two fictional paradigms.
然后,大约15年前,人们意识到其他方式的运动是可能的。“Zoomorphic(类动物的)”机器人从动物王国中寻找灵感,借鉴了亿万年的研究和发展。其中一种机器人模仿了章鱼的可塑手臂,使其能够轻松地抓取物体并操纵到狭窄、棘手的空间中。另一种复制了壁虎覆盖脚趾的脊线,因此具备了沿墙面攀爬的能力。
Then, around 15 years ago, came the realisation that other means of locomotion were possible. “Zoomorphic” robots mined the animal kingdom for inspiration, piggybacking on evolution’s millennia of research and development. One mimicked an octopus’s malleable arm, allowing it to easily grasp objects and manoeuvre into tight, tricky spaces. Another replicated the ridge-covered toes of a gecko and, consequently, its ability to scale walls.
类似动物的机器人仍然很受欢迎。近年来,美国和英国的武装力量都在为巡逻和监视尝试四足机器人“狗”;今年2月,一条蛇形机器人被送入日本福岛核电站受损的反应堆之一,以检查残留在内部的废料。然而,意大利机器人学家芭芭拉·马佐莱表示,机器人领域对生物的另一主要类别——植物,探索热情远不如动物。她把这种不愿意归因于对植物行为有一种误解:即植物既不具备运动能力也不具备感知能力。“这完全不对”,她说。
Animal-like robots continue to be popular. In recent years both America’s and Britain’s armed forces have experimented with quadrupedal robot “dogs” for patrols and surveillance; in February a snake-shaped robot was sent into one of the damaged nuclear reactors of the Fukushima power plant in Japan to inspect the debris left inside. And yet, says Barbara Mazzolai, an Italian roboticist, the field of robotics has proved far less keen to investigate the other major category of living things—plants. She attributes the reluctance to a misconception about the usefulness of plant behaviour: that they are capable of neither motion nor perception. “It’s not true at all,” she says.
位于意大利热那亚的意大利技术学院(IIT)的生物启发软体机器人实验室的马佐莱博士及其团队最近推出了一款意图颠覆这种信条的机器。在科学机器人学上发表文章,他们描述了“FiloBot”(如上图所示),这是一种基于攀爬植物的机器人。与真实植物一样,FiloBot(源自意大利“蔓”一词)能够生长、附着和缠绕支撑物,并根据外部刺激在环境中导航。
Dr Mazzolai and her team at the Bioinspired Soft Robotics Laboratory at the Italian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Genoa recently unveiled a machine meant to uproot this dogma. Writing in Science Robotics, they described “FiloBot” (pictured above), a robot based on climbing plants. Like the real thing, FiloBot (from the Italian word for “tendril”) is capable of growing, attaching to and twining around supports, and navigating through an environment in response to external stimuli.
为了生存,攀爬植物必须具备在几种不同行为模式间切换的能力。在森林环境中,它必须先从土壤中长出,并沿着地面寻找能够依附的支撑物——比如附近的树。为了做到这一点,植物必须有一个能够承受自身重量的结构。不过,一旦找到支撑物,植物必须改变策略——将自己固定在物体周围,然后向阳光生长。为了击败其他植物,它必须尽可能快地移动,优先考虑快速生长而非重量。
To survive, a climbing plant must have the capacity to switch between several different modes of behaviour. In forest environments, it must first grow out of the soil and travel along the ground in search of a support to latch onto—a nearby tree, say. To do this the plant must have a structure capable of bearing its own weight. Once a support is located, though, the plant must switch strategy—anchoring itself around the object and then growing upwards towards the light. To outcompete other plants, it must move as quickly as possible, prioritising rapid growth over heft.
为了帮助它选择最佳的生长角度,攀爬植物使用沿着每个嫩枝分布的光线和重力感受器的信息。它还可以通过改变其组成细胞的分化和延伸方式来修改蔓的厚度:中间更多的填充物会产生一个更坚实的蔓,而一侧的额外生长会导致弯曲。
To help it choose the best angle at which to grow, a climbing plant uses information from light and gravity receptors distributed along each shoot. It can also modify the bulkiness of its tendrils by changing how their constituent cells divide and elongate: more padding in the middle will create a firmer tendril, while extra growth on one side will lead to curvature.
FiloBot通过其头部的传感器——位于主茎顶端,同时还配备了一卷塑料和一个加热元件来模仿这些行为。通过融化并挤出塑料以圆形图案,它可以以每分钟2到7毫米的速度(世界上速度最快的植物竹子无法超过0.1)3D打印其自己的身体。根据亮度和方向,它改变所暴露给塑料的热量————更低的温度会导致更易碎的身体,尺寸增长更快,而更高的温度则会生成更密实和更坚固的块状,生长速度更慢。通过改变围绕圆圈的塑料量,它还可以以旋转模式生长,从而缠绕支撑物。
FiloBot mimics these behaviours using sensors in its head—at the tip of the main shoot—which is also equipped with a spool of plastic and a heating element. By melting and extruding the plastic in a circular pattern, it can 3D-print its own body at a rate of between two and seven millimetres per minute (bamboo, the world’s speediest plant, cannot beat 0.1). Depending on brightness and orientation, it alters the heat that the plastic is exposed to—lower temperatures result in a more brittle body that increases in size more quickly, while higher temperatures make denser and stronger clumps that grow more slowly. By varying the amount of plastic deposited around the circle, it can also grow in a rotating pattern to coil around a support.
研究人员发现,这些简单功能足以让FiloBot在复杂、未知的环境中移动,跨越间隙并找到可依附的物体。他们表示,由于缺乏大型的机载计算硬件,它保持灵活性且需要最少的监督,而其缓慢的速度意味着它不会干扰周围的事物。他们认为,这使其适用于潜在应用,包括在难以到达或未知地点进行环境监测(在那里操控机器人沿着精确路径行驶可能是不可能的),或监测灾难现场,其中现有基础设施不稳定。
The researchers found that these simple functionalities were enough to let FiloBot move through a complex, unseen environment, cross gaps and find things to attach to. The lack of heavy on-board computing hardware, they say, means that it remains nimble and requires minimal oversight, while its slow pace means that it doesn’t disturb things around it. They reckon that this makes it suitable for potential applications including environmental monitoring in hard-to-reach or unknown locations (where piloting a robot along an exact course might be impossible), or monitoring disaster sites where existing infrastructure is unstable.
目前,随着研究人员进一步调整和测试,FiloBot的蔓尚未离开实验室。不过,它已经在解析植物行为方面发挥了作用。例如,长期以来一直有一种假设认为攀爬植物通过利用朝向阴处生长的能力找到支撑物,尽管确切的机制并不清楚。FiloBot通过寻找阴影区域特有的远红外波长来复制这种行为,从而洞察植物可能如何完成相同的任务。
For now, as the researchers tweak and test it further, FiloBot’s tendrils have not left the laboratory. Still, it has already been useful in deconstructing plant behaviour. For example, it was long hypothesised that climbing plants find their supports by harnessing an ability to grow towards shade, though the exact mechanism was unclear. FiloBot could replicate this behaviour by seeking out the far-red wavelengths characteristic of shaded areas, providing an insight into how plants might accomplish the same thing.
FiloBot并非该团队正在培养的唯一类植物的机器人。自2012年以来,马佐莱博士一直在研发基于根的“仿生植物”(当时是世界上第一个植物启发型机器人风险)。这些机器人可以在土壤中钻孔,并可以用于分析化学物质或寻找水源。此外,在2021年,IIT研究小组与欧洲合作伙伴开始研发“I-Seed”,一种可生物降解的微型机器人,可以被风和雨移动,并根据湿度变化形状。基于南非天竺葵的种子,它可以用于携带和释放真正种子进行重新造林,在击中适合的土壤后打开并释放其载荷。
FiloBot is not the only plantlike robot the team is cultivating. Dr Mazzolai has been developing “plantoids”, based on roots, since 2012 (then the first plant-inspired robotics venture in the world). These can burrow through earth, and could be used to analyse chemicals or find water. And in 2021 the group at IIT, along with European partners, started developing “I-Seed”, a biodegradable mini-bot that can be moved about by wind and rain and change shape according to humidity. Based on the seeds of the South African geranium, it could be used to carry and distribute real seeds for reforestation, opening up and releasing its cargo once it hits suitable soil.
马佐莱博士希望这类项目能够激发其他机器人学家从植物学中汲取灵感。她说,植物王国是另一个世界,采用了完全不同的方式来对待动物的方式。“因此,我们可以开发全新的技术和人工解决方案,因为它截然不同。” 。■
Dr Mazzolai hopes that such projects will inspire other roboticists to take their cues from botany. The plant kingdom is another world, she says, with a completely different approach to the animal one. “And so we can develop completely new technologies and artificial solutions, because it is so different.” ■
科学技术 | 网络黑客 (Science and technology | Hacking the internet)
一场隐秘攻击险些威胁到全球电脑 (A stealth attack came close to compromising the world’s computers)
这次网络恐慌展示了互联网的开源代码为何容易受到攻击。 (The cyber-scare shows why the internet’s crowdsourced code is vulnerable)
在2020年的XKCD漫画中,一幅描绘了一个摇摆不定的方块排列,标着标签:“所有现代数字基础设施”。在底部脆弱地支撑着一块独立而纤细的砖块,“自2003年以来,内布拉斯加某位随机个体无私维护的项目。” 这幅插图迅速成为技术专家中的流行经典,因为它突出展示了一个严酷的事实:构成互联网核心的软件并非由巨头企业或庞大的官僚机构维护,而是由少数埋头苦干、默默付出的志愿者们来维护。近日发生的网络安全恐慌展示了结果可能近乎灾难性。
In 2020 XKCD, a popular online comic strip, published a cartoon depicting a teetering arrangement of blocks with the label: “all modern digital infrastructure”. Perched precariously at the bottom, holding everything up, was a lone, slender brick: “A project some random person in Nebraska has been thanklessly maintaining since 2003.” The illustration quickly became a cult classic among the technically minded, for it highlighted a harsh truth: the software at the heart of the internet is maintained not by giant corporations or sprawling bureaucracies but by a handful of earnest volunteers toiling in obscurity. A cyber-security scare in recent days shows how the result can be near-disaster.
3月29日,微软工程师Andres Freund发布了一篇短篇侦探故事。在最近几周里,他注意到SSH(一种用于在互联网上安全登录到另一设备的系统)运行速度比预期慢了约500毫秒。更仔细的检查发现恶意代码潜藏在XZ Utils中,这是一些用于压缩Linux操作系统内部使用的数据的软件,而Linux操作系统又几乎运行在所有公开可访问的互联网服务器上。这些服务器最终支撑着互联网,包括重要的金融和政府服务。这段恶意代码将成为一个“主钥匙”,使攻击者可以窃取加密数据或植入其他恶意软件。
On March 29th Andres Freund, an engineer at Microsoft, published a short detective story. In recent weeks he had noticed that SSH—a system to log on securely to another device over the internet—was running about 500 milliseconds more slowly than expected. Closer inspection revealed malicious code embedded deep inside XZ Utils, some software designed to compress data used inside the Linux operating system, which runs on virtually all publicly accessible internet servers. Those servers ultimately undergird the internet, including vital financial and government services. The malicious code would have served as a “master key”, allowing attackers to steal encrypted data or plant other malware.
故事最有趣的部分是它是怎么进入的。XZ Utils是开源软件,这意味着其代码是公开的,任何人都可以检查或修改。在2022年,一位名为Lasse Collin的开发人员发现,他维护的“无偿爱好项目”在长期的心理健康问题下变得越来越繁重。一位叫Jia Tan的开发者,他于前一年创建了一个账户,提出要帮忙。在接下来的两年里,他、她或他们在数百个场合贡献了有用的代码,积累了信任。到了二月,他们偷偷放入了恶意软件。
The most interesting part of the story is how it got there. XZ Utils is open-source software, meaning that its code is public and can be inspected or modified by anyone. In 2022 Lasse Collin, the developer who maintained it, found that his “unpaid hobby project” was becoming more onerous amid long-term mental-health issues. A developer called Jia Tan, who had created an account the previous year, offered to help. For more than two years he, she or they contributed helpful code on hundreds of occasions, building up trust. In February they smuggled in the malware.
匿名独立安全研究员The Grugq表示,这次攻击的意义“巨大”。“这个后门的实现非常特殊,但确实非常聪明和极其隐秘”——他暗示或许过于隐秘,因为代码中采取的一些措施隐藏其真实目的可能使其变慢,从而引起了Freund先生的警觉。The Grugq建议,Jia Tan的耐心,以及其他几个账户的支持,这些账户敦促Collin先生交接权杖,暗示了一个有组织的国家机构进行了复杂的人员情报活动。
The significance of the attack is “huge”, says The Grugq, a pseudonymous independent security researcher who is widely read by cyber-security experts. “The backdoor is very peculiar in how it is implemented, but it is really clever stuff and very stealthy”—perhaps too stealthy, he suggests, because some of the steps taken in the code to hide its true purpose may have slowed it down and thus raised Mr Freund’s alarm. Jia Tan’s patience, supported by several other accounts who urged Mr Collin to pass the baton, hints at a sophisticated human-intelligence operation by a state agency, suggests The Grugq.
他怀疑是俄罗斯外情局SVR,该局在2019-2020年还入侵了SolarWinds Orion网络管理软件,以获取对美国政府网络的广泛访问。Rhea Karty和Simon Henniger在他们的Substack上发布的分析表明,Jia Tan试图伪造他们的时区,但他们可能比格林威治标准时间早两到三个小时——这表明他们可能在东欧或西部俄罗斯,并且避免了在东欧假期工作。然而,目前,证据还不足以确定罪魁祸首。
He suspects the SVR, Russia’s foreign-intelligence service, which in 2019-20 also compromised SolarWinds Orion network-management software to gain extensive access to American government networks. Analysis by Rhea Karty and Simon Henniger, published on their Substack, suggests that Jia Tan made an effort to falsify their time zone but that they were probably two to three hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time—suggesting they may have been in eastern Europe or western Russia—and avoided working on eastern European holidays. For now, however, the evidence is too weak to nail down a culprit.
这次攻击也许是最有雄心的“供应链”攻击之一——它利用的不是特定的计算机或设备,而是后台软件或硬件中的一块——让人记忆犹新。这也生动展示了互联网的脆弱性以及它所依赖的众包代码。对于开源软件的捍卫者来说,Freund先生的鹰眼是其前提的证明:代码是公开的,可以被任何人检查,错误或故意的后门最终将会通过集体审查找到。
The attack is perhaps the most ambitious “supply-chain” attack—one that exploits not a particular computer or device, but a piece of back-end software or hardware—in recent memory. It is also a stark illustration of the frailties of the internet and the crowdsourced code upon which it relies. For defenders of open-source software, Mr Freund’s eagle eyes are a vindication of its premise: code is open, can be inspected by anyone, and errors or deliberate backdoors will eventually be found through collective scrutiny.
怀疑者则不那么确信。一些代码安全和调试工具确实发现了XZ Utils中的异常,但Freund先生承认,“必须要有一系列技术上的偶然选择相互结合才能发现这一问题”,包括他在解决一个无关问题时做出的一系列技术上但随意的选择。“没有其他人提出担忧,”另一名网络安全专家Kevin Beaumont写道。软件工程师们仍在研究后门的内部运作,试图理解其目的和设计。“全世界都欠Andres无限量的免费啤酒,”Beaumont先生总结道。“他在业余时间救了所有人的屁股。”
Sceptics are less sure. Some code security and debugging tools did pick up the anomalies in XZ Utils, but Mr Freund acknowledges “the number of coincidences that had to come together to find this”, including a series of technical but arbitrary choices he made while troubleshooting an unrelated problem. “Nobody else had raised concerns,” writes Kevin Beaumont, another cyber-security specialist. Software engineers are still probing the inner workings of the backdoor, attempting to understand its purpose and design. “The world owes Andres unlimited free beer,” concludes Mr Beaumont. “He just saved everybody’s arse in his spare time.”
这次攻击在造成广泛损害之前被发现并阻止了。无法判断Jia Tan,或者明显在这个身份背后的团队,是否一直在以其他假名尝试潜入互联网其他重要软件。但安全研究人员担心,互联网的基础结构极容易受到类似攻击的威胁。“关键问题是我们赌上了数万亿美元,建立在由业余爱好者开发的代码之上,”专家Michal Zalewski指出。其他后门可能仍然潜伏在互联网关键软件的其他地方,尚未被发现。■
The attack was detected and stopped before it could cause widespread damage. There is no way to tell whether Jia Tan, or the team apparently behind that persona, has been working on squirrelling into other vital pieces of internet software under other aliases. But security researchers are concerned that the foundations of the internet are ripe for similar campaigns. “The bottom line is that we have untold trillions of dollars riding on top of code developed by hobbyists,” notes Michal Zalewski, an expert. Other backdoors may yet lurk, undiscovered, elsewhere in the internet’s critical software. ■
文化 | 在蘑菇云下 (Culture | Under the mushroom cloud)
21世纪的核战争会是什么样子? (What would nuclear war look like in the 21st century?)
两本书探讨原子武器以及可能带来的全球毁灭。 (Two books examine atomic weaponry and the global annihilation it could bring about)
核战:一种场景 ,作者安妮·雅各布森。唐顿(Dutton)出版;400页;23.95美元。Torva;20英镑。
Nuclear War: A Scenario. By Annie Jacobsen. Dutton; 400 pages; $23.95. Torva; £20
倒计时 ,作者萨拉·斯科尔斯。Bold Type Books出版;272页;30美元和25英镑
Countdown. By Sarah Scoles. Bold Type Books; 272 pages; $30 and £25
1960年,美国拥有约18,000枚核武器。他们还制定了如何使用这些武器的详细计划。如果执行这些计划,苏联将有2.75亿人在战争的第一个小时内被杀害。接下来的六个月内,另外3.25亿人将因辐射尘落而死亡。即使中国不参与这场潜在的战争,辐射尘落也可能导致其约3亿公民死亡。
IN 1960 America had around 18,000 nuclear weapons. It also had detailed plans for how to use them. Had it implemented them, 275m people in the Soviet Union would have been killed in the first hour of war. Another 325m would have died from radioactive fallout over the next six months. Even if China stayed out of this prospective war, the fallout would have killed perhaps 300m of its citizens.
“我想到了Vannsee会议,”美国国防官员约翰·鲁贝尔写道,他在一次核计划会议中;在那次纪念的纳粹会议中,他们准备了对欧洲犹太人进行系统灭绝的计划。“我觉得自己就像见证了一次下沉到黑暗深渊的可比会议。”
“I thought of the Wannsee conference,” wrote John Rubel, an American defence official present at one nuclear-planning meeting, referring to a gathering of Nazis in a suburb of Berlin in January 1942, at which they prepared the systematic extermination of European Jews. “I felt as if I were witnessing a comparable descent into the deep heart of darkness.”
在《核战:一种场景》中,记者、军事事务作家安妮·雅各布森以约翰·鲁贝尔的故事开篇,介绍了一场假设的朝鲜对美国进行核攻击及随后吞噬世界的螺旋式演变。她的书既有条不紊又生动,技术扎实,有时则色彩鲜艳。
In “Nuclear War: A Scenario” Annie Jacobsen, a journalist and the author of several books on military affairs, tells Mr Rubel’s story as a preface to her own non-fiction account of a hypothetical North Korean nuclear attack on America and the ensuing spiral which consumes the world. Her book is at once methodical and vivid, technically grounded and at times lurid.
美国卫星捕捉到朝鲜发射的火箭,其传感器“强大到可以在200英里外看到一根点着的火柴”,她写道。15秒内,雷达就可以判断导弹是朝美国发射的。导弹将需要半个小时才能到达。总统被通知后,他有六分钟做出选择。
The American satellites which pick up the North Korean launch have sensors “so powerful they can see a single lighted match from 200 miles away”, she writes. Within 15 seconds radars can work out that the missile is heading for America. It will take just over half an hour to arrive. Once the president has been briefed, he has six minutes to make a choice.
雅各布森冷静地描述了整个国家迅速被摧毁的速度。一艘在美国西海岸附近的俄罗斯潜艇可以在80秒内向所有50个州发射全部导弹。即使一艘美国潜艇跟在其后,也来不及在那段时间内发射鱼雷,一位专家指出这个事实令1981年美国海军总司令震惊。从美国海岸线附近发射的导弹将在不到七分钟内击中目标。
Ms Jacobsen coolly lays out the speed with which entire countries can be snuffed out. A Russian submarine off America’s west coast could launch its full complement of missiles at all 50 states at once in 80 seconds. Even if an American submarine was close behind it could not fire a torpedo in that time, notes one expert. That fact is said to have shocked America’s navy chief when it was revealed to him in 1981. Missiles launched from close to the American coastline would take a little over seven minutes to hit their target.
《核战》处于一种长久以来的说教性核灾难传统之中。这个类型在上世纪80年代繁荣兴盛,与一系列电影一同兴起——《末日来临》、《缠绵》和《战争游戏》(前者制作于20年前,但当时被认为太过震撼而未公映)。所有这些反映了当时对冷战核竞赛失控的担忧。
“Nuclear War” sits in the long tradition of didactic nuclear dystopia. The genre flourished in the 1980s with a series of films—“The Day After”, “Threads” and “The War Game” (which had been made 20 years earlier, but was deemed too shocking to release then). All of these reflected contemporary fears that the cold-war arms race was spinning out of control.
这个类型在上世纪90年代和2000年代减少了:核武器成为过去时。然而,俄罗斯入侵乌克兰——一个在1991年从苏联继承了核导弹,但后来放弃了的国家——使其重新成为地缘政治和文化的焦点。想想克里斯多福 诺兰的传记片《J·罗伯特·奥本海默》,这部电影的商业复兴的成功,以及这部电影改编自的《美国普罗米修斯》一书。
The genre receded in the 1990s and 2000s: nuclear weapons were tools of the past. Yet Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—a country which inherited nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union in 1991, but later gave them up—has put them squarely back at the forefront of geopolitics and culture. Consider the success of Christopher Nolan’s biopic of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb, and the commercial revival of “American Prometheus”, the book on which that film was based.
雅各布森的场景也具有电影般的质感。在她的叙述中,总统被赶上直升机,逃往山中藏身处。将军们催促他快速进行报复。“如果有人向我们发动核袭击,”前美国核力量指挥官约翰·海登将军说,“我们会进行还击。”比尔·克林顿的国防部长威廉·佩里告诉雅各布森,一旦检测到来袭导弹,“我们会准备发射…我们不会等待。”目标是在朝鲜能发射更多导弹之前“斩首”朝鲜,摧毁其领导和指挥。
There is a cinematic quality to Ms Jacobsen’s scenario, too. In her account, the president is rushed onto a helicopter to escape to a mountain hideout. He is harangued by generals to retaliate quickly. “If somebody launches a nuclear weapon against us,” says General John Hyten, a former commander of American nuclear forces, “we launch one back.” William Perry, Bill Clinton’s secretary of defence, tells Ms Jacobsen that once an incoming missile is detected “we prepare to launch…we do not wait.” The aim is to “decapitate” North Korea—destroy its leadership and command—before it can fire more missiles.
雅各森以令人不安的细节描述了核战的现实。在她设想的场景中,一枚朝鲜导弹摧毁了洛杉矶北部的核电站,将废弃的燃料散播到辐射尘中。被X射线闪光烧毁的人留下“一个血淋淋、骨骼裸露的恐怖…”。另一枚炸弹摧毁了华盛顿特区。火风暴带来像飓风一样的660°C的热风;人们在国会大厦和白宫地下室被活活烤熟。在记录末日细节时,该文章使人想起1946年约翰·赫尔西在《纽约客》上发表的《广岛》一文。
Ms Jacobsen conveys the reality of nuclear war in sometimes stomach-churning detail. In her imagined scenario, a North Korean missile obliterates a nuclear-power station north of Los Angeles, seeding spent fuel into the fallout. Victims of the X-ray flash are left “a shredded horror of bloody tendons and exposed bone”. Another bomb destroys Washington, DC. Firestorms bring hurricane-like winds of 660°C; people are baked alive in the bowels of the Capitol and White House. In documenting the minutiae of the apocalypse, the writing is redolent of “Hiroshima”, a seminal article by John Hersey published in the New Yorker in 1946.
这个故事不仅关乎核武器的使用,还有关核战。雅各森的叙述建立在一系列悲剧性误解之上。由于地理位置的原因,前往朝鲜的美国导弹必须飞越俄罗斯。美国领导人无法联系俄罗斯总统。俄罗斯低劣的早期警报卫星,确实有可能将云团误认为导弹尾迹,错误地认为数百枚导弹来袭。克里姆林宫对美国发动攻击,美国做出回应。仅在莫斯科周边就有100个“瞄准点”。
The story is about not just nuclear use, but nuclear war. Ms Jacobsen’s narrative is built on an elaborate sequence of tragic misunderstandings. American missiles bound for North Korea must overfly Russia by dint of geography. American leaders cannot get Russia’s president on the phone. Russia’s sub-par early-warning satellites, which have indeed been known to confuse clouds for plumes, mistakenly see hundreds of missiles incoming. The Kremlin attacks America. America responds. There are 100 “aimpoints”—jargon for targets—in the greater Moscow area alone.
然而,在雅各森的场景中细节上也有一些可以质疑的地方。很难理解为什么朝鲜会冒着自杀式的突然袭击风险。美国可能会有“先发制人”政策,但正如前国防部长和副总统迪克·切尼所观察的,“实际上,大多数总统不会这么做。”俄罗斯领导人是否会因为来自故障传感器的数据就真的毁掉世界?
It is possible to quibble with details in Ms Jacobsen’s scenario. It is hard to see why North Korea would risk a suicidal bolt from the blue. America might have a “launch on warning” policy, but as Dick Cheney, a former defence secretary and vice-president, has observed, “realistically, most presidents wouldn’t do it.” And would Russian leaders truly end the world because of data from faulty sensors?
然而,有一点毫无争议,也是在过去30年中公众认识的一点就是核武器的改变世界影响。大量灰尘注入大气层将导致太阳光减少70%长达十年。降雨量将减少50%。“在种植和收获了10000年之后,”雅各布森写道,“人类回到了一个狩猎采集者的状态。”
What is not in dispute, however, and what has receded from public understanding over the past 30 years, is the world-changing impact of nuclear weapons. The vast injection of soot into the atmosphere would result in a 70% reduction in the sun’s rays for a decade. Rainfall would decline by 50%. “After 10,000 years of planting and harvesting,” writes Ms Jacobsen, “humans return to a hunter-gatherer state.”
然而人类继续部署、维护和建造核武器。在《Countdown倒计时》一书中,科学记者萨拉·斯科尔斯(Sarah Scoles)深入描绘了美国广阔的核实验室体系中工作的人员,包括新墨西哥州洛斯阿拉莫斯(Los Alamos)(奥本海默监督了第一颗核弹的发明和建造的地方)、附近的桑迪亚实验室以及加利福尼亚州的劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室。她书中最引人入胜的部分是探讨这些科学家如何像奥本海默一样调和他们的工作与原则的部分。
And yet humans continue to deploy, maintain and build nuclear weapons. In “Countdown” Sarah Scoles, a science journalist, profiles the people who work in America’s vast complex of nuclear laboratories, including Los Alamos in New Mexico (where Oppenheimer oversaw the invention and construction of the first nuclear bomb), the nearby Sandia labs, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The most compelling parts of her book are those in which she explores how these scientists, like Oppenheimer, reconcile their work with their principles.
有些人对核遏制的重要性感到赤身忿戾,挥舞着表明自己发明核弹后主要战争死亡人数急剧下降的图表。另一些持保留态度,表示反对核武器,同时坚称必须有人确保现有的核武器安全可靠。还有一些人似乎陷入了深深的矛盾境地,更倾向于强调其研究的民用应用。“我想知道外界的激进分子是否了解到我们这些内部人士也有很多共同目标,”洛斯阿拉莫斯的一位科学家表示,坚称支持(最终)裁军。“这在这里一点都不是极端立场。”
Some are gung-ho about the importance of nuclear deterrence, brandishing charts which show how deaths from major wars plummeted after the invention of the bomb. Others are equivocal, expressing opposition to nuclear weapons while insisting that someone has to ensure that the ones which exist remain safe and reliable. Still others seem deeply conflicted, preferring to emphasise the civilian applications of their research. “I wonder if the activists on the outside understand that there are those of us on the inside that share many of their goals,” says one scientist at Los Alamos, professing support for (eventual) disarmament. “That’s not an extreme position here at all.”
在《倒计时Countdown》中还显现了一代人之间的差异。1992年之前,美国通过爆炸试验来维护其核武器的良好状态。“人们早晨只需上飞机,飞往内华达,然后在沙漠中炸东西,”利弗莫尔实验室模拟与计算主任罗布·尼利(Rob Neely)带着些许蔑视地说。“直到他们震动了大地,他们才真正感到放心。”随着美国设计了W93型新弹头,数十年来首次,一些当时的科学家怀疑没有试验就能完成。尼利先生所在一代人依靠计算机建模,借助世界上最大的超级计算机和其他技术奇迹。“我们有一批新一代设计者正在崛起,”尼利先生说。在数字世界中,“这些代码就是他们的试验场。”
A generational divide also shines through “Countdown”. Before 1992 America kept its nuclear weapons in good order by explosive testing. “People would just get on the airplane in the morning, go down [to Nevada] and blow shit up in the desert,” says Rob Neely, head of simulations and computing at Livermore, with a hint of contempt. “It wasn’t until they shook the Earth that they really felt confident.” As America designs a new warhead, the W93, for the first time in decades, some scientists of that era are sceptical that it can be done without testing. Mr Neely’s generation relies on computer modelling, aided by the world’s largest supercomputers and other technical wizardry. “We’ve got a new generation of designers coming up,” says Mr Neely. In a digital world, “the codes are their test site.”
斯科尔斯女士撰写了一本平衡且易读的书,传达了核裁军者和核威慑倡导者的态度。令人印象深刻的是,即使在那些认为在中国的核库存增长、俄罗斯核武器种类愈发多样化的世界中,核现代化在必要的人士中也存在对其后果和威慑的脆弱性的深深矛盾。核武器“既可能产生和平效果,也可能产生灾难性影响”,“21世纪美国核武器的理由”一书作者、曾是五角大楼最高核官员的布拉德·罗伯茨(Brad Roberts)承认。“星期一、三、五,我会有一种感觉。星期二、四、六,我又有另一种感觉,”他告诉斯科尔斯女士。“然后星期天我喝了。”■
Ms Scoles has written a balanced and readable book, one which conveys the attitudes of nuclear disarmers and deterrence advocates alike. What is striking is that even among those who believe that nuclear modernisation is essential in a world where China’s arsenal is growing and Russia’s is becoming more diverse, there is profound ambivalence about the consequences of this and the precariousness of deterrence. Nuclear weapons “will either have a pacifying effect or a catastrophic effect”, acknowledges Brad Roberts, the author of “The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century” and once the Pentagon’s top nuclear official. “Monday, Wednesday, Friday, I feel one way. Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday, another,” he tells Ms Scoles. “Then Sunday I drink.” ■
文化 | 原子兽 (Culture | Atomic beast)
哥斯拉在其70岁生日当天,重新回到人们视野 (On his 70th birthday, Godzilla has roared back to relevance)
这只怪兽于1954年首次亮相,象征着核武器 (The monster made his first appearance in 1954 as a symbol of nuclear weapons)
在70岁的时候,一些人可能会考虑退休,如果他们还没有这样做的话。不过哥斯拉不属于这一类。自从这只巨型蜥蜴于1954年首次亮相于日本电影《哥斯拉》中以来,他已经在近40部电影中闯荡。 (《吉尼斯世界纪录》认证哥斯拉为影史最悠久的系列电影。)而且他并没有展现出任何减缓的迹象。去年12月,《哥斯拉减一》成为了一部票房热门的日本电影。《哥斯拉vs.金刚:新帝国》也最近上映了。
At the age of 70 some might think about retiring, if they have not done so already. Not Godzilla. Since the giant lizard made his screen debut in “Godzilla”, a Japanese film released in 1954, he has crashed his way through nearly 40 movies. (Guinness World Records certifies Godzilla as the longest-running movie franchise.) Nor does he shows any sign of slowing down. In December “Godzilla Minus One”, a Japanese film, became a box-office hit. “Godzilla x Kong: The New Empire” has recently hit cinemas, too.
自诞生以来,哥斯拉一直象征着当时的恐惧。他是从第二次世界大战的废墟中创造出来的。《哥斯拉》的编剧兼导演本多猪四郎被广岛原子弹轰炸的影响所困扰,他亲眼目睹了其余垣的影响。他说:“据说接下来的72年,那里将不会生长一根草—这个说法真的一直萦绕在我心头。”“哥斯拉代表了【核武器】的可怕”。
From his conception, Godzilla has symbolised the fears of his time. He was created from the wreckage of the second world war. Honda Ishiro, the writer-director of “Godzilla”, was haunted by the bombing of Hiroshima, the aftermath of which he witnessed first-hand. “It was said that, for the next 72 years, not a single blade of grass would grow there—and that really stayed with me,” he said. “Godzilla represents the frightfulness of nuclear weapons.”
在《哥斯拉》中,怪兽摧毁了小东岛上的一个村庄,研究人员认为他是被氢弹试验惊醒的。那次核爆炸的蘑菇云仍然挥之不去:1954年早些时候,美国在太平洋的比基尼环礁上引爆了强大的氢弹。一艘日本渔船的船员意外受到辐射。
In “Godzilla”, after the monster destroys a village on Odo Island, researchers conclude that he was roused from his prehistoric slumber by hydrogen-bomb testing. The bomb’s cloud still hung in the air: earlier in 1954 America had detonated powerful thermonuclear bombs on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. The crew of a Japanese fishing boat was accidentally irradiated.
《哥斯拉》提供了大量的恐怖电影刺激,包括一些被无数模仿的场景:人们逃离狭窄的城市街道,怪兽咀嚼着火车车厢。但它也反映了日本的战争创伤。“我在长崎的原子弹爆炸中幸免于难,”一位女性说,“现在又是这样!” 日本被与主要世界强国隔绝,必须独自面对这只怪兽。在故事的最有趣的转折中,一位科学家必须决定是否使用一种可怕的新武器来打败这个敌人。
“Godzilla” provides plenty of horror-film thrills, including scenes that have been endlessly imitated: people fleeing through narrow city streets and the monster crunching on train carriages. But it also reflects on Japan’s war trauma. “I barely escaped the atomic bomb at Nagasaki,” one woman says, “and now this!” Japan is isolated from major world powers and must face the monster alone. In the story’s most interesting turn, a scientist has to decide whether to use a terrible new weapon to defeat this enemy.
随着对核毁灭的记忆逐渐淡去,哥斯拉的意义发生了变异。自从1956年起,美国一直在制作自己的哥斯拉电影,好莱坞往往忽略了怪兽故事的历史背景,而更偏向于纯动作。随着时间的推移,哥斯拉从神话变成了网络迷因之一。他成为了一个名为“怪兽宇宙”的系列电影中的几个角色之一。近期的作品将超大号蜥蜴和【庞大的猿类】相遇:《哥斯拉vs.金刚》是《哥斯拉vs.金刚》(2021)的续集。
As the memory of nuclear destruction started to recede, Godzilla’s meaning mutated. America has been producing its own Godzilla films since 1956, and Hollywood has often ignored the historical aspect of the beast’s story in favour of pure action. In time Godzilla went from myth to meme. He became one of several characters in a franchise known as the “MonsterVerse”. Recent instalments have brought supersize lizard and enormous ape together: “Godzilla x Kong” is a sequel to “Godzilla vs. Kong” (2021).
怪兽宇宙往往偏向荒谬,但也探讨了哥斯拉故事中隐含的主题:环境。在一部电影中,哥斯拉帮助击败想要释放原始怪兽清除地球上“人类感染”环境恐怖分子。在《哥斯拉vs.金刚》中,怪兽捍卫着一个未被触及的自然境界。 在这个发布于一个充满对气候担忧的时代的电影中,哥斯拉代表了人类容易破坏的古老自然秩序。
The MonsterVerse has tended towards the absurd, but has also explored a theme implicit in the Godzilla story: the environment. In one movie Godzilla helps defeat eco-terrorists who want to unleash primitive monsters to rid Earth of the “infection” of mankind. In “Godzilla x Kong” the monster defends an untouched natural realm. In these films, released in an age of anxiety about the climate, Godzilla represents an ancient natural order that humans are wont to ruin.
《哥斯拉减一》是最近对这一生物的传记的最佳补充:它甚至使哥斯拉在三月份赢得了第一个奥斯卡奖,获得最佳视觉特效奖。然而,这部影片不仅在美学上令人印象深刻;它和原作一样深刻并且相互对话。影片设定在第二次世界大战末期,讲述了一个胆怯的神风特攻队队员鹿岛孝一。当他第一次在小东岛的一个着陆跑道上遭遇哥斯拉时,他未能行动。而当他返回东京发现他的父母在该市被轰炸中丧生时。
“Godzilla Minus One” is the best recent addition to the creature’s canon: it even earned Godzilla his first Oscar in March, for Best Visual Effects. Yet the film is not just aesthetically impressive; it is as profound as the original, and in conversation with it. Set at the end of the second world war the film follows Shikishima Koichi, a timid kamikaze pilot. When he first encounters Godzilla, at a landing strip on Odo Island, he fails to act. He returns to Tokyo to find his parents have been killed in the bombing of the city.
当哥斯拉再次袭击时—怪兽从太平洋的核试验中获得力量—孝一已经有了一个必须保护的临时家庭。他通过打败这只爬行动物弥补了他在战争中的失态,并让那时操控着日本的死亡崇拜之教对此毁灭。
By the time Godzilla strikes again—the monster has gained strength from nuclear tests in the Pacific—Koichi has a makeshift family he must protect. He makes up for his wartime dishonour by defeating the reptile and, with it, the cult of death that was gripping Japan at the time.
如今,随着核大国之间的紧张局势升温,哥斯拉重新获得了他一些不祥符号的象征意义。全球原子科学家公告的世界末日钟被设置在距离午夜仅90秒的位置—这是它离世界末日最近的时刻。只要这个时钟还在滴答作响,这只怪兽将仍然重要。 ■
Today, as tensions rise between nuclear powers, Godzilla has regained some of his ominous symbolism. The Doomsday Clock, an estimate of the risk of global catastrophe by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, is set at 90 seconds from midnight—as close as it has ever been to Armageddon. As long as the clock keeps ticking, this monster will matter. ■
文化 | 出售经文 (Culture | Selling scripture)
如何从《圣经》赚钱 (How to make money from the Bible)
唐纳德·特朗普已进入一个竞争激烈且不寻常的市场。 (Donald Trump has entered a competitive and unusual market)
美国第45任总统在《圣经翻译(Bible translations)方面有着极佳的品味。在今年复活节决定支持哪个版本时,唐纳德·特朗普选择了被广泛认为是17世纪英国文学杰作之一的《金句圣经(King James)》版本。或者更确切地说,他选择了一个被称为“上帝保佑美国圣经(God Bless the USA Bible)”的现代修订版。这本书集合了美国宪法、一首名为“上帝保佑美国(God Bless the USA)”的乡村歌曲歌词以及圣经内容。
America’s 45th president has excellent taste in Bible translations. When deciding which one to endorse this Easter, Donald Trump chose the King James version, widely considered to be one of the greatest works of English literature of the 17th century. Or rather, he chose a modern repackaging of it dubbed the “God Bless the USA Bible”. This includes in one volume the American constitution, the lyrics of a country song called “God Bless the USA” and the scriptures.
“所有美国人需要在家中拥有《圣经》,我的家里有很多。这是我最喜欢的一本书,”特朗普在一段宣传视频中说道。“宗教是如此重要,”他补充说。“我们必须让美国再次祈祷。”
“All Americans need the Bible in their home, and I have many. It’s my favourite book,” intoned Mr Trump in a promotional video. “Religion is so important,” he added. “We must make America pray again.”
由此,可以默认,再次付费(pay again):这本新书售价为59.99美元(加邮费)。据《纽约时报》报道,特朗普并非直接销售,但每次购买都会获得版税。因此,他已经进入了试图从《圣经》中赚钱的竞争激烈的商业领域。
And, tacitly, pay again: the new book costs $59.99 (plus postage). Mr Trump is not selling it directly, but receives royalties with each purchase, according to the New York Times. Thus, he has entered the highly competitive business of trying to make a buck from the holy book.
这对于特朗普来说是一种全新的冒险,他以前的产品往往更加花哨:售价399美元的镀金特朗普运动鞋,99美元的诱人特朗普古龙水。然而,圣经远非奢侈品,它谴责财富。它记载了一个说过“贫穷者有福”和“爱你的仇敌”之类话的人的生平。这样的情感很难与特朗普的言论混淆,他曾说过“我的美丽之处之一就是我非常富有”和“一个男人能做的最糟糕的事就是秃头”。
This is a new kind of venture for Mr Trump, whose previous offerings have tended to be flashier: gold-finished Trump sneakers for $399, an enticing Trump cologne for $99. The Bible, far from being a luxury object, inveighs against wealth. It tells of the life of a man who said things like “Blessed are the poor” and “Love your enemies.” Such sentiments are not easily mistaken for those of Mr Trump, which include “Part of the beauty of me is that I am very rich” and “The worst thing a man can do is go bald.”
在美国,宗教出版市场蓬勃发展:来自美国出版商协会的最新统计年度报告显示,到2023年前十个月,宗教出版物的收入增长了7%,达到6.74亿美元。其中的一部分或许能解决特朗普庞大的法律费用,但这是一个非常特殊的市场,新参与者面临一些障碍。
The market in religious publishing is thriving in America: the recent StatShot Annual Report from the Association of American Publishers found that revenues of religious presses had risen 7% in the first ten months of 2023, to $674m. A portion of that might defray at least some of Mr Trump’s sizeable legal expenses, but this is a very unusual market, with obstacles for new entrants.
最大的障碍之一在于许多供应商坚持免费提供它最受欢迎的产品。1899年成立的慈善组织吉底恩(The Gideons)已经在世界各地的酒店、医院和家庭暴力庇护所放置了25亿本《圣经》和《新约全书》——几乎每名基督教男女和孩童都有一本。疲倦的旅行者渴望了解福音真相只需伸手可及床头抽屉里就能找到。其他团体已经在网上发布了整本《圣经》,因此信徒可以搜索他们最喜爱的经文。在这种不公平的竞争下,特朗普能否竞争(compete)?
The biggest is that many suppliers insist on giving its most popular product away for nothing. The Gideons, a charity founded in 1899, have placed 2.5bn Bibles and New Testaments in hotels, hospitals and domestic-violence shelters around the world—roughly one for every Christian man, woman and child. Weary travellers yearning for gospel truths can simply reach into a bedside drawer and find some. Other groups have posted the entire Bible online, so the faithful can search for their favourite verses. Against such unfair competition, can Mr Trump compete?
很可能可以,有几个理由。首先,他所宣传的备受尊敬的文本是不受版权的——这一概念在1611年《金句圣经(King James Bible)》首次出版时并不存在。因此,他对一本长逝作者无需报酬的文本要求高价。不必在小先知书(minor prophets)的书籍边缘乱写注释;每本书的利润率都应该挺高。
Probably, for several reasons. First, the revered text he is touting is not subject to copyright—a concept that did not exist when the King James Bible was first published in 1611. So he is demanding a high price for a text whose long-dead authors do not need paying. Never mind scribbling notes in the margins of the books of the minor prophets; the profit margins on each copy of this book should be major.
如果没人购买《上帝保佑美国圣经**(God Bless the USA Bible)》就什么都不重要了。但该书获得了两个名人背书:演唱“上帝保佑美国”这首乡村歌曲的明星李·格林伍德(Lee Greenwood)也参与其中。而且特朗普正在激烈的选举战中推广这本著作,针对庞大的追随者群,其中许多人对经文和支持前总统反对他邪恶敌人充满激情。
None of that will matter if no one buys the God Bless the USA Bible. But it has two celebrity endorsements: Lee Greenwood, the country star who sings “God Bless the USA”, is involved, too. And Mr Trump is pushing the tome during a bitter election campaign, to a vast number of followers, many of whom are passionate both about scripture and about supporting the former president against his fiendish enemies.
宗教出版业的其他人面临了与特朗普相同的挑战——如何刷新(refresh)几千年前写成的畅销书(blockbuster),并提出了更具创造性的解决方案。他们无法像艾加莎·克里斯蒂(Agatha Christie)和伊恩·弗莱明(Ian Fleming)的文学遗产那样聘请现在的作者撰写续集故事。但他们可以委托人翻译成新版本(一项艰巨的任务)或为特定受众定制版本。
Others in the devotional publishing industry have faced the same challenge as Mr Trump—how to refresh a blockbuster written thousands of years ago—and come up with even more creative solutions. They cannot commission sequels by living authors, as the literary estates of Agatha Christie and Ian Fleming have done to produce new Hercule Poirot and James Bond stories. But they can commission new translations (a huge task) or tailor versions for specific audiences.
因此,从哈珀柯林斯(HarperCollins)的基督教分部Zondervan那里,你可以购买到“男孩圣经”(Boys Bible)(“你从未知道的粗俗和血腥内容在圣经中”)。从德国一家较小的公司,有“骑士圣经”(Biker Bible)(“整本新约和骑士生平故事”)。圣经篇幅冗长且混乱:许多现代读者渴望寻找可能特别相关的段落的快捷方式以及解释评论来帮助理解。其他人寻求趣味性:你可以购买“母亲圣经”(Mother’s Bible)(粉色的),或以地方方言出版的圣经(格拉斯哥话本以“在开始时”开篇)。甚至还有以虚构语言编写的经文,如“星际迷航”中的克林贡语或J.R.R.托尔金(J.R.R. Tolkien)创作的昆雅语。
Thus from Zondervan, the Christian arm of HarperCollins, you can buy the “Boys Bible” (“gross and gory stuff you never knew was in the Bible”). From a smaller German outfit, there is the “Biker Bible” (“the whole New Testament and life stories of bikers”). The Bible is long and confusing: many modern readers yearn for shortcuts to passages that might be especially relevant, and commentaries to aid comprehension. Others seek whimsy: you can buy the “Mother’s Bible” (it’s pink), or Bibles in regional dialects (a Glaswegian one opens with “In the Beginnin’”). There are even scriptures in fictitious tongues such as Klingon, from “Star Trek”, or Quenya, invented by J.R.R. Tolkien.
与《圣经》相比,《古兰经》的实物化更容易,也比以往更容易。在16世纪,学者威廉·廷代尔(William Tyndale)将《圣经》从希伯来语和希腊语翻译成英语,这种翻译方式不被教会认可,他后来因异端被处以火刑。教会在那个时代对新颖事物的容忍度较低,并创造了字面意义的鬼写手。
Such experimentation is much easier with the Bible than it is with the Koran, and much easier today than in previous centuries. In the 16th century the scholar William Tyndale translated the Bible from Hebrew and Greek into English, in a way that displeased the church. He was later burned at the stake for heresy. The church was less tolerant of novelty in those days, and created literal ghostwriters.
由于许多人对圣经持文字解读态度,仔细的校对是必不可少的。1631年,伦敦的印刷商无意中在第七戒的内容中遗漏了“不”这个词,结果使“你会通奸”成为了准确描述。这让许多读者感到愉悦,但并未获得当局认可。印刷商被处以毁灭性的罚款并丧失了许可证。之后,“邪恶圣经”逐渐成为了收藏品;现存的副本现在价值数万美元。未来的几代人是否会像宝贝般珍惜特朗普的圣经只能等待观察。■
Since many people take the Bible literally, careful proofreading is essential. In 1631 printers in London accidentally left the word “not” out of the seventh commandment, thus rendering it as “Thou shalt commit adultery.” This delighted many readers, but not the authorities. The printers were hit with ruinous fines and lost their licence. The “Wicked Bible” subsequently became a collector’s item; surviving copies are now valued at tens of thousands of dollars. Whether future generations will treasure Mr Trump’s Bible so dearly remains to be seen. ■
文化 | 数字游戏 (Culture | A numbers game)
在英超联赛中,数据帮助小俱乐部挑战豪强 (In the Premier League, data help minor clubs take on the mighty)
一本新书分析了伯恩利的统计聪明。 (A new book analyses Brentford’s statistical shrewdness)
明智的投资:布伦特福德足球俱乐部的跌宕起伏。 作者:Alex Duff。《康斯特布尔出版社;327页;22英镑**
Smart Money: The Fall & Rise of Brentford FC. By Alex Duff. Constable; 327 pages; £22
在大多数足球俱乐部,方程式很简单:你投入(大量)资金,然后收获明星球员和奖杯。以英超联赛现任冠军曼城为例。在2008年由阿布扎比的谢赫·曼苏尔接管之前,俱乐部经常在积分榜的下半部徘徊;自2011年以来,曼城已经七次赢得了英格兰足球的顶级奖杯。切尔西在2003年由俄罗斯寡头罗曼·阿布拉莫维奇收购后,也连续两次夺冠。(不用在意曼城被指控存在财务不当行为并予以否认,以及阿布拉莫维奇在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后被迫 出售切尔西的事实。)
AT MOST FOOTBALL clubs, the equation is simple: you put in (vast amounts of) money, and you get out star players and trophies. Take Manchester City, the Premier League’s reigning champions. Before its takeover in 2008 by Sheikh Mansour of Abu Dhabi, the club often languished in the bottom half of the table; it has won English football’s top trophy seven times since 2011. Chelsea also won back-to-back titles after the club was bought by Roman Abramovich, a Russian oligarch, in 2003. (Never mind that City is accused of financial mismanagement, which it denies, and Mr Abramovich was forced to sell Chelsea after Russia invaded Ukraine.)
Brentford FC 采取了另一种方式。这家位于伦敦西部的俱乐部经过数十年在足球的低级别联赛中苦苦挣扎后,于2021年晋升英超联赛。引人注目的是,使其成功的不是其所有者马修·本汉姆投入了多少资金,而是投入了多少。在Alex Duff的新书中,一位终身支持布伦特福德的球迷,他解释了这种节俭计划是如何产生回报的。
Brentford FC has taken a different approach. The club, based in west London, was promoted into the Premier League in 2021 after toiling for decades in the lower reaches of football. What makes its success surprising is not how much money its owner, Matthew Benham, has put into the team, but how little. In a new book Alex Duff, a lifelong Brentford fan, explains how a frugal plan paid dividends.
本汉姆先生第一次看到“蜜蜂队”比赛是在1979年,那时他11岁。年轻时他在牛津大学学习物理,然后去了城市,在那里成为了衍生品交易员。在30多岁时,本汉姆先生准确地意识到博彩公司在设置足球比赛赔率时存在错误,便离开银行成为一名全职赌徒。
Mr Benham first saw “the Bees” play in 1979, when he was 11. As a young adult he studied physics at Oxford University and then went to work in the City, where he became a derivatives trader. In his early 30s, sensing correctly that bookmakers were inaccurate when setting odds for football matches, Mr Benham left banking to become a full-time gambler.
他创立了自己的公司Smartodds,在那里他将自己对于发现股票潜在价值的才能应用到了发现足球球队潜在实力上。他与金融机构竞争以雇佣最优秀的数学家。他们被告知要专注于球队进球数——根据本汉姆先生的说法,这受到太多的随机性影响——而不是球队创造的“进球机会”。他相信,时间会证明进球自会到来。
He set up his own company, Smartodds, where he applied his aptitude for finding the underlying value of stocks to identifying the underlying strength of football teams. He competed with financial institutions to hire the best mathematicians. They were told to focus not on how many goals a team was scoring—which, according to Mr Benham, was subject to too much randomness—but on the “goalscoring opportunities” it was creating. In time, he reckoned, the goals would come.
这种方式效率如此高,以至于当布伦特福德在经历财务危机时,于2005年发出一项帮助的一般呼吁时,本汉姆先生主动提供了帮助。十年之内,他拥有了俱乐部,并将自己的想法应用到球队的建设中。分析为买低卖高的转会战略提供了极大的支持。
The approach was so efficient that when Brentford, going through one of its periodic financial crises, put out a general appeal for help in 2005, Mr Benham offered his services. Within a decade he owned the club and was applying his ideas to how the team was constructed. Analytics underpinned a remarkably lucrative buy-low-sell-high transfer strategy.
与迈克尔·刘易斯的关于棒球中使用统计数据的畅销书《金钱棒球》(2003)一样,“明智的投资”既知识性又富有娱乐性。Duff先生介绍了一个不同类别的人物,包括另一位赌徒托尼·布鲁姆,他于2009年接管了布莱顿。该书对体育统计学的学术领域以及美国体育博彩的起源等主题进行了有趣的探讨。
Like “Moneyball” (2003), Michael Lewis’s hit book about the use of statistics in baseball, “Smart Money” is both informative and entertaining. Mr Duff introduces a disparate cast of characters, including Tony Bloom, another bettor, who took over Brighton in 2009. The book makes diverting excursions into the academic field of sports statistics and the birth of sports betting in America, among other subjects.
Duff先生还对足球长期存在的与博彩之间的问题关系敏锐。批评者对广告的无处不在对球迷的影响表示担忧。球员们也对博彩上瘾。布伦特福德的明星前锋艾万·托尼因违反赌博规则超过200次而刚刚结束了为期八个月的禁赛。
Mr Duff is also alert to football’s long-standing, problematic relationship with gambling. Critics have voiced concerns about the effect of near-ubiquitous advertising on supporters. Players have become addicted to betting, too. Brentford’s star striker, Ivan Toney, has just finished an eight-month ban after breaching betting rules more than 200 times.
在足球界,有很多怀疑者对布伦特福德的理念持怀疑态度。(正如一位老一辈人挖苦道:“下周,让我们让你的电脑对阵他们的电脑,看看谁赢。”)但是,时间证明了这一理念的有效性。在英超联赛的处子赛季中,本汉姆投入的约1亿英镑(合1260万美元)在俱乐部中——与竞争对手相比微不足道——取得了首次利润2500万英镑。
There were plenty of sceptics within football about Brentford’s philosophy. (As one old-timer carped: “Next week, why don’t we get your computer to play against their computer and see who wins?”) But in time it worked. In their debut season in the Premier League, Mr Benham’s investment of around £100m ($126m) in the club—a tiny sum compared with competitors—realised its first profit of £25m.
统计数据还帮助球队在场上取得胜利。本汉姆先生确定定位球是创造进球机会的重要组成部分,并聘请了拥有4000种这样的战术的意大利教练吉安尼·维奥。球员们被指示要全力防守对手并在对手接球后十秒内进行抢断。尽管布伦特福德不争夺冠军,但近年来该队击败了几位足球的寡头,包括曼城。这一切的背后有多大的可能性呢?■
Statistics have helped the team win on the pitch, too. Mr Benham identified set pieces as an important part of creating scoring opportunities, and hired Gianni Vio, an Italian coach with 4,000 such plays in his repertoire. Players are instructed to press the opposition and tackle players within ten seconds of them receiving the ball. Though Brentford is not vying for the title, in recent years the team has beaten several of football’s plutocrats—including Manchester City. What were the odds? ■
文化 | 卢旺达 (Culture | Rwanda)
保罗·卡加梅如何利用文化使卢旺达人保持一致 (How Paul Kagame uses culture to keep Rwandans on message)
在种族屠杀30年后艺术的应用与滥用 (The uses and abuses of the arts 30 years after the genocide)
当Kizito Mihigo还只有12岁时,他逃离了家乡。他的父亲是图西人,被胡图邻居屠杀。这是1994年4月开始的卢旺达种族大屠杀中数十万起谋杀案之一。在前往邻近布隆迪的逃难途中,Mihigo 曾靠着藏在一堆尸体下装死才幸存下来。
When Kizito Mihigo was 12 years old he fled from his home. His father, a Tutsi, had been butchered by their Hutu neighbours. It was one of hundreds of thousands of murders in the Rwandan genocide, which began 30 years ago this month, in April 1994. At one point on his journey to safety in neighbouring Burundi, Mihigo survived only by playing dead underneath a pile of corpses.
但他侥幸生还了。卢旺达爱国阵线(RPF)的武装部队击败了种族灭绝政权;该组织的领导人保罗•卡加梅自那时起就主持卢旺达的事务。Mihigo返回后,展现出对福音音乐的天赋。“Twanze Gutoberwa Amateka”(“我们拒绝让我们的历史被曲解”)一曲中,他描述了大屠杀是卢旺达必须承担的十字架,这首歌在卡加梅先生出席的纪念活动上被播放。
Yet survive he did. The armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the genocidal regime; its leader, Paul Kagame, has run Rwanda ever since. When Mihigo returned he showed precocity for gospel music. “Twanze Gutoberwa Amateka” (“We Refuse to Let our History be Miscontrued”), in which he described the genocide as the cross Rwanda must carry, was played at commemorative services attended by Mr Kagame.
然而,Mihigo很快开始怀疑。他担忧RPF调和国家的努力是肤浅的。他在2014年的歌曲《Igisobanuro Cy’urupfu》(“死亡的意义”)提到那些“为复仇而被屠杀”的人,这是指被RPF在1990年代杀害的胡图人,而这些行为RPF却掩盖过去。Mihigo 被秘密羁押,遭受殴打,并被迫承认“恐怖主义罪行”,最终被判入狱。2018年获释后,他仍然受到监视。他于2020年试图逃离时被捕。几天后,他被发现死在了牢房里。
But Mihigo’s doubts soon grew. He worried that the RPF’s efforts to reconcile the country were superficial. His song of 2014, “Igisobanuro Cy’urupfu” (“The Meaning of Death”), mentioned those “slaughtered in revenge”, a reference to Hutus killed by the RPF in the 1990s—acts that the RPF glosses over. Mihigo was held incommunicado, beaten and made to confess to “terrorism charges” which landed him in prison. After his release in 2018 he remained under surveillance. When he tried to flee in 2020 he was arrested. A few days later he was found dead in a cell.
Mihigo的故事象征着自种族大屠杀以来的三十年文化如何被利用和滥用。在某些情况下,艺术将卢旺达人团结在一起。在其它场合,这些艺术被政权解读为一种威胁,表面上是对国家团结的威胁,但也是对政权自身生存的威胁。
Mihigo’s story is symbolic of how culture has been used and abused in the three decades since the genocide. In some cases the arts have brought Rwandans together. In others they have been interpreted by the regime as a threat, ostensibly to the country’s unity, but also to its own survival.
1994年后,RPF推广了这样一个说法,即卢旺达不再有胡图人或图西人,只有卢旺达人,而每个人都拥有尊严agarico。这些想法在纪念大屠杀的场所展示出来。在首都基加利南部的尼亚马塔,当局保留了一座教堂,那里曾有5000名图西人被杀害。最近一次参观时,阳光透过墙上的弹孔,照亮了仍然躺在长椅上的受害者的衣物。“疗愈是一个过程,”导游Josephine说。“大屠杀之后,新政府废除了这些族群。我们现在都是卢旺达人。”
After 1994 the RPF promoted a narrative that there are no Hutus or Tutsis any more, just Rwandans, and everyone has agarico (dignity). These ideas are on display at genocide-memorial sites. In Nyamata, south of the capital, Kigali, authorities have preserved a church where 5,000 Tutsis were killed. On a recent visit the sun shone through bullet holes in the walls, illuminating the victims’ clothes still lying on the pews. “The healing is a process,” says Josephine, a guide. “After the genocide the new government abolished these ethnicities. We are all Rwandans now.”
这一口号通过流行文化得到了微妙的鼓励。在大屠杀期间,一家广受欢迎的广播电台呼吁消灭图西“蟑螂”。但现在,大约四分之三的卢旺达人收听名为“Musekeweya”(“新黎明”)的广播节目,该节目自2004年开始播出。节目追随生活在邻近村庄中不同未指定群体的人们,展示类似罗密欧与朱丽叶式的跨越分歧的爱情情节。
That mantra has been subtly encouraged through popular culture. During the slaughter a popular radio station called for the extermination of Tutsi “cockroaches”. But now some three-quarters of Rwandans tune into “Musekeweya” (“New Dawn”), a radio show which has been on the air since 2004. It follows people from different, unspecified groups living in neighbouring villages, with Romeo-and-Juliet-style plotlines of love across divides.
推动团结文化的同时是对土著艺术的支持。今年三月,总统观看了备受欢迎的Inyamibwa文化团的表演,该团体旨在纪念自1994年以来的30年。这种赞助强调了殖民主义前存在的文化(也巩固了胡图和图西身份),并支持卡加梅先生经常表达的对非洲避免全面引入西方价值观的愿望。
Alongside unity-promoting culture is support of indigenous arts. In March the president watched the popular Inyamibwa Cultural Troupe (pictured) in a show marking 30 years since 1994. Such patronage highlights culture that predated colonialism (which entrenched Hutu and Tutsi identities) and supports Mr Kagame’s oft-stated desire for Africa to avoid the wholesale import of Western values.
然而,在真实的“千山之国”中,并非一切都那么令人温暖。根据非政府组织人权观察报道,违反“分裂主义”、 “恐怖主义”或大屠杀“否认主义”等广义法律的记者、YouTubers和反对派政治人士可能会面临不公平的审判、被迫失踪和不明死亡。去年,人权观察组织记录了卢旺达间谍如何恐吓海外卢旺达人。批评者可能生活在很远的地方,“但他们离火源很近。如果有一天他们靠近了,火会烧到他们身上,”卡加梅先生在2019年令人不安地说道。
Yet in the real “land of a thousand hills” not everything is so heartwarming. Journalists, YouTubers and opposition politicians who break broadly defined laws on “divisionism”, “terrorism” or genocide “denialism” can face unfair prosecutions, forced disappearance and unexplained deaths, according to Human Rights Watch, an NGO. Last year HRW documented how Rwandan spies intimidate Rwandans abroad. Critics may live far away, “but they are close to the fire. The day they get closer, the fire will burn them,” said Mr Kagame, ominously, in 2019.
尽管卡加梅先生庆祝传统艺术,但去年几名RPF成员在出席了家族加冕典礼后被解雇政府职务,显示了对竞争性政治团体的担忧。七月,尽管已经排除了最可信的反对人物,卡加梅先生仍将以压倒性多数的选票赢得总统连任。
For all Mr Kagame’s celebration of traditional arts, last year several members of the RPF were sacked from government jobs after attending a clan-coronation ceremony, suggesting concern about rival political groupings. In July, having already barred the most credible opposition figure, Mr Kagame will win re-election as president with a thumping majority.
在姆比奥的一个“和解村”,Lauren Niyonagira讲述了她逃离种族屠杀民兵的故事。她坐在自己的房子里,旁边是同村的Aloys Mutiribambe,曾杀害过她的姐妹。令人惊讶的是,他的儿子和她的女儿已经结婚了。
At a “reconciliation village” in Mbyo Lauren Niyonagira tells her story of escape from genocidal militias. She sits in her house next to Aloys Mutiribambe, a fellow villager, who killed her sister. Remarkably, his son and her daughter have married.
解读这类场景是对卢旺达更广泛思考的一个缩影。这些故事令人心痛;它们的结局令人振奋。无论是(政权支持的)民意调查还是独立研究都表明,尽管卢旺达人可能对专横的政府感到恼火,但大多数人现在还是过着和睦相处的生活。
Working out what to make of such scenes is a microcosm of thinking about Rwanda more broadly. The stories are harrowing; their codas inspiring. Both (state-backed) polls and independent research suggest that, although Rwandans may be irked by a bossy state, most people now rub along.
然而,民意调查者私下担心卢旺达人不敢诚实回答。其他学术研究描述了一群不满的农民,无法公开表达异议。2009年的一项研究建议,“新黎明”广播节目鼓励听众发声谈论当地问题,但并没有影响他们愿意与不同群体结盟的意愿。
Yet in private pollsters fret that Rwandans do not feel safe to answer honestly. Other academic work describes a disgruntled peasantry unable to openly express dissent. In 2009 a studysuggested that “New Dawn”, the radio show, encouraged listeners to speak up about local problems, but had no effect on their willingness to affiliate with different groups.
也许,因此开始质疑和解村庄是否存在一些欺骗。居民炫耀他们因居住在这里而获得的牛群。外面停满了满载着付了数百美元参观的游客的越野车。村民讲述完自己的经历后,就各自毫不示意地朝不同方向走去,甚至没有说一声再见。■
Perhaps, then, it is not too cynical to wonder if there is something deceptive about reconciliation villages. Residents show off the cows they received for living there. Parked outside are 4x4s full of tourists paying hundreds of dollars to visit. After giving their accounts the villagers walk off in separate directions, without so much as a goodbye. ■
「经济学人」
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